The One-Tier Board in the Changing and Converging World of Corporate Governance: A comparative study of boards in the UK, the US and the Netherlands by Calkoen, W.J.L. (Willem)
  
  
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The One-Tier Board 
in the Changing and Converging World of 
Corporate Governance 
 
A comparative study of boards  
in the UK, the US and the Netherlands 
 
 
Willem J.L. Calkoen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voorkant en zijkant 
  
 2 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pictures on cover: Board of Cadbury Plc of 1959 
   Board and officers of General Motors Corporation of 1973 
   Combined meeting of Royal De Kuyper BV, i.e. 
   management board and supervisory board 
 
 
  
 3 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The One-Tier Board 
in the Changing and Converging World of 
Corporate Governance 
 
A comparative study of boards  
in the UK, the US and the Netherlands 
  
 4 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
  
 5 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
The One-Tier Board 
in the Changing and Converging World of 
Corporate Governance 
 
A comparative study of boards 
in the UK, the US and the Netherlands 
 
 
De One-Tier Board 
(Monistisch Bestuur) 
in de veranderende en convergerende wereld van corporate governance 
 
Een vergelijkende studie van besturen in het VK, de VS en Nederland 
 
 
Proefschrift 
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor 
aan de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 
op gezag van de rector magnificus 
Prof. dr. H.G. Schmidt 
en volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties. 
 
 
De openbare verdediging zal plaatsvinden 
op dinsdag 11 oktober 2011 om 16.00 uur 
 
door 
 
Willem Jacob Lodewijk Calkoen 
geboren te Utrecht 
 
 
 
 
Erasmus logo 
  
 6 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
Promotiecommissie: 
 
 
Promotor:  Prof. mr. L. Timmerman 
 
Overige leden: Prof. mr. M.J. Kroeze 
   Prof. mr. S.R. Schuit 
   Prof. mr. B.F. Assink 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This book is produced by the author with financial assistance of the J.E. Jurriaanse 
Stichting  for the defence of his thesis and for a seminar to be held in Amsterdam on 
27 January 2012. It is available at the Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam and can be referred 
to as "Willem J.L. Calkoen, [title of this book] dissertatie Rotterdam p __." 
  
 7 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
Table of contents 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 14 
1.1 General introduction .............................................................................. 14 
1.2 Introduction: one-tier board as alternative ............................................ 15 
1.3 History and Culture ............................................................................... 18 
1.4 Company legislation and informal codes of best practices ................... 20 
1.5 Composition of Boards.......................................................................... 20 
1.6 Role of directors .................................................................................... 22 
1.7 Duties of Directors ................................................................................ 23 
1.8 Liability ................................................................................................. 23 
1.9 Purpose of this study ............................................................................. 24 
2. UNITED KINGDOM .......................................................................... 26 
2.1 History and culture ................................................................................ 26 
2.1.1 General characteristics .......................................................................... 26 
2.1.2 History of UK company governance ..................................................... 27 
2.1.3 Aspects of British company culture ...................................................... 40 
2.2 Who owns shares? ................................................................................. 51 
2.2.1 Sources of Finance ................................................................................ 51 
2.2.2 UK banks do not use influence ............................................................. 52 
2.2.3 Stock Exchange important for peer control ........................................... 52 
2.2.4 Who are the shareholders and what is their influence? ......................... 52 
2.3 Formal Acts and Informal Codes .......................................................... 58 
2.4 Composition of UK boards ................................................................... 62 
2.4.1 Introduction on composition of the board ............................................. 62 
2.4.2 Choice of one-tier board ........................................................................ 63 
2.4.3 NEDs before and after the Codes: from being the “cats paws” of CEOs 
to holding the balance of power ............................................................ 65 
2.4.4 Types of directors on UK boards .......................................................... 66 
2.4.5 More executives on the board and their dilemma ................................. 69 
2.4.6 Important changes in composition caused by Codes ............................. 70 
2.4.7 Board balance and independence .......................................................... 70 
2.4.8 Not too large .......................................................................................... 72 
2.4.9 At least half the board members to be NEDs ........................................ 74 
2.4.10 Separate chairman and CEO ................................................................. 75 
2.4.11 Formal documentation of roles ............................................................. 76 
2.4.12 Summary of composition of the board in the UK ................................. 76 
2.5 Role of the board members ................................................................... 77 
2.5.1 Introduction on role of board members ................................................. 77 
2.5.2 Power of shareholders: freedom of constitution .................................... 78 
  
 8 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
2.5.3 Definition of the roles of the board ....................................................... 79 
2.5.4 Dual roles of NEDs in developing strategy and monitoring ................. 81 
2.5.5 The active strategy-developing role of NEDs ....................................... 83 
2.5.6 Banks ..................................................................................................... 93 
2.5.7 Roles of chairman.................................................................................. 94 
2.5.8 Getting the best out of NEDs .............................................................. 103 
2.5.9 Succession; formal; board as a whole ................................................. 111 
2.5.10 Role of shareholders: single out long-term shareholders interested in 
stewardship .......................................................................................... 114 
2.5.11 Summary of the role of board members in the UK ............................. 116 
2.6 Duties of directors ............................................................................... 117 
2.6.1 Basis of duties ..................................................................................... 117 
2.6.2 To whom are duties owed? .................................................................. 118 
2.6.3 Enlightened shareholder value ............................................................ 119 
2.6.4 Core duties .......................................................................................... 120 
2.6.5 Duty of care and distinction between executives and NEDs ............... 120 
2.6.6 Fiduciary duties ................................................................................... 129 
2.6.7 Voidability, but not against good faith third parties ............................ 133 
2.6.8 Summary: duties of NEDs ................................................................... 133 
2.7 Liability of directors ............................................................................ 134 
2.7.1 Who can sue? ...................................................................................... 134 
2.7.2 General atmosphere of liability ........................................................... 134 
2.7.3 Derivative suits in the UK ................................................................... 135 
2.7.4 Enforcement by the company .............................................................. 137 
2.7.5 Suits brought directly by a shareholder ............................................... 139 
2.7.6 Outside directors insulated: indemnification, insurance ..................... 140 
2.7.7 Company insolvency matters .............................................................. 142 
2.7.8 Regulator: criminal penalties .............................................................. 143 
2.7.9 Other measures, including disqualification ......................................... 143 
2.7.10 Summary: rare cases............................................................................ 144 
3. UNITED STATES ............................................................................. 145 
3.1 History and culture .............................................................................. 145 
3.1.1 General characteristics ........................................................................ 145 
3.1.2 History of US corporate governance ................................................... 146 
3.1.3 Aspects of US corporate culture .......................................................... 169 
3.2 Who own shares? ................................................................................ 178 
3.2.1 Sources of finance ............................................................................... 178 
3.2.2 Stock exchanges important for regulations ......................................... 178 
3.2.3 Who are the shareholders? .................................................................. 179 
3.3 Many formal Acts, informal codes in US by private initiative ........... 185 
3.4 Composition of US boards .................................................................. 187 
  
 9 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
3.4.1 Introduction on composition of boards ............................................... 187 
3.4.2 US one-tier board: “primacy of the board” and one-tier turning into 
two-tier or multiple-tier board ............................................................. 188 
3.4.3 Evolution of US boards over the last 30 years .................................... 190 
3.4.4 Types of directors on US boards ......................................................... 191 
3.4.5 Most officers who are not on the board do attend board meetings ..... 193 
3.4.6 Counterbalance provided by independent directors ............................ 194 
3.4.7 Executive sessions ............................................................................... 195 
3.4.8 Not too large ........................................................................................ 196 
3.4.9 Independent directors in a strong majority on the board and as sole 
members of committees, plus requirements for qualifications ............ 196 
3.4.10 Term of office...................................................................................... 199 
3.4.11 Formal documentation of roles ........................................................... 200 
3.4.12 Summary of the composition of US boards ........................................ 200 
3.5 Role of US board members ................................................................. 201 
3.5.1 Introduction on role of board members ............................................... 201 
3.5.2 Definition of roles of the board and its members ................................ 202 
3.5.3 Active role of independent directors in challenging and debating 
strategy ................................................................................................ 203 
3.5.4 Special aspects of enterprise risk management, standards of supervision 
and care ............................................................................................... 214 
3.5.5 What is the status of the discussion about non-CEO chairmen? What 
roles does a lead director have? ........................................................... 222 
3.5.6 Elements of best practices ................................................................... 229 
3.5.7 CEO succession ................................................................................... 234 
3.5.8 Corporate governance at banks ........................................................... 237 
3.5.9 A summary of the role of board members in the US ........................... 237 
3.6 Duties of independent directors ........................................................... 239 
3.6.1 Introduction on duties of independent directors .................................. 239 
3.6.2 Distinction between duties and liabilities, best practice codes............ 240 
3.6.3 Developments since Enron (2002) ...................................................... 244 
3.6.4 Basis of duties ..................................................................................... 244 
3.6.5 To whom do directors owe duties? ..................................................... 249 
3.6.6 Pressures on boards ............................................................................. 250 
3.6.7 Summary of Duties.............................................................................. 250 
3.7 Liability of independent directors ....................................................... 250 
3.7.1 Who can sue? ...................................................................................... 250 
3.7.1.1 The company in a shareholder derivative lawsuit ............................... 250 
3.7.1.2 Creditor‟s rights .................................................................................. 250 
3.7.1.3 Shareholders directly against directors .............................................. 251 
3.7.1.4 Regulatory action ................................................................................ 251 
  
 10 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
3.7.1.5 ERISA .................................................................................................. 251 
3.7.2 Procedural complications .................................................................... 252 
3.7.2.1 Derivative lawsuits .............................................................................. 252 
3.7.2.2 Creditors suits in bankruptcy .............................................................. 253 
3.7.2.3 Direct shareholder damage and securities class action lawsuits ....... 254 
3.7.2.4 SEC enforcement ................................................................................. 254 
3.7.2.5 ERISA .................................................................................................. 255 
3.7.3 Liability standards of directors in various proceedings ....................... 255 
3.7.3.1 Fiduciary duty violations under corporate law, business judgment rule, 
duty of loyalty, duty of care ................................................................. 255 
3.7.3.2 Enhanced business judgment rule, hostile tender offers, merger cases 
and deal protection measures ............................................................. 265 
3.7.3.3 The duty of disclosure ......................................................................... 278 
3.7.3.4 Conflict-of-interest transactions ......................................................... 278 
3.7.3.5 Securities Law duty violation .............................................................. 278 
3.7.3.6 Insolvency, creditors rights ................................................................. 280 
3.7.3.7 Criminal law cases .............................................................................. 280 
3.7.4 Insulation of directors from out-of-pocket payments .......................... 280 
3.7.5 Summary of director liability .............................................................. 281 
4. THE NETHERLANDS ..................................................................... 285 
4.1 History and Culture ............................................................................. 285 
4.1.1 General characteristics ........................................................................ 285 
4.1.2 Historical influences on Dutch boardroom culture ............................. 286 
4.1.3 Water: friend and foe ........................................................................... 288 
4.1.4 History of trade and business .............................................................. 295 
4.1.5 Evolution of corporate governance ..................................................... 305 
4.1.6 Features of Dutch Corporate Culture: consultation, plurality of interests, 
two-tier system, defence mechanisms ................................................. 330 
4.2 Who are the shareholders of public companies? ................................. 336 
4.2.1 Sources of finance ............................................................................... 336 
4.2.2 Dutch banks do not use influence ....................................................... 337 
4.2.3 Stock exchange not so important for peer control ............................... 337 
4.2.4 Who are shareholders? ........................................................................ 338 
4.2.5 Convergence: adaptation of Dutch legal concepts to foreign ones ..... 340 
4.3 Formal acts and informal codes .......................................................... 353 
4.4 Composition of Dutch boards, division of tasks ................................. 353 
4.4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 353 
4.4.2 Dutch board composition, present and future ..................................... 355 
4.4.2.1 Dutch board composition, usually two-tier board .............................. 355 
4.4.2.2 Structure regime supervisory boards .................................................. 356 
4.4.2.3 One-tier boards under present law ..................................................... 360 
  
 11 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
4.4.2.4 Act on One-tier Boards ....................................................................... 363 
4.4.3 Composition of the average boards ..................................................... 365 
4.4.4 Changes in board composition brought about by codes, committees . 369 
4.4.5 Non-executives in the majority on the future one-tier board .............. 370 
4.4.6 Size ...................................................................................................... 371 
4.4.7 Summary of composition of boards .................................................... 371 
4.5 Role of board members ....................................................................... 372 
4.5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 372 
4.5.2 How supervisory boards have evolved in the last 30 years into a one-
and-a-half-tier system .......................................................................... 373 
4.5.3 The legal context of the division of powers between shareholders and 
board members .................................................................................... 379 
4.5.4 Roles of boards in a two-tier and one-tier system ............................... 381 
4.5.5 Boards‟ roles on strategy ..................................................................... 384 
4.5.6 Early and on-site information, access to lower management: difference 
between two-tier and one-tier boards .................................................. 390 
4.5.7 Differences between supervisory board members and non-executive 
directors ............................................................................................... 391 
4.5.8 Role of management board members in representing the company .... 395 
4.5.9 Dual task of managing directors: action and monitoring .................... 398 
4.5.10 Independence of supervisory board members ..................................... 400 
4.5.11 Chairmen in the present and future ..................................................... 402 
4.5.12 Separate chairman and CEO: exceptions in family companies? ......... 408 
4.5.13 Evaluation ........................................................................................... 410 
4.5.14 Term of office, re-election, dismissal of supervisory board members and 
non-executive directors ....................................................................... 411 
4.5.15 Formal documentation of functions in two-tier and one-tier boards ... 412 
4.5.16 How board committees can help to get the best out of directors ......... 413 
4.5.17 Succession ........................................................................................... 414 
4.5.18 Risk management ................................................................................ 416 
4.5.19 Corporate Governance at Banks .......................................................... 422 
4.5.20 Summary of roles of supervisory board members/non-executive 
directors ............................................................................................... 428 
4.6 Duties of Dutch board members .......................................................... 429 
4.6.1 Introduction to the duties of board members ....................................... 429 
4.6.2 Basis for the duties of board members ................................................ 430 
4.6.3 Enterprise Chamber procedure: right of inquiry ................................. 438 
4.6.4 Enterprise Chamber cases and standards............................................. 440 
4.6.5 Conflicts of interest ............................................................................. 446 
4.6.6 Summary of duties of directors ........................................................... 449 
4.7 Liability of directors ............................................................................ 450 
  
 12 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
4.7.1 General ................................................................................................ 450 
4.7.2 Who can sue? ...................................................................................... 452 
4.7.2.1 The company ....................................................................................... 452 
4.7.2.2 The shareholder ................................................................................... 453 
4.7.2.3 Liquidator ............................................................................................ 454 
4.7.2.4 Creditors and third parties ................................................................... 456 
4.7.2.5 Government authorities ....................................................................... 457 
4.7.2.6 Who can be sued? ................................................................................ 458 
4.7.2.7 Joint liability ........................................................................................ 458 
4.7.3 Procedural complications .................................................................... 463 
4.7.3.1 No derivative actions ........................................................................... 463 
4.7.3.2 Class actions ........................................................................................ 463 
4.7.3.3 Costs and fees in liability proceedings ................................................ 465 
4.7.4 Aspects of liability: difference between supervisory board member and 
non-executive director ......................................................................... 465 
4.7.5 Indemnification and insurance ............................................................ 470 
4.7.6 Summary of liability............................................................................ 472 
5. CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 474 
5.1 Differences, changes, convergence, remaining differences, what can we 
learn from each other ........................................................................... 474 
5.2 Boards before the 1980s ...................................................................... 474 
5.3 Changes at different moments ............................................................. 475 
5.4 Convergence ........................................................................................ 478 
5.5 Remaining differences ......................................................................... 481 
5.6 What should the Dutch take over from the UK and the US; cherry 
picking ................................................................................................. 487 
5.7 One-tier boards should also be possible for financial institutions ....... 493 
5.8 Pros and ons of a one-tier board .......................................................... 493 
5.9 One-tier board alternative inspiration for further discussion .............. 493 
6. ANNEXES .......................................................................................... 495 
6.1 Annex Summary in English ................................................................ 495 
6.2 Samenvatting in het Nederlands .......................................................... 500 
6.3 Annex One-Tier – Two-Tier ............................................................... 505 
6.4 Annex English translation of the Act .................................................. 508 
6.5 Annex Act in Dutch............................................................................. 514 
6.6 Annex Definitions ............................................................................... 524 
6.7 Annex Abbreviations........................................................................... 527 
6.8 Annex Cadbury Code 1992 ................................................................. 529 
6.9 Annex UK Acts ................................................................................... 531 
6.10 Annex Peters Code 1997 ..................................................................... 533 
6.11 Annex Frijns Code 2008 ..................................................................... 535 
  
 13 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
6.12 Annex DCC ......................................................................................... 541 
6.13 Annex Bibliography ............................................................................ 545 
6.14 Annex Court cases list with reference to pages ................................... 564 
6.15 Annex Acknowledgements ................................................................. 570 
6.16 Annex CV ............................................................................................ 572 
  
 14 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 General introduction 
 
 Each country has developed its own corporate governance. 
  
 “The lack of universal solutions for management problems does not mean 
that countries cannot learn from each other. Looking over de borders is 
one of the most effective ways of getting ideas for management. But their 
application calls for prudence and judgment.”1 
 
 I have chosen for the comparison of the UK, the US and the Netherlands, 
because UK and US investors directly or indirectly own about 50% of the 
Netherlands‟ shares and the UK and US have given corporate governance 
so much thought.  
 
 What are the differences in law and in practice? 
 
 Do the three systems converge, in line with growing internationalization? 
 
 Can they learn from each other‟s examples? 
 
 This study will concentrate on the structure and functioning of boards in 
these countries and especially on the pros and cons of one-tier and two-
tier boards. My research focuses on companies whose shares are traded 
on stock exchanges. Corporate Governance Codes in the UK and the 
Netherlands are applicable to listed companies; US corporate acts also 
have listed companies as their focus. On the other hand, private 
companies too are affected by board structures and best practice codes; I 
will therefore also briefly touch on examples of family companies. 
 
 The Netherlands‟ management culture is used to a two-tier board system 
with supervisory boards. On 6 June 2011 the Netherlands‟ Upper 
Chamber, the Senate, confirmed a new act creating the possibility for an 
optional one-tier board: the One-Tier Board Act (“the Act”). The Act will 
probably be effective on 1 January 2012 and is meant to accommodate 
the foreign – mainly US and UK – shareholders. The introduction of an 
                                                     
1 Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, Michael Minkov, Allemaal Andersdenkenden: Omgaan met 
cultuurverschillen (2011), p. 338 (“Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2011)”). The quote is my translation. 
  
 15 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
optional UK and US corporate governance system is a good moment to 
look into the UK and US practices. The practices of these two countries 
have interesting differences. These countries have put much thought into 
better corporate governance and their investment institutions are the most 
influential. 
 
 This study has five main chapters: 
 
 1. Introduction 
 2. UK 
 3. US 
 4 the Netherlands and 
 5. conclusion: changes, convergence, differences, examples worth 
following, which is at the same time the summary of the whole 
book. 
 
 Each of the country chapters 2 (UK), 3 (US) and 4 (The Netherlands) are 
composed of sections 1 – history and culture, 2 – who owns the shares, 
3 – acts and informal codes, 4 – composition of boards, 5 – role of 
directors, 6 – duties and 7 – liability of directors. Each time the sections 
4, 5, 6 and 7 are concluded by a summary of that section. 
 
 With the new alternative in the Netherlands for a one-tier board beside 
the traditional two-tier board this study aims at those who are interested 
in the Dutch corporate world. I also hope it will be of interest to UK and 
US directors and advisors, who may be active in, or for, Dutch boards or 
want to make a comparison with their own practices. 
 
1.2 Introduction: one-tier board as alternative 
 
 The Netherlands has had a two-tier board system – i.e. a management 
board and a supervisory board – for nearly 400 years. 
 
 A draft act presented by the Dutch government, to make a provision for 
one-tier boards in Dutch company law as an alternative option to a two-
tier board structure, was passed by the House of Representatives of 
Parliament (“Tweede Kamer”) on 8 December 2009 and the Upper 
Chamber or Senate on 6 June 2011. This confirmed the optional One-Tier 
Board Act, which is an amendment to Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code 
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(DCC),
2
 is hereinafter called the “Act”. Under the new legislation, 
companies will be able to choose between a two-tier board (a 
management board and a separate supervisory board) and a one-tier board 
(executive and non-executive directors on a single board). The main 
reason for introducing this alternative is to have a flexible law for foreign 
shareholders,
3
 since over 70% of the shareholders in the total of Dutch 
listed companies are foreigners. There are many foreign board members 
and institutional investors who favour a one-tier board. 
 
 The Act proposes that the different functions of the members of a one-tier 
board of a one-tier company (executive and non-executive members) 
should be described in the company‟s articles of association. Non-
executive members always perform a monitoring role, determine the 
remuneration of the executive members and one of them holds the 
position of chairman.
4
 If a company chooses to have a one-tier board 
structure, the positions of CEO and chairman in each company must be 
fulfilled by two separate persons.  
 
 There are special two-tier board rules, which are mandatory in the 
Netherlands for large companies that meet certain criteria, 
structuurvennootschappen. Those supervisory boards have specific extra 
powers and are nominated and elected according to specific rules set out 
in the DCC. These rules will also be applicable to non-executive directors 
on the new one-tier board of such large companies, which fall under the 
regime for “structuurvennootschappen”. 
 
 This is a good moment for the Dutch corporate world to look at the 
practice of one-tier boards in the UK and the US. It can help the Dutch to 
decide whether to opt for a one-tier board and, if so, what type of one-tier 
board and, if not, what Dutch boards can learn from the British and US 
practice of corporate governance in general. Finding “instances that 
might be instructive” for Dutch practice in British and US corporate 
governance practice is one of the main questions to be investigated in this 
study. Even Dutch companies that retain a two-tier board can learn from 
the British and US theory and practice of corporate governance. For 
example, Morris Tabaksblat, retired CEO of Anglo-Dutch Unilever and 
                                                     
2 This One-Tier Board Act is called “Wet van 6 juni 2011 tot wijziging van Boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek 
in verband met de aanpassing van regels over bestuur en toezicht in naamloze en besloten vennootschappen”. 
3 Parliamentary Papers II, 2008/09, 31763 no. 6, p. 3.  
4 Please note that in this book the words he/his/him also cover she/her/her, as appropriate. 
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chairman of Anglo-Dutch Reed Elsevier, has said, “a two-tier system 
with a managing board and a supervisory board is a preferable 
arrangement, but with a „turbo on it‟; this can happen by having the 
Dutch supervisory board chairman‟s tasks move more towards those of 
the UK chairman.”5  
 
 We can learn as well from the practice of US non-CEO chairmen and 
“lead” directors. It will be an advantage if Dutch supervisory directors 
could be inspired by some of the examples of how British non-executive 
directors and US independent directors to receive timely information, 
have access to staff, spend time on regular evaluation and have set up 
succession procedures; in short, how to play a more active role in 
developing strategy and long-term planning and follow a framework for 
dealing with company matters and with each other. 
 
 Giving Dutch directors a glimpse of the British and US corporate world 
can be useful for their understanding of expectations of their own UK and 
US shareholders. In addition, the present book can be of interest to the 
many foreign, often British or American, directors of Dutch companies, 
enabling them to compare situations in the three countries: Britain, the 
US and the Netherlands. It will give them an insight in Dutch practice. A 
comparison of UK and US practice as observed by a Dutchman might be 
of value to them. At the same time, I hope this study can foremost be of 
use to Dutch directors, lawyers and students. 
 
 Why have I chosen Britain and the US besides the Netherlands? After all, 
many other countries have one-tier boards. Indeed, more countries have 
one-tier boards rather than two-tier boards
6
. The choice of Britain and the 
US came up for the following reasons.  
 The British and the Americans have put a lot of thought into corporate 
governance over the last 40 years: 
                                                     
5 Pieter Couwenbergh and Hein Haenen, De Regels van het Spel: Gesprekken met Morris Tabaksblat [translated 
title: Rules of the Game], 3rd ed. (2008), p. 138 (“Couwenbergh and Haenen, Tabaksblat (2008)”). 
6 All former Commonwealth countries, North and South American countries, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Belgium and Luxembourg have one-tier boards. France has the alternatives of one-tier and a two-tier system, 
but mostly uses one-tier boards. Italy traditonally has one general director and statutory auditors and has added 
one-tier and two-tier alternatives, but usually practices the traditional system. The Netherlands, Germany, 
Norway, Denmark, Finland and the Middle European countries (some, like Hungary and Romania have 
introduced the alternative one-tier) and China and Russia have two-tier boards, see Alexander Loos (ed.), 
Directors‟ Liability: A World Wide Review (2010), (“Loos (2010)”). 
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 – Britain has taken the lead in the area of corporate governance 
since 1992, with the first Code of Best Practice, the Cadbury 
Code, introducing such concepts as balanced boards, separate 
board chairmen, hard-working, well-informed outside directors, 
strategy debate, evaluation and succession;  
 – the US has actively used the term “corporate governance” since 
1977 and was the first to prescribe an audit committee and to 
develop the practice of executive sessions; furthermore, the US 
have developed a clear line of case law on the duty of directors; 
US shareholder activists and institutions have been active since 
the 1990s, especially in the last 5 years, developing codes of best 
practices and fighting for shareholder rights. 
 
 The second reason is that by far the most investors are organized by way 
of US and UK investment institutions. 
 
 Each of the three countries, the UK, the US and the Netherlands, has had 
its scandals, such as BCCI, Maxwell, Penn Central, Enron, WorldCom 
and Ahold; they are lessons how not to go about it.
7
 Each country, of 
course, has many hard-working and trustworthy directors and companies 
that set good examples for best practices in corporate governance. Other 
directors can learn from all of this. The recent credit crisis has made 
everyone – especially people connected with banks – reassess whether 
boards and board supervision function properly. 
 
 The chapters about each country will have sections on history, culture, 
who holds the shares, corporate law and informal codes, the composition 
of boards, the role and duties of directors and their liability. These items 
are briefly described below. 
 
1.3 History and Culture 
 
 It is my view that law in general, particularly corporate governance 
practice, is determined to a large extent by the history and the culture of 
the country concerned. It is easier to understand the practice of corporate 
governance of a country if one has an understanding of its history and 
culture. 
 
                                                     
7 Erasmus said: “If no one would be ill, there would not be good doctors or good medicine”. 
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 The three country chapters therefore start with sections on their history 
and culture. For example, it is important to note that in 1600 the English 
East India Company had strong shareholder influence and directors that 
could be dismissed by the shareholders. In the same period, shareholders 
in the Dutch East India Company (the “VOC”) had very little influence 
and the directors were well protected. 
 
 It tells you something about the US approach to corporate governance if 
you realize that the first American corporations had powerful boards.  
 
 The cultural aspects of corporate enterprises are of special interest. 
Education, history, practical circumstances and many other factors 
determine boardroom culture. It is revealing to take note of what directors 
of a nation really think their culture is and how they like to think of their 
culture. Of course, generalizations can always be debated, descriptions of 
culture may apply often but not to all persons, and in each country there 
will be exceptions to the general rule. Still, the manner of governance of 
companies in a country is to a large extent determined by its culture and 
does not normally change very rapidly. American directors, often Masters 
of Business Administration, are good at swift and effective 
implementation and execution. In the US business is often approached in 
an academic way. There is a strong tradition of entrepreneurs and a belief 
in free enterprise. British directors, who have often enjoyed a broad 
education, are creative in board meetings: they listen, they like 
brainstorming and are good at drafting with nuance. They like to think 
they are pragmatic and they often are. Dutch directors, many of whom are 
engineering, law or economics graduates are practical and have good 
knowledge of languages and a liking for transparency, which gives them 
the capacity to work internationally. 
 
 Going through the history of corporate governance we see important 
changes in the UK since 1992, in the US since 2002 and in the 
Netherlands since 2004. The three systems are to some extent gradually 
converging, but differences will remain because of dissimilar legal 
traditions and cultures. 
 
 In sub-sections 2.1.1, 3.1.1 and 4.1.1 I will give the key features of the 
corporate culture of each of the countries. 
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1.4 Company legislation and informal codes of best practices 
 
 Britain is used to informal rules and developed the idea of a Code of Best 
Practice, based on a legal duty to “comply or explain”. The first of many 
was the Cadbury Code of 1992. The code concept has been adopted in 
many other countries, which have often followed the ideas of the British 
codes. In the UK the stock exchange and investment institutions 
traditionally play an important role. 
 
 The US has a strong legal culture, with many state corporate laws and 
Federal Securities Laws, stock exchange regulations, an active plaintiffs‟ 
bar and courts that set clear criteria. In recent years shareholder activists 
have introduced many codes of best practice, which have influenced 
directors, even without a statutory basis. Recently, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 has had substantial influence and the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010 will add to the burden of boards as well. 
 
 The Netherlands has its DCC and a fair volume of mandatory company 
law. 1997 saw the publication of the Peters Code, which was followed in 
2004 by the Tabaksblat Code. This was updated in December 2008 and is 
now the Frijns Code. There is a legal duty of “comply or explain” 
concerning this Code. 
 
1.5 Composition of Boards 
 
 Britain has boards consisting of three to five executive directors, a 
chairman and five or six outside directors. In other words, the boards are 
well-balanced between executives and non-executive directors and not 
too large.
8
 
 
 US boards very often have only one executive director, the CEO who is 
Chairman at the same time (in the past often referred to as “the imperial 
CEO”) and nine or ten independent directors, including a “lead” or 
“senior independent” director.9 The independent directors hold many 
executive sessions, which contrary to what the word indicates, are 
                                                     
8 These numbers are averages of listed companies as reported by Derek Higgs, Review of the Role and 
Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors (January 2003), p. 18 (“Higgs Review”). 
9 These numbers are averages of listed companies. The Conference Board, Corporate Governance Handbook, 
Legal Standards and Board Practices, 3rd ed. (2009), pp. 22-24 (“Conference Board (2009)”). 
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meetings without any executive directors present.
10
 Full board meetings 
are usually attended by the CEO and all independent directors, who 
together are the board, and by officers who are not on the board. Board 
committees consist of independent directors only. There is, of late, a 
strong movement to split the combined function of CEO/Chairman into 
an independent chairman and a CEO. At present 30% of listed companies 
have an independent chairman. The arguments put forward for having a 
non-CEO as Chairman give a good idea of what a CEO and a Chairman 
should be doing to fulfil their role properly. 
 
 The question has even been asked whether the US is adopting elements of 
a two-tier board?
11
 
 
 Dutch management boards are not the same as UK and US boards of 
directors. Dutch management boards deal with all aspects of day-to-day 
management and with the broad strategy, while UK and US boards deal 
with broad strategy and high level management and leave day-to-day 
management and representation to executives in the UK and to officers in 
the US. Dutch companies will typically have about four to five managing 
directors and about five to six supervisory directors.
12
 Under the Dutch 
law in a two-tier board system the supervisory board only monitors and 
advises.  
 
 Main differences between the Dutch two-tier board and US and UK 
systems are that Dutch supervisory board members meet less often and 
receive less information and at a later stage, than US and UK outside 
directors. As they are not expected to go and see the workplace, they are 
generally less involved in the development of strategy. By law they are 
not supposed to participate in the process leading up to proposals, but as 
supervisors have to wait for management to come with strategy or other 
essential plans and accept or reject what has been tabled. Therefore, in 
the majority of the companies, they do not receive more information than 
is necessary for the fulfilling of their monitoring duties and do not visit 
the workplace or talk with lower staff. 
                                                     
10 Robert Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance (2008), pp. 285-286 and Stephen M. Bainbridge, The 
New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (2008), pp. 2 and 178 (“Bainbridge (2008)”). 
11 Adrian Cadbury, Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal View (2002), p. 71 (“Cadbury 
(2002)”). 
12 These numbers are averages of listed companies. The larger companies sometimes have more, see the 
“Nationale Commissarissen Onderzoek 2009”. 
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 The new Dutch Act introducing one-tier boards as an alternative has 
opted for a mandatory non-CEO separate chairman and leaves a company 
free to decide on the number of executive directors and non-executive 
directors.  
 
 In the Netherlands the CEO has in many cases become more powerful 
over the last 10 years. 
 
 Apart from the introduction of a one-tier board, which has clearly been 
inspired by US and UK examples, the influence of these two countries 
has also been felt in the growing desire of many supervisory directors on 
two-tier boards in the Netherlands to be more involved in the 
development of certain fields, such as strategy, and get more and earlier 
information. 
 
1.6 Role of directors 
 
 Both Britain and the US have thoroughly and for a long time studied and 
discussed the monitoring and strategic roles of the chairman and the 
outside directors. It is of interest for all three countries to increase and 
promote the possibilities of giving an independent chairman and outside 
directors the ways and means of adding value to the common corporate 
effort. How do British and US boards tackle this daunting task? We 
should study the ways these outside directors co-develop strategy without 
losing their independence from management which they need to maintain 
in order to be proper monitors. 
 
 A US chairman is less prominent than a UK chairman, who is more 
visible and hands on. There are nuances of difference in these two 
countries. While UK non-executives are involved in development of 
strategy by asking many – fundamental and detailed – questions and 
suggesting creative proposals, US independent directors actively 
challenge the strategy by asking even more basic and detailed questions 
and by debating alternatives to the strategy put forward by executives. 
The practice is, up to now in the Netherlands, that in the majority of the 
companies the supervisory board limits itself to monitoring strategy. In a 
minority of the companies – sometimes in very large companies – with 
strong supervisory directors, who are retired CEOs from other companies, 
the supervisory board is, to some extent, involved in developing strategy.  
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1.7 Duties of Directors 
 
 There is a difference from country to country as to duties of directors. To 
whom do they owe duties? To the company? What does this mean? To 
shareholders or to all parties which have an interest in the company, 
sometimes called “stakeholders”? What are the standards? In Britain, the 
Companies Act 2006 defines these duties in detail. Broadly speaking, 
they are based on the pillars of loyalty to an enlightened shareholder 
value, of care and of good faith. In the US the pillars are also loyalty and 
care. Provided American directors fulfil these two duties, they can rely on 
the safe harbour of the business judgment rule. In both countries case law 
on these duties give a clear picture. The duties of loyalty and care, in 
relation to the delegation of risk management and monitoring of what has 
been delegated, will continue to evolve.  
 
 Duties of directors under Dutch law are less clear.  
 
 In the US and especially in the UK, companies sign very detailed internal 
company agreements about duties with their executive and non-executive 
directors, sometimes running to five or six pages in the case of UK non-
executive directors and Chairmen. 
 
 In all three countries it is acknowledged, albeit with varying nuances, that 
the role of non-executive or supervisory directors is different from that of 
the executive directors.  
 
1.8 Liability 
 
 Director‟s liability also varies in each of the three countries both from a 
legal and a practical point of view. In Britain there has not been much 
liability litigation, but wrongdoing can, indeed, lead to dismissal, 
disqualification or cold shouldering of a director. 
 
 In the US litigation could be said to start at the drop of a hat, but actual 
out-of-pocket payments by independent directors are rare because of (a) 
the legal standards, including the business judgment rule, (b) the strong 
systems of exculpation and indemnification, (c) a very good insurance 
system and settlement incentives, which typically lead to settlement 
within Director and Officer (D&O) insurance policy limits. 
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 The volume of litigation in the Netherlands (including the inquiry 
proceedings before the “Ondernemingskamer”, the court for company 
matters, hereafter “Enterprise Chamber”) now exceeds that of the UK, 
but is less extensive than in the US. The legal standards of 
mismanagement, “wanbeleid”, in Enterprise Chamber cases are not so 
clear. This is partly due to the fact that the inquiry proceedings before the 
Enterprise Chamber are relatively new and have not always been 
consistent on whether a judge may second guess directors. The Enterprise 
Chamber judgments only deal with declarations of mismanagement and 
taking of measures. District courts deal with liability, where the test is 
serious blame, “ernstig verwijt”. Again here, the legal standards are not 
quite clear, because there is not so much case law up to now.  
 
1.9 Purpose of this study 
 
 As mentioned above, the first aim of this study is to enable the Dutch to 
get an insight from UK and US experiences and thereby to make a more 
informed decision when choosing between a two-tier or a one-tier board 
and whatever the choice, which of the UK or US best practices can be 
followed in the Netherlands. It can also help members of international 
boards to understand each other better, which is one of the reasons why 
this book is written in English. 
 
 I hope that debate about the topics in this book can lead to a better 
understanding – and hence better practice – of corporate governance. 
 
 Such debate could include: 
 
 – role of outside directors in developing strategy; 
 – role of the chairman; 
 – internal guidelines for these roles; 
 – best ways of getting outside directors being well informed about 
the business; 
 – best composition of boards as to create a counterweight against a 
strong CEO, getting the best out of all the directors and creating 
optimal communication within the board; 
 – best composition of boards to avoid any cover up of disagreement 
between executives;  
 – best procedures for succession; 
 – role, duty and responsibility of outside directors for taking due 
care into account when delegating part of the  monitoring task;  
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 – different roles of executive or managing directors and non-
executive, independent or supervisory directors in risk 
management; 
 – examples to follow for more active directors and for creating a 
better culture in the company; 
 – how to create optimal communication between shareholders and 
boards; 
 – whether there are specific aspects that would apply to governance 
of banks that are or are not applicable to other listed companies;  
 – which differences will probably remain, notwithstanding the 
recent substantial changes in corporate governance practices in 
each of the three countries and the convergence that has taken 
place. 
 
 This study investigates one-tier board practices in the UK, the US and the 
Netherlands and the comparison with two-tier boards, with the aim of 
finding good examples for the Netherlands. I have first talked with a 
number of authorities in all three countries and subsequently studied the 
available literature and have kept on checking my findings with the 
experts. This study went to print on 7 July 2011 and covers the law up to 
that date. 
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2. UNITED KINGDOM 
 
2.1 History and culture 
 
 History and culture have a strong influence on the dynamics of every 
country. The following sub-section starts with some brief telegram style 
key words of UK company culture. It is followed by UK company history 
and then continues with a more detailed description of company culture. 
Describing the culture of a nation carries the caveat that generalizations 
do not apply to all cases. I base my views on conversations with 
experienced observers and on what has been written on the subject. 
 
2.1.1 General characteristics 
 
 Some key features of British corporate culture are: 
 
 a Informal regulations work 
  Island mentality; change without revolution; centralised society; 
peer control; “good sports” and fair play; “club membership”; 
importance of media and publicity; belief that informal self-
regulation works better than formal laws. 
 
 b Owners‟ power 
  Respect for ownership; belief that persons act in their own 
interests (e.g. Adam Smith); company law based on partnership. 
 
 c Strategic thinking 
  Respect for history and tradition; broad education; early exposure 
to and faith in analytical thinking; good eye for strategy; skilled 
in dialogue, debate and listening; competitive; prepared to accept 
a small loss; flexible in meetings; articulate; society of classes 
and sense of class; Industrial Revolution; socially-minded groups 
(e.g. Quakers). 
 
 d Sometimes long term, sometimes short term  
  Tolerant; idea that work can and should be fun; endeavour to be 
team players because the British realize the importance of results; 
realisation that, in a team, leadership must come from one person 
who is captain at that time; no heroes; leaders are replaceable; the 
tradition of making money by trading. 
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 After a brief outline of the history of company law in the UK, I will 
explain how these key concepts have influenced British corporate culture. 
In doing so, I will be writing as a Dutchman who has worked with 
English lawyers for many years, also in committees and boards of the 
International Bar Association. I have checked my views with many 
experienced British commentators. 
 
 Dutch and English history have been closely intertwined over the 
centuries. These nations have been allies and enemies from time to time. 
They were fierce competitors in trading and in establishing colonies 
abroad. They fought five sea wars with each other, but they also had close 
personal ties. Prince William of Orange, the Dutch Stadhouder 
(stadtholder) William III married the daughter of King James II, Mary 
Stuart, and became King William III of England with the Glorious 
Revolution.
13
 In later days, founders and directors of Shell and Unilever 
from both nations have often had family connections across the borders 
of both nations. 
 
2.1.2 History of UK company governance 
 
 1600 – the East India Company/power of shareholders 
 The most obvious difference between UK and Dutch systems of 
corporate governance is their opposing approach to the power of 
shareholders vis-à-vis directors. From the early 1600s and all through the 
20
th
 century this difference has continued. 
 
 In the Netherlands the Dutch East India Company (VOC) of 1602 and its 
later successors were oligarchic in character, with control concentrated in 
a small circle of directors. Shareholders had few, if any, powers. In the 
UK, on the other hand, the English East India Company of 1600 and its 
successors were less oligarchic. All shareholders had a say and could vote 
on matters of strategy and the appointment and dismissal of directors.
14
  
 
 On 31 December 1600 a royal charter was granted to the English East 
India Company. 
                                                     
13 Lisa Jardine, Going Dutch: How England Plundered Holland‟s Glory (2008), p. 70 (“Jardine (2008)”). 
14 Ella Gepken-Jager, Gerard van Solinge and Levinus Timmerman, VOC 1602-2002, 400 Years of Company 
Law, Law of Business and Finance, Vol. 6 (2005), pp. X-XI  (“Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman 
(2005)”). 
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 It began with 218 members called the General Court or Court of 
Proprietors and was governed by a Court of Directors, also called the 
Court of Committees. 
 
 The Court of Proprietors had voting rights and each share was subscribed 
at £200. Soon there were several hundred proprietors. The court met 
infrequently, but it held supreme authority. Its sanction was needed for 
the raising of funds, and it elected the directors. 
 
 The Court of Directors was the executive body and was responsible for 
the running of the company, although its policy decisions were to be 
ratified by the Court of Proprietors. The Court of Directors consisted of 
the Governor, the Deputy Governor and twenty-four directors. It met 
frequently and had numerous sub-committees for functions such as 
purchasing, sales and correspondence.  
 
 This Court of Directors had the classic functions of a board of today. 
They selected the chief executive. They were careful to choose someone 
in whom they had confidence. They were also responsible for the 
financing of enterprises. They proposed new shipping voyages to the 
Court of Proprietors. It was they, who developed the strategy of switching 
the trading focus from the East Indies to India.
15
 
 
 The governance continuity is striking. Not only was the governance 
structure of the English East India Company comparable to that of UK 
companies today, but so were the issues that faced the board. Even then 
shareholders differed in their motives. Short-term investors wanted to 
receive a return after each voyage, whereas others took a longer view and 
only looked for a possibly larger return after many trips to a certain area. 
The board also had to monitor its appointees, some of whom took 
advantage of their remoteness from London to act not only for the 
company but also for their own account. For this reason the selection of 
the company‟s captains and factors was a crucial responsibility. 
 
 It is interesting to see that the structure and responsibilities of the board 
of Britain‟s most influential company some four hundred years ago are 
clearly recognisable in those of UK companies today.
16
 
 
                                                     
15 Cadbury (2002), pp. 2-3. 
16 Cadbury (2002), p. 3. 
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 The past 400 years have seen many stock market crashes, vicissitudes of 
fortune, and endless debate about the balance of power in companies. 
However, some things remain the same: over time there has been 
consistent respect for democratic ownership, the power of shareholders, 
the protection of investors, and the responsibility and accountability of 
the board for running the company and developing strategy. In many 
instances, problems have been resolved by quick informal solutions or 
codes. 
 
 1688 – The Glorious Revolution/stock market boom/charters 
 The Glorious Revolution followed after the only, or at least last, violent 
British revolution, the one of 1648, which ended with the beheading of 
King Charles I. In 1688 parliament threw the Catholic James II out in 
favour of his Protestant son in law, the Dutch William III. Because this 
revolution took place without much bloodshed so easily and the Bill of 
Rights limiting Royal power, was so smoothly accepted, it was called the 
Glorious Revolution. After 1688 the UK has had no more revolutions.  
 
 From 1688 a stock market boom started in London. The public (i.e. 
wealthy aristocratic families and/or those who had made money in 
business) had a lot of money to invest. The number of charters issued for 
new companies in a variety of industries rose from 12 in 1691 to 53 in 
1694. The main stock exchange trade had moved from Amsterdam to 
London. In 1694, under William III, Parliament created the Bank of 
England and raised 1.2 million pounds in government bonds.
17
 The fact 
that the government could raise money on the capital market proved a 
great advantage in Britain‟s battles against the French. It made the 
government economically independent. Even the East India Company 
lent money to the government in 1698 and 1708 in exchange for a further 
charter. This was all of supreme importance for the political and military 
power of Britain at the start of the 18
th
 century. 
 
 1720 – Bubble Act/prohibition of stock companies without royal charter 
 1718 to 1720 were the years of the Bubbles. In France the Scotsman John 
Law set up a system, which led to five Bubbles and Crashes. The system 
was designed to raise money and inflate the market price of shares in the 
Mississippi Company. There were issues in tranches. Only 10% had to be 
paid on the first tranche and the first shareholders had priority on the 
                                                     
17 Paul M.L. Frentrop, Corporate Governance 1602-2002: Ondernemingen en hun aandeelhouders sinds de 
VOC, thesis (2002), p. 125 (“Frentrop (2002)”). 
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further tranches, which were announced from the start. A run on shares 
resulted. The price went up from 500 livres in March 1719 to 1,000 livres 
in December of that year. The system failed, the Bubbles burst and left 
France with an economic disaster. 
 
 In the UK, at about the same time, the South Sea Company also 
artificially boosted its share price. Shares were offered to the public in 
four tranches, with the price rising from £300 per share in April 1720 to 
£1,000 in the beginning of June of that year. Instalment payment was 
permitted. Loans were offered against shares. Euphoria gave way to 
mania. Generally the stock market was still booming.
18
 By 1720 there 
were 196 new companies in the UK that raised money on the capital 
market, many of them financial institutions and insurance companies. 
Stock prices went up. The South Sea Company share price increased by a 
factor of 9.5 (compared with the Mississippi Company increase of 19.6). 
However, the South Sea Company prices dropped again before the end of 
July, when the last tranche was to be issued, because so many new 
companies drew money from the market. The last tranche did not succeed 
and directors had to inject liquidity. 
 
 Upon the proposal of the South Sea Company the Bank of England took 
measures to block the formation of new joint stock companies. This 
enabled the South Sea Company to be maintained, as it was protected 
from suddenly losing its investors to other entrants. Parliament 
introduced the “Bubble Act”, barring all other joint stock companies and 
this situation continued to exist for more than 100 years. So until 1824 
the UK only had partnerships of associates and closed companies and no 
trading of shares. This meant that for many decades the UK did not have 
joint stock companies, except those that had received a charter from 
parliament (and charters were only given for public utility companies for 
canals or railroads). 
 
 19
th
 century/Industrial Revolution 
 In 1791 there were 81 of these public utility companies.
19
 Adam Smith 
considered that only these companies could be joint stock companies 
because they had a predictable and steady flow of income. He was one of 
the chief sceptics about companies that were governed by non-owners. In 
                                                     
18 Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World (2009), pp. 138-158 (“Ferguson 
(2009)”); and Frentrop (2002), pp. 128-147. 
19 Frentrop (2002), p. 147. 
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The Wealth of Nations (1776) he famously wrote: “The directors of such 
companies, being the managers rather of other people‟s money than of 
their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with 
the same anxious vigilance.”20  
 
 After the Napoleonic wars the British economy thrived and in 1824 there 
were 250 requests for charters. The Bubble Act was abolished, but this 
was immediately followed by a market crash and the Bubble Act was re-
introduced. It was simply too difficult for investors to discipline 
managers. 
 
 Managers often managed companies to their advantage and took too 
many risks and there was fraudulent activity in the capital market. The 
English created new systems for the rights of shareholders and regulation 
of the capital market. In 1844 the Bubble Act was finally abolished and 
the Joint Stock Companies Act gave legal status to these entities and 
created a register where the articles of association and the accounts of the 
company had to be filed. The Act required a “full and fair balance sheet” 
to be presented. Royal charters were no longer necessary.  
 
 The British remained leaders in Europe in the area of company 
investment law since 1840 and through to the 21
st
 century.
21
 The process 
started with the steel industry and railroad companies, many of which 
were founded by families and relatively small groups of local investors.  
 
 In the first 70 years of the 19
th
 century Britain was the world‟s strongest 
economy. In fact its Industrial Revolution had already started in the mid 
18
th
 century; earlier than in any other country. Why? The freedom of 
private enterprise had gained room. Since the Magna Carta of 1225, 
which laid down elements of the Rule of Law, kings were limited in their 
power and powers were shared with the aristocracy, cities and the church. 
There was a feeling of one nation and cooperation. First farms became 
bigger, then industry developed, inventions led to more efficient 
production and use of natural resources (coal and iron ore), while on the 
continent most countries were involved in destructive revolutions. 
Furthermore, English society managed to give new entrepreneurs and 
intellectuals a chance.
22
  
                                                     
20 Cadbury (2002), p. 4. 
21 Frentrop (2002), p. 165. 
22 David S. Landis, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, Dutch translation (1998), pp. 232-256 (“Landis 
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 During the Industrial Revolution the UK was the workplace of Europe. 
At the high point, in 1851 the First World Fair known as the “Great 
Exhibition of the Works of Industry of all Nations” was held in the 
Crystal Palace in London. The UK led the way in the Industrial 
Revolution. The Test Act of 1620, which forced anyone wishing to take 
public office or go to university to adhere to the Church of England, was 
lifted in 1830, thereby empowering more sections of the upper middle 
class, such as the Quakers, who were often imbued with a strong sense of 
entrepreneurship, discipline and social responsibility. This government 
policy was to create a breed of young men who could be leaders of the 
expanding UK economy and represent the government and business all 
over the world.
23
 The first investors in a new company often had 
experience of the business or were family of the founders. It was still the 
general conviction that limited liability companies invited fraud and 
speculation and that only unlimited liability held investors back from 
speculation. The Limited Liability Act of 1855 and the Joint Stock 
Companies Acts of 1856 and 1860 gave the right to any group of at least 
seven investors to have the privileges of limited liability, provided the 
word “limited” was added to its name, which, so it was believed, should 
avoid misuse. From 1863 to 1866 about 3,500 “limited companies” were 
founded. Most businesses were family businesses with more or less 
closed groups of shareholders. The Companies Act of 1879 repeated the 
need for a “full and fair balance sheet to exhibit a true and correct view” 
of the company‟s affairs.24 
 
 Proposals were also drafted to enable workers to acquire shares in the 
companies where they worked.  
 
 First half of the 20
th
 century – managerial capitalism  
 Gradually private savings grew and the larger public started to buy 
shares. Family companies merged with others and started raising outside 
capital. By 1905 the economic model had slowly shifted from “family 
capitalism” to “financial capitalism”. Representatives of financial 
institutions had held board positions in the companies in which they 
invested and could thus monitor whether there would be a regular 
                                                                                                                                    
(1998)”). 
23 Prof. Andrew Chambers, Corporate Governance Handbook (2008), p. 357 (“Chambers (2008)”). 
24 Cadbury (2002), p. 5 and Mark Goyder, Tomorrow‟s Owners: Stewardship of Tomorrow‟s Company (October 
2008), p. 5 (“Goyder (2008/B)”). 
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dividend.
25
 Few industrial companies had their shares listed in 1909: 41 
in Britain, 16 in Germany and 2 in France. Public companies were still 
managed as if they were family businesses.  
 
 But family influence waned before the dawn of the “Managerial 
Revolution” and “Managerial Capitalism”. An oligarchy developed in 
Europe. Bank directors monitored boards. In Germany one banker could 
be supervisory director of 100 companies. In Britain the maximum was 
30 board memberships.
26
 While directors became oligarchic, ownership 
was fragmented and split up among many small shareholders. The 
fragmentation of ownership limited the power of shareholders. They had 
no difficulty selling shares and could “vote with their feet”.  
 
 Berle and Means,
27
 the American writers who argued in favour of the 
primacy of directors as they considered the small shareholders to be 
incapable of developing a strategy, were cited in the UK. The UK already 
had an investigation committee in 1926. It was known as the Liberal 
Industrial Inquiry. It concluded “the truth is that a strong and possibly 
efficient management rather likes to have an ineffective board, which will 
know too little to have views or to interfere”. In terms of power, it was 
executive management that was in the driving seat.
28
 In the years 1928-
1935 protection of shareholders became important due to the Great 
Depression. The Companies Act was changed in 1929. From then on the 
board had to publish accounts each year and the Annual General Meeting 
of Shareholders (AGM) appointed an auditor annually. Britain stayed true 
to its tradition of not having over-powerful boards nor boards that paid no 
attention to shareholders.
29
 However, as industry became increasingly 
complicated, it became ever more difficult to monitor managers.
30
  
 
 After 1950 – takeover discipline 
 1958-1959 saw the first unfriendly takeover of British Aluminium by the 
joint venture of the US Reynolds and the Midlands Tube Investments 
Ltd. led by Sigmund Warburg, the founder of S.G. Warburg.
31
 The 
                                                     
25 Frentrop (2002), p. 213. 
26 Frentrop (2002), p. 239. 
27 Adolfe A. Berle Jr. and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932) (“Berle and 
Means (1932)”). 
28 Cadbury (2002), pp. 6-7. 
29 Economist – August 1931, pp. 211-212 and Frentrop (2002), p. 270. 
30 Frentrop (2002), p. 276. 
31 Ron Chernov, The Warburgs (1993), pp. 651-654 (“Chernov (1993)”); and Frentrop (2002), p. 293. 
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intermediaries in the City felt some order should be introduced and within 
three months the Notes on Amalgamations of British Business (City 
Notes) were introduced. These were the first of many informal 
regulations. 
 
 Since 1964 the British developed the concept of groups, conglomerates of 
interrelated companies, to compete with US and German concerns. An 
example was ICI, which tried to take over Courtaulds. Mergers and large 
conglomerates were encouraged by the Labour government of Harold 
Wilson with the Industrial Reorganization Corporation (IRC) in order to 
compete with huge US and German competitors. British Leyland was 
formed in 1968 with government support by the merger of Leyland and 
British Motor Holdings, but was not successful.
32
 
 
 In 1968 the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and the Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers were introduced. 
 This self-regulation (with no sanctions other than loss of reputation – a 
very important commodity in the City) was supplemented by the Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers. Shareholders were to get equal information and 
takeover targets could not introduce defence mechanisms without 
permission of the shareholders. A member of the Panel summarised the 
City Code as prescribing “How a decent chap behaves”.33 
 
 Subsequently from 1974 onwards, the UK tried to convince Europe to 
introduce the Takeover Directive, the 13
th
 European Directive, which was 
introduced after 30 years of negotiation in 2004, but the Directive is full 
of opt-outs and exceptions for Member States.
34
 
 
 The takeover threat continued as a disciplinary measure for lax boards. 
Freedom of the market is the British motto. Only on 1 June 2010, after 
the Cadbury and Kraft case, has the Takeover Panel issued a consultation 
paper aimed at raising the standards for tender offers. 
 
 In 1977 there was a discussion in the UK about the introduction of a two-
tier board especially to facilitate “worker directors” (the Bullock Report), 
but even the unions did not want this. Managers also started to take 
                                                     
32 Frentrop (2002), p. 297. 
33 Frentrop (2002), p. 301. 
34 G. van Solinge and M.P. Nieuwe Weme, Rechtspersonenrecht (2009), pp. 16 and 748 (“Van Solinge and 
Nieuwe Weme (2009)”). 
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account of the interests of employees. Such managers were likely to be 
popular.
35
 
 
 From 1979 Margaret Thatcher reintroduced the power of the market. She 
promoted denationalisation. She wanted a nation of shareholders to 
counter the power of the unions. In her first years she fought a “social 
war” (i.e. an ideological clash between nationalised inefficiency and 
control on the one hand and potential private profit-making services on 
the other). All of this led to more profit for companies. Corporate 
governance had not been a subject of debate. Companies had grown 
steadily. 
 
 The UK used “market control” to discipline boards. It was the market 
which really sounded the alarm for sluggish boards. The takeover threat 
was seen as alerting the boards of all companies to the need to achieve 
higher levels of performance.
36
 
 
 Death of gentlemanly banking, 1985-2000 
 From 1695 to 1995 the City was all British and consisted of many 
different professions: jobbers, brokers, merchant/investment banks and 
commercial/clearing banks. This complicated organization of separate 
professions kept foreign – and essentially US – entrants out. As recently 
as December 1983 Minister Alex Fletcher said, “I think a British-owned 
securities industry is important”.37 By 2000, the then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer remarked that the “absence of a single British-owned 
investment bank is a serious deficiency”.38 
 
 At the same time the governor of the Bank of England light-heartedly 
noted that “the City is like Wimbledon, it does not matter that foreigners 
play in the finals, as long as the game is played here”. Augur does not 
agree with the comparison: “the British own Wimbledon, determine that 
players must play in white and make the money; the same does not apply 
to the manners of all the foreign investment banks that have taken over 
the City”.39 
 
                                                     
35 Frentrop (2002), p. 318. 
36 Cadbury (2002), p. 9. 
37 Philip Augur, The Death of Gentlemanly Capitalism (2001), p. 5 (“Augur (2001)”). 
38 Augur (2001), p. 6. 
39 Augur (2001), p. 3.  
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 Merchant bankers tended to be upper class, whereas commercial and 
clearing bankers were middle class. Merchant bankers‟ contacts were 
with CEOs and chairmen and concerned Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) 
and equity funding. Commercial bankers had contacts with treasurers and 
CEOs.
40
 Values of order and self-confidence, which were taught at the 
public schools, which are actually private,
41
 were good preparation for 
merchant bankers. Clearing banks were dominated by grammar school 
boys and were totally different in style and values. They tended to come 
from the provinces, the North and the Midlands, whereas merchant 
bankers were from the home counties, Gloucestershire and Edinburgh. 
Clearing bankers were trained to keep records, but merchant bankers 
looked down on bureaucracy. There was considerable antipathy between 
the two groups. This became a serious business issue when clearing 
banks tried to establish or buy investment banks.
42
 
 
 In 1983 Margaret Thatcher announced the “Big Bang” for Monday, 
27 October 1987. That put an end to the split between the four 
professions. The government issued its White Paper in 1985 and the 
Financial Services Act in 1986.
43
 Old values crumbled and old honour 
codes broke down. The cult of the individual was growing. As part of the 
ethos of Thatcherism, maximum tax rates went down from 84% to 60% 
and then to 40%.
44
 
 
 Three pillars of the establishment in the UK were the public schools, the 
gentlemen‟s clubs and country houses.45 Eton set the standards for the old 
city: my word is my bond: “Dictum meum pactum”.46 As grammar 
school-based institutions senior managers of clearing banks lacked the 
nerve to challenge the overbearing and usually misplaced confidence of 
the public school boys. Foreign banks were better equipped to cope with 
changes. They had the size, experience and flexibility to adapt to the new 
world. They were unencumbered by class-based historical experience. In 
fact, by imposing so many changes on a City that was manifestly unfit to 
adapt to new challenges, government, the stock exchange and the Bank of 
                                                     
40 Augur (2001), p. 16. 
41 In the UK, the private schools, such as Eton, Harrow and St. Pauls, are called public schools. The really public 
schools, that are open to all, are called private or grammar schools. 
42 Augur (2001), p. 38. 
43 Augur (2001), pp. 45 and 76. 
44 Augur (2001), p. 21. 
45 Augur (2001), p. 33. 
46 Augur (2001), p. 35. Wellington said: “The battle of Waterloo was won on the playing grounds of Eton”. 
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England ensured that only foreign firms would survive. There was 
another element: UK merchant bankers were relationship banks, while 
US investment bankers were product led banks, which aggressively 
pushed their products to customers. Merchant banking became 
investment banking. 
 
 One after the other the once powerful UK merchant banks disappeared. 
While in 1995 S.G. Warburg was still world leader with a 15% share of 
all listings in that year, a couple of poor decisions in 1994 blew the firm 
away.
47
 Barings collapsed in 1995, when the board failed to monitor 
Mr Leeson.
48
 Failure of control at Barings occurred at the highest levels 
in the firm. At Kleinworth the misjudgment of a handful saw the firm 
give up its independence.
49
 
 
 Barclays and Nat West shared one characteristic: the CEO did not believe 
in investment banking.
50
 At Nat West the CEO Derek Wanless and the 
chairman, Lord Alexander, a former barrister, did not want to enlarge 
their investment banking activities. The non-executive directors, 
however, all wished to continue to grow in investment banking. In board 
meetings, where the opportunity to buy the large investment bank, S.G. 
Warburg, was discussed, the chairman, Lord Alexander, listened to his 
colleague non-executive directors, who were in favour of the acquisition. 
He went along with the majority, as did the CEO Derek Wanless,
51
 but he 
left soon afterwards, feeling let down. Because Wanless had actually 
been against the acquisition and had to experience that the board did not 
agree with his policy, he left. Nat West continued with its plan to buy 
S.G. Warburg. The problem between Nat West and Warburg, however, 
was social class (Nat West‟s new CEO, Owen, had not attended 
Oxbridge, nor been to a major public school, neither had Derek Wanless 
for that matter). The gentlemen capitalists of Warburg instead turned to 
Credit Suisse recommending their offer, although the price was low, 
Warburg was sold to Credit Suisse, and Owen was left in the cold to look 
for smaller fry. Class had cold shouldered him. 
 
 In the UK investment banks had been working in a barely regulated 
environment where it was permitted to “warm up” the market in the 
                                                     
47 David Freud, Freud in the City (2006), p. 165 (“Freud (2006)”). 
48 Freud (2006), p. 215. 
49 Augur (2001), p. 252. 
50 Augur (2001), p. 269. 
51 Augur (2001), pp. 180-181 and 269. 
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press, as occurred in the case of Eurotunnel. During the British Airways 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) of 1986 a top UK solicitor commented that 
there was “too much information in this document”, implying that he did 
not see the legal necessity of informing the public properly at that time.
52
  
 
 It is interesting to note that the big Dutch commercial banks have not 
been successful in investment banking for similar reasons. ING bought 
Barings, but did not know the business. ABN AMRO had continuous 
internal scrimmages about its costly investment banking. Every year it 
turned out that ABN AMRO made losses in their investment banking 
department, which was directed by Wilco Jiskoot, who was in continuous 
disagreement with his CEO, Rijkman Groenink, while the supervisory 
directors were not aware of this disagreement.
53
 
 
 US investment banks had grown up in a much more toughly regulated 
and profitable environment. “Conditioning” was forbidden.54 US bankers 
received 5%-7% of Initial Public Offering (IPO) value as their fee, 
whereas in the UK bankers received 0.75%.
55
 Freud and Augur imply that 
the US way of setting the price smells of a cartel.
56
 So Swiss, German, 
Dutch and, in the end, mainly US investment banks took over all their 
London counterparts. Japan had collapsed, New York had flourished, 
London had sold out and continental Europe had developed larger banks 
that also embarked successfully on investment banking.
57
 Now the City 
was in the hands of the “Bulge Bracket”, i.e. senior syndicate members 
bracketed together in deal announcements, specifically by the Super 
Bulge (MGM) Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch.
58
 
Now, after the crisis, these three, be it that Merill Lynch was taken over 
by Bank of America after its collapse, are still in the lead. Goldman Sachs 
is now one of the top two, with its special risk management practice 
called “The Edge”.59  
 
 Some aspects of the “class society” have remained, but the same cannot 
always be said of the gentlemanly manners. American bonuses and 
                                                     
52 Freud (2006), p. 49. 
53 Jeroen Smit, The Perfect Prey (2009) (“Smit (2009)”). 
54 Freud (2006), p. 45. 
55 Freud (2006), p. 77. 
56 Freud (2006), p. 163 and Philip Augur, The Greed of Merchants (2006), p. 6 (“Augur (2006)”). 
57 Augur (2001), p. 325. 
58 Augur (2006), p. 30. 
59 Augur (2006), p. 113. 
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tougher methods have been introduced. And yet manners and appearance 
do still count. Whether in Park Avenue or in Canary Wharf, the 
prevailing decor is Old England, with hunting scenes, gilt-framed 
mirrors, Regency striped curtains, antique dining tables and traditional 
chairs.
60
 
 
 The extensive description of the “Death of Gentlemanly Capitalism” in 
the UK shows how class difference until recently spoiled the atmosphere 
of the City and how the tougher US banking culture took over the 
industry. Investment banking in London survived and remains one of the 
most profitable businesses in the UK, even though nearly all the 
investment banks are owned by foreigners. 
 
 Nat West‟s decision to want to stay and grow in investment banking, was 
backed by the majority of the non-executive directors despite the 
opposition of the CEO and the chairman. It shows how important the 
non-executive directors on a board are. But in this case the board was 
unable to explain this strategy, of the majority of the board to want to buy 
an investment bank, to its shareholders, who did not block the following 
acquisition, but were unhappy, which created problems for Nat West‟s 
future.
61
 
 
 From 1992 – corporate governance codes 
 In due course the shareholder scene changed: no longer were most shares 
in hands of private – small – investors, companies started to feel the 
presence of institutional investors, such as pension funds with larger 
stakes, who could not so easily sell their shares and quit if they did not 
like what they saw. “Exit” was giving way to “voice”. These shareholders 
wanted a greater say and a better insight in what was happening in their 
companies.  
 
 There was growing concern over the reliability of accounts of UK 
companies. The collapse of the seemingly well performing listed 
companies Colorell and Polly Peck,
62
 whose accounts prior to their 
failure appeared to give no indication of the true state of their finances, 
cast doubt on the trust, which could be placed in accounts and audit 
statements attached to them. This in turn, it was feared, could limit 
                                                     
60 Augur (2001), pp. 308 and 321 (comment by author: many New York, Chicago, Washington DC and many 
other US law firms have the same Old England appearance).  
61 Augur (2001), p. 255. 
62 Cadbury (2002), p. 11. 
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confidence in UK accounting practices and the reputation of London as 
financial centre. Therefore, the Financial Reporting Council, the London 
Stock Exchange and the accountancy profession set up the Cadbury 
Committee, which drafted a code and created the “comply or explain” 
concept. The establishment of the Cadbury Committee was soon followed 
by the failure of BCCI and the collapse of Robert Maxwell‟s business 
empire.  
 
 The Committee‟s report attracted huge publicity and was yet again an 
example of English informal self-regulation, which was followed by 
about 70 codes of best practices all over the world, often copying each 
other. Here Britain showed real leadership in the corporate investment 
world.  
 
 Britain can thus be said to have taken the lead in new corporate 
governance and the promotion of independent non-executive directors 
(NEDs) and an independent chairman. In the last 10 years non-executive 
directors (NEDs) have become prominent in Britain.  
 
2.1.3 Aspects of British company culture 
 
 Although British, US and Dutch culture have much in common, such as 
the same Christian religions, tolerance, rationality and a tradition of 
individualism,
63
 there are special cultural aspects which account for 
differences in corporate governance, even in these originally Anglo-
Saxon and North European countries. Four aspects of British corporate 
culture relevant to corporate governance will be described below: 
 
 a informal regulations work: pragmatism, case by case approach, 
reluctance to commit to rigid unchangeable rules 
 b owners‟ power 
 c strategic thinking 
 d sometimes long term, sometimes short term. 
 
 While describing these aspects of corporate culture, I will make use of 
broad impressions, realizing that these are generalizations of British 
character and not a description of the character of each individual. My 
                                                     
63 Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner, Over de grenzen van cultuur en management (2006), 
pp. 20-25 (“Trompenaars and Hampden (2006)”). 
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aim is to give a generalized impression by a foreigner and to try to clarify 
differences in board dynamics by looking at history and culture. 
 
 (a) Informal regulations work: pragmatism – case by case approach – 
reluctance to commit to rigid, unchangeable rules; common law 
 
 (a) A Island mentality – changes without revolution 
  The UK has not been invaded by foreign powers since 1066 and 
has been fairly content with its forms of government
64
 and 
governance. Its system of government has evolved in its own 
way, sometimes behind and sometimes ahead of other countries, 
but always avoiding revolution after the beheading of Charles I in 
1648 and the Commonwealth Republic. The so-called Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 was in fact a restoration of the 
“constitutional” monarchy without a written constitution, which 
had been the practice long before continental kings were forced 
to follow suit. 
 
  In 1992 the UK clearly took the lead in the field of corporate 
governance. The application of codes with the “comply or 
explain” rule is typical of the imaginative English approach to 
change, which differs from that of other countries and was in this 
case quickly followed by many other countries.  
 
 (a) B Pragmatism 
  The British like a case by case approach. there is a reluctance to 
commit to rigid, unchangeable rules. The long experience of 
having a parliamentary monarchy without a constitution has 
convinced the British that not all principles of governance 
necessarily need to be pinned down in formal laws. The US for 
example does have a written constitution. As a result the US 
relies on extensive written acts. Another reason why the UK did 
not need written legislation, is that it was a close knit society 
where people could rely on precedent. UK leaders still like to see 
themselves as pragmatical, which reinforces the will to have 
informal regulations. 
 
                                                     
64 Jonathan Charkham, Keeping Better Company: Corporate Governance Ten Years on (2005), p. 291 
(“Charkham (2005)”). 
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 (a) C Centralised society/peer control 
  London is a huge city and a financial hub. A good business 
reputation is essential in the City.
65
 Peer control works strongly: 
this starts in the public schools and at Oxbridge and then 
continues in the business world. During the Industrial Revolution, 
cities such as Birmingham and York became centres of industry, 
but provincial businesses and listed companies still had their head 
office in the City. Having a financial centre which is at the same 
time the place for the head office of all major listed companies 
makes dialogue with large shareholders easier, especially if one 
adds the “club membership” atmosphere. 
 
 (a) D Fair play 
  “Fair play”, “being a good sport” and of avoiding and not doing 
things that are “not done” are important aspects of education and 
English life. In rugby the players listen to the referee and there 
are few fights. In cricket the players also listen to the umpire. In 
certain cases a player can be called out by the umpire only after 
an appeal by the players of the other team crying out “How‟s 
that?”. Unwritten rules and listening to the referee are clearly 
very important in these games and in business.
66
  
 
  The background of abiding by unwritten rules goes back to the 
aristocracy and its code of honour, being further developed at 
schools, like Eton. At those schools rugby and especially cricket 
were taken very seriously. One speaks of the “spirit of cricket”. 
Such admirable sentiments created the “stiff upper lip” and “my 
word is my bond”. It was also deliberately developed as a 
government policy in the middle of the 19
th
 century, when the 
UK was colonizing so many countries around the world and 
needed a breed of young men that could take charge and would 
be admired by local princes.
67
 They promoted the public schools. 
Although the aristocracy has lost a great deal of its influence 
                                                     
65 Charkham (2005), p. 294 and Arad Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance (2007), p. 40 
(“Reisberg (2007)”) and Chambers (2008), p. 357. 
66 Johan Huizinga wrote Homo Ludens in 1938 and emphasized how important it is to observe games to 
understand culture. He also wrote that fair play in games is what good faith in business is. The last English 
edition is of 2008. 
67 Chambers (2008), p. 357. 
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since the Great War, the new leading class aspires to the same set 
of values and the same sense of class.  
 
 (a) E Media and publicity 
  Media and publicity play an important role in peer control. 
British citizens enjoy publicity
68
 and know how to use it to their 
advantage. 
 
  (a) F Self-regulation preferable to formal laws 
  The Courts of Equity made law possible without formal laws. 
Peer control, tradition and belief in informal arrangements have 
worked well for the Takeover Panel and the Stock Exchange, 
with the City Code “If you misbehave you‟re out of business.” 
  The same principle forms the basis for corporate governance 
codes of which the Cadbury Code of 1992 was the first.
69
  
 
 (a) G Common law and equitable principles 
  An aspect of pragmatism is common law. Around 1200 the UK 
had only limited specific writs for any legal action; they were 
particular actions, such as “delictus”. Around 1250 other free 
actions were permitted to be brought in equity before the Lord 
Chancellor. Any request became possible and the law became 
flexible. An example is trust law. Later the flexible equitable 
principles flowed into the common law courts, but the common 
law courts and chancery courts remain to this day. The chancery 
courts deal with many business matters such as company law, 
intellectual property law and bankruptcy disputes. Around 1870 
the two systems were brought together. At the high court level 
there are several divisions including a commercial division next 
to the chancery courts. The Court of Appeals has a separate 
chancery division. It is interesting that all US states took over the 
UK common law courts and that only Delaware kept the 
chancery court for business matters. 
 
                                                     
68 Charkham (2005), p. 295, where he says “the UK may be divided in two groups: those who enjoy publicity 
and admit it and those who enjoy it and pretend otherwise”. 
69 Charkham (2005), pp. 297-299. 
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 (b) Owners‟ power 
 
 (b) A Respect for ownership 
  Land owners – the rural nobility – have always been the 
backbone of the English nation. The security brought by owning 
property and the sense of social obligations have been inherited 
in later times by the founders and owners of family businesses. 
Their position as owners has always been respected and in the 
same way owners of shares in a company are respected as having 
the ultimate power in the company. 
 
 (b) B Strong institutional shareholders 
  Already in the late 1950s large pension funds and institutional 
investors had large shareholdings in the bigger listed companies. 
They were a strong force. They supported the first hostile 
takeovers in 1958. They supported the creation of the Takeover 
Panel and later they supported the Cadbury Code and the Higgs 
Review. 
 
 (b) C Belief that persons follow their interests 
  The English view commercial cooperation and joint ventures as 
engagements of sound self-interest.
70
 They believe that each 
person is free to follow his own interests, and can leave a joint 
venture at will. They are convinced a CEO will not work as hard 
for his shareholders as he would for himself (Adam Smith, see 
page 17, point 2.1.2 under “History”). The British would say that 
the same applies to the US culture. They are right: it has to do 
with free enterprise. 
 
 (b) D Accountability 
  Appointing responsible governors or directors to safeguard the 
interests of partners or shareholders stems from the same critical 
common sense. It means that governors or directors must do their 
very best in their fiduciary function. Within their remit they are 
allotted freedom of judgment, provided they act in good faith. 
Accountability is a very English word. Directors are appointed by 
shareholders and must account for their performance at the 
meeting of shareholders. If they fail to give proper account for 
                                                     
70 Charkham (2005), p. 295. 
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themselves, they can be dismissed or “moved out”.71 In fact, 
directors are rarely formally dismissed by shareholders. They are, 
in practice, manoeuvred out of their position, by informal 
shareholder pressure.
72
 They will not be sued at the drop of a hat, 
as they would be in the US. The British emphasize the two-sided 
nature of the relationship between governors and those for whom 
they act. There is focus on the communication aspect, that there 
are responsibilities on both sides. “Accountability is like a 
telephone conversation: it requires both sides to listen”.73 
 
 (b) E Company law based on partnership: power of shareholders over 
directors and freedom of articles of association 
  UK company law is based on the premise that a company is a 
type of partnership. In consequence, shareholders are free to 
arrange their company as they see fit, unhampered by any 
mandatory law, and are free to elect and dismiss directors as they 
wish, which is a right even US shareholders do not have, at least 
not on paper.
74
 
 
 (c) Strategic Thinking 
 
 (c) A Mercantile 
  Surrounded by the sea, the British did not need to fear sudden 
attacks and had time to think strategically about their friends and 
enemies on the continent. The familiarity with the sea, which 
needs careful planning in advance, gave them a broader view than 
many of their land locked fellow Europeans. And what is more, 
navigating needs creative responses to uncertainties of nature and 
tenacity to keep the projected course.
75
 
 
                                                     
71 Cadbury (2002), p. 40 and Peter Montagnon, „The Role of the Shareholder‟, in Ken Rushton (ed.), The 
Business Case for Corporate Governance (2008), p. 83 (“Rushton (2008)”). Ken Rushton wrote and edited 
this book, which includes chapters by himself, Sir Geoffrey Own, Mivory Steele, David Jackson, Peter 
Montagnon, Sir Brian Nicolson, Charles Mayo, Keith Johnstone and Will Clark and Stilpon Nestor.  
72 A few examples of shareholder pressure and “rumour in the city” are given hereunder in 2.2.4. 
73 Charkham (2005), p. 368. 
74 P.L. Davies (ed.), Gower and Davies‟ Principles of Modern Company Law, 8th ed. (2008), p. 366 (“Davies 
(2008)”). 
75 Charkham (2005), p. 291. 
  
 46 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
 (c) B Respect for history and tradition 
  Studying history is popular in the UK. While CEOs in other 
countries have usually studied economy, business administration 
or engineering, the university study that is most popular with 
CEOs in the UK is history. Even if they have not studied history, 
their education tends to favour the arts. 
 
  Military generals and admirals have often studied history. There 
is a feeling that a good understanding of history gives a broad 
view and stimulates strategic thinking. The study of history is 
kept alive and has influenced the thinking of corporate 
governance. 
 
  Tradition is held in honour in the UK. Foreigners admire the 
British approach to tradition. In many areas it is often not 
necessary to have a specific law on a certain subject. It should be 
enough if everybody realizes that something has always been 
done in the same way and should therefore continue to be done in 
that way. Change occurs in the UK too, but is not promoted for 
change sake only. 
 
 (c) C Good eye for strategy and debate about strategy 
  People who have studied history get a good understanding of 
strategy and people who are capable of thinking creatively and 
broadly are highly respected, even in these times of specialism 
and analytical detail. It is this concept of strategic thinking that is 
regarded as important, especially for the role of non-executive 
independent directors. There is an emphasis on independent, 
creative and broad thinking, which is regarded as an essential 
asset. The conviction counts that the talented amateur can add 
value. The art of debating is cultivated at school and university. 
Their education should be broad and debating stressed. It gives 
them the ability to find the right words. Directors go into 
meetings with an open mind and are prepared to accept that 
someone else may come up with a better alternative as long as 
they win in the end. This is different from many foreigners, who 
are less prepared to consider meetings as grounds for free debate. 
M. Tabaksblat values the informality of the debate of the 
English.
76
 
                                                     
76 Couwenbergh and Haenen, Tabaksblat (2008), p. 77. 
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 (c) D Dialogue and listening 
  The Higgs Review
77
 and the Combined Code and the UK 
Corporate Governance Code
78
 use the word “dialogue”. The 
Compact Oxford English Dictionary defines dialogue as a 
conversation carried on between two or more persons. According 
to British understanding, this requires a willingness on the part of 
both sides to listen as well as speak.  
 
  The chairman and the senior independent director should listen to 
the views of shareholders. And the chairman should listen to all 
directors.
79
 In this way a fresh strategy can be developed by the 
board. The Dutch often spend much time thinking about what 
they should or should not say as opposed to thinking of what they 
could hear or sound out. 
 
 (c) E Competitive and combative 
  History and custom have it that results are achieved through an 
attitude open to debate. Discussions in Parliament are 
contentious, the court system is competitive, relations between 
the nobility and the Crown have been competitive and throughout 
history kings have often won the Crown in competitive 
circumstances. You tend to prefer what you are used to. The 
British have a pugnacious attitude without resorting to wars or 
revolutions. Thorough debate is the key to the best strategy, since 
this is the only way to be sure that all options have been 
considered.
80
 
 
 (c) F Social classes/sense of class 
  Class has been a constant feature of British society for many 
centuries: the upper class, the middle class and the working class. 
Moving from one to the other has not been easy. Normally there 
is a balance in society. Thinking about balance amongst the social 
classes leads to strategic thinking and needs room for a long term 
                                                     
77 Higgs Review, Annex A provided the basis for Revised Code C1, p. 78. 
78 Combined Code on Corporate Governance, June 2006 (“CC6”), D.1. Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance, June 2008 (“CC8”), D.1 and UK Corporate Governance Code, June 2010 (“CG10”), E. 
79 Cadbury (2002), p. 90, CG10 A.3 Supporting Principle and the example of Lord Alexander, chair of Nat 
West, in listening to his non-executive directors, who favoured retaining an investment bank contrary to the 
views of the CEO and himself. He followed the majority. See Augur (2001), pp. 180-181. 
80 Cadbury (2002), p. 91. 
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view. Since the First World War ideas and practices have 
changed, with a widely questioned honours system, a weaker 
House of Lords and a directionless monarchy. However, Britain 
has a very different sort of society from that of France, Ireland or 
the USA, principally because since 1688 it has never experienced 
a time when those in power have consciously sought to expand 
the historic symbols of rank and privilege. The members of the 
aristocracy may have lost their influence, but they have been 
replaced by the members of the upper middle class, who aspire to 
much the same set of values.
81
 David Cameron, the Prime 
Minister elected in 2010, is again an Etonian. It is sometimes said 
that it is striking, how little Britain‟s social structures have 
changed since the 18
th
 century.
82
 
 
  Members of the upper middle class have a sense of their position 
in society and many of them are company directors.
83
 This may 
also be a reason why diversity has not yet worked well in Britain. 
The rather strong separation of the social classes has occasionally 
even played a destructive role, vide the “Death of Gentlemanly 
Capitalsm”, above under History. 
 
 (c) G Socially-minded groups of nonconformists such as the Quakers 
  In the Industrial Revolution socially aware groups came to the 
fore, who embraced hard work, better treatment of employees and 
tranquil solutions to problems, be good for employees and be 
peaceful. A good example are the Quakers, who were excluded 
from many activities by the Test Act of 1620, and prohibited 
from going to university, but were remarkably good at making 
things, developing industry and looking after their employees. 
 
  It was the independent Quaker and nonconformist families that 
came up with inventions in steel (Darby and Huntsman), railways 
(Pease, Ellis and Bradshaw), pottery (Cookworthy and 
Champion), cotton (Bright), banking (Gurney, Barings and 
Barclay) and chocolate (Cadbury). They created better conditions 
                                                     
81 Jon Lawrence, „The British Sense of Class‟, Journal of Contemporary History (2000), pp. 35 and 307 
(“Lawrence (2000)”). 
82 Financial Times, 13/14 November 2010, p. 7. 
83 Ernest Zahn, Regenten, Rebellen en Reformatoren: Een visie op Nederland en de Nederlanders, Dutch 
translation (2005), p. 130 (“Zahn (2005)”). 
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for employees, combatted slavery and fought for peace. This 
group has played a major role in American industrial history as 
well (e.g. William Penn).
84
 
 
 (d) Sometimes long term, sometimes short term 
 
 (d) A Flexibility 
  As mentioned above in connection with the English East India 
Company, it has always been recognised that some shareholders 
have short-term goals (profit from a single trip) and others a long-
term goal (profit after many trips to a region). Modern corporate 
governance acknowledges that both views can go together.
85
 
There is a continuing debate about how to match them and the 
UK Stewardship Code gives some solutions.
86
 
 
  Of the three countries, UK, US and the Netherlands, the UK 
scores the highest on the “uncertainty avoidance index” of Geert 
Hofstede.
87
 This means that British do not get nervous or stressed 
about new situations. They do not try to avoid suprises. 
 
 (d) B Tolerant 
  Since the 17
th
 century Britain has accepted and assimilated many 
minorities, which have ideas and entrepreneurial ambitions. The 
commercial strength of the UK has benefited from these 
immigrants. Although the UK has had an honest and effective 
legal system, the British did not develop the US tendency to 
embark on litigation immediately. There is a willingness to seek 
out-of-court solutions. In the corporate world too, few liability 
cases have been brought against directors. Informal ways of 
resolving issues are: suspending and disqualifying directors and 
publishing bad results. Such informal solutions often surprise 
outsiders.
88
  
 
                                                     
84 Paul H. Emden, Quakers in Commerce: A Record of Business Achievement (August 1939). 
85 Mark Goyder, Tomorrow‟s Owners: Defining Differentiating and Rewarding Stewardship (2008) (“Goyder 
(2008/A)”). 
86 The UK Stewardship Code of July 2010. 
87 Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2011), pp. 197-199 and Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: 
Software of the Mind. Intercultural Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival (1991), p. 113 (“Hofstede 
(1991)”). 
88 Charkham (2005), pp. 291-292. 
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  Warburg, Schroders, Rothschild and Kleinwort are all merchant 
banks set up by continental European families, as was Casenove, 
an important stockbroker. These families adopted English values 
to a marked degree.
89
 
 
 (d) C Work should be fun 
  Books published in Germany, France or the US on how to run 
meetings and boards and on the composition of boards will 
seldom, if ever, state that board meetings should be fun. In the 
UK this is generally emphasized.
90
 The English sense of humour 
and its relish for social gatherings are widely recognized all over 
the world. 
 
 (d) D Forming teams 
  Although the British are independent-minded they are good at 
forming teams. Past and present have shown them that teamwork 
is necessary for good results. They get an early taste for it by 
practising sports as youngsters at school and develop it further in 
the course of their work. Books about boards emphasize the need 
for teamwork and stress that creating a team is one of the 
important functions of the chairman.
91
  
 
 (d) E One-person leadership/No heroes/Captain can be replaced 
  The British realize and are convinced that from time to time 
leadership should be centred in one person. The team must be led 
by a leader since this produces optimal results. There should be 
discussion, but the discussion should not be for discussion's sake, 
but lead to a decision. A leader is needed to steer this process to 
conclude the discussion. That person should also communicate 
with the outside world.
92
 CEOs and chairmen have to hold these 
leading roles. CEOs run and represent the company. Chairmen 
run boards and lead the dialogue with shareholders. 
 
  Unlike France (with its Président Directeur Général or “PDG”), 
Germany and the US, the English do not like to have or worship 
heroes. There has to be a leader, but that leader is at all times 
                                                     
89 Augur (2001), p. 323. 
90 Patrick Dunne, Running Board Meeings: How to Get the Most from Them, 3rd ed. (2005), pp. 45 and 48 
(“Dunne (2005)”) and Chambers (2008), p. 133. 
91 Cadbury (2002), p. 81. 
92 Chambers (2008), p. 357. 
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replaceable. Winston Churchill was a hero during the Second 
World War, but was easily replaced in 1945 when the UK 
electorate had set their minds on Labour. CEOs in Britain can be 
dismissed by the meeting of shareholders and thus it has been 
since the first English companies were established in 1600.
93
 
 
  Although respect for hierarchy is stronger in the UK than for 
example in the Netherlands, there is a tendency to get rid of 
directors readily in the UK. This contrasts markedly with Dutch 
board culture. The Dutch have no real hierarchy and sometimes 
keep members on board for too long. They sometimes frown on 
the easy way the British can dismiss a director. 
 
 (d) F Making money/trading 
  Making money is respected. The British realize that you need 
money to engage in enterprise. The British, as a seagoing nation, 
have always been good traders. Gambling also is accepted in 
every level of society, albeit not among Quakers and some other 
smaller groups.
94
 
 
2.2 Who owns shares? 
 
 “He who pays the piper calls the tune” is a well-known English 
expression.
95
 An element of corporate culture is the role of shareholders. 
In the UK shareholders have a substantial influence. By law they have 
powers to appoint and dismiss directors and they have to be asked 
consent for important transactions. In practice, they use these powers, not 
formally, but by pressure. 
 
2.2.1 Sources of Finance 
 
 While many family companies have a large equity percentage, larger 
companies raise money either from banks in the form of loans or from 
capital markets. 
 
                                                     
93 Lawrence (2000), p. 36. 
94 Charkham (2005), p. 294. 
95 Charkham (2005), p. 303. 
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2.2.2 UK banks do not use influence 
 
 UK banks do not exert great influence over the companies they finance. 
They do not take equity stakes to cement the relationship with a 
borrowing customer. There could be a conflict of interest in their role as 
lender and shareholder. Companies often borrow from quite a number of 
banks. It is not typical for the lead banker to want to have influence in a 
company.
96
 
 
2.2.3 Stock Exchange important for peer control 
 
 The London Stock Exchange was formed in 1600 and has decided since 
1697, which companies are accepted for listing. Compliance with the 
Codes of Best Practices forms part of the listing requirements of the 
London Stock Exchange. Listing on the London Stock Exchange has 
become more attractive in recent years than a listing on the NYSE or 
NASDAQ because of the strict and burdensome and hence costly 
requirements of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2004. 
 
2.2.4 Who are the shareholders and what is their influence? 
 
 The fragmented share ownership of the inter-war period has been 
replaced by a concentrated form of share ownership as an increasing 
proportion of shares have come to be owned by institutions. Individuals 
held over half of UK shares in 1963. Today they hold one eighth. UK 
pension funds have become particularly dominant by as early as 1970. 
Around 75-80% of shares of British companies are now held by 
institutions, with pension funds alone owning about 30%.
97
 
 
 This change in the pattern of share ownership in favour of investing 
institutions, such as pension funds and insurance companies, has 
encouraged those institutions to use their influence based on the number 
of their votes. This has increased shareholder influence in general. 
 
 Boards cannot disregard the views of important shareholders, especially 
if there is some degree of consensus between them. 
 Institutional investors now have powerful incentives to use their influence 
to improve the performance of their portfolios. Their holdings are 
                                                     
96 Charkham (2005), p. 304. 
97 Goyder (2008/B), p. 5; Charkham (2005), p. 307; and Montagnon in Rushton (2008), p. 85. 
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collectively so large, selling has become difficult since this would 
influence the market. “Get out” is giving way to “influence”. These 
institutions take a fairly long-term view of their investments. Few UK 
companies have dominant shareholders with more than, say 25%, 
ownership, which is also the case in the US, Japan and the Netherlands. 
There is therefore an incentive for institutional shareholders to 
“persuade” each other and to create strong voting blocks when particular 
matters are put to a vote.
98
 The key lever that shareholders control is their 
ability to vote at general meetings, but the practice is that “persuasion” 
takes place first and then “pressure” to avoid cumbersome general 
meetings.
99
 
 
 The most recent development is that more and more foreign institutions, 
particularly from the US, hold UK shares. There is a tradition of good 
“one-on-one” communication with large shareholders.100 However, this is 
less easy with foreign shareholders. What the role of hedge funds and of 
shareholder activists is going to be remains to be seen. Some of them are 
well informed about companies in which they take stakes and can engage 
effectively with management. Some of them recognize, too, that 
corporate governance is connected to value. For example: a better board 
structure can increase shareholder prices.
101
 
 
 British institutional investors, increasingly via voting associations, have 
influenced corporate governance in various ways, generally by “pressure” 
and “persuasion”: 
 
 (a) Separate Chairman 
  After the Higgs Review of 2003 on the separation of the roles of 
CEO and Chairman and the introduction of the Senior 
Independent Director (SID)
102
 institutional investors have taken a 
strong stance and pressed for the proposed reforms in many 
companies.
103
 
                                                     
98 Cadbury (2002), p. 9. 
99 Montagnon in Rushton (2008), p. 93. 
100 Montagnon in Rushton (2008), pp. 88 and 92 and Sir Bryan Nicholson, „The Role of the Regulator‟, in Ken 
Rushton (ed.), The Business Case for Corporate Governance (2008), p. 117.  
101 Goyder (2008/A), p. 6 and Montagnon in Rushton (2008), p. 93 and pp. 98-99. 
102 Higgs Review, paras. 5.3, 5.7, 7.4 and 7.5. 
103 Montagnon in Rushton (2008), p. 84, the SID has a role in evaluating the chairman and in the succession of 
the chairman and replacing the chairman in a crisis. There is some resemblance to the US “lead” director. This 
is discussed further below. 
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 (b) Get the most out of non-executives 
  Institutional investors in the same way as outside directors, want 
to be included actively in strategic decisions and risk 
management. This is clear from their support of the Codes of 
Best Practices.
104
 
 
 (c) Appoint and dismiss directors 
  In the UK it is crucial for shareholders to have the power under 
company law to appoint and dismiss directors.
105
 In practice it is 
quite rare in the UK for shareholders to propose individuals as 
candidates for a particular board. This normally happens only 
after a company has run into trouble. Even then there is 
reluctance to usurp the nomination committee‟s right to select.  
 
  Directors representing institutional investors often use indirect 
pressure to influence the nomination committee, which also 
sounds out shareholders. In general, shareholders have pushed for 
the introduction of a Senior Independent Director to whom they 
can communicate any comments on the functioning of the 
Chairman and the CEO.  
 
  In 2004 influential shareholders of Sainsbury had made clear before the 
shareholders meeting that they were going to reject Sir Ian Prosser, the 
candidate of the nomination committee, as Chairman. Sainsbury had been losing 
ground to Tesco. Sir Ian had experience in leading a retail company. However, 
City institutions made it plain they did not feel Sir Ian had the right touch to 
guide the company out of troubles. Sir Ian gracefully withdrew. The nomination 
committee consulted shareholders and nominated Sir Philip Hampton, who had 
financial City experience, complementing the skills of Justin King, Sainsbury‟s 
CEO.  
  Similarly, Michael Green was forced to withdraw in 2003 as Chairman of ITV 
as a result of shareholder‟s desire for a properly independent chairman, and Sir 
Peter Burt, again a figure familiar with the City, was chosen.106  
                                                     
104 Montagnon in Rushton (2008), pp. 91-92.  
105 Section 168 of the Companies Act 2006 gives the majority of the general meeting the right at any moment to 
remove a director, but this power to remove is rarely used in a general meeting because it is cumbersome, it is 
used to exert power to demand accountability. Now in FTSE 350 companies all directors are up for re-election 
each year. 
106 Montagnon in Rushton (2008), p. 86.  
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  There have been instances where shareholders‟ representations have influenced 
the board not to let the chief executive become chairman. The Association of 
British Insurers (ABI) held ground-breaking discussions with Barclays over its 
proposal to appoint Matt Barrett, its former CEO, as Chairman in 2004. It may 
have influenced the bank‟s decision to change its plan and look outside for its 
subsequent Chairman, Marcus Agius. Similarly HSBC went out of its way to 
consult shareholders on its proposal to appoint its CEO, Stephen Green, as 
Chairman in 2006. Discussions with shareholders led to the appointment of a 
new CEO at Morrison, the supermarket concern, in 2006. Directors have 
grumbled about the need for these discussions, but it has created fewer 
situations of unfettered power in the hands of one person.107 
 
  Now there is discussion about possibly including one or two shareholder 
representatives on the nomination committee, which is otherwise composed of 
non-executive directors.108 
 
 (d) Remuneration policy 
  Shareholders also play a role in establishing remuneration 
structure policy. The ABI, representing shareholders, now 
receives over 200 requests a year from companies seeking 
shareholder views on remuneration policy. This has led to less 
extreme short-term option schemes than in the US.
109
  
 
  CEOs and/or chairmen of companies hold many one-on-one 
meetings with influential shareholders. Hermes, an influential UK 
pension fund, for example, always divides its one-on-one 
meetings as a shareholder with CEOs and/or chairmen into three 
parts: one-third strategy, one-third remuneration and one third 
succession.
110
 
 
  Companies are now
111
 obliged to offer shareholders an advisory 
vote on their remuneration report. As before, a separate binding 
vote is required on share incentive schemes that are dilutive 
                                                     
107 Montagnon in Rushton (2008), p. 87. 
108 Mark Goyder and Harlan Zimmerman, Tomorrow‟s Company, Tomorrow‟s Corporate Governance: Bridging 
the UK Gap through Swedish Style Nominations Committees (March 2010) (“Goyder and Zimmerman 
(2010)”). 
109 Montagnon in Rushton (2008), pp. 86-89.  
110 Information received orally from Hermes. 
111 Section 438 of the Companies Act 2006 and Davies (2008), p. 385. 
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and/or involve the issue of shares to directors. The press watches 
votes on remuneration closely, and companies are concerned 
about the loss of reputation that may flow from evidence of 
widespread opposition to their remuneration policy. Moreover, a 
public dispute over remuneration can seriously demotivate 
directors. For these reasons companies increasingly seek dialogue 
with shareholders in order to sort out problems before they 
arise.
112
 
 
  There are three reasons why shareholders have become involved 
with remuneration. First, a conflict of interest arises when boards 
have the task of deciding on the remuneration of directors who sit 
on these same boards. Shareholders have a responsibility to help 
mitigate this effect. Second, remuneration creates incentives that 
will determine the approach taken by management in driving the 
company forward. Shareholders have a strong direct interest in 
what happens. Finally, there is a general need to preserve the 
integrity of the system. If lack of discipline and oversight allows 
companies to bestow lavish rewards on mediocrity and failure, it 
will no longer be possible to reward success. This will damage 
entrepreneurialism and inhibit wealth creation. 
 
  The efforts of shareholders over the years have met with some 
success, particularly with regard to the structure of remuneration. 
It was always possible for the UK to avoid the bonus extremes of 
the US, where it has become a subject of public interest and anger 
in the last few years.
113
 
 
 (e) Remuneration amounts 
  Shareholders have had less influence on the overall amounts of 
remuneration, which is being driven higher and higher. This is 
partly because they do not wish to get involved in setting the 
going rate. The ratchet effect is caused by disclosure, which 
aimed to have a limiting influence through public exposure, but 
the opposite happened.  
 
  More recently, however, shareholders are taking a stance on remuneration 
matters, such as in Shell Plc‟s annual general meeting of shareholders in 
                                                     
112 Montagnon in Rushton (2008), pp. 88-89. 
113 Montagnon in Rushton (2008), pp. 88-89.  
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London on 21 May 2009 when a remuneration proposal was voted down by 
60%. 
 
 (f) Risk control 
  Shareholders have had an important indirect influence on better 
internal control.  
 
  In 2002 the Association of British Insurers published a brief set of guidelines 
calling on boards to disclose in their annual report that they had considered the 
risks and to confirm that the risks were being managed and were manageable. 
 
 (g) Strategy 
  Finally, shareholders have a significant say in important strategic 
questions. The UK Listing Rules made by the Financial Services 
Authority
114
 give them the right to vote when a company wishes 
to make a substantial purchase or disposal of assets that will alter 
the shape of the company. This right is regarded as highly 
important. In practice shareholders have not used this right to 
bluntly block actions proposed by the board, but the mere fact 
that shareholders have such a right forces boards to consider in 
advance whether they will be able to carry their shareholders with 
them in any decision. This background explains why strategy and 
strategic decisions are extensively discussed in boards with non-
executive directors at an early stage.
115
 
 
 Voting associations
116
 often give shareholders advice on how they should 
vote. This advice if often followed by institutions that do not wish to 
make costs investigating voting alternatives. 
 
                                                     
114 Davies (2008), pp. 16-17. Listing Rules: LR 10.1.2 and LR 10.5.1, see also advice of Advocate General 
L. Timmerman to the ABN AMRO in Sale LaSalle Bank case, HR 13-07-2007, NJ 2007, 434, nos. 3.31 and 
3.32. 
115 Montagnon in Rushton (2008), pp. 90-92.  
116 Montagnon in Rushton (2008), pp. 86-92. Shareholder bodies that play an important role are the Institutional 
Shareholders Committee (ISC), which codified best practice principles for shareholders in a statement, the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI), the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), the Institutional 
Voting Information Service (IVIS), Research Recommendations Electronic Voting (RREV), the Investment 
Management Association (IMA) and the Association of Investment Companies (AIC). 
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2.3 Formal Acts and Informal Codes 
 
Another element of the corporate culture in the UK is the practice of 
directing corporate boards by informal codes, beside facilitating company 
Acts. 
 
 The Companies Act of 1985 was quite short and simply provided that 
managers were accountable to the board and the board was accountable to 
shareholders. In 1998 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 
Margaret Beckett, commissioned an independent review of company law 
which was “fundamental to the national competitiveness”. Its aim was to 
be “primarily enabling and facilitating”, leaving a lot of freedom to 
entrepreneurs to draft their own rules in articles of association. This 
resulted in the Companies Act 2006, which is more extensive than the 
Companies Act of 1985. 
 
 (i) Acts 
 
  An overview of the main sections of the Companies Act 2006 is 
attached as “Annex UK Acts”. The sections that will be discussed 
in detail in this study are “the duties of directors”, in sections 
170-174, including the important section 172, which so clearly 
describes the “success of the company” and the “enlightened 
shareholder value” (see sub-section 2.6.3 hereof), “duty to avoid 
conflicts of interest” in sections 175-181 (see sub-section 2.6.6 
hereof), “limiting directors‟ liabilities” in sections 232-239 (see 
sub-section 2.7.6 hereof) and derivative claims (see sub-section 
2.7.3 hereof). 
 
  Although directors are dealt with there are no sections dealing 
with the board of directors as such. Under the Companies Act of 
2006 default in performing the duties of a director may be a tort. 
 
  The position of directors is also regulated in many other laws, 
mentioned in the Annex UK Acts. Here I mention the Insolvency 
Act of 1986, the Financial Services and Marketing Act 2000, 
including market abuse, the Criminal Justice Act 1993, including 
insider dealing, the Listing Rules, the Takeover Code, the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, under which the 
court can bar a person from being a director for 2 to 15 years; 
there is extensive case law on this subject, including an order 
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against all the directors of Barings for the failure to control 
Mr Leeson. 
 
 (ii) Informal Codes 
 
  Informal self-regulation is a creative method especially well-
suited to the English legal environment. The informal method 
works: after issuance of the Cadbury Code of 1992, which 
promoted the separation of the roles of CEO and chairman, there 
was criticism of the separation of the roles of CEO and Chair, but 
94% of the FTSE 350 companies have introduced this separation 
by 2007; the same thing can be said in relation to required 
evaluations of the board: these were criticised in 2003, but are 
now to be deemed correct and quite normal as many companies 
have found that evaluations lead to improvement in board 
processes and make an important contribution to succession 
planning. The market-based approach, as exemplified by the 
drafting of a Code of Best Practices for Corporate Governance 
under the “comply or explain” method, has many advantages: 
  – Codes of Best Practices are flexible; 
  – the texts are aspirational rather than minimal since they 
describe the situation of the best, with the aim of 
encouraging the rest to raise their performance to that 
level; 
  – simple words can be used, for example, boards can be 
described as “effective” and “robust” and directors as 
being of “high” quality, and texts can talk of the need to 
avoid “unwieldy” boards and “unfettered” power for one 
person or group; 
  – the Codes of Best Practices can be monitored for 
compliance and updated yearly to improve standards and 
adapt to new developments; 
  – the Codes aim to support rather than constrain 
entrepreneurship; 
  – the flexibility of the Codes enables them to aim at 
improving conduct within many different types of 
companies; 
  – enforcement by shareholders, i.e. market control; 
  – the concept of “comply or explain” Codes seems to work 
internationally; the EU Corporate Governance Forum has 
stated that “the experience of countries which have 
  
 60 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
implemented this approach for several years shows that it 
does lead to a movement of convergence”.117  
 
  The development started in 1992 with the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC), the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy 
profession asking a Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance under the chairmanship of Sir Adrian 
Cadbury to consider issues in relation to financial reporting and 
accountability and to make recommendations on good practice in 
the following areas: 
 
  (i) the responsibilities of executive and non-executive 
directors for reviewing and reporting on performance to 
shareholders; 
  (ii) the case for audit committees of the board, including their 
composition and role; 
  (iii) responsibilities of auditors and the value of the audit; 
  (iv) links between shareholders, boards and auditors; 
  (v) other matters.
118
 
 
  Although its terms of reference concentrated on accountancy 
matters, the committee extended its remit to include many aspects 
of the organization of the board of directors and the conduct of 
directors, despite not having been appointed by and lacking the 
backing of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the 
Institute of Directors (I of D). Sir Adrian Cadbury says that 
although these institutions initially opposed his committee‟s far-
reaching and wide-ranging ideas, “when I explained the ideas to 
their open meetings they were very good and came to support our 
ideas.”119 
 
  As background it is useful to know that Sir Adrian, a Quaker by 
the way, had a wealth of management experience.
120
 He had been 
a Cadbury board member from 1958 and became CEO and later 
Chair of Cadbury PLC, which merged with Schweppes in 1969. 
He subsequently resumed the position of managing director of 
                                                     
117 Nicholson in Rushton (2008), pp. 103-106. 
118 Cadbury (2002), pp. 10-11. 
119 Information obtained during conversations with Sir Adrian Cadbury at his home. 
120 Sir A. Cadbury, Family Firms and their Governance: Creating Tomorrow‟s Company from Today‟s (2000). 
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Cadbury-Schweppes PLC while Lord Watkinson was Chairman 
until 1975. Sir Adrian then became Chairman and remained in 
that role until 1989. At that time Cadbury-Schweppes was one of 
the UK‟s most successful manufacturing companies.  
 
  Sir Adrian knew all about the separation of the roles of CEO and 
Chair, the role of outside directors in strategy discussions and the 
evaluation and succession of boards. He also had experience in 
the monitoring role of outside directors after 23 years as Director 
of the Bank of England. Finally, he had been a supervisory 
director (commissaris) of the Dutch car and truck manufacturer, 
DAF N.V. 
 
  The development of the role of the “independent chairman”, 
separate from the CEO, has meant a vital change as well as an 
important step forward in corporate governance. This step 
forward is now increasingly being introduced in the US and has 
also been included in the Dutch Act on One-Tier Boards (the 
“Act”). The role of the chairman therefore forms an important 
part of this study. 
 
  It is interesting to note how change in the UK can be promoted 
quite easily by persons of high quality, who are respected and 
have support in the City. Adrian Cadbury is an example. Higgs 
and Walker are other examples. 
 
Attached hereto as “Annex Cadbury Code” is a summary of the 
Cadbury Code of 1992, as drafted by the Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. 
 
  The Cadbury Committee later monitored the general compliance 
and then reported annually. 
 
  The Cadbury Committee was followed by: 
  – the Greenbury Committee, which studied Director‟s 
Remuneration in 1995; 
  – the Hampel Committee, established in November 1995 
by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) to draft a 
Combined Code, which was published in November 1998 
and supported the Cadbury Code; 
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  – the Higgs Review on Non-Executive Directors which was 
published in January 2003 and again supported and 
reinforced the Cadbury Code; 
  – the Smith Report of 2003 on Audit Committees; 
  – the 2003 Combined Code; 
  – the 2005 report of the Turnbull Committee on Internal 
Risk Control; 
  – the Combined Codes of 2006 and 2008 (“CC6” and 
“CC8”) 
  – the Walker Review of Bank Corporate Governance of 
November 2009
121
 
  – the UK Corporate Governance Code of July 2010 
(“CG10”) 
  – the UK Stewardship Code of July 2010. 
 
 I have referred to the Codes and therefore also to the Combined Code and 
UK Corporate Governance Code as “soft law”. This is perhaps 
misleading. At the centre of the CC6, CC8 and CG10 there is a perfectly 
“hard” obligation.122 The UK Listing Rules require UK-registered 
companies with a primary listing in the UK to disclose in their annual 
report the extent to which they have complied with the CC6, CC8 and 
CG10 and to give reasons for non-compliance (if any). Again the Walker 
Review reconfirmed the advantages of best practice codes. 
 
2.4 Composition of UK boards 
 
2.4.1 Introduction on composition of the board 
 
 In many countries a board and its members generally fulfil all functions 
necessary for a successful enterprise. A company should have  a purpose, 
a strategy, policies, a process for risk management, a system for orderly 
succession, evaluation procedures and rules for communication with 
shareholders and other stakeholders, such as employees, customers, 
suppliers and society. In general all these elements must be developed, 
implemented and monitored. Together, the members of boards fulfil all 
these roles. The question is what practice has been developed to do so in 
the most efficient way and how do companies avoid dangers or 
                                                     
121 Sir David Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities, 
Final Recommendations, 26 November 2009, Executive Summary, p. 3 and nos. 1-21 (“Walker Review”). 
122 Listing Rules, LR 9.8.6(5). 
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inefficiencies such as an “imperial CEO”, “group think”, loafing in 
acceptable sub-optimal work, lack of teamwork, festering disputes and 
lack of communication? 
 
 Each country has developed different best practices for the composition, 
roles, duties and liabilities of board members. The description of UK 
boards follows hereunder: 
 first, for the composition of UK boards – this section 2.4; second, the 
division of the roles of UK board members – section 2.5; third, the 
description of duties – section 2.6; and finally, liabilities of board 
members in the UK – section 2.7. 
 
 This section (2.4) describes the best practices in the UK for the composition of the board. 
First it describes the UK choice of a unitary one-tier board (2.4.2); followed, second, by 
the composition of average boards, the evolution of boards over the last 30 years (2.4.3); 
and description of the composition of an average board, consisting of all the executive 
directors (usually 2 to 4), a separate chairman and a majority of non-executive directors 
(NEDs), including a senior independent director (SID) (2.4.4); and subsequently by the 
dilemma for executive directors of having a dual role (being part of the executive team 
and giving an individual view on strategy) (2.4.5); the important changes in board 
composition brought about by the codes (2.4.6); balance and independence (2.4.7); the 
importance of not being too large (2.4.8); and a description of the balance created by 
having a majority of NEDs on the board and on committees (2.4.9); and by a separate 
non-CEO chairman (2.4.10); formal lists of responsibilities of NEDs (2.4.11). These 
aspects are followed by a summary concerning the composition of UK boards (2.4.12). 
 
 This section 2.4 on the composition of the board is followed by sections on the role of 
each type of director (section 2.5), including the three most salient points of UK best 
practice, (i) the active role of NEDs in developing strategy, (ii) the important roles of the 
chairman and (iii) the best practices to ensure optimal performance of these roles. 
 
2.4.2 Choice of one-tier board 
 
 Before turning to the composition of the board, let us look at its structure. 
 
 The UK differs from most countries in that the division of powers 
between the board and the shareholders is a matter for private 
arrangement by the members of the company rather than something 
regulated by law. This may reflect the partnership origins of British 
company law (under partnership law the partners have the freedom to 
arrange the internal affairs of the partnership very much as they wish), 
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and it certainly facilitates the use of a single act to regulate all manner 
and sizes of company and give the members complete freedom to arrange 
the company as they wish and to choose whatever structure they consider 
appropriate. 
 
 This is also a point of some theoretical (even ideological) importance: the 
directors‟ authority is derived from the shareholders through a process of 
delegation via the company‟s articles of association and not from being 
separately granted in an act. Furthermore, this helps to underline the 
shareholder-centred nature of British company law and the freedom 
regarding the division of powers as well as regarding appointment and 
dismissal.
123
 
 
 The Companies Act 2006 only provides that a company must have one or 
more directors, but describes directors‟ duties in great detail (see 
section 2.6). It does not mention the board or its composition. In theory, 
UK companies can therefore choose between a one-tier and a two-tier 
board.
124
 These options are also available in France, Switzerland and 
Italy. Most companies in those countries opt for the unitary board.
125
 
Domestic UK law does formally recognize the possibility of a two-tier 
structure as an option instead of a one-tier board for Sociétés Européens 
(SEs) (European Companies) that register in Britain.
126
 
 
 In the 1970s, 1980s and even the 1990s there was debate in the UK 
whether a two-tier board system should be adopted, possibly even with 
employee representation
127
 in keeping with the German model. This 
debate was prompted by the perceived weaknesses of the UK practice of 
NEDs, usually chosen by the CEO.
128
 However, even the UK unions did 
not want employee representation on boards. Moreover, the UK was not, 
in general, impressed by the German board system. The German 
economy was not strong in the 1980s and there were many examples of 
unduly strong CEOs dodging everything, such as giving very sparse 
information, to keep the supervisory directors at a distance. 
 
                                                     
123 Davies (2009), pp. 366 and 398. 
124 Cadbury (2002), p. 71. 
125 Cadbury (2002), p. 76. 
126 Davies (2008), p. 399. 
127 The Bullock Report (1975) on Industrial Democracy, including the possibility of employee representation in 
the UK, Charkham (2005), p. 314, and the Labour Party‟s Proposal “Winning for Britain” (1994). 
128 Davies (2008), p. 402. 
  
 65 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
 In the 1990s, the debate initiated by the Cadbury Committee about 
finding ways of curbing the power of an imperial CEO resulted in a 
decision to create a balance by ensuring that a board had a majority of 
committed and independent NEDs.
129
 This decision made sense only for 
one-tier boards. In 2009, the Walker Review also assumed that a 
company has a one-tier board. But interestingly, the Walker Review 
recommends that there should be separate meetings of only NEDs to 
consider alternative strategies in a free debate.
130
 This comes close to 
creating a two-tier system ad hoc. It is, indeed, close to the US system of 
executive sessions, i.e. separate meetings of only non-executives. 
 
 It is my view that the US idea of executive sessions before or after each 
board meeting is a good idea, also in the two-tier system.
131
 
 
2.4.3 NEDs before and after the Codes: from being the “cats paws” of CEOs to 
holding the balance of power 
 
 In the 1980s NEDs were not generally held in high esteem. Chosen by the 
CEO, they were not expected to do more than attend a few committee 
meetings and generally do the bidding of the CEO. NEDs were modestly 
rewarded. The CEO dominated.
132
 Most boards only had a few NEDs. 
Generally the CEO was also the chairman of the board, but if there was a 
separate chairman, he would often be the former CEO, who would be 
powerful and could overrule the CEO. The number of non-executive 
directors varied widely, smaller companies having only a few and large 
companies having many, sometimes up to even 20. Certainly, in the latter 
case this was not conducive to a productive debate. 
 
 The company secretary has always been important. He reported to the 
CEO and now supports the Chairman.
133
 Annual General Meetings 
(AGMs) were important events, but as they were attended mostly by 
small shareholders and rarely by financial institutions with large 
                                                     
129 Davies (2008), p. 403. 
130 Walker Review, nos. 2.5 and 2.6. 
131 Lawrence Cunningham (ed.), The Essays of Warren Buffet: Lessons for Investors and Managers (2009) 
("Cunningham (2009)”), p. 45. 
132 Davies (2008), p. 402. 
133 David Jackson, „The Role of the Company Secretary‟, in Ken Rushton (ed.), The Business Case for 
Corporate Governance (2008), pp. 67-80; Charkham (2005), p. 321; CC8 A5 and CG10 B5, Supporting 
Principle and sections 270-280 Companies Act 2006. 
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shareholdings, they could be worked off quickly, sometimes within an 
hour.
134
 
 
 Since 1992 and the publication of the Cadbury Code, the UK has 
introduced important changes through the codes and the debates they 
have sparked. These changes have also been pushed by large institutions 
such as Hermes and organizations of investors and pension funds. The 
UK has in fact taken the lead in the corporate governance debate around 
the world. One factor has been that important business leaders who 
combine idealism with the capacity to think and write at an academic 
level have developed the code system with its “comply or explain” 
principle and high aspirational concepts, which have been followed in 
most places around the world. Since the introduction of the Cadbury 
Code, NEDs have been in the majority on boards and their 
responsibilities have been extended, while the positions of CEO and 
chairman have been separated. Now there are real differences between 
the two positions: they have become more of a complementary tandem, 
equal but different. 
 
2.4.4 Types of directors on UK boards 
 
 A typical British board has about 2 to 4 executive directors, a chairman 
and 5 to 7 outside directors.
135
 These numbers, the separate role of the 
chairman and the fact that the outside directors are in the majority are 
regarded as important factors in achieving a balanced board. These are 
essential elements of the Cadbury Code and subsequent codes. The types 
of directors are described below: 
 
 (a) Executive directors 
  Some members of the board are executive directors: such as the 
CEO, CFO and COO and the Chief Marketing Director. They 
carry on the business, work full time and monitor the execution 
and performance of the company‟s activities. The CEO is clearly 
the boss of the other executive directors. As members of the 
board they are also, as individuals, involved in the debate about 
the development of the overall strategy.  
 
                                                     
134 Jackson in Rushton (2008), p. 69.  
135 Higgs Review, para. 3.9; Charkham (2005), pp. 315 and 317. 
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 (b) Chairman 
  99% of UK listed companies have a separate chairman, who is 
not CEO. The chairman is not an executive director and not an 
independent director. His role will be discussed separately in 
detail at 2.4.11 and 2.5.7 below. He is meant to be an 
independent director, i.e. independent from the business and from 
the CEO, at the moment of his appointment. However, as he is 
generally physically present at the company about two days a 
week and because he will in due course form a team with the 
CEO, each in their separate roles, he does not remain 
independent. He has specific roles as leader of the board, leader 
of the discussion on strategy, leader of the communication with 
shareholders, and leader in succession planning, evaluation and 
induction of the Board and all its members. 
 
 (c) Outside directors/NEDs 
  Non-executive directors are also called outside directors. Sir 
Adrian Cadbury prefers the term outside director as non- 
executive director for him is too much of a negative description. 
Many writers abbreviate Non-Executive Director to NED. NED 
itself has become a household word, which I will use mostly 
hereafter. 
 
  The heart of the matter for outside directors is that they have at 
least the dual function
136
 of: 
  1. developing strategy, and  
  2. monitoring the execution of the business. 
  This aspect of a dual function is described below in sub-
section 2.4.6. 
 
  If there is a separate chairman, one of the NEDs is called the 
senior independent director (SID). The role of this director is to 
take charge of the evaluation of the chairman. See 2.5.7(ix) and 
2.5.9 below. 
 
 (d) Company secretary and internal auditor 
  In the UK the company secretary has an important function in 
company law. In the 1948 Companies Act the company secretary 
was defined as an officer of the company. The function 
                                                     
136 Davies (2008), p. 362. 
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developed into the chief administrative officer of the company. 
He has a pivotal role in communication among directors. The 
development of the role is also evidenced by the establishment of 
the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators 
(ICSA).
137
  
 
  In the 1980s the role of the company secretary was diluted 
somewhat, because the functions of general counsel and company 
secretary were often combined and the work of the company 
secretary would be delegated to a lower secretary. They would 
concentrate on monitoring.
138
 
 
  With the advent of Corporate Governance Codes and emphasis of 
non-executives and the Chairman being involved in strategy 
development, the now again independent function of the 
company secretary has become important to assist the Chairman 
in promoting corporate governance and added value of NEDs.
139
 
He is sometimes called “the conscience of the company”.140 
 
  All public companies must have a company secretary and there 
are requirements of legal training and/or experience.
141
 The 
company secretary assists the Chairman in the preparation of the 
annual reports and the annual accounts.
142
 
  The Guidance on Board Effectiveness of March 2011 also 
underlines the importance of the company secretary.
143
 The 
internal auditor should carry weight as well be an employee and 
have direct access to the Chairman. 
 
                                                     
137 David Jackson in Rushton (2008), p. 68. 
138 David Jackson in Rushton (2008), pp. 70 and 76. 
139 Ken Rushton, „The Role of the Chairman‟, in Ken Rushton (ed.), The Business Case for Corporate 
Governance (2008), p. 33; Higgs Review, para. II.29, CC8 A.5 and CG10 B.5. 
140 Richard Smerdon, A Practical Guide to Corporate Governance (2007), p. 193 (“Smerdon (2007)”), see also 
complete chapter 9 of his book. 
141 Sections 271 and 273 Companies Act 2006. 
142 Listing Rule 9.8.6. 
143 Guidance on Board Effectiveness of the Financial Reporting Council of March 2011, part two. 
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2.4.5 More executives on the board and their dilemma 
 
 In the UK all executive directors are members of the board.
144
 
 
 However, in the US it has become common that the CEO is the only 
executive member of the board. Outside or independent directors should, 
as is argued in the US, form a large majority in order to counter balance 
the power of the US “imperial” CEO, who is often Chairman as well. 
 
 There are advantages in having all the executive directors as members of 
the board, as is the practice in the UK. The first obvious advantage is that 
the NEDs learn more about how and why each executive director takes 
certain decisions. It leads to a more balanced discussion. Executive 
directors, who regularly meet with NEDs will have more ease in also 
pointing out to the NEDs what the dilemmas and weaker points in their 
propositions are. The UK concept of balance on the board is not one 
executive versus many non-executives. Second, the NEDs can see for 
themselves whether the executive directors form a team, when the NEDs 
are all in personal contact with the team of executives at regular 
meetings. Finally, such an arrangement gives the non-executive directors 
greater exposure to potential successors of the current CEO, and the 
executive directors are obliged to think more broadly about the company 
as a whole.
145
 
  
 Executive directors have the dilemma of playing a dual role within their 
companies. They are on both sides of the divide between board and 
management. They have to take off their management hat when entering 
the board room and replace it with their board hat. Theoretically there is 
no conflict, because both management and board hats require devotion to 
the company‟s best interests. But in practice this dual role has led to a 
questioning of the principles on which unitary boards in the UK are 
based. While at times executive directors are in an invidious position, for 
example where the matter at issue is the future of their chief executive, a 
mix of executive and outside directors can be made to work well. The 
advantage over having the chief executive alone speaking for the 
management of the business is that the board has the opportunity to hear 
the views of other key executives and to raise matters with them. While 
                                                     
144 CC8 A.3, Main Principle and CG10 A.3, Supporting Principle. 
145 Sir Geoffrey Owen, „The Role of the Board‟, in Ken Rushton (ed.), The Business Case for Corporate 
Governance (2008), p. 17. 
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chief executives will understandably meet with their executive colleagues 
before a board meeting to agree on a common line, to have them actually 
present and even give their views will add to the better information and 
understanding by the NEDs.
146
 
 
2.4.6 Important changes in composition caused by Codes 
 
 What was the corporate governance problem the Cadbury Committee 
sought to address? Although various problems were identified, the central 
problem was what was known as the “imperial CEO”. The Committee‟s 
proposals involved putting in place various balances.
147
 These measures 
were board balance, independent NEDs, no overly large boards, NED 
majority on the board and committees, a separate chairman, evaluation 
procedures, a system for re-election/succession, formal lists of the 
division of responsibilities and timely information for NEDs. All these 
measures work together to create the right balance for boards. 
 
2.4.7 Board balance and independence  
 
 At least one half of the board as a whole, excluding the chairman, should 
be non-executive directors (NEDs), all of whom should be independent 
(discussed below at the end of this item).
148
 
 
 However, there should be a balance of executive and non-executive 
directors
149
 and “to ensure that power and information are not 
concentrated in one or two individuals, there should be strong presence 
on the board of both executive and non-executive directors”. The Board 
should not be too large, but also not too small.
150
 The ideal size is about 2 
to 4 executives, 1 chairman and 5 to 7 outside directors. The number of 
executive directors should be sufficient to ensure that the board receives 
balanced information and the number of outside directors should not be 
so great as to prevent good debate.  
 
 It is all about the balance between executive and non-executive directors 
and creating the possibility of good communication and creative debate in 
                                                     
146 Cadbury (2002), pp. 54-55 and 80. 
147 Davies (2008), p. 403. 
148 CC8 A.3.2 and CG10 B1.2 and CG10 B.1.2. 
149 CC A.3, Main Principle. 
150 CC A.3, Supporting Principle and Ken Rushton, „Introduction‟, in Ken Rushton (ed.), The Business Case for 
Corporate Governance (2008), p. 7. 
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a strong unitary board. The general opinion is that NEDs can have more 
in-depth knowledge and influence if they experience the cut and thrust of 
debate among the executive directors and are not simply fed the one-
sided view of the CEO. This differs from the US idea of counterbalance, 
which envisages boards with one or two executive directors and about 
eight non-executive directors. The British idea is based on creating a 
team that communicates optimally with each other. 
 
 Balance also demands a balance of variety of experience.
151
 The reason 
for a wider variety of backgrounds is that they will bring different 
perspectives to the work of the board. As for specialisation, there is an 
argument that banks ought to have a number of NEDs who know the 
banking and finance business: “financial experience and deep experience 
from elsewhere”.152 The same may apply – possibly to a slightly lesser 
extent – to other industries. 
 
 There are two further balances:
153
 international diversity and age and 
gender diversity.
154
 The average age of NEDs is 59 and of chairmen is 62. 
Very few are women (only 7% of NEDs and only 2 chairpersons), 
although the percentage of women managers is much higher.
155
 The 
Higgs Review called for the pool of candidates to be widened in order to 
escape the influence of the old boys‟ network and Walker repeats the 
point about women board members. 
 
 As with the board as a whole NEDs have a role in “setting the strategy 
and supervising its implementation, which includes monitoring”.156 
 Or worded differently “constructively challenge and help develop 
strategy … scrutiny … management”.157  
 
 The CC8 and CG10 define the term independent.
158
 The essence is that a 
NED is to be independent from management and the company. This 
                                                     
151 Cadbury (2002), p. 53. 
152 Walker Review, no. 3.15. 
153 Cadbury (2002), p. 53. 
154 Rushton in Rushton (2008), pp. 38-39. 
155 Higgs Review, p. 17. 
156 CC6, A.1. 
157 CC8, A.1, Supporting Principle and CG10, A.4 Main Principle. 
158 CC8, A.3.1 and CG10, B.1.1 define a person as not independent from the company if he: 
 – has been employee of the company or group within the last five years; 
  
 72 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
means that a person who has been an employee of the company within 
the previous five years or has had a material business relationship with it 
in the previous three years is not independent. It is interesting to note that 
a director representing a shareholder is not independent. Such 
appointments are therefore avoided. This is described in more detail 
below in sub-section 2.5.7. There is only a minor difference with the 
Dutch Code. The material business relationship point relates to the past 
3 years in the UK and the past one year in the Netherlands. Furthermore, 
in the UK especially a director becomes not independent if he has served 
for 9 years on the board and a Chairman becomes not independent upon 
his appointment. 
 
2.4.8 Not too large 
 
“The board should not be so large as to be „unwieldy‟. The board should 
be of sufficient size that the balance of skills is appropriate.”159  
 The board should consist of about ten members and may be slightly 
larger in very complicated companies. Cadbury
160
 states that the US 
board may be slightly smaller, but in the US there are usually only one or 
two executive directors on the board, while the other executives do 
attend, but not as board members. 
 
 Cadbury mentions: 
 “Sir Walter Puckey, writing on board size, says that in his experience 
  „I have found that its most effective size for first-class participation and decision 
making is between six and eight excluding the chairman and the secretary, who 
                                                                                                                                    
 – has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the company either 
directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a body that has such a relationship 
with the company; 
 – has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from a director‟s fee, 
participates in the company‟s share option or a performance-related pay scheme, or is a member of the 
company‟s pension scheme; 
 – has close family ties with any of the company‟s advisors, directors or senior employees; 
 – holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through involvement in other 
companies or bodies; 
 – represents a significant shareholder; 
 – has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their first election. 
159 CC8, A.3 and CG10 B.1, Supporting Principle. 
160 Cadbury (2002), p. 51. 
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may or may not be a director. Too many board meetings display verbosity 
among a few and almost complete silence from the rest.‟”
161
 
 
 Martin Lipton and Jay W. Lorsch, who have contributed so constructively to the debate on 
corporate governance in the US as well as internationally, argue persuasively for a 
reduction in the size of American boards. In their "Modest Proposal for Improved 
Corporate Governance" their recommendation is as follows: “We believe that the size of a 
board should be limited to a maximum of ten directors (indeed we would favour boards of 
eight or nine) with a ratio of at least two independent directors to any director who has a 
connection with the company ….”162 
 They reason that boards of this size enable the directors to get to know each other well 
enough for their discussions to be frank and searching and to allow every director to 
contribute to them. With this number it should also be possible for board members to 
reach a true consensus in coming to their decisions. It is worth adding that the “modesty” 
of Lipton and Lorsch‟s proposals lies only in their not being backed by statute, not in their 
refreshingly radical nature. 
 
 Other authorities edge the figure up. Sir Walter Puckey quotes Harold Koontz as saying 
that it is sensible “to limit a board to thirteen members in order to obtain the free 
discussion and deliberative interplay which board decisions require. At the upper end, 
Professor Northcote Parkinson‟s researches have conclusively demonstrated that what he 
refers to as the „coefficient of inefficiency‟ is reached when the members of a body 
number between nineteen and twenty-two; at that point an inner cabinet is established, or 
establishes itself, to take over the functions of the original board or committee.” 
 “Figures quoted in The Professional Board for the top 150 companies showed that on 
average they had 11.4 directors on their boards. There was, however, a wide variation 
within that average, with 15 per cent of companies having eight or less and 15 per cent 
having fifteen or more. Just over half of the board members of those same companies 
were outside directors. This confirms that the proportion of outside directors to executive 
directors has risen compared with ten years ago, when boards were more likely to be 
made up of one-third outsiders to two-thirds insiders.” 
 
 Warren Buffet stresses the point of not too large boards as well.163 
 
                                                     
161 Cadbury (2002), pp. 51-52. 
162 Martin Lipton and Jay W. Lorsch, „Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance‟, 48 The Business 
Lawyer 59 (1992), pp. 67-68. 
163 Cunningham (2009), p. 45. 
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 Higgs gives the following overview:
164
 
 
 Average size and composition of boards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Patrick Dunne:
165
 
 Even the Walker Review, which requires an extra NED committee (the 
risk committee), recommends that the board be kept small.
166
 
 
2.4.9 At least half the board members to be NEDs 
 
 At least half of the board, excluding the chairman, should be made up of 
independent NEDs. The aim should be to strike a balance and not to 
ensure a large majority. This is better for a well-balanced debate. 
 
 The board should have nomination, remuneration and audit committees, 
of which NEDs should be the only members or majority members. 
Needless to say, NEDs should decide on the remuneration of executive 
directors. NEDs may often be the only members of the remuneration 
committee. The company chairman may be a member but not the 
chairman of the remuneration committee.
167
  
 
 The nominations committee is nearly always chaired by the chairman of 
the board, who should be independent upon appointment, but will cease 
to be independent in due course because of his intense contacts with the 
                                                     
164 Higgs Review, p. 18. 
165 Dunne (2005), p. 15. 
166 Walker Review, nos. 3.1 and 3.6. 
167 CC8, B.2.1 and CG10, D 2.1. 
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company.
168
 Succession is a vital issue and the chairman should take the 
lead in that area. 
 
 Evaluation of directors and possible criticism of the chairman and his 
dismissal may be led by the Senior Independent Director (SID) in 
separate meetings of NEDs.  
 
 The audit committee will be chaired by a NED with a financial 
background, and often attended by the CFO.
169
 
 
 The Walker Review recommends that a risk committee be added for 
banks and other financial institutions (BOFIs).
170
 
 
2.4.10 Separate chairman and CEO 
 
 No one individual should have unfettered powers of decision.
171
 The 
CEO and the chairman of the board should not be the same person.
172
 The 
role of the chairman is distinct from that of the CEO. They have different 
but complementary functions and work as a tandem.
173
 The CEO runs the 
company, formulates and executes the strategy, conducts the business and 
is in charge of all management. The chairman runs the board and acts as 
the coach of the CEO and should be happy with the success of the CEO. 
Not only is there nowhere a description of the chairman‟s role, but it is 
hardly recognized in company legislation. Indeed, unlike executive 
directors and NEDs, the chairman often does not even receive a job 
description from the company. Nonetheless, the chairman is responsible 
for leadership of the board, ensuring its effectiveness in carrying out all 
aspects of its role and setting its agenda. The chairman is also responsible 
for ensuring that the non-executive directors receive accurate, timely and 
clear information.
174
 
 
 The chairman should ensure effective communication with 
shareholders.
175
 The chairman should also facilitate the effective 
                                                     
168 CG10, B.2.1. 
169 CG10, C.3.1 and FSA Rule DTR 7.1.1.R (schedule B). 
170 Walker Review, recommendation 23. 
171 CG10 A.2, Main Principle. 
172 CG10, A.2.1. 
173 Owen in Rushton (2008), p. 12 and Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 23. 
174 CG10 A.3, Supporting Principle. 
175 CG10 E.1.1 and A.2, Supporting Principle. 
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contribution of non-executive directors in particular and ensure 
constructive relations between executive and non-executive directors.
176
 
An illustration of the importance attached to the chairmanship of the 
board is the provision that in the largest (the FTSE 100) companies a 
person should hold only one chairmanship (this restriction is currently 
under review by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), because of the 
difficulty of finding good chairmen if the pool of eligible candidates 
becomes so restricted). The Walker Review recommends that chairmen 
of major banks should work two-thirds of their time for the bank.
177
 
 
 Also “The retiring CEO should not move on to become chair of the 
board.”178 
 
 Half of UK listed companies had separate chairmen in 1989, three 
quarters by 1994 and nearly all in 2008.
179
 
 
2.4.11 Formal documentation of roles 
 
 There should be a formal statement of matters on which the full board‟s 
decision is necessary (i.e. this should not be left to management to decide 
and report on).
180
 In the same way the division of responsibilities between 
the chairman and the CEO should be clearly established, set out in 
writing and agreed by the board.
181
 These points of corporate governance 
should be included in the disclosures in the annual report.
182
 
 
2.4.12 Summary of composition of the board in the UK 
 
 (i) The UK has a one-tier board system, and is used to this system. 
 
 (ii) The aim of the UK Codes is to create a dialogue among a 
balanced team of executive and non-executive directors. All, or 
almost all, of the executive directors are on the board. NEDs are 
in a slight majority. Practically all of UK listed companies have a 
separate chairman. The chairman has an important role. 
                                                     
176 CG10 A.3, Supporting Principle. 
177 Walker Review, recommendation 7. 
178 CG10, A.3.1. 
179 Cadbury (2002), p. 105. 
180 CC8 and CG10, A.1.1. 
181 CC8 and CG10, A.2.1. 
182 Listing Rules 9.8.6(5) and (6). 
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 (iii) Other measures created by the Codes are independent NEDs, no 
overly large boards, usually, NEDs only on the committees and 
formal regulations for the division of responsibilities. 
 
 (iv) The UK board composition differs from the composition in the 
US, where only the CEO and about 6 to 9 independent directors 
are board members. The aim in the US is that the strong majority 
of independent directors gives independent counterbalance to the 
CEO. 30% of US listed companies have separate non-CEO 
chairmen. The other 70% have the one person who is both CEO 
and chairman and a lead director for counterbalance. In the UK 
the company secretary has a clear and important role of 
supporting the chairman in corporate governance and in 
preparing the annual report and accounts. 
 
2.5 Role of the board members 
 
2.5.1 Introduction on role of board members 
 
 As mentioned above in 2.4.1, boards of companies in each country must 
develop, implement and monitor all the elements: purpose, strategy, 
policies, risk management, orderly succession, evaluation and 
communication. The question for each country is how these tasks should 
be divided. Which board member should have which role? And how can 
these roles be optimally fulfilled? 
 
 The main differences between a one-tier board in the UK and the average 
two-tier board in the Netherlands concerning the division of 
responsibilities are that in the UK the non-executive directors (NEDs) 
have on-site and operational information, receive more and earlier 
information, are involved in board resolutions and are actively involved 
in developing strategy. In addition, the UK chairman has a more intensive 
role and is paid more than the average Dutch chairman of a supervisory 
board. 
 
 These three elements – early, more on-site information, involvement in 
decision making, involvement in developing strategy – are all worth 
considering to include in the practice of boards in the Netherlands, 
whether in a one-tier or a two-tier board system. I will make a proposal 
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for Dutch boards to once a year discuss these aspects and how to deal 
with them. 
 
 In this section (2.5) the role of board members of a UK company will be discussed 
concerning the following items: first, the legal context of the division of powers between 
shareholders and board members (2.5.2); the definition of the roles of the unitary board 
and its members (2.5.3); the dual role of NEDs: monitoring and strategy (2.5.4); followed 
by the important aspects of the active role of UK NEDs in  developing strategy, i.e. what 
is strategy?; how is strategy discussed?, at what stage and how does the debate take 
place?, is there debate and is it creative?, what influence on strategy can NEDs have if (a) 
he/she knows the business or (b) is an outsider (2.5.5)?; and subsequently some specific 
aspects for banks and the financial industry and what additional input is provided by the 
Walker Review for the roles of NEDs (2.5.6); which is followed by the important sub-
section on the roles of the UK chairman (2.5.7); and finally a discussion about what can 
be done to enable NEDs to perform their dual roles – strategy and monitoring – optimally: 
aspects such as involvement, interpersonal behaviour, independence, time commitment, 
remuneration, early and operational on-site information, committees, the senior 
independent director (SID), evaluation, induction, training, qualities, diversity, regular 
selection, documentation on division of roles and NED appointment letters (2.5.8); as 
well as a description of the best practice for rigorous succession procedures (2.5.9); and 
the role of shareholders and ways in which boards can single out special shareholders who 
take a long-term view and are prepared for “stewardship” (2.5.10). This is all closed by a 
summary of the UK roles of NEDs (2.5.11). 
 
2.5.2 Power of shareholders: freedom of constitution 
 
 As described above in 2.4.2, the shareholders in the UK have the power 
to arrange the company as they wish, subject to some mandatory 
requirements of the law. In the area of division of roles among directors 
the shareholders are also free to agree to whatever system they wish, free 
to delegate powers to board members and free to ask to have a say and to 
ask for consultation. 
 
 The Companies Act 2006 does not mention or describe the board. It does 
lay down the duties of directors as described in 2.6 below. 
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2.5.3 Definition of the roles of the board 
 
 While the Companies Act 2006 does not mention or describe the board 
Cadbury
183
 summarizes the functions of the board as: 
 
 a defining the company‟s purpose; 
 b agreeing on strategy; 
 c establishing the company‟s policies; 
 d appointing the executive directors, i.e. succession;
184
 
 e monitoring the executive team; 
 f assessing their own performance. 
 
 Of course, each company has a formal aim described in the Articles of 
Association mentioning the nature of the enterprise (manufacturing, 
trading, banking). The corporate aim is determined by the founders and 
sets the limits of what a company can do. Purpose is about developing 
the goals and the objectives of the company. What does the entrepreneur 
wish to achieve? The goal is the success of the company, its growth and 
profitability and usually describes what markets, and what financial 
targets will be met. Sometimes general aims are added, such as respect 
for the individual, giving the best customer service and pursuing tasks in 
a superior fashion.
185
 The strategy, in the narrow sense, could also be 
called “tactics” and concerns the company‟s short-term and long-term 
goals and the manner of their achievement, what is the core business, 
what should be disposed of, what should be acquired and how the 
resources should be allocated. Strategy looks into the future. The policies 
are about the manner of activity, the standards and values and look at 
present-day activity. Succession concerns the manner and practice of 
proposing new board members.  
 
 My collective term for the purpose, strategy, policies and succession and 
remuneration would be strategy in the wide sense.
186
 My definitions for 
                                                     
183 Cadbury (2002), pp. 36-37. 
184 The author‟s own preference would be to broaden point d to arranging for proper succession for all board 
members, and I would also add the policy on executive remuneration. 
185 Thomas Watson Jr., A Business and Its Beliefs (1963). Thomas Watson Jr. was the second generation director 
at IBM. 
186 Cadbury (2002), pp. 37-38. I have discussed this with Adrian Cadbury and he agrees. The Frijns Code 
mentions that the role of the management board is to determine the purpose or objectives (“doelstellingen”), 
strategy (“strategie”) and policy (“randvoorwaarden”), which is the strategy in the wide sense. Prof. B. Assink 
in his inaugural speech of 20 January 2010, „De Januskop van het Ondernemingsrecht‟, p. 17 (“Assink 
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the Dutch words “strategie” and “beleid” are that there is a "strategy" in 
the narrow sense, or tactics and that there is a “strategy” in the wide 
sense, also called “beleid”, which is purpose, strategy policy and 
succession together. I draw this conclusion from the text of 
article 2.140/250, paragraph 2 (“beleid”) and article 2.141/251 
(information or “strategisch beleid”) DCC in combination with the Frijns 
Code II.1.2. 
 
 Higgs defines the role of the board as follows: 
 
 “The board is collectively responsible for promoting the success of the company by 
directing and supervising the company‟s affairs. The board‟s role is to provide 
entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a framework of prudent and effective 
controls which enable risk to be assessed and managed. The board should set the 
company‟s strategic aims, ensure that the necessary financial and human resources are in 
place for the company to meet its objectives, and review management performance. The 
board should set the company‟s values and standards and ensure that its obligations to its 
shareholders and others are understood and met.”187  
 
 In my view the words “entrepreneurial leadership” in the Higgs Review 
are very important. These words do not appear in any Dutch Code, 
regulation or opinion as being the task of supervisory directors. It is well 
known that more money is lost by sluggish leadership than by mistakes. 
This is an example worth considering for the Netherlands.
188
 
 
 In the CC6 and CC8 the following was added: 
 
 All directors must take decisions objectively in the interests of the company. 
 
 As part of their role as members of a unitary board, non-executive directors should 
constructively challenge and help develop proposals on strategy. Non-executive directors 
should scrutinise the performance of management in meeting agreed goals and objectives 
and monitor the reporting of performance. They should satisfy themselves on the integrity 
                                                                                                                                    
(2010)”), also describes strategy in the wide sense and the tactics in the narrower sense, which can be for 
5 years but adapted each year. 
187 Higgs Review, p. 21. This text is also retained in the Combined Codes of 2006 and 2008 (CC6 and CC8) in 
A.1, Main Principle and Supporting Principles and in the UK Corporate Governance Code of 2010, which 
introduced the “long-term success of the company”. 
188 Prof. B. Assink in his oratie of 2010 (Assink (2010)) described entrepreneurship, “ondernemerschap”, in 
substantial detail. 
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of financial information and that financial controls and systems of risk management are 
robust and defensible. They are responsible for determining appropriate levels of 
remuneration of executive directors and have a prime role in appointing, and where 
necessary removin, executive directors, and in succession planning.189 
 
 This text was copied from the definition in the Higgs Review of the role 
of the NED. Interestingly, the words “success of the company” have 
become a standard expression for defining the duty of directors in section 
172 of the Companies Act 2006. 
 
 Patrick Dunne says: 
  “In running training sessions around the world over the past 15 years, I have 
found the following shorthand helpful when describing the role of a board and 
the purpose of board meetings: 
 Right strategy 
   Ensuring that the right strategy is in place and that it is being 
executed. Also ensuring that there is a good process in place for 
developing and monitoring strategy. 
 Right resources 
   Making sure that there are the appropriate resources in place to fit 
with the agreed strategy. The most important of these are people and 
money. 
 Keep out of jail 
   By this I mean that the board needs to ensure that the company 
complies with the appropriate laws and regulations relating to its 
industry and location. In other words, „all the governance stuff‟.”
190
 
 
 In my view the words “constructively challenge and help develop 
proposals on strategy” in the UK Codes are a good text and a useful 
guidance for Dutch supervisory directors in a two-tier system or non-
executive directors in a one-tier system. 
 
2.5.4 Dual roles of NEDs in developing strategy and monitoring 
 
The role of NEDs has clearly been enhanced and made more important. 
NEDs have an active role in strategic decision making and they monitor 
the executives. 
                                                     
189 CC6 A.1 and in CC8 A.1 of CG10 the Supporting Principle remained the same. Only the Main Principle A.1 
of CG10 was changed to: “Every company should be headed by an effective board, which is collectively 
responsible for the long-term success of the company”. 
190 Dunne (2005), p. 9. 
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 “NEDs can suffer from schizophrenia in that they should be encouraging 
the development of the company, „the upside‟, while at the same time 
monitoring risk to the company, „the downside‟. Working with the 
executive directors on these areas should lead to greater success for the 
company and hence enhance shareholders value.”191 
 
 Higgs writes in his review in 6.1 that Cadbury and Hampel identified the 
tension between these two elements. However, Sir Adrian Cadbury no 
longer sees the tension as worrisome. He regards the two roles as 
important and the strategy part as particularly important. Higgs writes in 
6.2 of his review that “based on 40 in-depth interviews with directors, the 
research found that while there might be a tension, there was no essential 
contradiction between the monitoring and strategic aspects of the role of 
the non-executive director. An overemphasis on monitoring and control 
risks non-executive directors seeing themselves and being seen, as an 
alien policing influence detached from the rest of the board. An 
overemphasis on strategy risks non-executive directors becoming too 
close to executive management, undermining shareholder confidence in 
the effectiveness of good governance.”192 For this reason there is so much 
discussion about the independent qualities of directors and balance in the 
board.  
 
 Sir Geoffrey Owen: 
 
 “A useful distinction has been made between the board as watchdog and the board as 
pilot. The former implies a strong focus on monitoring and oversight while the latter is 
much more active, gathering a great deal of information and involving itself directly in 
decisions.”
193
 
 
 Now, one can still ask: if the outside director is so deeply involved in the 
strategic thinking in advance, can he then monitor? The answer in the UK 
is yes. Exactly, because he is well informed and has been privy to the 
strategic decisions. He is able to monitor effectively and take a well-
reasoned critical view, because he understands the building blocks of the 
decisions, good or bad, in which he has participated. 
 
                                                     
191 Murray Steele, „The Role of the Non-Executive Director‟, in Ken Rushton (ed.), The Business Case for 
Corporate Governance (2008), pp. 51-54. 
192 Higgs Review, paras. 6.1-6.2. 
193 Owen in Rushton (2008), p. 27.  
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2.5.5 The active strategy-developing role of NEDs 
 
 As is described above in 2.5.4 two main roles for NEDs are developing 
strategy with the executive directors and monitoring the executive 
directors. The long list of UK legislation mentioned in Annex UK Acts 
clearly shows that the monitoring function is important in the UK as well. 
It includes the monitoring and assessment of the executive team and of 
the functioning of the board as a whole. But strategy developing is more 
than monitoring. Under UK laws and practice NEDs have to play an 
active role in company strategy development too. 
 
 The strategy aspect is the interesting part of the role of British NEDs. 
Hereunder we discuss the following aspects: 
 i What is strategy? 
 ii How is strategy discussed? 
 iii In what stage is it discussed? 
 iv Is there real creativity? Is there debate? 
 v What is the influence of the NED? 
 vi Can he have influence if he is an outsider to the business? 
 vii Can he remain a critical monitor once the board has decided on 
the execution of the strategy? 
 
 The reaction to scandals such as BCCI, Maxwell, Enron, WorldCom and 
the purchase of ABN AMRO by RBS is often: “Where were the 
directors? Were they independent?” The question is always: did they 
monitor and did they know the business sufficiently well to carry out 
their monitoring duties? So, why is the strategy element important? Sir 
Derek Birkin gives an answer: 
 
  “If a board has the right strategy then you find that operational 
matters don‟t consume too much time at board meetings. This is 
because major capital expenditure approvals, policy matters and 
so on will just naturally fit. If they don‟t, then you need to revisit 
the strategy.”194 
  
 It is often said that less money is lost, because of mistakes than by 
complacent entrepreneurship. This is easy to say in growth periods, but 
could seem less relevant in crises of the kind we are currently 
experiencing. It is said as well that entrepreneurship is the continuous 
                                                     
194 Dunne (2005), p. 34. 
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drive to develop ideas to stay ahead of the competition and the ceaseless 
striving for new products that can be of use to society and be profitable. 
 
 In other words, companies get into trouble for two main reasons: first, a 
single bad decision that puts the company off course and, second, a slow 
decline that stems from deteriorating performance on the part of the CEO 
and his team.
195
 
 
 (i) What is strategy? 
  As described in 2.5.3 above one can speak of strategy in the wide 
sense, which in my view would be roughly comparable with 
“beleid” in Dutch, i.e. purpose, strategy, policy and succession 
planning, and strategy in the narrow sense, which would be 
“strategie” or “tactiek” in Dutch.196 Hereunder two quotes about 
strategy in either sense. 
 
  Cadbury quotes Michael Porter: “Corporate strategy is what 
makes the corporate whole add up to more than the sum of its 
business unit parts.”197 (This would be strategy in the wide 
sense.) 
  and Stiles, Philip and Taylor Bernard in Boards at Work (2001): 
“The first order strategy deciding what areas of business to be in, 
what is the core business, what should be divested or bought, how 
resources are to be allocated around the organization, is in the 
domain of the board.”198 (This would be strategy in the narrow 
sense.) 
 
  While every company has a general aim that is described in the 
articles of association the word purpose is one step further and 
can be defined very generally as the success of the company and 
broadly the products or services the company will offer, the 
markets it will enter, the financial targets it will meet, sometimes 
broad terms such as “more customer satisfaction”. 
 
                                                     
195 Owen in Rushton (2008), p. 26.  
196 Articles 2:140/250, 2 DCC mention that the supervisory board supervises the management board‟s “beleid”. 
The Frijns Code in II.1.2 gives a list of items that the management board presents to the supervisory board for 
approval (the list being in my view “beleid”) and the list includes purpose, strategy and policy. 
197 Cadbury (2002), p. 132. 
198 Cadbury (2002), p. 133. 
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  Elements of strategy in the narrow sense include:  
  – core business; 
  – what to divest or buy; 
  – how to allocate resources; 
  Policies, internal guidelines, including ethical codes, CSR 
regulations, whistle blowing rules, risk management directives, 
are also part of the wider strategy debate. 
 
 (ii) How is strategy discussed? 
  It is clear in the UK that all directors, including outside directors, 
have a leading and active role in the development of strategy and 
can add value. In practice, the whole board has an annual 
strategic meeting (called “away days”) in a resort for two or three 
days. A strategic topic is also discussed at each meeting. 
Sometimes executive directors prepare strategic options for the 
board, sometimes outside directors put forward options, 
sometimes executive directors submit drafts to the board and 
sometimes they suggest strategic moves (such as a takeover) to 
the board. 
 
  In a two-tier system, such as in the Netherlands, executive 
directors determine strategy, make drafts for strategic plans and 
propose takeovers. With exception of a few large listed 
companies with some experienced supervisory directors, who 
have been CEO in other companies, supervisory directors 
generally only supervise, monitor and correct the strategy. In the 
UK outside directors in most cases actively participate in the 
debate about strategy, which is meant to be a creative process. 
Although outside directors may have less detailed knowledge, 
they can add value by contributing their experience, their 
independent and critical questions and alternative points of view. 
This fits in very well with the British idea of team effort and role 
allocation. In general, the British like to think about strategies. 
Outside directors in the UK do not merely advise. They are not 
consultants, but individuals with experience in a wide range of 
business fields, who can take an intelligent and objective view of 
the company as a whole.
199
 In the UK the chairman should 
promote debate well in advance, when there is still time to 
                                                     
199 Owen in Rushton (2008), p. 13.  
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choose between options.
200
 This means NEDs can and should be 
pro-active. “An exemplary board is one which is a robust, social 
grouping of individuals which is capable of challenging one 
another‟s conclusions through open communications in an 
atmosphere of respect, trust and candour. This captures the spirit 
of the board as a collegiate team.”201 
 
  Some examples: 
  (a) At Cadbury-Schweppes PLC under the chairmanship of Sir Adrian 
Cadbury, the company had three divisions: the Cadbury chocolate and 
the Schweppes drinks businesses, which were international and had 
worldwide trademarks, and, third, a food business with different foods 
of varied Cadbury and Schweppes origin. These included many old 
British trademarks. The food business was one of the elements that 
brought the merger about in the first place – the combination created 
synergy – and it included some old Cadbury trademarks. An outside 
director, who was a politician, saw that this division had lower returns 
and that there was less internationalisation in the food business. He 
was not an insider at all and had the independence to query why the 
food business should not be sold, which was not a popular question. 
The chairman, Adrian Cadbury, let him ask the question and then 
sought the views of all the directors. New elements came up in a 
meeting and he therefore postponed the decision until a subsequent 
meeting. In the end the food business was sold and some of the old 
trademarks bought back, all for the good of the company. 
 
  (b) RBS, as part of a consortium, acquired ABN AMRO in 2008 for a 
high price when the market was at its top. Little due diligence was 
carried out. A year later, in 2009, the shareholders were unhappy. The 
only way in which this might possibly have been avoided is to have 
had forward-looking strategy on takeovers. A board should regularly 
discuss whether it wishes to grow by takeovers, and if so, what the 
procedure should be, what type of due diligence is required, what the 
criteria should be – such as strategic fit, group finance after the 
acquisition, can the board control the new group – and what the 
valuation method should be. This debate in advance avoids situations 
where an energetic CEO takes the board by surprise and gets his way 
by saying “This is an opportunity we can‟t afford to miss”. The 
                                                     
200 Cadbury (2002), p. 34. 
201 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 45. 
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outside directors must be independent and the chairman must allow 
for time for creative and forward-looking debate. 
 
  (c) David Jackson describes two different extremes, first in his capacity 
as general counsel and executive director at Power-Gen and later in 
his capacity as company secretary at BP, which make clear that the 
role of NEDs in a smaller company can be different from the role of 
NEDs in a larger company.202 
 
   At PowerGen the executives were entering into new capital projects 
regularly. The complete board, including non-executives from former 
government-owned companies, was involved in new projects in new 
countries all the time. These were seen as strategic moves into new 
markets. Because bid documents had to be reviewed matters were 
delegated to committees of executive and non-executive directors. 
They were operating in an industry which was simultaneously being 
invented and privatised and developing rapidly. In a more mature 
organization, they might have stood back and let the executive team 
deal with these matters within carefully prescribed boundaries. As 
time went by behaviour changed and they got ahead of things. 
 
   At the other end of the scale, in a complex global organization such as 
BP the contribution of the non-executive directors is different. They 
will, on behalf of the shareholders, make sure that the executive team 
is delivering on the agreed purpose and strategy. This seems more like 
a monitoring role, but when it comes to special lines of strategy and 
policy, such as the “Green” image of BP, its social, environmental and 
human rights policies, how to proceed with succession, what the 
structure of Board Committees should be, and what the boundaries of 
joint ventures and takeovers should be, the outside directors can play a 
vital role in the debate on the strategy of the company (David Jackson 
wrote this in 2008). 
 
  It becomes very clear from these examples that there is no “one 
fits all” system. There are many types of companies in very 
different sizes. This is important to keep in mind. Professor Sven 
Dumoulin
203
 makes this point clear in Dutch legal literature as 
                                                     
202 Jackson in Rushton (2008), pp. 74-75.  
203 Prof. Sven Dumoulin, „De positie van niet-uitvoerend bestuurders in het monistisch bestuursmodel‟, 
Ondernemingsrecht 2005/91, nr. 2 (“Dumoulin (2005)”). 
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well. In all the examples mentioned it is clear that strategy must 
be forward looking and that the chairman should make sure that 
there is sufficient time for debate and he should stimulate the 
board to reflect creatively on the company‟s strategy. 
 
  Several recommendations by Adrian Cadbury have been 
discussed above, such as: 
  – the Chairman should encourage debate well in advance; 
  – the Chairman should let the other directors give their 
view first; 
  – the strategy should be communicated in a consistent way. 
  It is often said for many countries that so much of strategy 
development is discussed in the corridors, outside, before and 
after meetings. That happens and can be fruitful but sometimes 
confusing. It is especially this aspect that the British try to 
streamline by creating a good team atmosphere in the meetings. 
 
 (iii) At what stage is strategy discussed: well in advance and taking 
time 
  Rushton, who gives clear instructions for leadership of meetings 
by chairmen, says in the chapter of the book he edited: 
  “It is particularly important that sufficient board time is given to 
developing and reviewing business strategy … the Chairman 
must see to it that contributions and challenges are sought from 
the non-executive directors.”204 
 
  And he gives an example of a chairman who said 
  “his board spent two days considering strategy at the beginning 
of each planning cycle so, later in the cycle, they were able to 
take a more informed view on the individual business strategies” 
(think of the example above, on p. 66 of the acquisition of a 
bank). 
  “Every director needs to take care that his chairman is using the 
board‟s time in a way that is consistent with his duty to promote 
the success of the company. All directors, not just the chairman, 
could be exposed if agendas and board papers fail to include 
those matters that are material to the company‟s success.”205  
 
                                                     
204 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 31. 
205 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 31. 
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  So far as running the meeting is concerned, an effective chairman 
will allow the CEO and his executive colleagues to present 
proposals or reports that will usually be pre-agreed by 
management. The chairman will see to it that the presentations 
are not so long as to leave inadequate time for discussion. It is up 
to the chairman to set the tone at the board meeting by 
encouraging non-executive directors to contribute. The quality of 
the debate is often dependent on the quality of the board papers 
and presentations.  
  “Another Chairman said … so long as the weighty issues such as 
strategy and budget are taken first. He argued … that the 
chairman‟s priority is strategy without … limiting time for 
discussion.”206 
 
  To express the differences in timing of the contribution of NEDs 
in a one-tier board and of supervisory board members in a two-
tier board in merger talks, Cadbury compared the decision 
making processes in the Daimler German two-tier board and the 
Chrysler US one-tier board.
207
 CEOs Jürgen Schremp and Robert 
Eaton opened their discussions in January 1998. On 5 February 
Eaton informed his Chrysler board, including independent 
directors. His complete board met every fortnight, approving the 
merger on 6 May and announcing this the next day. On the 
German side Schremp informed his management board on 7 
April and the chairman of the supervisory board on 16 April. The 
supervisory board was officially informed on 6 May, the day 
before the merger was announced. 
 
  Dunne advises that strategy should be discussed at every board 
meeting, not only on away days. He also advises that strategy 
should be a separate agenda item at each board meeting.
208
 
 
  Dunne together with Murray Steele of Cranfield also gives some 
tips for away days: 
– be clear on the purpose of the away day and your desired 
outcomes (e.g. selection from a number of well-
researched strategic options); 
                                                     
206 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 32. 
207 Cadbury (2002), p. 233; IMD, Lausanne, Volume 8, no. 4, October 2000. 
208 Dunne (2005), p. 36. 
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– decide early enough whether to use an external facilitator 
and, if so, select one with experience of the issues to be 
discussed who will do the necessary homework; 
– the chairman or CEO should brief the facilitator about 
team dynamics, politics and taboo subjects (the facilitator 
will then have to interpret skilfully!); 
– external facilitators must be good and well prepared; 
– decide whether there will be non-board members present 
and, if so, brief them appropriately; 
– hold the away day offsite; 
– don‟t allow interruptions except in case of emergency; 
– don‟t start with an operational board meeting; 
– participants should be prepared to challenge each other, 
in particular to allow differences to surface – a key to 
success is the quality of debate, both in content and 
challenge; 
– no one has a monopoly on wisdom, so no one should 
dominate the debate; 
– responsibility for implementing actions arising should be 
clear; 
– follow up and review the effectiveness of the day as part 
of your annual board review; 
– finally, “socialising” by the board is an important part of 
building a strong and cohesive board, so ensure that there 
is sufficient emphasis and time devoted to this.
209
 
 
 (iv) Is there real creativity? Is there debate? 
  Creative 
 Patrick Dunne gives further advice: “Is it a creative process or 
not?”210 
  The NEDs he had spoken with broadly agreed that for the most 
part a board meeting is a creative process. “Why bother having 
the meeting if it isn‟t?” For them, the point of the meetings is to 
agree on a strategy and regularly assess its effectiveness and 
within the strategy establish and maintain a clear policy on 
relevant operational issues and also to consider and enable 
successful succession planning throughout the organization, gain 
external input and evaluation for executive decisions and ensure 
                                                     
209 Dunne (2005), p. 40. 
210 Dunne (2005), p. 9. 
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the company effects all necessary procedural and compliance 
items across the range, from health and safety issues to Stock 
Exchange compliance matters. 
 
  British legal literature emphasizes that atmosphere is important. 
The British boards have a lighter atmosphere and are more fun 
than US boards.
211
 
 
  Talking about strategy can be a lot more fun than merely 
monitoring whether the business is properly under control.
212
 
 
  Debate 
  The meetings of UK boards often take place in a good 
atmosphere of debate, where elements of the UK culture of team 
play, broad thinking, adversarial and nuanced points of view 
come out well. They understand the differences between 
“dissent” and “disloyalty” and try to avoid group thinking.213 
 
  Cadbury gives the following description of a board:
214
 
  “In a unitary board, strategies, plans and policies are developed 
over time, through debate and argument, within the board and 
between the board and senior management. This method of 
hammering out decisions through a dialogue, between those who 
form policy and those who put it into effect, is one of the 
strengths of the unitary approach.” 
 
  Rushton suggests the following: 
  “Exemplary board … robust, social grouping … which is capable 
of challenging one another‟s conclusions through open 
communications in an atmosphere of respect, trust and 
candour.”215 
 
  The board‟s overriding responsibility is to develop the company, 
which is more about tough-minded discussion between 
executives and NEDs in an atmosphere of trust than it is about 
                                                     
211 Dunne (2005), pp. 43 and 48. 
212 Dunne (2005), p. 34. 
213 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 46. 
214 Cadbury (2002), p. 134. 
215 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 45. 
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spinning endless webs of process around the executive directors 
on the assumption that evil will otherwise triumph.
216
 
 
 (v) What is the influence of a NED? 
  The examples given on p. 66 above in Cadbury-Schweppes, the 
bank in the ideal situation and David Jackson‟s examples at 
PowerGen and BP show that NEDs can have influence. 
 
  The example of Nat West (see the history of banks above) shows 
that, in practice, a majority of NEDs can override the chair and 
the CEO. 
 
  The Walker Review shows that banks and other financial 
institutions (BOFIs) with challenging NEDs have weathered the 
crisis better.
217
 
 
 (vi) Can a NED have influence if he is an outsider? 
  The example mentioned above in relation to the Cadbury-
Schweppes strategy in 1988, where the politician dared to ask 
why the group retained a division that was underperforming, 
makes clear that common sense can win the day. 
 
  The board of a BOFI needs to have a majority of NEDs with 
financial experience, but diverse skills and a wealth of experience 
from elsewhere are also required, implying that outsiders are 
essential as well.
218
 
 
 (vii) Can a NED remain a critical monitor once the board has 
decided on a strategic route? (This is the main question raised 
by proponents of a two-tier board) 
  Yes, the UK view is that a NED who has helped to decide on a 
strategic route can continue to adopt a critical stance. Higgs 
concluded, after 40 in-depth interviews, that there is no 
contradiction between a NED's monitoring and strategic roles.
219
 
Walker foresees that a risk committee consisting mainly of NEDs 
could do due diligence for an acquisition after the board has 
decided to take steps to acquire a target. The result of the due 
                                                     
216 Dunne (2005), p. 34. 
217 Walker Review, nos. 2.12 and 2.13. 
218 Walker Review, nos. 3.13 and 3.15. 
219 Higgs Review, paras. 6.1-6.2. 
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diligence may be that the acquisition is not pursued.
220
 The 
Walker Review in discussing the alternatives of the one- and 
two-tier systems, concludes that one-tier boards have the 
advantage of timely information for NEDs and value adding 
interaction with NEDs.
221
 
 
2.5.6 Banks 
 
 As in other countries special attention has since the credit crisis been 
given in the UK to corporate governance at banks. The themes of the 
consultation document of the Walker Review of 17 July 2009, were 
repeated in the executive summary of the Walker Review.
222
 It stresses 
board behaviour, i.e. the need for an environment in which effective 
challenge of the executive by NEDs takes place in board meetings before 
decisions are taken on major risk and strategic issues. It also emphasizes 
time commitment of NEDs, as well as financial industry experience and 
independence of mind of NEDs. 
 
 Some specific items in the Walker Review are: 
 
 – banks and other financial institutions (BOFIs) on both sides of 
the Atlantic with long entrenched imperial CEOs and little NED 
input have fared materially worse than those with challenging 
NEDs. The NED contribution was materially helpful in BOFIs 
that have weathered the crisis better than others;
223
 BOFIs where 
CEOs later became chairmen also fared well;
224
 
 
 – the majority of NEDs and the chairman should have financial 
experience;
225
 
 
 – the chairman of a BOFI should be submitted to re-election on an 
annual basis;
226
 
                                                     
220 Walker Review, executive summary and nos. 6.30 and 6.31 and recommendation 26. 
221 Walker Review, p. 33. 
222 Walker Review, pp. 9-10. 
223 Walker Review, nos. 2.12 and 2.13; see also two research papers by Nestor Advisors: (i) Governance in 
Crisis, a comparative case study of 6 US investment banks; those that weathered the crisis best – Goldman 
Sachs and JP Morgan – had CEOs with shorter terms and more knowledgeable NEDs; (ii) a study of 20 
European banks which came to the same conclusions, see www.nestoradvisors.com. 
224 Walker Review, no. 309. 
225 Walker Review, nos. 3.13 and 4.20 and recommendation 8. 
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 – each BOFI should have a chief risk officer (CRO) and a risk 
committee which has a majority of NEDs; the risk committee 
should carry out special due diligence investigations in the case 
of large acquisitions;
227
 
 
 – the greater the prospective risk appetite of a BOFI board, the 
greater will be the need for financial industry expertise among 
NEDs on the board; however, although the board should have a 
majority of NEDs with financial experience, these boards will 
also require some NEDs with other skills;
228
 
 
 – there will have to be a greater time commitment on the part of 
NEDs (up to 35 days a year)
229
 and the chairman of a major 
BOFI (two-thirds of his time).
230
 
 
2.5.7 Roles of chairman 
 
Here , I would like to quote the Walker Review: 
 “In all this, the role of the chairman is paramount, calling for both 
exceptional board leadership skills and ability to get confidently and 
competently to grips with major strategic issues.”231 
 
 In describing the paramount role of the chairman I will discuss the 
following matters below: why have a separate chairman?; his general role 
in leadership of the board; agenda setting and promotion of the 
contribution by NEDs; providing good governance, information for the 
board, proper evaluation; orderly succession; good relationship with the 
CEO; guarding reputation of the company and good representation; 
communication with shareholders; providing for a senior independent 
director (SID) and a job description of the chairman; appointment and 
limited period. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
226 Walker Review, recommendation 10, this idea is criticised on the ground that it would promote short 
termsism; this is already a compromise because the one-year only rule applies to the chairman. 
227 Walker Review, recommendations 23, 24 and 26 and nos. 6.1 to 6.37.  
228 Walker Review, nos. 3.7-3.15. 
229 Walker Review, recommendation 3. 
230 Walker Review, recommendation 7. 
231 Walker Review, p. 6.  
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 (i) Why have a separate chairman? 
  The basic reason for having a chairman separate from the CEO is 
to provide balance on the board and offset the “imperial CEO”. 
Sir Adrian Cadbury, who gained experience of both positions 
over a period of many years, started the discussion and gives five 
good reasons for having a separate chairman:
232
 
 
  I different mixes of ability and experience are required; 
  II the chairman must build the board team which takes time 
and commitment; 
  III putting two functions together concentrates a great deal 
of power in one person; 
  IV the combination (of CEO and chairman in one person) 
makes it more difficult for the board to carry out its 
supervisory function (see also Rushton);
233
 
  V sharing out the ever-growing workload (see also 
Rushton
234
) created by governance and shareholder 
contact issues. 
 
 (ii) General role of chairman: leadership of the board  
  As mentioned earlier, the role of the chairman is not described in 
the Companies Act 2006. Before 1990 half of the CEOs 
combined the position of CEO with that of chairman. The 
Cadbury Code and subsequent codes as well as institutional 
investors have pushed for the separation of the roles and for the 
positions to be held by two different people. Now nearly all 
larger listed companies in the UK have separated these roles. 
 
  The chairman must fulfil the criteria of independence – inter alia 
not having been employee or CEO of the company – at the 
moment he is appointed, though he loses his independence as he 
becomes closer to the company every day. He is, on average, at 
the company about two days a week and has an office there. He 
works closely together with the CEO, the CFO, the company 
secretary and the deputy chairman or SID and with the other 
independent directors. He is not an executive director and also 
not an independent non-executive director. His function is to 
                                                     
232 Cadbury (2002), p. 108. 
233 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 29. In the US Ira Millstein says a CEO/chairman is conflicted in the 
supervisory role. 
234 Rushton in Rushton (2008), pp. 29 and 31. 
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develop and maintain the board as an optimal team and to ensure 
that all aspects of corporate governance are performed as well as 
possible. These include communication within the board, timely 
information, induction or introduction programme, orderly 
succession of board members for a well balanced board, good 
meetings with time for discussion on strategy, and consistent 
communication with shareholders, analysts, financial institutions 
and the media. His role is complementary to that of the CEO, 
who runs the business. 
 
  The Higgs Review
235
 describes the roles of the chairman 
summarized as follows: 
  “The role of the chairman is that he leads the board, sets the 
agenda, provides timely information to directors and arranges for 
induction,
236
 ensures the provision of effective information to 
shareholders, arranges evaluation, facilitates effective 
contribution to board tasks by non-executive directors and 
ensures constructive relations between executive and non-
executive directors and monitors an orderly succession of board 
members.” 
 
 (iii) Agenda setting and the promotion of contributions by NEDs 
  By setting the agenda and sitting at the head of the table the 
chairman leads and runs the board. In practice, the chairman will 
often set the agenda with the company secretary. He should 
delegate legal and compliance issues to the company secretary 
and the chairman should focus himself as much as possible on 
strategy.
237
 
 
  The main job of the chairman is to ensure that the board operates 
as an effective team.
238
 The meetings should have a good debate 
                                                     
235 Higgs Review, p. 23, these elements are copied into CC6 A.2, Supporting Principle and with some changes in 
CG10 A.3. 
236 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 41. 
237 Dunne (2005), p. 34, Cadbury (2002), p. 83. 
238 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 44. 
 Cadbury (2002), p. 52, Chairman … to build … an effective team 
 p. 80, … arriving … at better conclusions … than would have been possible without that debate. 
 p. 87, Openness and equality between board members are essential to a thorough debate and chairmen have 
to work on persistently for their achievement…. The challenge for chairmen is to draw on the differences 
between viewpoints of their executive directors and outside directors, while maintaining their unity as a 
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and draw out the differences in the opinions of its members, 
while maintaining their unity as a team. Chairmen should listen 
first. A telling example (see above in the history of banks) is that 
of Lord Alexander, chairman of Nat West, who listened to his 
NEDs, even when the majority disagreed with him.
239
 Lord 
Alexander was not in favour of being in the investment banking 
business, while the majority of the NEDs were in favour. They 
prevailed in the meeting. However, it later turned out that they 
did not succeed in pursuing that course, because their 
shareholders did not really support the idea and because 
Warburg‟s management preferred to join UBS. Later Nat West 
was taken over by the smaller RBS. 
 
  Sometimes it may seem that the chairman has become too 
powerful which creates a distance between himself and the 
NEDs. Can the NEDs keep up with the chairman? This risk 
occurs when the relationship between CEO and chairman 
becomes too close.
240
 The International Underwriting Association 
of London Limited has commented that if a chairman spends too 
much time at the company he could become too dominant.
241
 If 
the chairman focuses on creating a good team and follows Sir 
Adrian Cadbury‟s advice to reach agreement through debate and 
argument, these risks will not occur and he will run the board 
properly. The chairman orchestrates, he does not talk too much, 
but gives others freedom to speak.
242
 The chairman should 
regularly check informally, possibly over dinner, whether there is 
any unease or discontent among board members.
243
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
board team. 
 p. 90, Chairmen must be prepared to accept that in an open debate their conviction may be doubted. 
Chairmen should at least listen first. 
 p. 99, Chairmen who can lead their boards, rather than driving them, to arrive at balanced judgments will 
have earned the respect of their colleagues. A sense of humour is in order. 
239 Augur (2001), pp. 180-181 and 269 and p. 37 of this study. 
240 Walker Review, no. 4.16. 
241 Walker Review, p. 57 (box). 
242 Cadbury (2002), p. 241 and “complete freedom to speak under a reasonably independent chairman is a 
precious asset”, Cadbury (2002), p. 88. 
243 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 41. 
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 (iv) Provide good governance, timely information to the board and 
good evaluation 
  The chairman should make sure that good standards of corporate 
governance are met,
244
 seeking the support of the company 
secretary.
245
 They must ensure that there are good induction 
programmes
246
 and that good and timely information is provided 
to the NEDs.
247
 The chairman should also ensure that the NEDs 
evaluate themselves and the executives each year.
248
 The SID 
arranges for separate meetings of NEDs to evaluate the chairman. 
 
 (v) Orderly succession 
  Succession is an important task of the board. The chairman 
should lead this process and, in most cases, chair the nomination 
committee.
249
 
 
 (vi) Relationship with the CEO 
  The volume of work for those who head a company is growing 
all the time. There is more than enough work for two at the top of 
a public company.
250
 The natural split is for the chairman to be in 
charge of the board and the way it functions and for the CEO to 
be responsible for in fact running the company. It is vital that 
they see their jobs as complementary and not as competing.
251
 
There is a need for a well defined division of labour, trust and 
avoidance of competition.
252
 The chairman should meet the CEO 
once a week. An important aspect of the role of the chairman is 
to support the CEO. He should be happy with the CEO‟s success. 
He should be the CEO‟s sounding board. 
 
  However, their relationship is part of a network of relationships 
between board members and senior executives and should not be 
                                                     
244 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 32. 
245 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 33. 
246 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 41. 
247 CC8 A.2 and CG10 B.5, Supporting Principle and p. 40; Cadbury (2002), p. 85. 
248 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 47, see also 2.4.12 above. 
249 CC8 A.4.2 and CG10 B.2.1; Cadbury (2002), p. 96. 
250 Cadbury (2002), p. 121. 
251 Cadbury (2002), p. 117. 
252 Cadbury (2002), p. 117. 
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to the detriment of those other links. Their thoughts need to be 
openly shared with the other directors.
253
 
  In my view it is very important that the CEO and chairman share 
their thinking, including their dilemmas, with the other directors 
and not cover up any of their dilemmas or those of the other 
directors. 
 
 (vii) Guarding reputation of the company, representation 
  While the CEO runs the company and represents the company 
externally, the chairman is also accountable for everything 
concerning the company.
254
 
 
  Chairmen usually prefer to keep a low public profile and leave 
their CEO in the spotlight. The focus has tended to shift from 
chairman to CEO.
255
 In times of crisis the chairman is likely to be 
a key player and the eyes are often on him. In practice the 
chairman should not be too visible at the start of external 
problems, such as Union Carbide‟s Bhopal drama or ICI‟s 
explosion at a factory in Peterborough.
256
 
 
  In the matter of BP‟s disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, the 
CEO was the face of the company and his US successor is as 
well. In one instance – the negotiations with President Obama 
about an escrow account – the chairman of BP played an 
important role. It proved useful to have a second head. 
 
  However, if there is an internal board crisis or a lack of trust in a 
director, the chairman should play an active role. BP had many 
separate sessions of NEDs. If there is lack of trust in the 
chairman or a dispute between the chairman and the CEO, the 
SID should be active and visible.
257
 
 
 (viii) Communication with shareholders 
  The communication with shareholders is important and the 
chairman has an important role in this area.
258
  
                                                     
253 Cadbury (2002), p. 121; Walker Review, no. 4.16. 
254 Cadbury (2002), p. 117. 
255 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 35; Cadbury (2002), p. 136. 
256 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 35. 
257 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 35. 
258 CC8 A.2, Supporting Principle and CG10 E.1, Supporting Principle and E.1.1. 
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  The annual report always contains a chairman‟s page, which 
tends to be the most read page in the UK
259
 because it describes 
the long-term strategy. 
 
  At the AGM, UK chairmen endeavour to answer questions of 
shareholders themselves. They make every effort to be well 
prepared. Sometimes they have to confer with a specialist board 
member or arrange for the shareholders to approach the specialist 
board member after the meeting. 
 
  Shareholders often write letters to the chairman marked “for the 
chairman‟s personal attention only”. A good chairman is 
interested in all letters from shareholders and either deals with 
them personally or arranges for them to be answered by the 
person who knows most about the topic. 
 
  Outside financial analysts have started to wield considerable 
power. Whenever the annual or bi-annual results are published 
CEOs, CFOs and chairmen in the UK now meet first with the 
analysts and immediately thereafter with the press.
260
 
 
  CEOs, CFOs and chairmen meet and have contacts with larger 
institutional investors. The Combined Code and UK Corporate 
Governance Code set out the principle on which relations with 
institutional investors should be based: “There should be a 
dialogue with shareholders based on the mutual understanding of 
objectives. The board as a whole has responsibility for ensuring 
that a satisfactory dialogue with shareholders takes place.”261 The 
chairman should maintain sufficient contact with major 
shareholders to understand their issues and concerns
262
 and he 
should communicate these to the whole board. He should discuss 
governance and strategy with major shareholders. Other NEDs 
should be offered the opportunity to attend some of these 
meetings. The SID should attend as much as possible.
263
 
                                                     
259 Cadbury (2002), p. 138. 
260 Cadbury (2002), pp. 143-147. 
261 CC8 D.1 and CG10 E.1, Main Principle. 
262 CC8 D.1, Supporting Principle and CG10 E.1.1. 
263 CC8 D.1.1 and CG10 E.1.1. 
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Therefore, the chairman has the role of listening to and sounding 
out major shareholders and passing their views on to the board.  
 
  In my view the Dutch would do well to follow the British 
example of listening quietly, without reacting, even by body 
language. On the other hand it may not go well with the Dutch 
practice to have a chairman discuss strategy with shareholders. 
Here the Dutch are closer to the US, where a chairman does not 
discuss strategy with shareholders. 
 
  It should be understood that many of these contacts with major 
shareholders are “one-on-ones” or “one-on-tens” (with a group of 
shareholders) and that there is the caveat that they are selective. 
The warning is that these meetings are usually over lunch. “These 
meetings came perilously close to passing price-sensitive 
information to selected investors.”264 There are, however, two 
safeguards that make it less dangerous in practice. First, high 
level executives of the investors are more interested in longer 
term issues of strategy and board competence than price-sensitive 
short-term points. Second, they are normally willing to be 
included into the category of “insiders”, i.e. confirm that they 
will not trade or tip as long as the information is not known to all. 
For example, Hermes, the large UK pension fund often chooses 
this approach of a lock-up in accordance with the “Code of 
conduct in support of companies”. The FSA has also issued 
helpful disclosure rules.
265
 
 
  This contact with major institutional shareholders is very 
important in the UK. A few years ago this was relatively easy as 
these major UK shareholders often jointly had a majority. Now, 
however, there are more foreign institutional investors and hedge 
funds. Contact with them is less easy. This is discussed further at 
2.5.10 below. 
 
  The chairman should ensure that all these communications are 
consistent.
266
 
 
                                                     
264 Cadbury (2002), p. 147. 
265 Cadbury (2002), p. 148. 
266 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 40; Cadbury (2002), p. 134. 
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 (ix) SID 
  The senior independent director has the following roles to: 
  – lead the meetings of NEDs, when they meet separately 
from time to time; 
  – lead the meetings of NEDs to evaluate the chairman;267 
  – take the lead if there is a crisis involving the chairman, 
e.g. if there is a dispute or mistrust between shareholders 
and the chairman, or a dispute between the CEO and the 
chairman; 
  – listen to the views of shareholders and to understand their 
issues and concerns.
268
 
 
 (x) Job description of the chairman 
  Although NEDs always have detailed 3 or 4-page contracts, it 
sometimes happens that a chairman does not have a job 
description.
269
 Nonetheless, it is very important for the chairman 
and the CEO to divide their responsibilities clearly.
270
 
 
 (xi) Appointment 
  The board appoints the Chairman upon the nomination by the 
nominations committee. The SID will play a role in this process, 
also of sounding out shareholders. It is advisable to appoint one, 
preferably two potential candidates for the position of chairman 
in advance on the board as NED, to find out how the candidate 
can get along with all board members.
271
 Upon appointment he 
should meet the independence criteria.
272
 See also sub-section 
2.5.9 hereunder on succession. 
 
 (xii) Limited period 
  There is a tendency to keep the period of tenure to a limited 
period of 6 years.
273
 The Walker Review proposes that chairmen 
should be up for re-election each year.
274
 
 
                                                     
267 CC8 A.6.1 and CG10 B.6.3. 
268 CC8 D.1.1 and CG10 E.1.1. 
269 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 34. 
270 Cadbury (2002), p. 117. 
271 Cadbury (2002), p. 118. 
272 CG10 A.3.1. 
273 CG10 B.2.3. 
274 Walker Review, recommendation 10 and nos. 4.23 to 4.26. 
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2.5.8 Getting the best out of NEDs 
 
After the separation of the functions of the CEO and the chairman, the 
second next most far-reaching development in the UK during the last 15 
years has been the enhancement of the role of the Non-Executive 
Directors (NEDs), as a result of the various codes and the pressure of 
institutional investors. 
 
 The role of NEDs has been enhanced in many ways: 
 – they are now involved in developing strategy (see 2.5.5 above) in 
addition to their monitoring role; 
 – they have a small majority on the board (balance); 
 – there is a formalised nomination process to ensure a varied board; 
 – they are elected for fixed terms; 
 – they are helpfully induced into the board, receive continued 
education  and timely information; 
 – they are involved in committee work. 
 
 The following sub-paragraph discusses what can be done to make NEDs 
function optimally. 
 
 The role of a NED is complex and demanding 
 “How complex and demanding the role is today is aptly portrayed by this 
job advertisement 
  Experienced professional required for demanding role in small but influential 
team. Although the role is part time (up to 18 days, in some cases 30 days, a 
year) there is scope to make a significant contribution to a multi-million pound 
operation. Commensurate with this, the successful candidate will need to be 
fully versed in stakeholder issues and may be required to fall on his or her 
sword as appropriate. 
  To be successful, the candidate must have an extensive working knowledge of 
corporate finance, business planning, financial analysis, auditing, regulation and 
compliance, human resources, remuneration policy, organizational theory and 
change management. 
  On a personal level, he or she will be an experienced diplomat, negotiator, 
lateral thinker, communicator, trouble shooter, and will have the drive and 
energy to ensure successful outcomes.”275 
 
                                                     
275 Steele in Rushton (2008), pp. 50-52. 
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 Involved in the business, especially at BOFIs 
 It is clear that NEDs have to have an understanding of the company‟s 
operating environment, e.g. technological change, legal and regulatory 
developments; the dynamics of the industry; competitors; and customers.  
 
 Challenging the executives means getting them to distinguish between 
prejudice and fact. There is the temptation, especially where executives 
have worked together over an extended time, for management to lapse 
into not readily noticeable underperformance. Challenge by NEDs can 
prevent such slack. For BOFIs, Walker recommends a majority of NEDs 
with financial experience.
276
 
 
 Interpersonal 
 NEDs need to have strong interpersonal qualities (people‟s skills). The 
Higgs Review sums it up as follows: “The key to NED effectiveness lies 
as much in behaviour and relationships as in structure and process.”277 
The Higgs Review adds that consultation responses have identified 
personal attributes as integrity and high ethical standards, sound 
judgment, the ability to challenge and probe and strong interpersonal 
skills.
278
 Summarizing, the personal skills of effective NEDs, they should 
question intelligently, debate constructively, challenge rigorously, and 
decide dispassionately. NEDs need to make effective contributions which 
enable them to gain the trust of the executives.
279
 Sir Adrian Cadbury has 
quoted Geoffrey Mills and Angus Murray as follows: “A good non-
executive director needs to have intellect, integrity and courage. Of these 
qualities, courage is the most important, for without it, the other two 
characteristics are useless.”280 
 
 NEDs must have many qualities and they face at least three dilemmas:
281
 
 i. they should combine full engagement and involvement in the 
company on the one hand, and a wise way of mentoring in a 
remote, non-authoritarian manner on the other; 
 ii. NEDs should challenge and ask intelligent questions, but should 
always motivate positively; and 
                                                     
276 Walker Review, nos. 3.13 and 3.15. 
277 Higgs Review, para. 6.3, p. 27. 
278 Higgs Review, para. 6.12, p. 27. 
279 Steele in Rushton (2008), p. 55. 
280 Cadbury (2002), p. 57. 
281 Steele in Rushton (2008), pp. 56-57. 
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 iii. NEDs should remain independent and at a distance in order to see 
things differently, but should at the same time be very involved. 
 
 Independence 
 NEDs must be independent, which is described in sub-section 2.4.7 
above.
282
 
 
 Time commitment 
 After the Higgs Review the time involvement for NEDs increased by 
about 20% between 2003 and 2006. The time commitment for a typical 
NED can be estimated as two days a month, broken down into one 
meeting a month plus one day‟s preparation. Chairmanship or 
membership of board committees or attending strategy development 
sessions would be additional. 
 
 Research has shown that an executive director in one company becomes 
ineffective as a NED in another company, in case he has more than two 
NED appointments in other companies. The general rule of thumb is that 
if you are a person who makes it a full-time job to be NED, then five 
appointments are “doable”. However, this is based on the assumption that 
the companies are all performing satisfactorily. If one or more of the 
companies gets into difficulties, management of the NEDs personal diary 
becomes an issue. Numerous directors in this situation suddenly find the 
need to cancel their holidays. There are significant pitfalls if you do not 
devote sufficient time to the role of a NED. As soon as there are 
difficulties, even five directorships are too much. 
 
This diagram makes clear the time spent.
283
 
 
                                                     
282 CC8 A.3.1 and CG10 B.1.1. See 2.4.7 above. 
283 Steele in Rushton (2008), p. 58. 
 This diagram is from Independent Remuneration Solutions (IRS), a 2006 survey. Because each NED 
normally only sits on one committee brackets have been put around the second and third committees. It does 
mention preparation for Formal meetings, so add 5. 
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 Number of days spent by NEDs: 
 Formal meetings Small company Large company 
 – Board  9 9 
 – Strategy 1 3 
 – Audit Committee 1 4 
 – Remuneration Committee (1) (4) 
 – Nomination Committee (1) (4) 
 – Other  1 2 
 Preparation Committees 3 5 
 Visits on site  1 4 
 Total   16 27 
 
 Since 2006 time spent on all aspects has been increasing. Walker 
recommends 30 to 36 days for NEDs of BOFIs.
284
 
 
 Remuneration 
 Is it worth being a NED? In the UK the simple answer is that in purely 
financial terms it is almost certainly not worth it. 
 
 A NED would receive between £ 10,000 and £ 40,000 p.a. in a small 
quoted company and £ 50,000 to £ 100,000 in a large quoted company. 
These amounts are higher than those received by Dutch supervisory 
directors and lower than those of their US counterparts. For chairmen the 
figures are about five times as high.
285
 In the UK the NED, unlike US 
independent directors, do not receive options on shares in the company or 
performance-related elements.
286
 They may buy shares. 
 
 Information, early and on site 
 An important element of an outside director‟s work involves contact with 
lower management. This starts during the period of due diligence before 
accepting the appointment and, after acceptance, then continues during 
induction and subsequently while on the job. An outside director should 
be curious and wish to meet with lower management and see factories. 
The opportunities are easily available in a one-tier system, less so from 
the position of a supervisory board member in a two-tier system, where 
such contacts should be arranged through the chairman.
287
 The chairman, 
                                                     
284 Walker Review, recommendation 3. 
285 Steele in Rushton (2008), p. 59 and Chambers (2008), p. 63. 
286 CG10 D.1.3. 
287 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 41. 
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with help of the company secretary, has responsibility for arranging for 
proper due diligence, induction, professional advice and information.
288
 
These aspects, especially induction and visits to factories, are often 
mentioned in the annual reports of the company. 
 
 The senior independent director (SID) 
 The role of the SID was first proposed in the Hampel Report in 1998 and 
its value was reiterated in the Higgs Review of 2003 to the extent that it is 
now enshrined in the Combined Code.
289
 Prior to the Hampel Report, 
there had been a number of situations where a dispute in the board led to 
one of the NEDs taking the initiative in resolving the conflict. 
 
 In simple terms, the role of the SID is to act as an alternative to the 
chairman, particularly where there is a possibility of the chairman‟s 
thinking being unduly influenced by the executive directors, thus 
potentially compromising the effective working of the board. The SID 
should be available to shareholders, when these are concerned that they 
cannot resolve issues with the chairman or chief executive through 
normal channels of contact. Additionally, the SID should chair meetings 
of non-executive directors when the chairman does not attend. 
Shareholders may also wish to voice their unhappiness about the 
chairman. In such cases the SID should listen and possibly act and when 
necessary chair the Nominations Committee.
290
 It is ideal to have a SID, 
who does not have the ambition to be chairman. 
 
 NEDs and board committees 
 Membership of the principal board committees – nomination, 
remuneration and audit – involves a significant time commitment for 
NEDs. Nearly all quoted companies have these committees. Similarly, 
private companies, especially those which are backed by private equity or 
venture capital, are introducing audit and remuneration committees.
291
 
 
 Scrutiny by both remuneration and audit committees has increased in 
recent years: by remuneration committees because of the media‟s fixation 
with the “fat cat” syndrome and by audit committees because of their 
                                                     
288 CC8 A.5, Main Principle and Supporting Principle and A.5.3 and CG10 B.5, Main Principle and Supporting 
Principle and B.5.2. 
289 CC8 A.6.1 and D.1.1 and CG10 B.6.3 and E.1.1. 
290 Steele in Rushton (2008), pp. 41 and 60. 
291 Steele in Rushton (2008), p. 60. 
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responsibility for the accuracy of the company‟s annual report and 
accounts. 
 
 The Smith Report on Audit Committees, which was released at the same 
time as the Higgs Review, states that the audit committee should consist 
of at least three independent NEDs, one of whom should have significant, 
recent and relevant financial experience. The Smith Report has greatly 
increased responsibility for checking published accounts. These 
requirements, together with the greater scrutiny introduced by Sarbanes-
Oxley in the US, have affected the willingness of UK NEDs to serve on 
audit committees. In the Ernst & Young Corporate Governance Survey 
published in January 2005, two-thirds of NEDs stated that they were less 
likely to accept the position of chairman of the audit committee than 
twelve months earlier. 
 
 Board evaluation 
 Another relatively recent issue facing NEDs is that of board evaluation. 
The Higgs Review recommended that board evaluation should be 
introduced and it was included in the Combined Code. The principles are 
listed below: 
 
 – The board should undertake a formal and rigorous annual 
evaluation of its own performance and that of its committees and 
individual directors.
292
 
 – Individual evaluation should aim to show whether each director 
continues to contribute effectively and to demonstrate 
commitment to his role (including commitment of time for board 
and committee meetings and any other duties). The chairman 
should act on the results of the performance evaluation by 
recognizing the strengths and addressing the weaknesses of the 
board and, propose that, where appropriate, new members be 
appointed to the board or that malfunctioning directors resign.
293
 
 – The chairman should meet with the NEDs without the executive 
directors being present (it is not stipulated how often) and once a 
year the NEDs should meet without the chairman to appraise the 
latter‟s performance.294  
                                                     
292 CC8 A.6, Main Principle and CG10 B.6, Main Principle. 
293 CC8 A.6, Supporting Principle and CG10 B.6, Supporting Principle. 
294 CG10 A.4.2. 
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  Apart from this, the full board should evaluate the board as a 
whole.
295
 
 – The board should state in the annual report how performance 
evaluation of the board, its committees and its individual 
directors has been conducted. The NEDs, led by the senior 
independent director, should be responsible for performance 
evaluation of the chairman, taking into account the views of 
executive directors.
296
 
 
 Board evaluation is starting to make an impact. An experienced chairman 
commented that he was now seeing very few “duds” in boardrooms, and 
he considered that NEDs were much more professional than they were 
five years earlier.
297
 
 
 Training for NEDs 
 NED training is an interesting but sensitive issue. The Higgs Review 
made two statements on NED training. First, “There should be a step 
change in training and development provision for board members.” As a 
result of this observation, there was an initial rush of supply of new 
training providers. In 2006 very few remained. Despite the 
encouragement of Higgs, there has not been a step for change in demand 
by NEDs for training. Research led to the conclusion that “62 percent of 
NEDs in listed companies have never received any training for their 
role.”298 
 
 Diversity 
 Over the past few years the issue of diversity on boards has been debated 
extensively. The Higgs Review highlighted the lack of diversity and its 
research concluded that previous board experience is often seen to be the 
main, and sometimes only, competence demanded of potential NED 
candidates. Walker has raised the point of diversity again.
299
 
 
 Rigorous procedures for appointments and succession 
 The appointment system is to be formalised. The importance of orderly 
succession is described below in 2.5.9. 
 
                                                     
295 Rushton in Rushton (2008), p. 47. 
296 CC8 A.6.1 and CG10 B.6.3. 
297 Steele in Rushton (2008), p. 62. 
298 Steele in Rushton (2008), p. 62. 
299 Steele in Rushton (2008), p. 62; Walker Review, no. 3.6. 
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 Regular selection 
 All directors should be submitted for re-election at regular intervals, 
subject to continued satisfactory performance. The board should ensure 
planned and progressive refreshing of the board.
300
 This provision 
emphasizes the power of shareholders and the importance of succession. 
 
 Under the CC of 2008 NEDs are to be re-elected after the first 12 months 
and then again after 3 years. The CG 2010 for FTSE 300, however, 
demands re-election each year. This is important to avoid acceptance of 
underperformance and lingering bad relations, is the argument. Now the 
Walker Review has recommended re-election of the chairman every 
12 months.
301
 The counter-argument is that this creates short-termism as 
has been mentioned by the UK‟s biggest investment funds. 
 
 Generally, the thinking is that NEDs, if re-elected several times, should 
not serve more than nine years. In any case they will cease to be regarded 
as independent after nine years.
302
 Any term beyond six years for a NED 
should be subject to rigorous review and should take into account the 
need for progressive refreshing of the board.
303
 
 
 All directors are elected by shareholders, who have the power to remove 
them in an AGM,
304
 but in practice a formal dismissal is rare. Because the 
shareholders do have the built in right to dismiss, shareholders can exert 
real pressure to get rid of a director. In the US there is no prospect of 
companies being made effectively accountable to their owners, because 
shareholders lack the ultimate weapon of being able to dismiss boards. As 
a result, when crisis strikes, there is no option in the US but to resort to 
huge pressure by shareholder activists as in the case of General Motors 
(GM) in 1993 and now happens quite often. Shareholders of Apple, for 
example, have put tough demands on succession.
305
 
                                                     
300 CC8 A.7; the wording of CG10 B.7 of the first sentence is the same. The second sentence is worked out in 
article B.7.1: annual re-election for FTSE 300 directors and three years for all other directors. The Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) has made the annual re-election a comply or explain obligation. On 18 July 2010 
three of UK‟s biggest pension funds – Hermes Equity Ownership Services, Railpen Investments and 
Universities Superannuation Scheme – wrote to object against annual re-election, because it would promote 
short termism. 
301 Walker Review, recommendation 10 and nos. 4.23 to 4.26, which give all the arguments for and against.  
302 CC8 A.1.3. 
303 CG10 B.2.3. 
304 Charkham (2005), p. 311. 
305 Financial Times, 23 December 2010, p. 14 and 23 February 2011, p. 15 
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 Appointment letters 
 In the UK NEDs receive and sign 3 or 4-page appointment letters. This 
shows that serious thought is given to the appointment of NEDs in 
Britain.
306
 This example should be followed in other countries. 
 
2.5.9 Succession; formal; board as a whole 
 
 Having good board members is essential. Having the board work as a 
team is vital. Succession planning, orderly nomination and proper 
dismissal are important strategic tasks of the board. 
 
 Main Principle A.4 of the Combined Code of 2008 and B.2 of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code 2010 state that there should be a formal, 
rigorous and transparent procedure for the appointment of new directors. 
Six code provisions follow. This reflects the findings of the Higgs 
Review, which considered that the procedure was much too informal and 
often involved solo actions by the CEO or chairman. The whole board 
                                                     
306 The points covered are: 
 – background to appointment (recent events, strategy point, specific knowledge, replacement of retired 
NED); 
 – formality (date of starting + term); 
 – basis for independent role 
  – bring independent and broad view 
  – be involved in creation of robust strategy 
  – review and monitor detailed plans and budgets needed to make it work 
  also 
  – long description (of tasks); 
 – chairman‟s role (if chair) 
  (– leader of board 
  – composition of board and committees 
  – communication with stakeholders and shareholders); 
 – induction (how to gain familiarity with the enterprises); 
 – time commitment (two days a month, including one meeting per month, one away day‟s meeting per 
year, customer exhibition, Christmas party); 
 – information flow (company will provide monthly management accounts, board papers); 
 – other appointments (company expects you to discuss these regularly with the chair); 
 – committee (appointment on ….. committee); 
 – meeting with auditors; 
 – intended term (3 years subject to annual review; no compensation for loss of office); 
 – review process (you and chair each year); 
 – fees, insurance and independent advice. 
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should be involved after the important preparatory work by the 
nominations committee. A majority of the members should be non-
executives. The chairman should chair the nomination committee,
307
 
except in case the nomination or dismissal of his own position is under 
consideration. This is why there should be a senior independent director 
(SID).
308
 
 
 “Succession is a sensitive matter and should not be left to conversations 
in the corridor. It should be on the agenda of the nominating committee at 
least each half year. At least then the discussion takes place.”309 Dunne 
states that a change of board members can create disharmony, because it 
is a deeply personal thing and touches ambitions.
310
 Therefore, the more 
planning the better. The committee should report regularly to the 
complete board on the matter.”311  
 
 The complete board should nominate all members of the board. The 
complete board should also nominate the chairman and the CEO. This 
recommendation is important in improving board effectiveness. It moved 
the appointment of NEDs away from the patronage of chairmen and the 
club-like approach to board membership. If a director feels he owes his 
position to the chairman, he loses a degree of independence. By involving 
the board as a whole, all directors share the responsibility of choosing 
their colleagues. Formal process means searching for those who will add 
value to the board team or fill gaps in it.”312 
 
 Selecting a chairman requires forward planning. Preferably the chairman 
should be chosen from the existing NEDs, because if a chairman is 
selected from outside he will not know the business and may have 
difficulty in forming a tandem with the CEO, i.e. in being able to 
counterbalance the CEO. It will also be easier to decide whether the CEO 
and the potential chair will get along well. Good planning is to identify 
two NEDs as possible chairman to be prepared for any eventuality.
313
 
 
                                                     
307 Cadbury (2002), p. 96; and Dunne (2005), p. 95. 
308 CC8 A.3.3 and CG10 B.2.1. 
309 Cadbury (2002), p. 96. 
310 Dunne (2005), pp. 95-98. 
311 Cadbury (2002), p. 99. 
312 Citation of a letter from Adrian Cadbury to me of 25 May 2010. 
313 Cadbury (2002), pp. 118 and 176. 
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 The first step to remove a chairman can come either from within (i.e. 
from board members) or from without (i.e. from shareholders). In both 
cases the senior independent director should be approached and should 
then discuss the issue with the other board members.
314
 Private pressure 
is likely to lead to a better outcome than public clamour.
315
 An example is 
the decision of the Standard Chartered Bank Board, chaired by Sir 
Patrick Gillam, to replace their CEO Rana Talwar. A newspaper 
reported: 
 
  “While Talwar sipped a cocktail, the Bank‟s NEDs met at 
Standard Chartered‟s head office to decide whether Gillam or 
Talwar should go. Gillam told them he wanted Talwar out, but 
then left them (the NEDs) to conduct their own meeting. After 90 
heated minutes the decision to axe Talwar was made. On 
Wednesday Talwar heard the news from Cob Stenharn, a leading 
NED, and Lord Stewartby, the deputy chairman.”316 
 
 The central responsibility of NEDs is not sitting on audit committees or 
acting as monitors, it is taking the necessary decisions to ensure that 
leadership of their company is in the right hands.
317
 
 
 The succession of the CEO and other executives is important as well. 
Companies should have training and succession plans. It is a good thing if 
the CEO rises from within. If the nomination committee is to have 
influence there, it should know a good number of senior managers. For 
this reason it is advisable for senior managers to regularly attend board 
meetings and make presentations there and for NEDs to visit subsidiaries. 
 
 Institutional investors deem succession important. Hermes, a large UK 
investment fund that buy about 1% of the shares in large listed companies 
and seeks to have regular dialogue with the companies, says that in one-
on-ones with the board they discuss one-third strategy, one-third 
remuneration and one-third succession.
318
 
 
 I believe that formalities and regular formal discussions in the 
nominations committee about succession are a good way to avoid CEOs 
                                                     
314 Cadbury (2002), p. 181. 
315 Cadbury (2002), p. 182. 
316 Cadbury (2002), p. 184. 
317 Cadbury (2002), p. 194. 
318 I was told this by a Hermes representative. 
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and the chairmen to have too much influence on succession. It is a good 
example for other countries to be formal about the forward planning on 
nominations. For the Netherlands I propose that boards discuss annually 
how they will internally deal with succession. 
 
2.5.10 Role of shareholders: single out long-term shareholders interested in 
stewardship 
 
As mentioned at the end of sub-section 2.2.4 above there are many 
influential voting associations in the UK that promote ideas about better 
shareholdership. They include the Institutional Shareholders‟ Committee 
(ISC), the Association of British Insurers (ABI), the National Association 
of Pension Funds (NAPF), the Institutional Voting Information Service 
(IVIS), Research Recommendation Electronic Voting (RREV), the 
Investment Management Association (IMA) and the Association of 
Investment Companies (AIC). 
 
 Then there are not-for-profit institutions that do research in the area of 
corporate governance, such as Tomorrow‟s Company under the 
leadership of Mark Goyder, which has published some very interesting 
reports and recommendations. One of them is entitled Tomorrow‟s 
Owners,
319
 which reveals that the average shareholding is now shorter 
than before and that some new categories of shareholder are playing an 
increasing role, such as hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds as well 
as private equity. The report also underlines that these new types of 
shareholders are outweighed by a factor of ten by the world‟s pension 
funds, mutual funds and insurance funds. 
 
 In 2007 the split of the world wide investments was as follows: 
 – private equity US $0.8 trillion; 
 – hedge funds US $2.3 trillion; 
 – sovereign wealth funds US $3.3 trillion; 
 – insurance funds US $20 trillion 
 – mutual funds US $26 trillion; 
 – pension funds US $28 trillion. 
 
 The report continues by providing an overview of all categories of 
shareholders according to the degree of their “active long-term interest” 
or “stewardship” in the following order: 
                                                     
319 Goyder (2008/B). 
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 – founders  high 
 – families/trusts/foundations    | 
 – employees    | 
 – engaged shareholders    | degree of 
 – unengaged shareholders    | stewardship 
 – traders     | 
 – speculator  low 
 The report emphasizes that it is not useful to demonise the lower 
categories. They belong to what it terms the “casino economy”, which is 
useful and necessary for a stock exchange with good trading volume. The 
higher categories, together with the enterprises, belong to the “real 
economy”. The report argues that these differences in shareholdership 
should be accepted and that they are a strong argument for one-on-ones 
dialogue with shareholders interested in “stewardship”. This is also 
reflected in the UK Corporate Governance Code of 2010: “Chairmen 
should discuss strategy with major shareholders.” The FSA has given 
guidelines in recognition of one-on-ones: Disclosure Rules (DR) 
2.2.10.
320
 
 
 As mentioned earlier Hermes is another interesting institution. Colin 
Melvin, director of corporate governance of Hermes and chief executive 
of Hermes Equity Ownership Services Limited (EOS), explains this 
relationship in describing the work done by EOS: 
 
  “The work I do is to some extent aimed at taking the intermediaries out of the 
system, addressing some of these problems and getting a proper conversation 
going, a dialogue between the owners of the companies, the pension funds, and 
the companies themselves. We don‟t manage money for these funds. We don‟t 
buy and sell the shares. That‟s done by other fund managers. What we do is 
represent them in engagements and discussions with companies, we vote the 
stock and we have a long-term conversation with companies about longer term 
strategy and value creation. And it‟s not about giving companies a hard time, 
it‟s not about second guessing or micromanaging them. I wouldn‟t pretend to 
know how to manage some of the largest companies we engage with. It‟s about 
calling to account some of the directors for their performance on behalf of the 
owners. And that process we very firmly believe adds value for the long-term 
owner and the pension fund.”
321
 
 
                                                     
320 CG10 E.1.1. For DR 2.2.10 http//fsahandbook.info/DTR. 
321 Goyder (2008/B), p. 26. 
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 On March 24, 2010 Tomorrow‟s Company322 issued a new report in 
which it discusses the Swedish practice of appointing two or three 
shareholder representatives, elected by shareholders, who do not become 
members of the board but are voted in as members of the nominations 
committee. Tomorrow‟s Company argues that it might be a good idea for 
the UK as well to allow shareholders to appoint one or two outside 
members to the nominations committee. Apart from the advantage of 
involving shareholders in the process of nominating directors, it would 
also have the advantage of creating more scope for dialogue about 
strategy between representatives of shareholders and the board, which is a 
specific UK aim,
323
 whereas it is less of a goal in common practice in the 
US and the Netherlands.
324
 
 
2.5.11 Summary of the role of board members in the UK 
 
 (i) The UK system of “comply or explain” codes with their 
increasing aspirational levels has allowed gradual improvement. 
The UK continues to lead the way in developing corporate 
governance. 
 
 (ii) The members of a UK one-tier board have joint responsibility for 
developing, achieving and monitoring all aspects of corporate 
strategy. 
 
 (iii) The NEDs are playing an ever more enhanced role in creative 
debate about strategy and in challenging the executives on the 
development of strategy as well as monitoring the achievements 
of the executives. This role differs from the general position of 
supervisory directors in the Netherlands. 
 
 (iv) All measures for promoting the better functioning of NEDs 
should be adopted, including the provision of early information 
and on-site information, time for debate about strategy, induction, 
training, time for the job, remuneration, evaluation and orderly 
succession procedures. 
 
                                                     
322 Goyder and Zimmerman (2010). 
323 See CG E.1.1. 
324 Chapter IV of the Frijns Code only describes information to shareheolders at general meetings. 
  
 117 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
 (v) The role of the separate chairman involves spending about half of 
his working time at the company, ensuring that the board works 
well as a team and providing for all the aspects mentioned at (iv) 
above. He is complementary to the CEO and acts as his coach or 
partner. As such, the chairman is responsible for the image of the 
company and the communication with shareholders. He is 
actively involved in the communication with major shareholders 
about governance and strategy. 
 
 (vi) The comparison with US boards shows that in points (ii), (iii) and 
(iv) above, US boards and board members have more or less the 
same roles as their UK counterparts. There are two differences 
between the roles of UK and US outside directors. First, while 
UK outside directors are actively involved in developing strategy 
and sometimes even come forward with proposals. The US 
outside directors are also actively involved, but in the US there is 
more emphasis in asking challenging questions in a Socratic 
manner about the proposals of management. Second, the UK 
chairman is more prominent than the US chairman or lead 
director. He discusses strategy with shareholders, while US and 
Dutch chairmen do not do that. 
 
 (vii) The UK also has special roles for the SID in evaluating the 
chairman, which is being followed in the US and the Netherlands. 
 
 (viii) The UK company secretary has an important role in guiding the 
corporate governance of the company and clearly assisting the 
chairman in this task. 
 
2.6 Duties of directors 
 
2.6.1 Basis of duties 
 
 In the UK directors‟ duties are based on: 
 
 – common law rules and case law; 
 – statutory law, e.g. sections 170-178 of the Companies Act 2006; 
 – articles of association of the company; 
 – listing requirements; 
 – the UK Corporate Governance Code; 
 – the City Code on Takeovers; 
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 – the Code of Market Conduct; 
 – the many items of legislation listed in section 2.3 and Annex UK 
Acts. 
 
 The Companies Act 2006 contains a fairly large number of descriptive 
rules on duties of directors in sections 170 to 177 in Chapter 2 of D10 of 
the Act headed: General Duties of Directors. These rules are intended to 
describe the essentials of common law, which continues to apply. 
 
2.6.2 To whom are duties owed? 
 
 Under common law, directors owe their duties to the company and if he 
is in default of his duties it is therefore the company that must bring an 
action against a director (this principle was decided in Foss v. Harbottle, 
1843
325
). 
 
 Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 
 Two shareholders brought a claim on behalf of themselves and all other shareholders of 
the Victoria Park Company alleging that five directors had breached their duties by 
effecting various fraudulent and illegal transactions, and that there remained an 
insufficient number of qualified directors to constitute a board. In particular, it was 
claimed that the directors, in their capacity as directors, had the company buy land from 
themselves at prices in excess of market value and that in order to fund the purchase, they 
raised funds for the company by mortgaging Victoria Park‟s property in an unauthorised 
manner. 
 The court noted that it remained possible for a general meeting of Victoria Park‟s 
shareholders to be convened, at which the acts of the board could be ratified or otherwise, 
and that the company was still able to bring a claim by itself. Therefore, the claim by the 
two shareholders could not proceed. 
 This case laid down the rule, that where a cause of action is vested in a company, the 
company is the only proper claimant. Individual shareholders should not generally be 
allowed to bring claims on behalf of the company. 
 
 The principle that duties are owed by the directors to the company is to 
be found in section 170(1) of the Companies Act 2006.
326
 The general 
duties are described in sections 171 to 177 of the Companies Act 2006. 
Then sections 178-239 give many detailed provisions for different types 
of transactions, where there can be a conflict of interest. The centrepiece 
                                                     
325 Foss v. Harbottle, 67 E.R. 189; [1843] 2 Hare 461, Court of Chancery. 
326 Davies (2008), p. 479. 
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section is section 172 introducing the “enlightened shareholder value”. 
The government described this as “most likely to drive long-term 
company performance and maximise overall competitiveness and wealth 
and welfare for all”. It also says, “the key company law provision is for 
the fiduciary duties of directors”. These require them to manage the 
undertaking for the benefit of the company honestly (“in good faith”). 
That benefit is defined by case law as the interest of members 
(shareholders) present and future. 
 
2.6.3 Enlightened shareholder value 
 
 Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006, which describes the duty of a 
director, has as centrepiece the words “to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole” and then goes on to 
say “and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to” and lists six 
elements affecting all so-called stakeholders. It caused great debate and 
required a lot of explanation by the Attorney General Lord Peter 
Goldsmith.
327
 The question was whether the government had opted for 
“enlightened shareholder value” or for “pluralism”, i.e. the stakeholder 
model.
328
 The Attorney General‟s explanation stressed that the 
government had chosen for the “enlightened shareholder value” and 
therefore not for “pluralism”. 
 
 This is clear from the first words of section 172, “although in the interests 
of the company and its long-term members the board should consider all 
elements”.329 It also means that there is emphasis on the involvement of 
the board as a whole, because the duty to consider – “have regard to” – 
all factors results in a greater mutual reliance by one director on 
another
330
 and at the same time that, if all elements have been considered, 
the board is free to choose. The judge should not second guess the board 
in a business decision.
331
 In the UK it is clear that the judge will not sit on 
the chair of the directors who have a good faith business judgment. The 
Attorney General said as much in Parliament: “Under the duty to promote 
the success of the company, the weight to be given to any factor is a 
                                                     
327 Davies (2008), pp. 506-514. 
328 Davies (2008), p. 509 and Charles Mayo, „Directors‟ Duties‟, in Ken Rushton (ed.), The Business Case for 
Corporate Governance (2008), p. 127. 
329 Davies (2008), p. 509. 
330 Mayo in Rushton (2008), p. 128.  
331 Mayo in Rushton (2008), p. 128. 
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matter for the good faith judgment of the director. Importantly, his 
decision is not subject to a reasonableness test and, as now, the courts 
will not be able to apply a reasonableness test to directors‟ business 
decisions”.332 The Company Law Review worded it as follows: “The law 
recognizes that it is essential for directors to have discretion in the way 
they manage, and legal actions will not interfere with proper exercise of 
such business judgment.
333
 Lord Wilberforce, giving the judgment of the 
privy council said in 1974: “Their lordships accept it would be wrong for 
the court to substitute its opinion for that of management or, indeed, 
question management decision, if bona fide arrived at.”334  
 
 There is a focus on boards and on the long-term (“inclusive”) view of the 
director‟s role in the interest of the long-term shareholders. The directors 
may regard a particular investment as serving the long term interests of 
the company.
335
 
 
 It is clear that in the end, after the board consideration, long-term 
shareholder interests prevail.
336
  
 
2.6.4 Core duties 
 
The most important duties have always been
337
 (a) the duty of loyalty 
based on fiduciary principles developed by the courts of equity; and (b) 
the duties of skill and care based on the principles of the law of 
negligence. 
 
2.6.5 Duty of care and distinction between executives and NEDs 
 
 We start with the duty of care, which in the past has always tended to be of a very low 
standard. A decision of 1925 re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. describes this.338 In 
that case, where the chairman was held liable for fraud, a non-executive director was not 
held liable for having transgressed the duty of care, because he had no serious role. There 
was no objective standard for expected care and there was a highly subjective duty: “a 
                                                     
332 Mayo in Rushton (2008), p. 128. 
333 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law, p. 35. 
334 Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. and others, [1974] A.C. 821 at p. 832. 
335 Cadbury (2002), p. 42. 
336 Davies (2008), p. 509. 
337 Davies (2008), p. 477. 
338 City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., [1925] Ch. 407; [1925] All E.R. 485, C.A. 
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director need not exhibit in the performance of his duties a greater degree of skill than 
may reasonably be expected from someone of his knowledge and experience”. An earlier 
famous example was the Marquess of Bute, who was appointed president of a bank at the 
age of six months and attended only one meeting of the board in his whole life. He was 
not held liable.339  
 
 The jurisprudence, such as Dorchester Finance v. Stebbing and Norman 
v. Goddard and first instance cases in connection the Insolvency Act, 
section 214, moved the criteria to a more objective test for monitoring. A 
further boost for an objective test was given by the Corporate 
Governance Code in 1992, the Cadbury Code, which allocated a major 
role to the non-executive directors in monitoring the executive 
directors.
340
 The Companies Act 2006 added more objective duties. The 
jurisprudence was led by: 
 
 Dorchester Finance Co. Ltd v. Stebbing and others (1989)
 341
 
 Dorchester Finance was a money lending company with three directors, all of whom had 
accountancy experience. For the relevant period only Stebbing, the executive director, 
was actively involved in the company‟s affairs.  There were no board meetings. Harris 
and Lewis, the two non-executive directors, never looked at Dorchester‟s books or 
accounts. They admitted to signing blank cheques, which enabled Stebbing to apply 
funds, illegally, as he pleased. The non-executive directors relied on the argument that 
their duties were to a lower standard than applied for executives, and that accordingly 
they had no duties to perform. 
 The court held that “A director in carrying out his duties: (i) was required to exhibit in the 
performance of his duties such a degree of skill as may reasonably be expected from a 
person with his knowledge and experience, (ii) had, in the performance of his duties, to 
take such care as an ordinary man might be expected to take on his own behalf, and (iii) 
must exercise any power vested in him in good faith and in the interests of the company.”  
No distinction could be drawn between executive and non-executive directors. 
 On this basis, all three directors were found to have been negligent. 
 
 Again, a first instance decision by Hoffman J., later Lord Hoffman, 
member of the Supreme Court, by analogy with section 214 of the 
Insolvency Act set an objective standard for director‟s standards.342 In the 
                                                     
339 Cardiff Savings Bank, [1892] 2 Ch. 100. 
340 Davies (2008), p. 489. 
341 Dorchester Finance Co. Ltd. v. Stebbing and others, [1989] B.C.L.C. 498, Ch.D. 
342 Re D‟Jan of London Ltd, [1993] B.C.C. 646; [1994] 1 B.C.L.C. 561. See also Smerdon (2007), pp. 93 and 
104. Section 214(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986 already had the language “reasonably diligent person” 
  
 122 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
case of D‟Jan of 1993 Mr D‟Jan, the only director and 99% shareholder 
of the company while his wife had the other 1%, had not read a fire 
insurance policy before he signed it, because he trusted that his broker 
had read it. It turned out that there was a misrepresentation in the form. 
This led to non payment by the insurance when the company‟s factory 
burned down. Mr D‟Jan had a defence that he and his wife owned 100% 
of the shares, a subjective argument. Judge Hoffman put forward the 
objective standard. What can be expected of a reasonably diligent person. 
The objective standard was confirmed in section 174 of the Companies 
Act 2006 (a director must exercise “the care, skill and diligence that 
would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person with (a) general 
knowledge, skill and experience that may be reasonably expected of a 
person carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation to 
the company (the objective standard for that type of function), and (b) the 
general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has”, (is the 
subjective element)). There is still a subjective element, but only if it 
improves upon the objective standard of the reasonable director.
343
 
 
 I add that Judge Hoffman held Mr D‟Jan liable, but not for the whole 
damage. This common law right to mitigate damage claims is codified in 
the UK Companies Act 2006 in section 1197 if the director had acted 
honestly and reasonably and taking all circumstances into effect. This is 
also a possibility of exculpation for less involved directors. 
 
 The text of section 1157(1) of the UK Companies Act is: 
 “1157 Power of Court to grant relief in certain cases  
 (1) if in proceedings for negligence, default, breach of any duty or 
breach of trust against  
  (a) an officer of a company; or  
  (b) a person employed by the company as auditor (whether he is 
or is not an officer of the company)  
  it appears to the court hearing the case that the officer or person is 
or may be liable but that he acted honestly and reasonably and 
that having regard to all cirumstances of the case (including those 
connected with his appointment) he might fairly be excused, the 
court may relieve him, either wholly or in part, from the liability 
                                                                                                                                    
improved by section 174 of the Companies Act 2006. 
343 Davies (2008), pp. 492-493. One of these decisions, Norman v. Theodore Goddard (1992), is described 
below. 
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on such terms as it thinks fit.” (Compare Dutch Staleman v. Van 
de Ven definition, see sub-section 4.7.2.1) 
 
 What does this mean? 
 First, although all directors, executives and NEDs are subject to a 
uniform and objective duty of care, the requirements for the discharge of 
that duty will not be uniform in each particular case, not only between 
executives and non-executives but even among individual members of 
each group and will also depend on the size of the company.
344
 Davies 
gives the example of an Australian case, Daniels v. Anderson (1995). The 
Court of Appeal of NSW, applying an objective test, found that NEDs 
were not liable for failure to discover foreign exchange frauds being 
committed by an employee, though the CEO was liable.
345
 
 
 Second, there is a minimum standard for NEDs to “take reasonable steps 
to guide and monitor management”.346 
 
 Third, directors are permitted to delegate (Daniels v. Anderson (1995), 
see above) and (Norman v. Theodore Goddard & Ors (Quirk, third party) 
in 1992
347
), where objective tests were applied and at least some of the 
directors escaped liability.
348
 
 
 Norman & Anor v. Theodore Goddard & Ors (Quirk, third party) (1992) 
 Bingham, a partner at Theodore Goddard, a London firm of solicitors, specialising in tax 
and trust work, was involved in fraudulent dealings with trust funds, including a Jersey 
settlement of which Mrs Norman was the settlor and tenant for life. The asset of the trust 
was the share capital of LBI, a company holding property and cash. Bingham arranged for 
Somerville, an employee of Theodore Goddard, to be made the sole director of LBI and 
Somerville then appointed a third party, Quirk, as another director. Quirk took on 
responsibility for the day-to-day business and cheque book. Bingham persuaded Quirk to 
deposit LBI‟s cash with Gibbon in order to obtain offshore tax advantages. Bingham was 
                                                     
344 Davies (2008), p. 491; and Keith Johnstone and Will Chalk, „What Sanctions Are Necessary?‟, in Ken 
Rushton (ed.), The Business Case for Corporate Governance (2008), p. 165 (“Johnstone and Chalk in Rushton 
(2008)”). 
345 Daniels v. Anderson, [1995] 16 A.C.S.R. 607. The fact that Davies cites this Australian case to support his 
description of English law shows Australian cases are relevant for English law as persuasive authority, not a 
binding precedent. 
346 Davies (2008), p. 491. 
347 Norman & Anor v. Theodor Goddard & Ors (Quirk, third party), [1992] B.C.C. 14; [1991] B.C.L.C.1027. 
348 Davies (2008), pp. 491-492. 
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“the picture of the respectable member of a very eminent firm of city solicitors”. He 
assured Quirk that depositing the money with Gibbon was more profitable than putting it 
elsewhere, the money would be available if needed, and that Gibbon was under the 
control of Theodore Goddard and thus safe. However, Gibbon was in fact owned by 
Bingham, who stole the funds. 
 The court held that on the facts “a director… need not exhibit a greater degree of skill 
than may reasonably be expected from a person undertaking [his particular] duties”, but 
“in considering what a director ought reasonably to have known or inferred, one should 
also take into account the knowledge, skill and experience which he actually had in 
addition to that which a person carrying out his functions should be expected to have”. 
Quirk did not breach his duty by relying on the information given to him by Bingham and 
acted reasonably in not investigating further, given Bingham‟s position. 
 
 It is important to note that directors have the duty to act in the interest of 
the company above the interest of those who have appointed him. This is 
clear in jurisprudence in joint venture cases.
349
  
 
 Fourth, while delegation is permitted the second requirement of some 
guiding and monitoring remains applicable, even in case of delegation to 
sub-board structures, as was mentioned by the Turnbull Committee, 
which contributed to the Combined Code. One can see this principle at 
work in the Barings case. It was held in Barings Plc in 2001
350
 that even 
though delegation is allowed directors should have had internal controls 
in place in relation to trading activities in an overseas subsidiary whose 
losses can cause the demise of the bank. The judgment made a distinction 
between the functions of executives and non-executives, but in this case, 
all directors were disqualified. In the 1980s thought was given to the 
misuse of companies and to reform the Corporate Insolvency Law.
351
 The 
objectives were: restoration of business, maximum return to creditors, 
identifying causes of failure and mismanagement, and, where appropriate 
depriving directors in the management of companies. For the last element 
the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 was enacted. It makes 
it possible to seek a court order against directors of insolvency companies 
on grounds of “unfitness” to be involved in the management of other 
companies.
352
 Barings was a large case. 
                                                     
349 R. Neath Rugby Ltd., Hawks v. Cuddy, [2008] B.C.C. 390; an appeal at [2009] 2 B.C.L.C. 427 (C.A.). 
350 Barings Plc (No. 5), [2001] B.C.C. 273; [2000] B.C.L.C. 523; and see Smerdon (2007), pp. 104-105 and 
Davies (2008), p. 493. 
351 R. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (2005), p. 39. 
352 Davies (2008), pp. 237-238. 
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 Some other disqualification cases are:  
 
 Westmid (1998)353 
 Griffiths, Conway and Wassall were directors of Westmid Packaging Services. Griffiths 
was a “much-respected businessman and a pillar of the community” the controlling force 
behind the company. Conway and Wassall were “treated more like employees than 
directors”. They did not read Westmid‟s financial statements or accounts and therefore 
did not appreciate that Griffiths was using Westmid‟s assets for the purposes of other 
companies in his group or that he allowed Westmid to continue trading even past the time 
that he must have known that the company was insolvent. 
 The Court of Appeal noted that: 
 “…the collegiate or collective responsibility of the board of directors of a company is of 
fundamental importance to corporate governance under English company law. That… 
must however be based on individual responsibility. Each individual director owes duties 
to the company to inform himself about its affairs and to join with his co-directors in 
supervising and controlling them. 
 A proper degree of delegation and division of responsibility is of course permissible, and 
often necessary, but not total abrogation of responsibility. A board of directors must not 
permit one individual to dominate them and use them…”. 
 Disqualification orders against all three directors were upheld. 
 
 Secretary of State v. Swan (2005)354 
 Swan was chairman and CEO of Finelist plc. An experienced accountant, North, was a 
non-executive director and deputy chairman, as well as chairman of the audit and 
remuneration committees. Finelist practised cheque kiting, taking advantage of the time 
taken for a cheque to clear to obtain a fictional increase in the balance of the payee‟s 
account before the cheque is cleared giving a rosier picture of the annual accounts. 
 Swan was rarely asked to sign cheques but on one occasion, without asking any questions, 
he signed four cheques that as a result of their size and matching amounts “called out for 
comment and question”. These cheques crossed between the two subsidiaries thereby 
creating artificial credit for the group. North was informed of various accounting and 
financial irregularities by a senior manager. Instead of investigating, he had a short 
meeting with Swan and the finance director, believed and accepted the finance director‟s 
explanation, and did no more. As a result of the cheque kiting, an indebtedness statement 
in a circular to shareholders showed materially inaccurate figures and the group breached 
its banking covenants. 
                                                     
353 Westmid Packaging Services Ltd (No. 3), [1998] 2 All E.R. 124; [1998] B.C.C. 836; [1998] 2 B.C.L.C. 646 
(Civ. Dir.). 
354 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Swan (No. 2), [2005] E.W.H.C. 603 (Ch.); [2005] B.C.C. 596. 
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 Swan “was a businessman with obvious flair and drive in relation to operational matters, 
but he was not a person likely to pay attention to financial or accountancy technicalities or 
other matters of detail which he did not regard as having an obvious impact on the profit 
or loss of the group”. He was held not to have had actual knowledge of the cheque kiting 
but he ought to have known as a result of the unusual cheques he had been asked to sign, 
which should have prompted him to make enquiries. However, on the statement of 
indebtedness in the circular, he was entitled to have left this to the finance team. 
North‟s response to the allegations by the senior manager was held by the Court to have 
been “wholly inappropriate, unsatisfactory and inadequate”. He had failed to show the 
“decisive, courageous and independent action” required of a non-executive director. 
Neither Swan nor North were found to have acted fraudulently or dishonestly. 
Disqualification orders were made against both directors. Swan should have asked further 
questions as CEO. North should have asked further questions, because he had extra 
financial expertise. A non-executive director must be prepared to rock the boat. 
 
 Fifth, the principles of delegation to managers below board level also 
apply to the division of responsibilities among directors. Inevitably, 
executive directors will carry a greater load of management responsibility 
than non-executives. The CFO will carry particular responsibility in the 
area of finance. However, all directors have a duty to maintain sufficient 
knowledge of the company‟s business and may certainly not be 
dominated by one of their members.
355
 
 
 Sixth, delegation is inevitable in large companies and the directors cannot 
guarantee that all matters are going well within the company. Subordinate 
employees may be fraudulent or negligent and the directors may not 
discover this in time, but this does not necessarily mean that directors 
have been negligent, that will depend on the facts of the case, including 
quality of the internal controls.
356
 
 
 It is of course interesting to compare all of this with the US duty of care 
of oversight as defined in the cases Graham, Caremark, Stone v. Ritter 
and Citygroup, described in 3.5.4 under 8 and 3.7.2.1 below. In the US 
much depends on the facts of the case, whether the directors had in good 
faith introduced internal controls. Both in the UK and the US the aspect 
of good faith judgment of the directors comes into play. In the UK the 
aspect of good faith is mentioned in section 172 of the Companies Act 
                                                     
355 Davies (2008), p. 493 and the Barings and Westmid judgments. The question of delegation among directors is 
discussed in a comparable way in the Netherlands, see 4.5.9 and 4.5.18 below. 
356 Davies (2008), p. 493. 
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2006: “a director must act in a way he considers, in good faith, would be 
most likely to promote the success of the company”. This means that the 
director must show he has acted in good faith in his considerations about 
the matter. Section 174 of the Companies Act makes the test an objective 
one in paragraph 2(a) and adds a subjective element in paragraph 2(b) for 
directors that have more than normal knowledge. In the US the plaintiff 
must show lack of subjective good faith. 
 
 The usual tests in the UK and the US are: what was the quality of the 
controls? Were there red flags? What did the director consider? Was his 
consideration in good faith? The differences in the test of care are that the 
Delaware Courts have a clear set of procedural steps to arrive at liability, 
while in the UK it is simply “all facts of the case”.  
 
 When asked whether both countries have an objective test for the 
competence of directors, I would say that is now the case in the UK and 
the US for listed companies, but in the US is more subjective for smaller 
companies. 
 
 Finally, as in the case of auditors, pointing out that there is a breach of 
care or loyalty is one step, establishing that the loss for the company is 
the consequence of that breach is another thing.
357
 
 
 Generally developments at common law as well as the Companies Act 
2006 have brought the standards of care, skill and diligence into line with 
those required in other fields by the jurisprudence about negligence. The 
move from a subjective to an objective test will give the court a greater 
role in defining the functions of directors, no matter how sensitive the 
courts are to the need of avoiding the benefit of hindsight. For example, 
the courts‟ decision on the rigour with which the board has to supervise 
the performance of delegated tasks will help in defining the monitoring 
role of the board, while decisions about whether the audit committee of 
the board has sufficiently scrutinised the external auditor will help define 
the division of responsibilities between the audit committee, auditors and 
management. Twenty years ago one might have predicted that the courts 
would either be ineffectual (out of a desire of avoiding reliance on 
hindsight) or produce undesirable interventions. However, with the 
emergence of the UK Corporate Governance Codes there is now a body 
of best practice available on which the courts are free – but not obliged – 
                                                     
357 Davies (2008), p. 494. 
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to draw.
358
 The case that has made many NEDs nervous of liability is the 
Equitable Life Assurance case of 2003,
359
 where NEDs were not able to 
get excused from the case. In the end the case was not pursued because of 
costs. 
 
 Equitable Life Assurance (2003) 
 Equitable Life was an unlimited liability society whose members were with-profits 
policyholders. Until June 1988 policies were provided, in a high number of cases, with 
guaranteed annuity rates permitting the policyholder to receive an annuity at a guaranteed 
rate on retirement.  Over several years this rate exceeded the normal annuity rate 
prevailing on other policies at the retirement date, and in the interests of fairness, the 
board adopted a differential terminal bonus policy, which adjusted the bonuses paid under 
their policies to equalise annuities payable under policies where the guaranteed rate was 
chosen and other policies where it was not.  Complaints were made and a test case was 
brought to determine whether Equitable had the right to declare differential bonuses.  
Equitable lost the case and issued proceedings for negligence against its former directors.  
 Equitable alleged that the directors were negligent in (i) failing to take legal advice as to 
the validity of the differential terminal bonus policy before awarding the differential 
bonuses each year, and (ii) after the problem was known and legal advice had been sought 
and given, failing to reduce bonuses and ensure that existing and prospective 
policyholders were fully aware of the potential costs to the company should the test case 
be lost.  It also alleged use by the directors of their discretion for improper purpose. 
 The non-executive directors sought summary judgment, excusing them from liability, 
arguing that they had relied on the executive directors.  The court was not sympathetic, 
concluding that the duty owed by a non-executive director does not differ from that owed 
by an executive director saying “It is plainly arguable … that a company may reasonably 
at least look to non-executive directors for independence of judgment and supervision of 
the executive management.” The application for summary judgment was refused. The trial 
began in 2005, but after the case went badly for Equitable – there were difficulties in 
proving breach of duty and causal links between alleged breach and the damage claim – it 
agreed to drop the case and pay the legal expenses of the directors. 
 
 The case was a much discussed case by directors and lawyers, because of the huge 
amounts involved and because many directors and lawyers held policies with Equitable 
Life. In the same case the judge had previously given a summary judgment in favour of 
the auditors, dismissing a claim against them. A week before the hearing of the directors, 
his judgment in the auditors‟ case was overruled by the Court of Appeal. He was therefore 
                                                     
358 Davies (2008), p. 494. 
359 Equitable Life Assurance Co. v. Bowley, [2003] E.W.H.C. 2263 (Comm.); [2003] B.C.C. 829; [2004] 1 
B.C.L.C. 180 Q.B.D. (Comm.), see also in 2.7.2. 
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more cautious and less robust about dismissing the claim against the directors. In the 
subsequent trial the plaintiffs abandoned their claim against the directors after presenting 
it, but before the defence was presented, i.e. the plaintiffs accepted they had no claim. The 
claim against the auditors was also lost. Nevertheless, the case had made NEDs nervous. 
 
2.6.6 Fiduciary duties 
 
 There are six sub-groups of fiduciary duties for directors, executive or 
non-executive. The first three duties are: 
 
 1. to act within the scope of powers conferred on them; 
 2. to act in good faith to promote the success of the company; 
 3. to exercise independent judgment; 
 
 directors also have the following three duties, which stem from their 
obligations to avoid conflicts, namely the duty: 
 
 4. to avoid entering into transactions with the company (“self- 
dealing”); 
 5. to avoid conflicts of interest; 
 6. not to accept benefits from third parties. 
 
 Re 1 – Act within powers 
 
 This means the duty to act in accordance with the company‟s articles of 
association and to exercise powers only for the purposes for which they 
are conferred (section 171 Companies Act 2006). 
 
 This concerns cases of ultra vires, payments of dividends, directors‟ 
remuneration or the issue of shares or financial assistance. In such cases 
the acts can be voided by the company, except where this would harm the 
interests of bona fide third parties,
360
 such as the bona fide purchaser for 
consideration, where a director could be held liable. The same reasoning 
applies to unlawful distributions to shareholders and section 847 of the 
Companies Act 2006. Malafide shareholders have to pay back, bona fide 
shareholders do not and in that case the company can hold directors 
liable.
361
 
 
                                                     
360 Davies (2008), pp. 497-506. 
361 Davies (2008), p. 505. 
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 Re 2 – Promote the success of the company 
 
 Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 is the modern version of the duty 
of loyalty.
362
 Section 172 reads: 
 
 172 Duty to promote the success of the company 
 (1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in 
good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing 
so have regard (amongst other matters) to 
  (a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
  (b) the interests of the company‟s employees, 
  (c) the need to foster the company‟s business relationships 
with suppliers, customers and others, 
  (d) the impact of the company‟s operations on the community 
and the environment, 
  (e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation 
for high standards of business conduct, and 
  (f) the need to act fairly as between members of the 
company. 
 (2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist 
of or include purposes other than the benefit of its members, 
subsection (1) has effect as if the reference to promoting the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members were to 
achieve those purposes. 
 (3) The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any 
enactment or rule of law requiring directors, in certain 
circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of 
the company. 
 
 This is a much debated section. In the first part of subsection (1) and in 
subsection (2) it describes the principle of “enlightened shareholder 
value” and the duty of loyalty. In the second part of subsection (1) and in 
subsection (3) it gives examples of all the factors (including stakeholder 
interests) to which the directors should have regard, but is subordinated to 
the overriding duty to promote the success of the company. This is a 
requirement of care, in the positive sense of thoughtfulness and cynically 
a requirement of box ticking and not a method by which the courts are 
required to second guess the wisdom of the choice (resembles the 
                                                     
362 Davies (2008), p. 507. 
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Delaware business judgment rule). It is for this “have regard” that board 
meetings in the UK are usually carefully minuted. Cynically there is 
boiler plate language: “we have considered all factors”. 
 
 The Attorney General, Lord Peter Goldsmith, explained clearly that this 
section describes one all-inclusive duty of loyalty to the company and not 
one of pluralism.
363364
 
 
 Re 3 – Independent judgment 
 
 The directors must exercise independent judgment, and not submit to 
other directors or influences. They may delegate and enter into contracts 
that bind the company such as long term exclusive delivery contracts with 
non-competition clauses or an agreement to develop football grounds as 
wished by a sponsor.
365
 This is set out in section 173 of the Companies 
Act 2006. 
 
 Re 4 – Avoid conflicts of interest 
 
 Section 175 of the Companies Act 2006 describes the duty to avoid 
conflicts of interest. Conflicts of interest are to be taken broadly and 
examples are: corporate opportunities should be left to the company and, 
dealing with a company of which the director is also a director. The duty 
is not infringed if the matter has been authorized by the directors, who 
may give this authorization in the case of a private company. The articles 
of association usually permit such authorization
366
 and in the case of 
listed companies it is a requirement that there is a provision in the 
constitution enabling the directors to provide this authorization.
367
 Most 
constitutions of listed companies have a provision about this possibility. 
Another requirement is that a quorum of independent directors gives this 
authority. 
 
                                                     
363 Davies (2008), pp. 509-525. (See also 2.6.3 above, p. 107-108). 
364 The Attorney General is a member of the Cabinet of Ministers. He is the legal advisor of the government and 
defends new Acts in parliament. 
365 Davies (2008), pp. 525-528; and Fulham Football Club Ltd. v. Cabra Estates Plc, [1992] B.C.C. 863; [1994] 
1 B.C.L.C. 363, where the board, having agreed to sponsor Cabra Estates' plan want to change the plans, 
notwithstanding its agreement not to do so. The board was bound to the agreement. 
366 Sub-section 175(5)(a) Companies Act 2006. 
367 Sub-section 175(5)(b) Companies Act 2006. 
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 Section 177 of the Companies Act 2006 obliges a director who has a 
conflict of interest to give notice to the other directors of the conflict 
before the transaction. This adds a duty of extra vigilance to the duty to 
avoid conflicts. It follows that the proper practice is for the conflicted 
director to inform the board and attend the debate and for the others to 
vote. Usually the articles of association describe that the director, who 
has informed the board, may participate in the discussions and count for 
the quorum of presence and vote. 
 
 In Meyer v. Scottish Co-operative (1959)368 nominee directors appointed by Scottish Co-
operative on the board of the subsidiary Scottish Textiles had the subsidiary enter into 
contracts which were bad for the subsidiary but good for Scottish Co-operative. They did 
not inform their co-directors, minority shareholders in the subsidiary. The nominee 
directors had breached their duty of care. 
 
 In Royal Hastings v. Gulliver (1967)369 the directors had profited by the sale of the 
company without having informed the new shareholders. There was no fraud or 
negligence, but the case went against the directors anyway, differently from Bell v. Lever 
Brothers, exactly because they had profited without informing shareholders. 
 
 Re 5 – Avoid entering into transactions with the company (self-dealing) 
 
 Section 188 of the Companies Act 2006 provides that long-term service 
contracts with directors need the approval not only of the board but also 
of the members, i.e. shareholders. Such a contract is void if the 
“members'” approval is absent (section 189). Here the contract is void 
and not voidable, because no third parties are involved. 
 
 Section 190 provides that sales of assets by or to directors and persons 
connected with them need the approval of the “members”. Sections 198-
203 provide for the same requirement of “members'” approval in case of 
loans, quasi-loans, credit transactions and related transactions. Such 
transactions are voidable by the company, unless third party rights have 
intervened.
370
 
 
                                                     
368 Meyer v. Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd., [1959] A.C. 324; [1958] 3 All E.R. 66. 
369 Royal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, [1967] 2 A.C. 134; [1942] All E.R. 378. 
370 Davies (2008), p. 538. 
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 In Harrisson (2001)371 Peter Harrisson bought land from the company and sold it at a 
huge profit.  When he bought it he knew the hidden benefits of planning permits were due 
to being confirmed. He did not inform his board members of this profit and the Court of 
Appeal held him accountable. 
 
 Re 6 – Not to accept benefits from third parties 
 
 Section 176 provides that directors may not receive benefits from third 
parties, such as bribes. The company may choose to rescind the 
arrangement or hold the third party and the director jointly and severally 
liable. Here, differently from section 175, there is only an exception if the 
shareholders‟ meeting has given consent. 
 
2.6.7 Voidability, but not against good faith third parties 
 
 Acts committed in breach of the articles of association or powers of 
attorney or infringements of the rules on conflict of interest as described 
above could be held voidable by – and would therefore not be binding on 
– the company, unless third party rights have intervened. In addition, the 
director can be held liable.
372
  
 
 For contracts sections 40 and 41 of the Companies Act 2006 apply. These 
sections clearly provide that notwithstanding any limitation under the 
articles of association a director binds the company in favour of a person 
dealing with the company in good faith. Section 40(2)(b) also describes 
what a good faith third party is and section 41 goes on to make further 
exceptions to voidability, namely where: 
 (a) restitution is no longer possible; or 
 (b) the company is indemnified; or 
 (c) the rights are acquired bona fide by a third party; or 
 (d) the transaction is affirmed by the company. 
 
2.6.8 Summary: duties of NEDs 
 
 The core duties are of loyalty, skill and care. The Companies Act 2006 
has codified these duties in detail. 
 
                                                     
371 J.J. Harrisson (Properties) Ltd v. Harrisson, [2001] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1467; [2002] B.C.C. 729; [2002] 1 
B.C.L.C. 162; [2001] W.T.L.R. 1327 C.A. (Civ. Div.). 
372 Davies (2008), p. 538. 
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 Although in principle the duties of NEDs are equal to those of the 
executive directors, delegation to sub-board employees and to board 
members is accepted and directors can delegate and rely on 
trustworthyness of delegates unless there were warnings. If there have 
been warning flags the NEDs should take action. Generally, the courts 
will not second guess directors. Principles of delegation also apply to the 
division of responsibilities among directors. Executive directors have a 
greater responsibility than NEDs. 
 
2.7 Liability of directors 
 
 The duties of directors are a description of what directors should 
undertake to do. Liability describes the consequences of default in court. 
 
2.7.1 Who can sue? 
 
 Directors only have duties to the company. The company can sue the 
directors in a derivative suit, but only if shareholders are successful in 
getting permission from the court for the company to do this. A derivative 
suit is one where the shareholder sues on behalf of the company. This is a 
special possibility under UK and US law to overcome the problem that 
shareholders cannot sue directors directly.
373
 This is described in more 
detail in 2.7.3. 
 
 Other lawsuits against directors are described hereunder as well. Lawsuits 
brought by shareholders directly in 2.7.5, by the liquidator in 2.7.7, by 
regulators in 2.7.8. Other measures are described in 2.7.9. 
 
2.7.2 General atmosphere of liability 
 
 UK company law, like US law, does not make a formal legal distinction 
between the duties of executive and non-executive directors. Instead, all 
directors generally bear equal legal responsibility for company actions. 
Case law suggests, however, that the English judiciary has recognized the 
part-time role that non-executives play in a public company and is 
prepared to adjust their duties in case of liability claims accordingly. 
Sections 174(2)(a) and 1157 also give a ground for a distinction between 
executives and NEDs. See 2.6.5 above. 
 
                                                     
373 Reisberg (2007), p. 5; and Davies (2008), p. 609 et seq. 
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 Despite judicial recognition of the distinctive role played by non-
executive directors, there has been growing concern in Britain about the 
risk of liability. A catalyst for this concern was a lawsuit brought by 
Equitable Life, a major British insurer that nearly went bankrupt in the 
late 1990s, described in detail above in 2.6.5.
374
 The old board was 
replaced after the debacle, and the new board sued the auditors and 
fifteen former directors, including nine non-executives, for damages 
exceeding £3 billion. The non-executive directors sought to have the 
claim against them dismissed, but this application failed. Equitable had 
D&O insurance coverage of £5 million, which was insufficient to cover 
the directors‟ legal expenses, let alone potential damages. The trial began 
in 2005, but after the case turned out against Equitable, it agreed to 
abandon its claim immediately after its presentation and pay the legal 
expenses of the non-executive directors. Despite this outcome, the 
litigation was often cited as the sort of nightmare that would make the 
boardrooms of public companies tougher to fill.
375
  
 
 In practice, litigation against directors in the UK is quite rare for various 
reasons. Primarily because litigation could leave the company worse off 
than before, because of costs. Often there is an indemnity clause or order 
in favour of the director. Moreover, the time lost by directors in litigation 
could be better spent and the company will suffer reputational damage. 
Directors have more to fear from fines for criminal offences and from 
naming and shaming. Another possible penalty is disqualification, as in 
the cases of Westmid (1998), Barings (2001) and Swan (2005) described 
above under 2.6.5 – duty of care –, where all the NEDs were disqualified. 
Disqualification is a court order that a person may not act as director of 
any company for a period of 2 to 15 years. 
 
2.7.3 Derivative suits in the UK 
 
 Before the Companies Act 2006 it was very difficult for a shareholder 
group to start a derivative suit in the UK. As the Foss v. Harbottle rule of 
1843
376
 implied, the grounds for getting relief from the courts were very 
                                                     
374 Equitable Life Assurance Co. v. Bowley, [2003] E.W.H.C. 2263 (Comm.); [2003] B.C.C. 829; [2004] 1 
B.C.L.C. 180 Q.B.D. (Comm.). The facts are described above on p. 102. 
375 Brian R. Cheffins and Bernard S. Black, Outside Director Liability across Countries, Stanford Law School, 
Law and Economics, ECGI – European Corporate Governance Institute – Working Paper no. 71/2006, 
pp. 1399-1400 (“Cheffins and Black (2006)”). The nuance of the distinction in duties between executives and 
NEDs is described in detail in 2.6.5 
376 Foss v. Harbottle, see 2.6.2 above. 
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limited. Only members of the board or shareholders have the right, after 
receiving the permission to do so from the board or the court, to file a 
derivative suit, which is a suit where a prosecuting shareholder starts 
litigation against directors for mismanagement and can do so 
notwithstanding the general rule that shareholders cannot bring action 
against directors for damages. If the derivative suit is successful damages 
caused by directors have to be reimbursed to the company.
377
 Sections 
260-269 of the Companies Act 2006 deal with such a derivative suit.
378
 
Environmentalists or employees cannot file derivative actions arguing 
that directors have not sufficiently taken their interests into account. The 
shareholder group would not get relief if the litigation issue could be 
better left to the shareholders as a whole. Under section 263(2) of the 
Companies Act 2006 permission must be refused if the court is satisfied 
(a) that a person acting in accordance with section 172 (duty to promote 
the success of the company) would not seek to continue the claim, i.e. it 
would not be in the interest of the company to continue the claim or (b) 
that the acts constituting the alleged breach of duty were in fact 
authorized. 
 
 First, the court hears only the applicant to determine whether the 
application should immediately be dismissed for lack of a prima facie 
case. If the case is not dismissed immediately, the court will then hear all 
parties and take evidence. 
 
 The court may then, at its discretion, check various factors:
379
 
 – whether the shareholder seeking to bring the derivative claim is 
acting in good faith, or whether, for example, the litigation is 
motivated by personal interests; 
 – whether the act or omission which constituted the alleged breach 
of duty is likely to be ratified by the company (i.e. by the 
shareholders collectively) or – expressed as a separate test – 
whether in the case of the alleged breach of duty the act or 
omission is likely to be authorized or ratified by the company; 
authorization can sometimes be given by the directors who are 
not involved (this is a very important defence for the directors); 
 – whether the company (i.e. the uninvolved directors) has decided 
not to sue; 
                                                     
377 Reisberg (2007), p. 5. 
378 Reisberg (2007), p. 204. 
379 Davies (2008), pp. 618-620; and Reisberg (2007), p. 143 et seq. 
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 – whether the shareholder could pursue the case in his own right. 
 
 It is unlikely that many applications for permission for derivative actions 
will be successful in Britain, which is what the Law Commission 
intended. In its consultation paper on derivative suits
380
 the Law 
Commission wrote: “a member should be able to maintain proceedings 
about wrongs done to the company only in exceptional circumstances” 
and “a shareholder should not be able to involve the company in litigation 
without good cause….". Otherwise the company may be “killed by 
kindness towards shareholders”, or “waste money and management time 
in dealing with unwarranted proceedings”.381 
 
2.7.4 Enforcement by the company 
 
 Duties and liability is one thing; enforcement is another. In the US it is 
quite easy to start litigation, but indemnities from liability in the articles 
of association protect directors. UK directors have slightly less 
protection, but procedural factors ensure that public companies rarely sue 
their directors. Directors owe their duties only to the company. While 
derivative suits in the US often provide a viable platform, it is much more 
difficult in the UK for shareholders to get relief through a derivative suit. 
If the complete board has been changed, as occurred in the Equitable Life 
litigation, the new board can decide to have the company initiate the 
litigation. This may happen in exceptional cases. The English courts have 
made the derivative suit possible, but only in limited and very obvious 
cases, such as for fraud on the minority, ultra vires conduct and acts 
requiring a special majority of shareholders, and these will rarely apply to 
outside directors of public companies. Now section 263(2) of the 
Companies Act 2006, described in 2.7.3 applies. Infringement of duties 
by outside directors is more likely to involve failure to exercise care or 
failure to consider all factors necessary for the success of the company, 
i.e. loyalty.
382
 
 
                                                     
380 Davies (2008), pp. 626-627 and Reisberg (2007), p. 5 describe several reasons that should be considered by 
shareholders not to litigate against the company, see also 2.7.4 below. 
381 Arad Reisberg has informed me on 10 June 2011 that to his knowledge there have been 7 attempts for 
derivative suits in the UK and that they all failed. 
382 Cheffins and Black (2006), p. 1404. 
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 In the UK the time, hassle and expense involved will discourage the 
launching of a suit. The question of costs plays a particular role in the 
UK. For example: 
 – the “loser pays” rule, i.e. all costs of litigation on both sides, 
therefore also the costs of the winner, must be paid by the loser; 
in the Equitable Life case, which was abandoned mid-trial, the 
plaintiffs had to pay their own costs and those of the company 
and directors – a total of £30 million;383 
 – although lawyers can agree to no win, no fee, the maximum 
“upside” is 200% of hourly rates; the US practice of contingency 
fees does not exist in the UK; 
 – even if plaintiffs win they do not get the proceeds, which go 
instead to the company; in other words, they have the full 
downside but not the upside; 
 – there is one advantage in that if the plaintiff gets leave to go to 
trial the company can provisionally be ordered to pay the 
litigation costs;
384
 
 – the defendant can demand an indemnity order or can benefit from 
an indemnity clause in the articles. 
 
 British literature describes the wisdom for shareholders not to involve the 
company in litigation. I mention a few points:
385
 
 – publicity of the case brings long-term reputational damage to the 
company; 
 – doubts about success; 
 – litigation may disrupt the decision making process of the 
company, because of the time involved for the board; 
 – deterrence of individuals becoming directors and inducing 
directors to leave; 
 – general discouragement of entrepreneurial directors; 
 – after the fact litigation is difficult. 
 
 The first four considerations not to litigate show common sense. They 
also apply in other countries, including the Netherlands. Shareholders 
who start litigation should always consider these points. Such UK 
common sense is a good example. 
 
                                                     
383 Cheffins and Black (2006), p. 1407. 
384 Wallersteiner v. Moir, [1975] Q.B. 373 C.A.; and Civil Procedural Rules 19.9 and Davies (2008), p. 622. 
385 Reisberg (2007), pp. 47-50 and Davies (2008), pp. 605-606. 
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2.7.5 Suits brought directly by a shareholder 
 
A shareholder whose personal rights are infringed may sue in his own 
name to enforce his rights. Section 994(1) of the Companies Act 2006 
permits shareholders who have been “unfairly prejudiced” by conduct in 
the company to apply for relief. These cases usually involve improper 
diversion of assets, which result in too low distribution to shareholders or 
self-serving conduct in favour of directors. They are actions against the 
company for an order of relief, which may have consequences for the 
board to be forced to take action. The possible relief can include 
dismissal of directors, appointment of other directors, forced transfer of 
shares. The Neath Rugby Ltd., Hawks v. Cuddy
386
 case is a clear example. 
This power of the court to give any relief to aggrieved shareholders is 
comparable with the Dutch Enterprise Chamber powers. The difference is 
that the Dutch Enterprise Chamber always institutes an enquiry, while the 
UK courts under this section do not, but the parties do go in depth with 
their evidence. 
 
 Once again, cost factors discourage procedures. The easiest first remedy 
for shareholders that feel wronged is that they can sell their shares. 
Especially in the case of public companies it is easy to sell shares on the 
liquid market. Therefore, petitions by shareholders who feel unfairly 
prejudiced, would tend to take place more often in the case of private 
companies. However, in the case of private companies, the courts usually 
do not uphold them.
387
 
 
 In addition to section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 shareholders in a 
public company can hardly sue in their own name under UK securities 
law to recover losses caused by false or misleading corporate disclosures. 
As mentioned in section 463 of the Companies Act 2006, the risks for the 
directors are negligible. Section 463 on misleading statements of the 
Companies Act confirms that directors have no liability towards 
shareholders and only a liability for fraud towards the company and no 
liability for mere negligence. Section 90A of FSMA opens a possibility 
for liability for fraud towards shareholders, but this is hardly ever 
applied.
388
 The UK FSA does work with penalties against companies. UK 
                                                     
386 See note 349. 
387 Cheffins and Black (2006), p. 1409. 
388 Davies (2008), pp. 741-742. 
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law lacks a provision analogous to SEC Rule 10b-5, the far-reaching US 
securities law for material misstatements.  
 
 UK directors can become liable to shareholders for “listing particulars” 
(documents in support of a public offering) that fail to include required 
information or contain certain misleading disclosures. Section 90 of the 
FSMA provides for the possibility of bringing a claim for compensation 
against persons responsible for the listing particulars. Directors fall 
within the definition of responsible persons, including non-executive 
directors. A claim under section 90 is analogous to a US claim under § 11 
of the Securities Act of 1993. Lawsuits of this sort are, however, virtually 
unknown in Britain.
389
 This is due to difficulties associated with 
organising class actions. The closest British class action has been the 
“representative action”. However, this is a complicated two-stage 
procedure. Reforms in 2000 introduced the concept of a “group litigation 
order” and fuelled speculation that there would be a wave of securities 
fraud cases. This has not yet occurred. The no win, no fee constraints and 
the “loser pays” rule discourage these actions. Even if such cases were to 
become common, the company and the insurer would have the deeper 
pockets and the directors would be able to rely on the “due diligence” 
defence. 
 
 An important point is that many British public companies (and Dutch as 
well) have a second listing on an American stock exchange and thus face 
exposure to US securities class actions. Generally, British and Dutch 
directors are worried about their US exposure and spend a lot of time and 
expense meeting the SEC requirements. However, out-of-pocket 
payments by US outside directors in case of damage claims are also rare 
for the many reasons described in section 3.7 of this study. 
 
2.7.6 Outside directors insulated: indemnification, insurance 
 
 There is little chance that non-executive directors of UK public 
companies will end up being sued. Directors‟ duties are fairly clear and 
case law shows that judges do not second guess directors with 
hindsight.
390
 This is close to the US business judgment rule – a safe 
                                                     
389 Cheffins and Black (2006), p. 1411. 
390 Davies (2008), p. 513 and Mayo in Rushton (2008), p. 128.  
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harbour for directors. Directors are liable if they have infringed the duties 
mentioned above, which can be summarized as loyalty and care.
391
 
 
 The company may indemnify directors in case they are nevertheless sued, 
but only under certain conditions. The Companies Act 2006 excludes 
indemnification of a director against claims by the company – section 
232. The company may equally not indemnify a director against a fine, 
administrative penalty or payment of damages resulting from a breach of 
duty – section 234(3)(a). Also, in contrast to the position in the US, a 
director who loses in court may not be reimbursed by the company for 
legal costs – section 234(3)(b). However, the company may give an 
indemnity in the case of a civil action by a third party e.g. a shareholder 
class action, covering the liability of the director and the costs of defence, 
section 234.
392
 
 
 But, interestingly, the company is permitted by law – section 233 – to 
insure its outside directors under D&O coverage. Typically, D&O 
policies in Britain give cover for “losses” arising from culpable acts or 
omissions committed in the insured‟s capacity as a director. “Culpable 
act” will usually be defined broadly to include breaches of duty, trust, 
neglect and wrongful trading. “Losses” will include sums paid under a 
settlement after a trial and legal costs incurred defending claims. D&O 
policies specifically exclude coverage for dishonest or fraudulent 
conduct, for obtaining a private benefit or profit, and for intentional 
misconduct.
393
 
 
 Another point is coverage. Partly because of the Equitable Life litigation, 
coverage of £100-200 million and with the largest companies up to £600 
million, i.e. comparable to US levels, has become common. This shift to 
higher policy limits could be a catalyst for more litigation against 
directors. Still, with regard to out-of-pocket liability for outside directors 
in case of damage claims, the unfavourable procedural terrain for 
plaintiffs in the UK should mean that even well-insured UK directors will 
face much less risk of litigation than their US counterparts.
394
 
 
                                                     
391 Davies (2008), p. 509. 
392 Cheffins and Black (2006), p. 1415 and Davies (2008), p. 596. 
393 Davies (2008), p. 592. 
394 Cheffins and Black (2006), p. 1415. 
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2.7.7 Company insolvency matters 
 
 When a company becomes insolvent, obviously non-executive directors 
risk damage claims against them to contribute to the assets of the 
company. This is more a theoretical than a practical worry. Ordinarily the 
board controls litigation decisions and will rarely sue its own members. 
The few derivative suits, so far, against directors, are described above 
and have not been successful to date. However, once a company enters a 
reorganization process under UK insolvency legislation known as 
“administration”, the administrator is authorized to sue in the name of the 
company. The liquidator who is appointed instead upon insolvency of the 
company has the same power. Also section 212 of the Insolvency Act 
1986 authorizes the liquidator to apply to the court for an order requiring 
the directors to make a contribution to the company‟s assets if they have 
breached a duty owed to the company. There is, however, no reported 
decision in which an administrator or liquidator has exercised his right to 
bring an action against a director, whether an executive or an outside 
director. Liquidators have brought some cases to court, but none 
involving a public company.
395
 
 
 There is another cause of action. A liquidator may petition the court to 
rule that the directors have engaged in “wrongful trading”. This is the 
case if the company is insolvent and the director knew or ought to have 
concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that it could avoid this 
fate and he failed to take every step a reasonable director could have 
taken to minimise the creditors‟ potential loss. These cases, too, are rare. 
Essentially because, though the Insolvency Act requires evidence of 
“failed to take every step that a reasonable director would have taken”, it 
gives no guidance as to what those steps might be. The amount of the 
contribution to be paid and “the relationship between cause and effect”, 
i.e. “causation” can also be difficult. Liquidators, usually accountants, are 
hesitant to start complicated litigation which they might lose. 
 
 Finally, D&O insurance policies typically cover this type of liability in 
bankruptcy cases. There is doubt about the validity of the insurance, 
because some view this “wrongful trading liability” as penal, i.e. having a 
                                                     
395 Cheffins and Black (2006), p. 1417; and Prof. Sir Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th 
edition (2011), pp. 682-683. 
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reference to criminal law, rather than compensatory, i.e. belonging to 
civil law. If it is penal, it would make the insurance invalid.
396
 
 
2.7.8 Regulator: criminal penalties 
 
 The law on accounts has become stricter. Each director must confirm 
that, insofar as he is aware, there was no “relevant information” of which 
auditors were not informed. Late filing of accounts is a finable offence 
with 2,600 convictions in 2004/5 alone. Providing misleading 
information can also lead to a fine. The former CEO of Sportsworld had 
to pay £45,000 in fines for failing to notify the market promptly of a 
change in its business performance. And the former CEO and CFO of the 
AIT Group were imprisoned and forced to pay substantial sums to 
investors, because they had recklessly misled the market.
397
 There are 
fines imposed on directors for many offences under many other laws, for 
example environmental legislation. 
 
2.7.9 Other measures, including disqualification 
 
 The Financial Services Authority (FSA) can send best practice letters to 
listed companies and does so regularly. It can write public letters for 
disclosure breaches as it did in the cases of Eurodis Electron and 
Sportsworld.
398
 The FSA may suspend or cancel a stock exchange listing 
or issue penalties. The investigation is not public. The FSA did not 
punish the directors of RBS for their alleged mistakes in the acquisition 
of ABN AMRO.
399
 The FSA did say they would consider that these 
mistakes would have influence if these persons should aspire to new 
board positions in a bank. 
 
 There is also the measure of disqualification, which means that a director 
can be forbidden to act as director of any company for a period of 2 to 5 
years. This often happens in the case of insolvency, e.g. all the directors 
of Barings were disqualified for 15 years.
400
 Of some 1,300 director 
disqualification orders made in 2004/5, over 1,100 followed an 
insolvency.
401
 In most cases this happens in small companies. 
                                                     
396 Cheffins and Black (2006), p. 1418. 
397 Johnstone and Chalk in Rushton (2008), pp. 160 and 162. 
398 Johnstone and Chalk in Rushton (2008), p. 159. 
399 Financial Times, 3 December 2010, p. 15. 
400 See for the Barings case 2.6.5 above under duty of care. 
401 Johnstone and Chalk in Rushton (2008), pp. 162-163; Davies (2008), pp. 237-255; and Cheffins and Black 
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 The Department of Business Investigation Services (BIS), formerly 
Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), and before that 
DIT, has the right to investigate companies. 
 
2.7.10 Summary: rare cases 
 
 Protecting directors in the UK from liability has not been a priority 
because the chances of a lawsuit have been so small. However, there has 
been growing concern in recent years about directors‟ liability, due in 
large part to the Equitable Life litigation and, in line with similar conerns 
in the US, attempts to protect directors have increased. The 2006 
amendments to the UK Companies Act allow a company to advance the 
legal expenses to a director, who is being sued, to indemnify directors in 
third party suits and provide their directors with better D&O protection. 
Thus far the risk of out-of-pocket payments by outside directors is 
minimal. The main concerns are naming and shaming, disqualification 
and regulatory fines. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
(2006), p. 548. 
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3. UNITED STATES 
 
3.1 History and culture 
 
 I start with a brief list in telegram style of key features of US culture, 
followed by US corporate history and US corporate culture painted with a 
broad brush and therefore including generalizations that do not apply to 
all persons. I base my views on personal conversations with experienced 
observers as well as on relevant literature. 
 
3.1.1 General characteristics 
 
 Some key features and phrases of US culture are: 
 
 (a) State laws, agencies, courts,  
  State laws, SEC, NYSE, NASDAQ, decentralised, Delaware case 
law, litigation is a right, a way of free expression, not so much 
soft law. 
 
 (b) American Dream, free enterprise  
  Everything‟s possible for every self-made man, comeback kid, 
voluntarism, yes you can, come back after bankruptcy, go for it, 
competitive, large mergers, imperial CEOs, anti-trust laws, 
abundant size and resources, frontier spirit, country of 
immigrants, melting pot, business as American Institution, 
openness, quite direct – like Dutch – unlike British.402 
 
 (c) Strategic thinking 
  Market discipline by corporate control, support for new entrants, 
managerial capitalism for corporate value, good training of talent 
in companies, corporate systems, good implementation, team 
work and hierarchy, strategy developed at officer level, 
alternatives debated and challenged at board level, art of 
questioning, primacy of the board, influence of academics, many 
changes by pressure groups after long debate. 
 
 (d) Sometimes short term, sometimes long term 
  Abundant size and resources, decentralised takeovers, support for 
new entrants, carrots for directors, bonus culture, all lead to short 
                                                     
402 Zahn (2005) described Dutch, German, French, UK and US culture in a similar telegram style. 
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term strategies; elements for long term strategy thinking are: 
team work and hierarchy, primacy of the board, managerial 
capitalism for corporate value, strategic investors. 
 
 Below I will elaborate on these key words. I should say at this point that I 
am a Dutchman who has lived and worked in Chicago for 6 months at the 
age of 31. As a lawyer I have worked with American lawyers for many 
years, regularly, on committees and boards of the International Bar 
Association. 
 
3.1.2 History of US corporate governance 
 
 19
th
 century: early separation of ownership and management 
 A noticeable characteristic of the US corporate world is the separation of 
ownership and management. Of course, at the start of the 19
th
 century the 
US too had many family companies that were managed by their owners. 
As the century progressed, however, share ownership began to spread and 
often the shareholdings were so small and diverse that management of the 
corporation had to be left to a professional manager. 
 
 There were several reasons for this early widespread share ownership: 
 
 – Among the industrialised nations at the time, only America had a 
continent-wide economy with low internal trade barriers. It alone 
therefore provided a sufficiently large market for those 
enterprises capable of achieving large-scale efficiencies.
403
  
 – Economies of scale made possible by new technologies required 
US corporations to become so large that their capital requirement 
could be satisfied only by selling stock widely to outside 
investors on the market.
404
 
 – In the huge railroad enterprises ownership and management soon 
became separated. Much more capital was required to build a 
railroad than to purchase a plantation, a textile mill or even a fleet 
of ships. The administrative tasks were numerous, varied and 
complex. They required the skills and training of full-time 
                                                     
403 Mark J. Roe, „The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance‟, in Donald H. Chew and Stuart L. Gillan 
(eds.), Global Corporate Governance (2009), p. 20 (“Roe (2009)”). 
404 Adolf A. Berle Jr., „Corporate Powers in Trust‟, 4 Harvard Law Review 1049 (1931); Adolfe A. Berle Jr. and 
Gardiner Means in their classic book Berle and Means (1932), pp. 333-357. 
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salaried professional managers. The railroad boom started as 
early as the 1840s.
405
 
 – The national taste for speculation also played a part in the early 
growth of trading on secondary stock markets and added, in turn, 
to the dispersal of stock ownership.
406
 
 – Retail lending banks were kept small and confined within state 
borders. This made bank lending on a large scale impossible. 
Therefore, capital had to be attracted on stock markets. At the 
time there were stock exchanges in several cities such as 
Philadelphia, New York and Boston.
407
 
 – The corporations became so large and exchanges so liquid that 
the heirs of family owners had an easy way of spreading their 
risks by trading their shares on stock exchanges. 
 
 All of this caused a rapid increase in the number of listed stock exchange 
companies, in which share ownership was separated from management. 
The New York stock exchange had 31 listed companies in 1830, mostly 
railroad companies. By 1859 many more were listed of all kinds of 
industries. Already by 1857 many Europeans were investing in US 
shares.
408
 Share ownership became really widespread. Even John 
Rockefeller, the founder of Standard Oil and the richest man in America, 
ended up by owning only a fraction of the outstanding stock in Standard 
Oil.
409
 
 
 1860s: Civil War: corporate law is the realm of States 
 The urgent need to raise enormous sums as a result of the American Civil 
War was instrumental in the development of mass markets in 
securities.
410
 Another development of the Civil War was that President 
Abraham Lincoln was able to do deals with US entrepreneurs who helped 
the government finance the war and in turn received facilities to rapidly 
open up the West. From that time on US corporations used the title 
“President” for the heads of their corporations. They saw themselves 
running their own empires. This mindset betrayed a tension between “big 
business” and the Federal Legislation, which continues until today. The 
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states deal with corporate law. The Securities Act 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act 1934 and Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank 
Act of 2010 are the exceptions.
411
 
 
 Takeover fights: market for taking corporate control 1860s-1870s 
 One of the first mega enterprises was the New York Central Railroad, 
which ended up in the hands of the famous “Commodore” Vanderbilt. He 
acquired several railroad corporations, but encountered strong opposition 
when he tried to buy the shares of the Erie corporation shares from 
management. Every time a judge gave a favourable judgment for 
Vanderbilt, Erie‟s management found another judge to give an opposing 
judgment. Indeed, the management even went so far as to leave the 
offices in New York with all the cash and move to New Jersey, together 
with 125 armed men and even some canons for protection! 
 
 Later Jay Gould became owner of the Erie railroad bridge corporation and 
wanted to buy more railroad corporations. He found a friendly judge 
ready to dismiss Mr Ramsey, the director of one of his targets, but 
Ramsey found another judge who dismissed the other directors. This led 
to a brawl involving about 800 armed men, among whom were the 
“Bowery Boys”, who had left the slums of New York to protect the 
interests of the Goulds. The takeover fight ended with a merger of the 
Delaware and Hudson railroads. At this stage, the ways entrepreneurs 
tried to gain and keep control of corporations had become too rough. A 
more peaceful disciplinary mechanism was put to work. On behalf of the 
investors, a merchant banker was added to the board of the companies to 
look after their interests. This was a sort of “corporate governance” avant 
la lettre, a form of supervision.
412
 
 
 Start of 20
th
 century: financial capitalism 
 In the last quarter of the 19
th
 century a great wave of mergers swept 
through the manufacturing sector. Nothing like it had ever been seen 
before. This involved an unparalleled process of horizontal consolidation, 
i.e. simultaneous mergers of many or all competitors in an industry into a 
single, great enterprise.
413
 These monopolies led to protests and in 1890 
the US enacted the Shearman Anti-Trust Act.
414
 Whereas before 1897 
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mergers had been initiated only by industrialists, after this date they were 
increasingly started by financiers in a highly efficient national capital 
market. This increased the number of mergers.
415
 The largest of these 
merged enterprises was US Steel, a “trust of trusts”. After the listing of 
US Steel, the average number of daily share sales increased from 2 
million to 3 million.  When first listed in 1901, US Steel had a market 
value of US $1.4 billion. This boosted the power of the emerging 
stockbroking houses, which could ensure that the large amounts of 
securities required were placed with the public, first and foremost by the 
firm of J. Pierpont Morgan.
416
 
 
 It was the practice for partners in investment banks, which had arranged 
the floating of the bonds and preference shares, to be given a position on 
the board of the company in order to supervise the board of directors and 
protect the interests of their clients, the investors. As some of these 
bankers accumulated numerous directorships they obtained exclusive 
power, particularly with the growth of trusts. This was referred to as 
“Morganization” after J. Pierpont Morgan. It also came to be known as 
“financial capitalism”. The Clayton Act of 1914, the second Anti-Trust 
Act after the Shearman Act of 1890, was meant to curb the size of these 
huge concerns. American enterprises had become larger than their 
European counterparts. By 1914 US industrialists had launched a wide 
variety of new products in the global market such as the telephone, 
portable camera, phonograph, electric street car, automobile, typewriter, 
passenger lifts in houses, machine tools. American manufacturers reigned 
supreme in every one of these fields, just as in the automobile industry, 
and in several they were monopolists. 
 
 In summary, the large railroad companies and the later other industrial 
enterprises too made use of the possibility of raising capital from the 
public in bonds and shares. 
 
 As the ownership of companies passed from the hands of just a few 
entrepreneurs to a wider public, corporate governance issues were raised. 
How could the board attract capital at the right price if the investors did 
not receive the right information? New capital could be raised by selling 
the investors preference shares or convertible bonds which gave a fixed 
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interest or dividend. But in order to place ordinary shares the public 
needed sufficient information if they were going to invest their money. 
 
 The second problem was the classic agency question. How could 
investors get sufficient assurance that the board would act in their 
interests? This problem was solved by appointing financial intermediaries 
as supervisors. J. Pierpont Morgan was the first of such financial 
supervisors.
417
 
 
 A market for ordinary shares of fluctuating value needed more 
disciplinary mechanisms than an investment banker on the board. As long 
as stock exchange prices were going up there was not a problem. In the 
1920s no one worried and there were hardly any laws governing 
securities. The situation changed only after the Great Crash in 1929 and 
the introduction of the economic programmes and securities laws by the 
administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt under his “New Deal”.  
 
 1933: New Deal, SEC, managerial capitalism 
 The shareholder base had spread to include many small shareholders. 
Between 1920 and 1929 the number of shareholders investing through the 
NYSE doubled from 14.4 million to 30 million.
418
 This pushed up share 
prices. However, in the Great Crash of 1929 share prices plummeted by 
83%. The Great Depression of the 1930s spurred a public debate about 
corporate reform and formed the backdrop for the first federal securities 
laws. Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and introduced the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Neither of these Acts addressed the 
need for independent directors or changes of corporate boards. Instead, 
Congress crafted a robust disclosure regime to empower investors 
through provision of information. It required independent auditors for 
listed companies to ensure reliability of information, and introduced a 
series of changes in proxy and takeover procedures.
419
 
 
 The crisis also led to the passing of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. This 
Act separated investment banking from commercial banking. It was a 
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wise decision and, in hindsight, it might have been better if this 
legislation had not been repealed in the 1990s.  
 
 From the 1920s and 1930s onwards a managerial hierarchy developed. 
Berle and Means famously identified the separation between ownership 
and control and the potential for divergence of interests between owners 
and managers.
420
 They argued that managers should administer corporate 
assets not in their own interest, or in some form of ambiguous public 
interest, but as trustees in the best interests of shareholders as the owners 
of the corporate enterprise. Although lip service was paid to their 
proposal, scholars, practitioners and regulators gradually came to agree 
that the imposition of a monitoring function of the board of directors, 
including outside directors, could serve as an effective antidote to what 
economists dubbed “agency costs” arising out of the separation between 
ownership and control. Such was expected in theory. In reality, outside 
directors were no more than decorative figures beholden to the imperial 
CEO. These outside directors were usually the banker, the lawyer and the 
accountant friends of the CEO or a representative of a customer or 
supplier. The CEOs were a close-knit group. They generally had much 
the same type of training, often attending the same group of schools. 
They joined the same professional societies and read the same journals. 
As their role came to require more narrowly specialised expertise, they 
became increasingly independent of the owners. The managers soon 
controlled the destiny of the enterprises by which they were employed. A 
sociologist called this the “managerial revolution”. Lawyers saw the 
“corporation” becoming an institution. Economists saw the “Economic 
Theory of Managerial Capitalism” at work.421 
 
 The number of small shareholders grew once again in the 1950s.
422
 In the 
1960s yet another wave of mergers produced conglomerates such as GE. 
The merger mania reached its pinnacle in 1968 with for example the 
tender offer by Gulf & Western for Sinclair Oil.
423
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 1970s: independent directors and corporate governance; political 
correctness 
 Throughout the 1940s, 50s and 60s the SEC was unsuccessful in its 
efforts to have amendments to the federal securities laws passed and in 
getting existing laws to be interpreted in the sense that independent 
directors for listed corporations would be required by law.
424
 However, 
though legislative reform had not yet materialised, the notion of directors‟ 
independence began to gain attention during this time. William O. 
Douglas, who served as chairman of the SEC and later as Justice on the 
Supreme Court, was an early and influential advocate of the need for 
independent directors.
425
 In 1956, the New York Stock Exchange 
recommended that listed companies include at least two outside directors 
on their boards to help ensure prompt and full disclosure of corporate 
information.
426
 In 1966, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey 
nominated outside directors for the first time. In the mid-1960s and 
throughout the 1970s, public debate on corporate governance resumed in 
the context of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. Director 
independence increasingly came to be seen as the crucial element that 
would help the board to monitor management, promote honesty and 
prevent the recurrence of corporate malfeasance. Public confidence in 
business had been thoroughly shaken by the perception of a corrupt 
alliance between corporate managers and political officials, and 
accusations of corruption pervaded all levels of society – not just the 
White House or the government, but inside corporations and within 
boardrooms. The growing stagflation and the long bear market gave 
stockholders a further reason to seek changes in the prevailing corporate 
governance regime. 
 
 From the early 1970s onwards, the SEC and the stock exchanges began to 
embrace the concept of the board as a monitor of management and 
demanded ever greater director independence. 
 
 In 1972, the SEC issued a release that concluded with the statement that 
“the Commission endorses … the establishment by all publicly-held 
companies of audit committees composed of outside directors.” In 1973, 
the New York Stock Exchange strongly recommended that each listed 
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company form an audit committee, preferably composed exclusively of 
independent directors.
 
In 1974, the SEC restated its support for 
independent audit committees by amending its rules to require disclosure 
of the existence or absence of an audit committee in proxy statements, i.e. 
information packets put together by officers of corporations and sent to 
all shareholders of corporations for the board to obtain proxies from 
shareholders for general meetings of shareholders.
 
In 1976, in response to 
the SEC‟s investigation into questionable corporate payments and 
practices, prompted in particular by the uncovering of falsified corporate 
records and the use of slush funds, the chairman of the SEC suggested 
that the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) “take the lead in this area by 
appropriately revising its listing requirements, thus providing a practical 
means effecting important objectives without increasing direct 
government regulation.”427 On 9 March 1977, the SEC approved the new 
Stock Exchange rule requiring all listed domestic companies to establish 
and maintain audit committees comprised solely of directors independent 
of management and free from any relationship that would interfere with 
their exercise of independent judgment as a committee member. 
 
 In April 1977, the SEC announced that it would hold public hearings into 
shareholder communications, shareholder participation in the corporate 
electoral process, and corporate governance in general.
428
 In the opinion 
of the then SEC chairman Harold Williams, it was important for boards to 
be able to operate independently of management. Accordingly, he 
proposed a series of rules aimed to facilitate the restructuring of boards 
and make them fully independent. At the very least, Williams believed, 
the nominating, compensation and audit committees should be composed 
entirely of independent directors.
429
 However, the SEC had no statutory 
authority to regulate the composition or membership of boards, or even 
committees, because corporate law is left to the individual states. As a 
result, Williams proposed that all corporations subject to the SEC‟s proxy 
rules should label directors as either “independent” or “affiliated”. 
However, the proposal was considered too sweeping – there had not been 
any expectation that directors needed to be independent, and labelling 
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them as such or as affiliated was deemed an unnecessary intrusion. The 
proposed disclosure requirements elicited a wave of protests from the 
business community. It should be noted that although the SEC chairman 
fully supported a shift towards greater independence of directors, he did 
not favour federal legislation mandating such a change. 
 
 The failure of Penn Central in 1977 was one of the major scandals of the 
time. The outside directors had been very lax.
430
 As mentioned above, in 
March 1977 the SEC approved the general obligation introduced by the 
New York Stock Exchange for domestic listed companies to have audit 
committees composed of independent directors. Even then, however, the 
SEC would not propose that this be included in federal legislation. 
 
 All the same, this marked the beginning of a shift in the main role of the 
board from supporting and advising the CEO to overseeing and guiding 
the CEO, senior management and corporate operations. The board‟s 
function changed from advising to monitoring. The wave of reform in the 
1970s marked the birth of the concepts “independent director” and 
“corporate governance”. The term “corporate governance” was already 
used in the US in 1977.
431
 As a corollary of the shifting role of the board, 
arguments for having a chairman separate from the CEO began to 
surface. 
 
 1980s: hostile takeovers and defence mechanisms 
 During the 1960s public offers for shares were not regulated. Bidders 
used “creeping mergers” and “surprise offers”. Offers were often 
announced after stock markets closed on a Friday, with the period open 
for acceptance set to close early the following week, sometimes even on 
the Monday, with the announcement that the bidder had already “secretly 
accumulated” a holding of 25 or 30%. These so-called “Saturday night 
specials” were felt by Congress to thwart efforts to give shareholders 
adequate information and time to come to a well-considered decision. In 
1968 Congress responded by amending Sections 13 and 14 of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act. Much of the legislation focuses on disclosure 
and contains obligations to register when acquiring more than 5% of a 
listed corporation and procedural and substantive rules on timing and the 
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content of bidding documentation. This legislation is called the Williams 
Act.
432
 
 
 Public share offers continued in the 1970s. Hyperinflation in the 1970s 
meant that “hard assets” of many companies were more valuable than the 
goods they produced. It became profitable to buy corporations for their 
assets, i.e. asset picking. Inflation also led to lower stock prices. Many 
mature businesses were no longer growing, but were still generating cash. 
Furthermore, institutions owned a larger percentage of shares and many 
institutions were keen to maximise the value of their investments. 
Attitudes toward debt changed as the US became more debtor-oriented. 
The availability of credit and the growth of the high yield “junk” bond 
market made money more easily available. Bidders could borrow to 
finance tender offers, making even large corporations vulnerable. 
Attitudes towards public share offers changed. Investment banks, law 
firms and even corporate executives, who had once viewed the business 
of unfriendly public offers as unseemly could no longer resist the high 
fees or success of many early takeovers.
433
 
 
 A policy debate developed on whether hostile offers were beneficial to 
corporations and the economy as a whole and whether the boards of 
target corporations should be active in the process and should have 
defence mechanisms at their disposal to be able to stall or block hostile 
tender offers. The arguments pro and con and the case law accepting 
defence mechanisms as in the Unocal and Paramount v. Time are 
discussed below in 3.7.3.2. The jurisprudence that is the basis for 
American corporate law is largely influenced by the Delaware Chancery 
Court of 5 chancellors and the Delaware Supreme Court; see for a 
detailed exposition in 3.1.3(a)E. 
 
 1990s: number of institutional investors increases 
 From 1980 to 1996 large institutional investors nearly doubled their 
portion of ownership of US listed corporations from 30% to over 50%. 
From 1990 onwards the pattern of corporate governance activity started 
to change again. Hostile takeovers declined substantially. New corporate 
governance mechanisms began to play a larger role, particularly 
executive stock option plans, by which directors acquired more shares, 
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and a greater involvement of boards where many directors now held 
larger parcels of shares.
434
 
 
 Institutional investors promoted stronger supervision and monitoring by 
the board and its independent members, especially through its 
composition. They realized that the cost of simply changing the board in 
order to make the company listen to them would be less than mounting a 
big takeover battle. “Fix the board” became the theme. However, it was 
not easy for institutional investors to clean up boards because the 1992 
proxy rules made it very difficult to organise a proxy contest. It was and 
still is nearly impossible for shareholders to get a candidate for the board 
nominated or put on the ballot without bearing the costs of a proxy fight. 
 
 Shareholders increased pressure by criticising CEOs year in, year out, on 
items such as underperformance and overcompensation. In 1993 the 
board of directors of General Motors ousted its chairman/CEO and made 
a landmark decision to split the functions of chairman and CEO by 
appointing a non-executive chairman and a separate CEO. Within three 
months three other listed companies followed suit. The SEC helped by 
permitting shareholders to include their criticism on the CEO‟s 
compensation on the proxy ballot as a non-binding opinion. 
 
 In April 1994, the GM board published its “Corporate Governance 
Guidelines”, which were dubbed by the media as “Magna Carta for 
Directors”.435 It would become a watershed document in US corporate 
governance opening up more possibilities for shareholders to have 
influence on the boards of companies. The GM guidelines focused on 
strengthening the role of an independent board of directors through the 
adoption of improvements ranging from executive sessions to annual 
board evaluations. CalPERS, the largest pension fund of California 
government employees, which had and has an important shareholders 
activist role, took the initiative to give corporations grades “A+” to “F” 
based on compliance with the GM guidelines.
436
 The SEC supported the 
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idea that an ideal board would consist, except for the CEO, of members 
completely independent of management.
437
 
 
 The institutional investors introduced the concept of “relationship 
investing”, a new form of “financial capitalism” directed at long-term 
investing. They were optimistic about the increase of monitoring by 
independent directors.
438
 Several newly energised corporate boards, led 
by independent directors seeking to become more involved in overseeing 
the direction of their corporations, saw their CEOs depart. Behind these 
more active boards were often major institutional investors. Such a 
development was sometimes called “political governance”. However, 
there was no institutional basis yet for this shareholder influence. It ran 
into strong opposition from traditional boards based on legal arguments 
and from executive management groups, such as that of the Business 
Roundtable, a meeting of CEOs of the largest corporations which was 
well advised by capable lawyers such as Martin Lipton. 
 
 In the 1990s the US administration did not create “soft laws” for better 
governance. Soft laws, unwritten rules, do not fit in well with US legal 
culture. Institutional investors therefore resorted to two methods: 
presenting shareholder proposals at the company‟s meeting of 
shareholders and jawboning boards of directors to push for a change in 
management or strategy.
439
 
 
 However, “political governance” by shareholders, often activated by 
institutional investors, did not really work yet. In the 1990s it did not 
matter so much, because stock prices continued to rise whether 
management was under- or outperforming. Another idea took hold: rather 
than trying to discipline directors by wielding a “stick” it might be better 
to offer them a “carrot” in the form of stock option plans. In the UK the 
Greenbury Report discouraged this, at least for independent directors. 
The British were convinced that independent directors should not have 
options because this would endanger their independence. In the US, 
however, option plans for directors seemed to solve the “problem of 
controlling directors”. This would have directors promote “shareholder 
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value”. The Business Roundtable – the association of CEOs – moved 
from promoting the interests of the stakeholders to those of the 
shareholders.
440
 
 
 21
st
 century: crashes, lessons, many developments 
 The Enron, Tyco and WorldCom scandals of 2001 and 2002 showed once 
again that higher compensation packages for directors – the “carrot” – is 
no guarantee of better management. 
 
 The WorldCom directors permitted the CEO to cook the books by not disclosing a loan of 
$250 million granted to him by the company without collateral and let him make multi-
billion dollar acquisitions without due diligence. In Enron the directors permitted the 
executives to cook the books by not disclosing a scheme of internal transactions, thereby 
hiding liabilities. In both cases the esteemed firm of Arthur Andersen had supported the 
executives. In Tyco a director received a finder‟s fee of $20 million without disclosing it. 
All three companies went bankrupt. These corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002 were, at 
the time, the largest and most catastrophic business failures in US history. These very 
public corporate disasters received a tremendous amount of public attention and served as 
the catalyst for regulatory changes. 
 
 On 20 July 2002 President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act into law, 
and shortly afterwards the NYSE and NASDAQ followed suit with new 
detailed corporate governance regulations that built upon the Sarbanes-
Oxley independent director requirements. These have to a great extent 
changed US boardroom discipline and boardroom dynamics. These 
changes were instigated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Some are positive, 
but there are many negative consequences. The Act goes into such detail 
that it promotes “check the box” practices. It forces boards to “recognize 
all the trees, but lose sight of the forest”. The Act has also created 
substantial extra administrative costs, which is a burden for US and 
foreign corporations listed on the US stock exchanges and has prompted a 
number of foreign listed companies to leave NYSE and NASDAQ and 
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move to the London Stock Exchange. Hereunder I focus on the US 
emphasis on independence of directors and the recent change in the 
requirements of process in board meetings. 
 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act dramatically changed the nature of federal 
securities laws with regard to corporate governance by directors. 
Significantly, Sarbanes-Oxley requires that all listed companies maintain 
wholly independent audit committees comprised solely of outside 
directors. This was an important breakthrough since it contrasts with the 
principle that federal law should not deal with the internal organisation of 
corporations. Reflecting a more tangible and robust definition than in the 
past, the term “independence” was defined as meaning that no members 
of the committee may accept any consulting, advising or other 
compensatory fee from the company or its affiliates, or be an affiliated 
person of the corporation or any subsidiary.
441
 In fact, this definition of 
independence was stricter than prior stock exchange listing requirements 
for audit committee members, which only required that members be free 
of relationships that might “interfere with their exercise of independent 
judgment as committee members”.442 Beyond just requiring that the audit 
committee consist of independent directors, Sarbanes-Oxley introduced 
several reform measures designed to structurally empower board 
members to remain independent. Section 204 of the Act requires auditors 
to report directly to the audit committee instead of to the management. 
Additionally, the audit committee was granted full authority to engage 
independent counsel and other advisors and be adequately funded, as well 
as to establish procedures for receiving, retaining and treating complaints 
and anonymous tips. Whistleblowing regulations were also introduced. 
 
 Furthermore, the NYSE Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards 
Committee issued a report of recommended changes to listing standards 
on 6 June 2002, nearly two months before Sarbanes-Oxley was signed 
into law, thus affording legislators the benefit of taking note of the 
exchange‟s broader requirements for board independence. The changes 
recommended in the report were soon approved by the SEC and adopted 
on 16 August 2002. Under the NYSE standards, an “independent 
director” is one who has no material relationship with the listed company. 
The NYSE also required listed companies to have a majority of 
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independent directors.
443
 Additionally, listed companies were required to 
have nominating and compensation committees composed entirely of 
independent directors, and to hold regularly scheduled executive sessions, 
without any executive, of the board chaired by a lead director or 
independent chairman. 
 
 The recent financial crisis has once again prompted a re-evaluation of 
corporate governance. Outside directors have failed to provide the 
oversight that optimistic forecasters expected. Unaffiliated directors may 
not have the expertise or access to information that would permit 
effective supervision of corporate management. 
 
 A significant indicator of the growing role of the board as an independent 
player in corporate governance was the change in composition of the 
board. Whereas in the 20
th
 century directors were typically members of 
management or otherwise closely linked to management (e.g. lawyers, 
investment bankers or other advisors of the company), board membership 
in the 21
st
 century reflects a significant majority of independent directors. 
In 1950 only 20% of directors of large public US company boards could 
be deemed independent, but by 2005 average independent director 
representation had reached 75%. A typical board is now composed of the 
CEO and about 8 or 9 independent directors. 
 
 In board meetings due process is very important. The board must be well 
informed, take time to receive good outside advice and debate all 
alternatives before coming to a well-reasoned decision. 
 
                                                     
443 NYSE Section 303A.02 Independence Test 
 – General: board must affirm – given all relative facts and circumstances – that each director is 
independent; 
 – also for the last 3 years that he/she (or family member) has not been: 
  – an executive director of issuer; 
  – a recipient of more than $120,000 in any year from the issuer; 
  – an officer of a contracting company for more than $1 million or more than 2% of the company‟s 
consolidated gross revenue in a year; 
  – executive director of another company where one of the executives of the issuer is independent 
director and on the compensation committee; 
  – employee of auditor of issuer. 
 NASDAQ 5605(a)(2) Independence Tests 
 – for the last 3 years he/she (or family member) has not been (same list as in the NYSE rules, except that 
the threshold for a contracting company‟s officer is not $1 million but $200,000 per year). 
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 An important case involving an “imperial” CEO/chairman was the Disney case. In 1994 
Disney had lost its COO/president Frank Wells in a helicopter crash. Eisner was chairman 
and CEO. Eisner assumed the presidency temporarily, but only 3 months later was found 
to be suffering from a heart disease and had to undergo bypass surgery. These events 
persuaded Eisner and the board to find a successor for him. Eisner and Irwin Russell, 
chair of the Compensation Committee, together approached Ovitz for the COO position. 
Ovitz, who would receive $150-$200 million over the next 5 years at the job he was then 
holding, initially refused. However, negotiations were subsequently resumed. Everything 
was discussed by telephone with 3 other Disney directors, who said that they had received 
sufficient information. Expert advice had been obtained. It was agreed that, as in his 
existing job and like Eisner, he would get a 5-year contract. He was terminated without 
cause after 14 months of service and Disney after the board had again taken expert legal 
advice paid about $130 million in compensation. 
 
 The first complaint, filed by a shareholder called Brehm, asking the court to permit a 
derivative suit, i.e. a law suit by the company against the directors, was dismissed straight 
forward by the Chancellor for failure to sufficiently allege particularised facts supporting 
the cause of action.444 This part of the decision was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme 
Court, but the Supreme Court went further to advise the plaintiffs to use their inspection 
rights to gather more information.445 The Supreme Court seemed troubled by the case, but 
pointed out that standards of liability are not the same as ideal corporate governance best 
practices.446 The Supreme Court gave plaintiffs the right to inspect books and records and 
re-plead the case in part. The plaintiffs used this right and, when more facts were adduced, 
their case was not dismissed and the plaintiffs could take the case to trial.447 
 
 It turned out that Ovitz and Eisner were unable to manage Disney together and the hiring 
was problematic from the start. The plaintiffs argued breach of duty of care, good faith 
and waste. They pleaded inter alia that the dismissal should have been for cause but could 
not prove that point. The case was tried before the Chancellor over 37 days. The 
Chancellor found the board process failed to meet best practice standards, which meant 
that the Compensation Committee should have received spreadsheets showing what Ovitz 
would have received if dismissed in respectively years 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Moreover, more 
extensive meetings should have taken place before the dismissal. Finally, the Chancellor 
found that the board acted in a sufficiently informed manner and had not therefore 
                                                     
444 Brehm v. Eisner, Ch. 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
445 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
446 Norman Veasey, ‛What happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004‟, University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 153:1399 (2005), p. 1419 (“Veasey (2005)”) and 3.6.2 below. 
447 Walt Disney, motion 1, 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) and Walt Disney, motion 2, 2004 WL 2050132 (Del. 
Ch. 2004). 
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breached the duty of care in making its decision. The Chancellor handed down an opinion 
of 174 pages in favour of defendants.448 The Supreme Court confirmed this ruling.449 
 
 In 2004 at Disney‟s AGM, 43% of the shareholders withheld their votes for the re-
election of Eisner. Although re-elected as director, the board decided to replace him as 
board chairman/CEO. This Disney case is cited often in corporate governance literature 
and is a warning that due process must be observed in boards and that boards must have a 
large majority of independent directors to counterbalance the CEO.
450
 
 
 Shareholder activism has effect on voting items from 2004 
 Financial institutions were mostly passive at the turn of the century. They 
are profit driven and do not want to spend money on corporate 
governance. Legally they had hardly any rights and a number of 
impediments. Many listed companies had defence mechanisms, including 
staggered boards, where only 1/3 of all directors were up for re-election 
each year. Shareholders rarely went to shareholders meetings. They gave 
proxies to brokers. It was prohibitively expensive to start a proxy fight 
against the board‟s proposals. A proposal of shareholders could only be 
initiated in “precatory” language, that would not bind the board.451 Nearly 
all nominations of the board for director positions were pushed through, 
because of the pluralist voting system, where any nominated director 
would be voted in, if he had more positive votes than any other candidate. 
In absence of votes for another candidate one vote was enough. Because 
of the broker proxy system most voters would not vote. In the Disney 
saga, in 2004, there were 11 nominated directors for 11 places, who all 
got in as directors. This caused shareholder activists to push for a change 
from the traditional plurality standard to majority voting, where a director 
who receives less than 50% of the shareholders‟ positive votes, resigns 
voluntarily. In some companies this voluntarily resignation is binding, but 
in others the board may refuse to accept the resignation.
452
 From 2004 
mainly government employee pension funds, such as CalPERS and 
                                                     
448 Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005) and Cons. C.A. No. 15452, 2005 
Del. Ch. Lexis 113. 
449 Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. Sup. 2006). 
450 The Disney case: a virtual roundtable discussion with Chancellor William B. Chandler III, Prof. Lawrence 
Hammermesh, Prof. John Coffee and William T. Allen, former Chancellor, and Corporate Governance (2009), 
p. 15. 
451 Bainbridge (2008), p. 216. 
452 Bainbridge (2008), p. 212 and Lisa M. Fairfax, „Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy‟, 
Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 69-53 (2008), pp. 65-66 (“Fairfax (2008)”). 
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TIAA-CREF, both active since 1992, became the torch bearers for 
change on voting issues. Voting advisory companies like Risk Metrics, 
now renamed Institutional Investor Services, were able to coordinate the 
votes of the traditionally silent majority, which gave shareholder activists 
substantial influence. There are three methods to push through: urging 
other shareholders to vote in line with the activist with the help of voting 
advisors, one-on-one meetings with the board and shaming the directors 
via the media.
453
 
 
 The Dodd-Frank Act, 21 July 2010 
 The credit crisis has taught us more lessons and there will be additional 
changes to come. The Dodd-Frank Act, signed by President Obama on 
21 July 2010, not only makes dramatic reforms to the financial regulatory 
system in the US but also contains a number of significant provisions 
relating to corporate governance and executive compensation of all listed 
companies. 
 
 The Dodd-Frank Act (the Act) settles many highly debated aspects of 
corporate governance by setting out more additional requirements to be 
met by directors. On most items the Act directs the SEC to make further 
regulations for detailed requirements. 
 
 Proxy access 
 The SEC issued a proposal in 2009, which provoked considerable debate 
and criticism from corporate circles. Now the Act, in an amendment to 
Section 14(1) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934, authorises, but does 
not require, the SEC to adopt rules on free proxy access, but makes an 
exception “if it disproportionately burdens small issuers”. “Issuers” 
herein means “listed corporations”. Shareholders have for a long time had 
the right to elect directors but in practice they could only vote for or 
against the board‟s nominations mentioned on the company‟s proxy 
statement. If shareholders wished to nominate a director, they had to go 
through the huge expense of filing their own proxy statement, which 
made their right to elect directors rather limited. This new proxy access 
will give large shareholders a strong instrument. The proposed rule would 
establish the right to nominate a director on the corporation‟s proxy card 
(i.e. at no cost). The proxy card is issued by the corporation to 
shareholders at their documented request months before the AGM 
together with the board‟s proxy material. The shareholders will have the 
                                                     
453 Bainbridge (2008), p. 219 and Fairfax (2008), pp. 54-107. 
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right to nominate a director, if those shareholders (or groups of 
shareholders) hold at least 1% of the company‟s shares for a period of at 
least one year (this applies to the largest companies, while higher 
ownership thresholds apply to smaller companies). Access to the proxy 
card would be of no use to a shareholder seeking to change control of the 
company (i.e. on the continuing assumption that boards can defend 
themselves against hostile takeovers) and there are various disclosure and 
qualification requirements. Up to 25% of a board could be installed 
through this proxy access in any one year. Following debate, the 
thresholds have been raised. Indeed, on 25 August 2010 the SEC issued a 
regulation that proxy access is only open to shareholders (or groups of 
shareholders) holding at least 3% of the company‟s shares for a minimum 
period of 3 years.
454
 The 3% requirement is comparable to the Dutch 
proposals for the right of shareholders to add items to the agenda. There 
is still strong opposition against this proxy access rule. The Business 
Roundtable has started litigation in the federal court of first instance of 
Washington DC, asking the court to declare the whole rule 
unconstitutional. The second agreement against the measre is that no cost 
benefit appraisal was made. As of 1 July 2011 this litigation is still 
pending. US corporate governance specialists have informed me that the 
corporate world is afraid that large pension funds may be able to push 
through the nomination of union members as candidates for membership 
of the board or that hedge funds may be able to push through the 
nomination of one of its representatives. The worry is that the board will 
no longer serve the interests of the shareholders as a whole, but each 
director will only take care of special interests. They add that this debate 
about nominating rights is a separate issue from the debates about 
plurality vs majority voting and staggered boards. These two issues are 
not dealt with in the Dodd-Frank Act, but are a hot topic of debate in 
many shareholders meetings in 2011. These issues are described below 
after some items of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
 
 CEO/chairman structure disclosure 
 The Act adds a new Section 14B to the Securities Exchange Act 1934 
under the heading “Corporate Governance” and directs the SEC to issue 
rules requiring US listed companies to disclose in their annual proxy 
statements the reasons why the company decided to have the positions of 
CEO and chairman filled by the same person or by separate individuals. 
This provision of the Act is a repetition and serves to rub in the point, 
                                                     
454 Wachtell Lipton Memo of 25 August 2010, see Wachtell website. 
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because the SEC had already adopted such rules as part of its December 
2009 “proxy disclosure enhancement rules” contained in Item 407 of 
Regulation S-K. It is clear that the issue of one person being both CEO 
and chairman is a major point of debate at present. The reporting 
requirement which the SEC now will have to make mandatory comes 
close to the UK “comply or explain” rule, see 2.1.2(viii) and 2.2.3(ii). 
 
 Limitations on broker discretionary voting regarding directors 
 NYSE rule 452 allows brokers to cast discretionary votes, i.e. they do not 
need to have specific authorisation from the shareholders they represent, 
on “routine” matters. “Broker discretionary votes” constitute between 
10% and 20% of the votes cast at most companies. This meant that in the 
past brokers – who are usually influenced by the CEO – had a say in 
director elections. Rule 452 was amended in 2009 to stipulate that the 
election of a director is never “routine”, and the Act now codifies this 
requirement through amendment of Section 6(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act 1934. The Act goes on to require all stock exchanges to 
amend their rules to prohibit broker discretionary voting on non-routine 
matters, including voting on executive compensation matters. 
 
 It is because of this provision prohibiting brokers from voting on 
directors appointments that the SEC has issued a release on other possible 
ways for issuers to communicate with beneficial owners, so that on the 
one hand the beneficial owners are well informed and on the other hand 
they can have more real influence on elections.
455
 
 
 Say-on-Pay (shareholder votes on executive compensation matters) and 
golden parachutes 
 The Act adds a new Section 14A of the Securities Exchange Act 1934, 
under which public companies must give shareholders a non-binding 
advisory vote at least every three years on the compensation of certain 
executive officers specifically named by function. 
 
 In recent years there have been a limited number of say-on-pay votes 
voluntarily proposed by management. Shareholders will be able to vote 
on compensation and on whether they wish to vote every one, two or 
three years. Several companies have already in advance of the law 
voluntarily adopted say-on-pay votes biennially (e.g. Prudential) and 
triennially (e.g. Microsoft). According to the Cravath Public Company 
                                                     
455 Wachtell Lipton Memo of 15 July 2010. 
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Alert
456
 in 2010, three companies – Motorola, Occidental Petroleum and 
Key Corp. – did not receive majority shareholder approval on say-on-pay 
votes. The consequence of failed votes on compensation is expected to be 
that certain directors, particularly compensation committee members, 
may be the target of “withhold the vote” campaigns and may not be re-
elected. 
 
 The Act also requires disclosure to shareholders and a non-binding 
advisory shareholder vote regarding “golden parachutes” for executives 
in any merger or acquisition transaction requiring a proxy or consent 
solicitation. 
 
 Disclosure of institutional investor’s voting records on compensation 
matters 
 As a complement to the new federally mandated say-on-pay and say-on-
golden parachutes votes every institutional investment manager subject to 
Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 will now be required 
to disclose, annually, how it voted. This type of disclosure is already best 
practice on the websites of investment institutions. 
 
 Independence of compensation committee members 
 Similar to the public company audit committee requirements added by 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to Section 10A of the Securities 
Exchange Act 1934, the Act has added a Section 10C that addresses the 
issue of the independence of compensation committees. Although NYSE 
and NASDAQ require all committees to have solely independent 
members, there has not previously been a Federal Exchange Act 
provision to back up the SEC rule regarding independence of 
compensation committee members. This is the second departure – the 
first being the section of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act providing for the 
independence of the audit committee members – from the principle that 
federal laws should not regulate the internal organisation of corporations. 
It should be noted that directors affiliated to large shareholders may not 
be eligible to serve on compensation committees. However, this is not yet 
included in the definition of NYSE or NASDAQ. Their sole concern is 
whether the director is affiliated to the listed corporation in question.
457
 
 
                                                     
456 Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP Public Company Alert, 21 July  2010, see Cravath website. 
457 See 3.4.9 below. 
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 Independence of compensation committee advisors 
 The Act does not require compensation committees to use only 
independent advisors, but only that independence be considered and that 
the corporation must pay the advisors. 
 
 New disclosures about compensation 
 New requirements of disclosure on compensation are: 
 Pay versus performance 
 Companies will be required to disclose the relationship between 
“executive compensation actually paid” and “the financial performance 
of the issuer”, taking into account any change in the value of the shares 
and dividends of the issuer and any distributions. 
 Internal pay ratio 
 Companies will be required to disclose the manner of compensation of all 
employees of the company (other than the CEO), plus the total 
compensation of the CEO, and also provide the ratio between the CEO‟s 
income and others. 
 Hedging 
 Companies will be required to disclose whether directors and employees 
are permitted to purchase instruments “to hedge or offset any decrease in 
the market value of shares” if they have received put options. 
 
 Claw backs 
 The Act creates a new Section 10D of the Securities Exchange Act 1934, 
which requires listed public companies to implement policies to recapture 
– or “claw back” – compensation “erroneously awarded” to executives 
prior to a restatement of the company‟s financial statements. It applies to 
all present and former executives and to restatements of accounts for any 
reason, not only in cases of misconduct. It is therefore very wide-ranging. 
 
 It should be noted as background that under Sarbanes-Oxley the SEC has 
hitherto been empowered to require the recovery of certain compensation 
from CEOs and CFOs (but no others) in the case of restatements resulting 
from misconduct. 
 
 The change to all executives, i.e. not only the CEO an CFO, and 
restatement for any reason, not only fraud, broaden its scope greatly. In 
recent years over 650 companies have made restatements annually. This 
will make boards rethink their bonus criteria.
458
 
                                                     
458 Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, Public Company Alert, 21 July 2010. 
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 Compensation restrictions at “covered financial institutions” 
 The Act imposes extra compensation-related requirements on “covered 
financial institutions”. Covered financial institutions are those financial 
institutions on a specific list, which are specially supervised by the 
Federal Government. They are obliged to report to the appropriate federal 
regulator the structure of all incentive-based compensation arrangements. 
This is to enable the federal regulators to determine if the compensation 
structure “provides an executive officer, employee, director or principal 
shareholder of the covered financial institution with excessive 
compensation” or “could lead to material financial loss to the covered 
financial institution”. The Act also directs the regulators to adopt rules to 
prohibit any types of incentive-based payment arrangements that 
encourage inappropriate risks. 
 
 Whistleblower provisions and “bounty” payments 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has provisions to protect whistleblowers from 
“discharge, demotion, suspension, threats, harassment or discrimination”. 
As a result, many companies introduced their own internal guidelines for 
whistleblowing and ethical treatment. Now the Act establishes a “bounty” 
programme at the SEC, under which whistleblowers may be awarded 
10% to 30% of the amount the government receives in fines if the fines 
are above $1 million. This applies only to “original information”. It could 
give the incentive to the whistleblower not to go to the company first with 
the information, but to bypass the company and immediately go to the 
SEC out of fear that the company may report itself, as a consequence of 
which the whistleblower‟s information would not be “original”. It is 
expected that corporate circles will strongly object to this system, which 
does not promote internal ethical behaviour.
459
 
 
 Summary 
 Congress passed, and the President signed, the Dodd-Frank Act on 
21 July 2010. Its application is in many cases subject to regulatory 
measures, and it is likely that there will be pressure from corporate circles 
for the SEC and other regulators to relax implementation to some extent. 
 
 Debate about staggered boards 
 Although not an item in the Dodd-Frank Act many shareholder activists 
raise the issue that they want the company to delete the staggered board 
                                                     
459 Wachtell Lipton Memo, 21 July 2010. 
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system. By this arrangement directors are not all re-elected each year but 
one third of directors is re-elected every three years. This is regarded as a 
semi-protection device. At present, about one third of listed corporations 
have a staggered board; see sub-section 3.4.10 and note 540 below. 
 
 Debate to change from plurality to majority voting in 2011 
 Many corporations still have a plurality voting system by which a director 
can be re-elected in case at least one shareholder votes him in, while the 
other shareholders withhold their votes. Shareholder activists are pushing 
for a change to majority voting, either irrevocably or subject to board 
decision. This resignation subject to board decision is called “plurality 
plus”. “Majority voting is the number one issue for the 2011 proxy season 
at shareholders meetings. This is the year that the focus shifts back from 
regulatory changes to the annual meetings.”460 As an example, in 2010 at 
a smaller listed company that had majority voting with resignation 
subject to board decision, activists withheld their votes to re-elect the one 
third of the directors that were up for re-election in a staggered board. 
The reason for the withholding of votes was that the board refused to 
abandon the staggered board system. The directors, who did not gain the 
majority, resigned. The board decided to give shareholders their way and 
deleted the staggered board and reappointed all directors, because there 
had been no material criticism against the directors. 
 
 Lawyers say that many of the Dodd-Frank measures will be contested in 
court or politicly, with the arguments that they are unconstitutional or that 
there is lack of a cost benefit appraisal. 
 
3.1.3 Aspects of US corporate culture 
 
 Although the British, the Americans and the Dutch have much in 
common, such as Christian religions and tradition, tolerance, rationality 
and independence,
461
 there are certain aspects of their business culture 
that give rise to divergency in corporate governance. Four aspects of US 
culture are relevant to corporate governance: 
 (a) legal practice; 
 (b) free enterprise; 
 (c) strategic implementation; 
 (d) sometimes short term, sometimes long term. 
                                                     
460 Financial Times, Wednesday, 23 February 2011, p. 16 about the change at Apple Corp. 
461 Trompenaars and Hampden (2006), pp. 20-25. 
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 Each aspect is described below. Again, my remarks are based on general 
impressions. I realize that I may be sometimes repeating old 
generalisations and that they are not applicable to each individual. The 
reader might nevertheless be interested or amused by these impressions 
of a foreigner with a long experience with Americans and their legal and 
business views and practice. 
 
 (a) Legal practice 
 
 (a) A State laws 
 The US has a federal system of government and in principle leaves 
regulations of corporations to the individual states. Most states have 
flexible laws that facilitate business. In the field of corporate law 
Delaware plays an important role in providing a clear and predictable 
legal framework. 
 
 (a) B SEC and Stock Exchanges 
 The SEC has played an important role since 1933, as did the strong 
disclosure provisions of President Roosevelt‟s New Deal laws after the 
1929 Crisis. Most director liability cases are based on insufficient 
transparency in issuing securities (Securities Act 1933, Section 11) and in 
selling securities (Security Exchange Act 1934, Section 10(b)). The 
Enron crisis led to the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, which 
has had a marked disciplinary effect and caused the SEC, NYSE and 
NASDAQ to promulgate strong federal corporate governance regulations. 
The Dodd-Frank Act of 21 July 2010 may have an even greater impact. 
 
 (a) C Law first: little room for informal codes 
 State laws and court judgments determine corporate law; there has 
traditionally been little room for informal directives and codes coming 
from the government, although several big private institutions such as the 
National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD), the Conference 
Board, which advises its corporate members on corporate governance, 
large pension funds such as CalPERS and Risk Metrics, the largest voting 
advisor, have set up best practice guidelines, widely disseminated and 
available to any director and even taught in special educational courses 
for board members. NYSE and NASDAQ too have introduced several 
best practice regulations. In the US the law in liability cases reflects the 
minimum standard of the business judgment rule, which only applies 
when fiduciary duties are breached. Everything is allowed unless it 
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oversteps the line of liability. This is the opposite of the British approach, 
where “comply or explain” codes set aspirational best practices but have 
not been tested in court. 
 
 (a) D Decentralised 
 People move from one end of the country to the other, making friends 
and new starts with equal chance. They worry little about burned bridges 
behind them. States have varying rules and laws and there are many 
different business cultures. Diversity is celebrated. America is a country 
made by immigrants. 
 
 (a) E Courts: Delaware 
 Americans have a good feel for due process and fair hearing, the value of 
liberty and justice for all. The courts play an important role: in the field of 
corporate law. These are the state courts. In the 19
th
 century, different 
courts in different states often gave mutually contradictory judgments. 
 
 About that time states started to develop corporate law statutes to protect 
investors. And towards the end of the 19
th
 century a number of states 
lowered taxes and enacted corporate statutes, which were liberal and 
enabling. New Jersey was the first to liberalise. Delaware eventually took 
the lead and became the most attractive state for publicly held 
corporations. Some argue that Delaware law is purposely management-
friendly in order to induce managers to opt for Delaware. Others argue 
that the logical course is to choose a shareholder-friendly state, because 
this enhances the value of the company. In fact the Delaware Courts 
usually find a nuanced middle ground between board and shareholder 
interests. 
 
 The Delaware Courts give clear direction on what boards of directors 
may and may not do and have managed to make the law clearer and more 
certain for the whole of corporate America. They have thereby attracted 
the vast majority of the Fortune 500 companies and more than half of all 
listed corporations to incorporate in Delaware. Because of the extensive 
experience of the Delaware courts, Delaware has a more well-developed 
body of case law than any other state,
462
 which gives corporations and 
their counsel greater guidance on matters of corporate governance and 
transaction liability issues.  
 
                                                     
462 Pinto and Branson (2009), pp. 16-17. 
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 Disputes on the internal affairs of Delaware corporations are usually filed 
in the Delaware Court of Chancery, which is a separate court of equity, as 
opposed to a court of law. Because it is a court of equity, there are no 
juries, and its cases are heard by the judges, called Chancellors. Currently 
the Chancery Court has one Chancellor and four Vice-Chancellors. The 
Court of Chancery is a trial court, with one Chancellor hearing each case. 
Litigants may appeal from decisions of the Court of Chancery to the 
Delaware Supreme Court, which has five members. Chief Justice Myron 
Steele and Justice Jack Jacobs have rendered many important opinions 
and communicate openly with the corporate legal world, leading to a 
clear understanding of corporate law.  
 
 The Delaware courts have clearly supported the business judgment rule, 
leaving business decisions to the directors, provided they are loyal to the 
company and take their decisions with due care. The most recent case law 
makes clear that the complete board should be involved in each decision 
and that the board must be well-informed before taking a decision. 
 
 (a) F Many lawsuits 
 Apart from the Delaware corporate injunction and liability cases directors 
are generally confronted with securities class action cases in the federal 
courts. All of these cases deal with the issue of insufficient information in 
filed registrations. Although many cases are lodged, it is rare for directors 
personally to have to pay out of pocket, because in nearly all cases the 
company indemnifies them and they are protected by good D&O policies. 
Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and about 11 other cases are the exception, 
where independent directors did have to stump up individually, because 
the plaintiffs found the behaviour so seriously breaching all duties of 
directors that an example had to be set. These “send a message” lawsuits 
are making directors increasingly nervous. 
 
 (b) Free enterprise 
 
 (b) A American Dream; free enterprise 
 Americans believe that a person can make a success of a new business 
even though he has failed before. A failure is seen as a lesson for the 
future and as an opportunity rather than as a bad mark that makes it 
impossible to do business later. Starting from nothing is possible. From 
newspaper boy to CEO is the American Dream, and everything is 
possible for “comeback kids”. Americans love comebacks. “Yes we can” 
is an appealing term, although at the time of publication of this study, not 
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so much heard as two years ago. Success and money are not dirty words 
in the USA, whereas they are downplayed in the UK and the Netherlands. 
Working hard in the US does not make a person look suspicious and 
ambition is not a negative word. 
 
 Government does not get in the way of enterprise. Anti-trust laws help 
new entrants. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Dodd-Frank Act might be 
called exceptions to the concept of free enterprise. They are certainly 
more restrictive on corporate freedom than any laws before. 
 
 (b) B Voluntarism 
 The first key element of voluntarism is believing and behaving as if each 
person is a sovereign individual: unique, independent, self-reliant, self-
governing and ultimately self-responsible. Free men of early America 
stressed “competency” and virtue. The second key element of 
voluntarism is believing and behaving as if each individual succeeds 
through fellowship in a group of his free choice. Because success means 
doing well in voluntary groups, a voluntary culture encourages 
individuals to strive for status. The typical American has a “can-do” 
confidence, conformism in his team and a status-driven culture.
463
 
 
 (b) C Go for it; assertivenes; recognition 
 Americans are winners, they want to win and as soon as they start an 
enterprise they really “go for it” in all respects. A job application letter 
and CV of an American person looks very different from the letter and 
CV of the same type of person from the Netherlands. The American letter 
is full of superlatives and landitory expressions, while the Dutch letter is 
– or used to be – rather modest. The US scores very high on the 
assertiveness list of Geert Hofstede as do the British.
464
 Americans value 
hard work, whereas the English set great store by success that seems 
effortless and “natural”. In the US risk-taking is encouraged: people are 
encouraged to “shoot for the stars”. Business leaders (the CEOs) value 
talent and gather talented people around them. They are also prepared to 
encourage to share in successes. Successful businessmen show 
magnanimity for charitable foundations; examples are Gates, Buffet, 
American Aid and the Peace Corps. 
                                                     
463 Claude S. Fischer, Made in America: A Social History of American Culture and Character (2010), pp. 10-11, 
97-101 (“Fischer (2010)”). 
464 Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2011), pp. 148-150; Hofstede (1991), p. 84. Hofstede calls the assertiveness 
list the masculinity index. 
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 (b) D Abundant size and resources 
 The country‟s immense size and ample natural resources mean that 
companies can grow strong within the US market, as there are no 
practical borders and no import duties between states. This strength 
provides them with an excellent springboard for doing business and 
mounting takeovers throughout the world.  
 
 (b) E Imperial CEO 
 US business has a reputation for success engineered by all-powerful 
CEOs. Examples are Rockefeller, J. Pierpont Morgan and, more recently, 
Eisner at Disney, Greenburg at AIG, Robert Woodruff at Coca Cola, Jack 
Welch at GE, Bill Gates at Microsoft and Steve Jobs at Apple. How did 
this strong one man leadership develop in an otherwise predominantly 
democratic country? Some say it goes back to the first British settlers at 
the start of the 17
th
 century, when Britain was not democratic yet. Some 
say it developed in the Lincoln era, when many strong heads of 
enterprises were successful in developing pan American companies. 
Some say it is connected with respect for individualism and meritocracy: 
if someone is successful, give him freedom to develop. Some say it is 
custom and has always been that way and has led to spectacular 
successes. Custom and following the example of successful “imperial 
CEOs” must be an important cultural aspect. However, the situation has 
changed since the Enron, WorldCom and the Disney disasters. Now a 
strong counterbalance is provided by independent directors and non-CEO 
chairmen. The strong charismatic CEO/chair is no longer the model. 
More modest CEOs are often successful in this day and age.
465
 
 
 (b) F Country of immigrants, direct 
 All Americans feel they are immigrants. This explains their diversity, 
their “can do” mentality and their direct way in communication, which is 
like the Dutch directness, but unlike the British. 
 
 (c) Strategic implementation 
 
 (c) A Discipline instilled by takeovers/support for new entrants 
 If a company is underperforming the company should be taken over. It 
was this notion that led to the formation of huge conglomerates, starting 
with Gould and Vanderbilt (railroads) in the 19
th
 century and US Steel 
                                                     
465 Jim Collins, Good to Great (2001) describes the success of modest CEOs at Kimberly Clark and Gillette. 
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and Standard Oil at the turn of the 20
th
 century. At the same time 
Americans wish to prevent monopolies, hence the American anti-trust, 
anti-monopoly and anti-cartel laws. Corporations are allowed to develop 
defence mechanisms to remain independent. Just as in the sporting world, 
the weakest team gets first choice of the draft of the best new players 
each year. Ever since 1830 there has been a culture, backed by state laws, 
of keeping banks small and inhibiting the growth of interstate banks. 
Only since 1990 have banks grown through mergers to much larger 
banks. Although established business power is admired, there is always 
support for a new entrant.  
 
 (c) B Academics 
 Academia play an important role in the US. The courses in business 
administration at Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Stanford and Michigan are 
world famous and many top directors from the US and elsewhere have 
studied there. These universities have developed important economic 
theories which have influenced legal developments. They also have 
famous law schools. Law professors in the US might give less direction 
to the Law than in the UK and the Netherlands, because of the strong role 
in the US of judges, lawyers and the SEC, but still professors, such as 
Bebchuck and Bainbridge have produced research and theories that have 
a large following among law makers and judges. Contrary to the other 
two countries, studied in this book, judges in the US write in legal 
professional publications and give regular talks at seminars. Chancellor 
Leo Strine and Chief Justice Myron Steele of the Delaware courts are 
good examples. They wield great influence, as do leading lawyers such as 
Martin Lipton, Ira Millstein and Holly Gregory. 
 
 (c) C Good implementation 
 It is common knowledge that Americans are good at devising and 
implementing plans, at least in business. This is something they have 
learned when studying for their masters degree in Business 
Administration. An MBA is highly regarded and a feature of US business 
culture.
466
 The British and Dutch have followed this example of their US 
competitors by establishing business schools at their own institutions of 
higher learning. 
 
                                                     
466 Philip Delves Broughton, What they teach you at Harvard Business School (2007). 
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 (c) D Adversarial system of justice; changes through long debate 
 The law advances as a result of an adversarial process in which advocates 
challenge each other in debate and the best argued case wins the day. The 
law develops organically and steadily. Examples are the development of 
poison pills, the rights of shareholders, the long fight for independent 
directors and, most recently, the move towards independent non-CEO 
chairmen. Change often comes after protracted debate over many years 
and lobbying by pressure groups. The CEOs are organised in the 
Business Roundtable. Besides, there is the NACD; recently the 
Chairman‟s Forum is gaining momentum. Shareholder activists and their 
organisations such as Risk Metrics, now called ISS, add to this influence. 
 
 (c) E Teamwork and hierarchy 
 The US believes in teamwork and is convinced that people working 
together are more likely to come up with good ideas than a person 
working alone provided teams have strong leaders. A US company is 
built up of groups in many levels who report to each other. At each level 
the group leaders know what mandate and room for action they have. 
Europeans are often struck by the many written internal regulations at US 
corporations, also called “systems”, as well as by the combination of 
teamwork and a strong hierarchy. That particular combination provides a 
good breeding ground for future leaders. The Dutch can learn from them 
how to lead. It also provides management with a talent scouting 
opportunity throughout the grades and promotes efficient planning of 
careers and succession. 
 
 (c) F Business as a science 
 A strong point of US business leaders is finding new ways of improving 
communication within the corporation and with shareholders and the 
outside world. In the area of negotiating, for example, a method has been 
developed at Harvard University to ascertain both parties‟ real interests, 
as opposed to taking strong positions at the start of the negotiations.
467
 
New forms of mediation as a form of alternative dispute resolution also 
evolved at Harvard.
468
 Moreover, many ideas about talent development 
and coaching, about “recognition of joint success moments” as corporate 
                                                     
467 Roger Fisher, William Uri and Bruce Patton, How to Get to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In, 
Harvard Negotiating Project (1991). 
468 Mediation Services developed in de US in the 1930s to settle labour disputes; R. Singer, Settling Disputes 
(1991), p. 6 ("Singer (1991)"). 
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culture development and systems have been formulated in the US and 
brought into practice in the past ten years. 
 
 (c) G Strategic debate 
 Students practise the Socratic method. They learn how to debate in a 
civilised manner. They learn to ask questions. There is a real 
understanding that strategic decisions are best taken after extensive 
debate, where the alternatives have been thoroughly investigated. In this 
respect there is a difference between the US and the UK. In the US the 
independent directors only challenge the strategy plans of the officers. In 
the UK, by contrast, non-executive directors are actively involved in 
development of ideas of strategy. American directors are good at asking 
questions. British directors like to think creatively about strategy. 
 
 (c) H Primacy of the board 
 Although US law has evolved from English law, public corporations in 
the US are not looked upon as partnerships as they are in the UK. As 
early as the late 19
th
 century, it was realized that it is impossible for a 
large number of shareholders to manage a corporation. The need for 
separation of ownership and control was seen early on. A corporation is 
seen as a “nexus of contracts” and the board represents and executes this 
nexus. The primacy of the board is accepted. Shareholders have 
traditionally had little influence over the appointment and dismissal of 
directors. This only started to change in the 1990s as a result of very 
vocal shareholder activism. 
 
 (d) Short term? Long term? 
 
 (d) A Quick success; leave ashes behind you 
 Success in business can come very quickly in the US, failure too. Both 
are accepted. “Leave the burned ashes behind you” is advice that gains 
ready acceptance and so is the recommendation of what to do next: “go 
West, young man”. Quick success is possible because of the vast space of 
the US and its ample resources. This often implies a short-term 
perspective.  
 
 (d) B Bonus culture 
 Money is seen as a measure of success. The realisation in the 1990s that 
the best way of motivating executives was to give them a carrot led to the 
development of the bonus culture and meant that executives could make 
millions of dollars a year. This culture has spread to other countries, but 
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is still strongest in the US. However, it has promoted the short-termism 
and over-optimistic risk taking leading to the financial crisis of 
2008-2009. 
 
 (d) C Openness 
 Disclosure is always paramount. Privacy is not important. Everything 
about people‟s private life and finances is in the public domain. The 
English, on the other hand, are very fond of their privacy and try to keep 
their financial situation out of the public eye. 
 
 (d) D Strategic investors 
 Notwithstanding strong tendancies to short-termism, strategic investors, 
such as Warren Buffet, are highly regarded in their support for long-term 
strategies. 
 
3.2 Who own shares? 
 
3.2.1 Sources of finance 
 
 Retail banks have been traditionally barred from growing beyond a local 
presence. Since the early 1800s the US banking system has been highly 
fragmented. States chartered their own banks, and Congress, influenced 
by local interests, refused to charter national banks that could operate 
more extensively than the politically powerful local banks.
469
 All of this 
meant that companies seeking to grow at a national level in the US did 
not go to banks to borrow capital, but instead raised capital on the equity 
markets.
470
 
 
3.2.2 Stock exchanges important for regulations 
 
 The various US stock exchanges have for many years made extensive 
regulations for listed corporations. Often these regulations have been 
supported by the SEC. The existence in America of large and creative 
stock exchanges for the past 150 years has supported the development of 
US corporations. 
 
                                                     
469 Roe (2009), p. 18; René Stultz, „The Limits of Financial Globalization‟, in D.H. Chew and S.L. Gillan (eds.), 
Global Corporate Governance (2009), p. 23 (“Stultz (2009)”). The National Banks Acts of 1863 and 1864 
gave national banks only limited powers. In 1892 the Supreme Court ruled that national banks could not own 
stock. 
470 Pinto and Branson (2009), p. 92. 
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 The US has the largest number of publicly traded corporations in the 
world: about 6,900 in 2003. Listed companies were good for 60% of US 
gross domestic product and represented 51.9% of all stock in 2001 owned 
by private shareholders.
471
 
 
3.2.3 Who are the shareholders? 
 
Although on paper in corporate law shareholders do not have much 
power in the US, shareholders have and are obtaining more and more 
leverage through activists and combining their power and by enlisting the 
media.
472
 
 
 1990s: more institutional shareholders 
 Whereas share ownership was very fragmented until the 1980s, it has 
now become slightly more concentrated. In 2001 more than 50% of the 
shares of US public companies have been owned by investment 
institutions. This is a smaller percentage than in the UK, and each of the 
institutions owns a smaller percentage than is normal in the UK. A 
dialogue between boards and shareholders has always been less frequent 
and open in the US than in the UK. 
 
 Although all shareholders of the same class are equal according to the 
strictly legal definition of their rights,
473
 in the 1980s financial markets 
showed a complex web of relationships between corporations and 
varying types of institutional investors. In some cases real economic and 
political power is exerted by such institutions. When they act in groups, 
the pressure can be overbearing. 
 
 Different shareholders: investors ↔ traders 
 In practice, it can no longer be assumed that all shareholders are equal. 
Shareholders should be classified according to their investment 
objectives along a spectrum, with investors at one end and traders at the 
other. In this way, managers of corporations will come to realize the 
concept of “shareholder value” is not sufficient if the different types of 
                                                     
471 Pinto and Branson (2009), p. 92. 
472 Leo E. Strine Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground, Paper for Harvard John Olin Center and 
University of Pennsylvania Law School (October 2007) (“Strine (2007)”). 
473 Brancato (1997), pp. 3-4. 
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shareholders are left out of the equation. Not all shareholders have the 
same motives.
474
 
 
 There are various levels of shareholder participation: 
 1. active large investors and active voters – striking examples are 
Warren Buffet, the ukulele playing “sage of Omaha” with his 
publicly quoted Berkshire, and LENS Inc.
475
 as well as major 
pension funds. They hold a relatively large block of shares in a 
few companies and use their voting power to influence vital 
corporate decisions; also called “relationship investing”;476 
 2. passive small investors and active voters – such investors hold 
relatively small percentage blocks in diversified fields of 
business, they do not want to be actively influencing corporate 
decisions, but they do display active voting behaviour. Examples 
are CalPERS and other state pension funds and some activist 
hedge funds; 
 3. active large investors and passive voters – investors such as trust 
accounts at banks and corporate pension funds, who do not vote 
actively; 
 4. trader and passive voters – they typically look at small profit 
margins for a quick turnover and do not care to vote their shares. 
Examples are money managers, programme traders and hedge 
funds.
477
 Activist hedge funds should be classified in group 2 
above. 
 This is comparable to the findings for the UK of Tomorrow‟s Company, 
described in sub-section 2.5.10 above. 
 
 Different shareholders have different aims and goals. For example, level 
3 and 4 shareholders may want higher dividends, whereas level 1 and 2 
shareholders may want profits to be ploughed back into R&D.
478
 Two 
myths exist about investment behaviour in the US: first, that institutional 
investors buy and sell stock for the short term, and second, that business 
corporations carry out their business only to please short-term investors. 
                                                     
474 Brancato (1997), p. 4 
475 LENS Inc. is owned by the famous Bob Monks and Nell Minow, see Jay W. Eisenhofer and Michael J. 
Barry, Shareholder Activism Handbook (2010), pp. 3-64, at 46-47 (“Eisenhofer and Barry (2010)”), about Bob 
Monks, who is a good friend of Adrian Cadbury. 
476 Eisenhofer and Barry (2010), pp. 3-63. 
477 Brancato (1997), p. 13. 
478 Brancato (1997), p. 19. 
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Generally speaking, these myths are unfounded: first, level 1 and 2 
investors, as described above, invest for the long term;
479
 second, many 
business corporations develop strategies for the long term.
480
 Many active 
investor-oriented shareholders are mindful of stakeholder interests.
481
 
Cultural and legal resistance against banks, insurers and mutual funds 
holding and voting large blocks of shares has not yet been overcome. 
Most corporate pension funds are not active in corporate governance 
issues of the companies in which they hold shares. By contrast, public 
pension funds have been more active. For example, CalPERS and 
others
482
 have prodded boards to set up governance and review 
procedures.
483
 
 
 Shareholder activism, redefined ↔ communication with shareholders 
 Shareholder activism by large US public pension funds has traditionally 
been pursued only by means of shareholder proposals and direct 
engagement and negotiations with senior managers rather than by 
outright proxy contests. This is because trustees and asset managers of 
such pension funds are subject to stringent fiduciary duties.
484
 Their stake 
in a company remains limited and there is no economic justification for 
the costs of an activism campaign. Usually large public pension funds 
first adopt and update corporate governance guidelines and promote 
adherence to them. In this process, pension funds tend to rely on support 
from influential proxy advisors (such as Risk Metrics, now Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS)) and shareowner associations (including the 
Council of Institutional Investors (CII)) and International Corporate 
Governance Network (ICGN)). Mutual funds and other institutional 
investors are often solicited to give support by voting in line. 
 
 However, some hedge funds regard shareholder activism as a real 
investment strategy. They tend to acquire larger interests in fewer 
corporations and demand changes regarding a wide variety of issues 
(from governance improvements to financial corrections and even 
fundamental strategic changes). They can discretely engage with 
                                                     
479 Brancato (1997), pp. 29-31. 
480 Collins (2001), which describes the success of corporations that climbed from good to great, such as 
Kimberly-Clark and Gillette. Their typically modest CEOs collected excellent staff around them and 
developed a sound business and succession strategy. 
481 Fairfax (2008), pp. 83 and 107. 
482 Eisenhofer and Barry (2010), pp. 3-27. 
483 Stultz (2009), pp. 28-29. 
484 Section 404(a) of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 
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management and corporate boards, but are sometimes prepared to 
become hostile (e.g. going public with the debate, launching a proxy 
contest or making a takeover bid). Having incurred the costs and removed 
the obstacles to their governance wishes, they then ask others to tag 
along, vote in line with the hedge fund and benefit from the change 
without the expenditure. To this end, hedge funds can rely on new SEC 
rules permitting solicitation of the votes of up to 10 additional 
shareholders without filing proxy materials.
485
 
 
 In the US good communication between boards and major shareholders is 
considered important. The most recent developments show that activist 
shareholders often rely on their ability to obtain support from fellow – 
more passive – investors. For the board, establishing a continuous 
dialogue with these large investors usually serves the purpose of making 
the views of management and board filter through to those more passive 
investors.
486
 
 
 The main point from the board‟s point of view of having good 
communication with institutional shareholders is to obtain backing for the 
board‟s strategy. This clearly happened in 1995 when the board of 
Chrysler and its CEO Robert Eaton successfully defended itself against a 
hostile takeover by Kirk Kerkorian, who was backed by former Chrysler 
CEO Lee A. Iacocca. The Council of Institutional Investors, representing 
nearly 100 public and private corporate pension funds, supported the 
Chrysler board.
487
 
 
 To quote Robert Eaton: 
 “On a number of occasions, I would leave and let the board member and 
the fund manager talk one on one. We had a simple story that combined 
solid performance over the past few years with a compelling strategy for 
the future. None of our institutional owners asked us to change direction. 
Not one of them told us to compromise the future for the sake of today.” 
                                                     
485 Rule 14a-2(2) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Regulation FD, The SEC adopted Regulation 
FD to address the problem of selective disclosure of material non-public information by public companies., 
SEC Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599, No. 87-31-99 (“the Adopting Release”). The SEC 
simultaneously adopted Rule 10b-5(1) (clarifying that liability for insider trading turns on “awareness” of 
material information) and Rule 10b-5(2) (addressing family and non-business relationships which may give 
rise to liability in insider trading). 
486 Conference Board (2009), pp. 71-72. 
487 Brancato (1997), pp. 6-11. 
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 In 1992 the SEC changed its proxy rules to make it easier for 
shareholders to communicate with each other.
488
 The rise of shareholder 
activism in recent decades, since 1992 and especially since 2002, has 
increased the importance of communication between board members and 
shareholders. Today more than ever, the business community recognises 
the need to restore investor confidence and the credibility of capital 
markets. In this environment, activist shareholders can act as catalysts for 
change by creating a triggering event (e.g. a revision of capital structure, 
a strategic decision such as the sale of non-core business lines, a new 
incentive-based compensation scheme, or a cash distribution) that will 
unlock shareholder value and yield investment return. The SEC 
contributed to this trend by relaxing the rules in 2003 and 2010. 
 
 Many aspects of communication in the US by management and boards 
with major shareholders and shareholder activists hold useful lessons for 
Dutch practice. 
 
 However, communication is still less easy for US shareholders than for 
their British counterparts because the Regulation Fair Disclosure under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits the selective disclosure of 
material non-public information – Regulation  FD489 – which, however, is 
recently being interpreted in a more friendly way, as described hereunder. 
 
 Shareholder communication in one-on-one fashion 
 In the US one-on-one meetings of directors with individual shareholders 
are regarded as useful for directors‟ long term strategy but the legal 
pitfalls are substantial. 
 
 The general legal concerns are (1) prohibition of misleading statements or 
omissions
490
 Any misleading has to be material which means any fact, 
projection or estimate that would alter the full information for a 
reasonable investor and omission means failure to correct or update 
statements in mandatory filings such as annual and quarterly reports. 
Insiders must disclose or abstain from trading and all material 
information must be made public, once given to anyone, which means 
                                                     
488 Eisenhofer and Barry (2010), pp. 3-48; exemption if the votes of only 10 or fewer shareholders are solicited 
and announcement of intended vote is permitted. 
489 Regulation FD, adopted by the SEC, Release No. 33-7881, 34-43154, File no. 57-31-99. 
490 Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
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that if certain information is given to an analyst or investor during a 
meeting it is very dangerous to give different information in another 
smaller group.
491
 (2) Selective, i.e. material non-public disclosure is not 
permitted, especially when it is given to broker dealers, investment 
advisors, investment companies and any holder of shares, with the 
exemption of “temporary advisors”, who owe trust and confidence to the 
issuer, or those who expressly agree to confidentiality, of credit rating 
agencies, for the purpose of public rating and/or “road shows” and (3) 
special care is required concerning earnings and earning estimates, 
Mergers and Acquisitions and Joint Ventures, changes in assets, new 
discoveries, acquisition or loss of contracts, changes in control in 
management, change in management stock splits, dividends, defaults, 
bankruptcies. If such information is given selectively it must 
simultaneously be made public by Form 8-K.
492
 In the US it is normal not 
to announce anything about pending negotiations until a deal is final. 
 
 The general advice of US lawyers to whoever enters this minefield is to 
(1) be consistent, (2) centralize the response in one person, (3) keep a log, 
(4) prepare questions and answers, (5) do not give selective disclosure of 
material information, (6) be ready to make public disclosures, (7) respond 
to rumours, (8) have periodic, quarterly calls with analysts, (9) plan them 
by requesting questions in advance, avoid forward-looking financial 
information, avoid commenting on analysts‟ estimates, avoid giving any 
information in “black-out” periods and realize that speaking at industry 
conferences is non-public. 
 
 From the above summary, one might get the impression that there are so 
many “doubts” that it were better not to see or communicate with any 
shareholders, except at AGM‟s or through the public media. To counter 
this impression the SEC has recently issued a Question and Answer: Does 
Regulation FD prohibit directors from speaking privately with a 
shareholder or a group of shareholders? The answer is: No. Regulation 
FD prohibits selective disclosure of material non-public information to a 
shareholder in circumstances where it is foreseeable that the shareholder 
will purchase or sell securities based on that information. The company 
                                                     
491 Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 give 
certain safe harbour provisions for “forward-looking statement”. 
492 Regulation FD, the penalties of Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
Regulation FD are administrative actions by the SEC cease and desist orders and civil actions for monetary 
damages and administrative actions against employees.  
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should implement procedures to avoid Regulation FD violations, such as 
pre-clearing discussion topics with the shareholder or having company 
counsel participate in the meeting. Of course if the shareholder enters into 
a confidentiality agreement there is no problem.
493
 In the Netherlands the 
Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM) has also issued a comparable 
Question and Answer notice. 
 
 Generally, the non-CEO chairmen rarely talk with shareholders alone. If 
they meet shareholders, they usually do so with an executive or at least 
the general council. One of the reasons is that executives know more of 
the facts and know better what is insider knowledge and what is not.  
 
 Summary 
 In recent years private US groups have won many rights for shareholders, 
not only in practice but also in law.
494
These have included proxy access, 
say-on-pay, voting by brokers and a separate non-CEO chairman. The 
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 has represented a breakthrough on all these 
points.  
 
 As mentioned above, the best protection for companies against 
shareholder activists is steering good and detailed communication with 
major shareholders, which is possible and important and should be done 
with care. Selective distribution of material non-public information is 
prohibited if it is foreseeable that the shareholder will trade in shares 
abased on that information. 
 
3.3 Many formal Acts, informal codes in US by private initiative 
 
 The sources of corporate law are the corporate law statutes of each state. 
Each state also has jurisprudence or common law applicable to 
corporations. The courts not only interpret the statutes but also create 
important legal practices and principles such as derivative suits and the 
business judgment rule. The corporate law of the State of Delaware is 
paramount. 
 
 Federal securities law is another important source of law for corporations. 
The most important federal statutes are the SEC Securities Act 1933 for 
“going public” and the SEC Securities Trading Act 1934 for “being 
                                                     
493 SEC letter of 4 June 2010. Regulation FD Question and Answer 101.11. 
494 Bainbridge (2008), pp. 209-225. 
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public”, with many other SEC regulations, which give rights for both 
criminal and civil actions.
495
 Traditionally, the Federal Congress and the 
SEC have left corporate law to the states. The most recent statutes of 
importance to our subject are the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the 
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, with which Congress introduced some new 
federal corporate law by creating obligations for boards. In these cases, 
Congress has expanded the historical boundaries of securities law and 
moved closer to a federal regime for corporate governance.
496
 
 
 Whereas many countries, including the UK and the Netherlands, have 
national corporate governance codes such as the Cadbury and the 
Tabaksblat Codes, which have a basis in the law in that companies are 
obliged to explain in their accounts if they do not comply with the Code, 
the US has a vast number of corporate governance codes published by 
private groups, all of which put pressure on corporations to improve 
corporate governance, but have no basis in the law.
497
 
 
 The main semi-private organisations that have drafted codes are: 
 
 – institutions: the American Law Institute (ALI), the American Bar 
Association (ABA) with the Model Business Corporation Act, 
the Conference Board, the Business Roundtable (for CEOs), 
NACD (for directors), the Blue Ribbon Chairman‟s Forum, 
Kennesaw University, the Millstein Institute at Yale and the 
Korn/Ferry surveys;
498
 
                                                     
495 These federal securities laws were preceded by State Blue Sky laws, which were introduced in many states at 
the start of the 20th century. They still exist. There are also state securities administrators. The New York Blue 
Sky Act is called the Martin Act. After Enron, Eliot Spitzer, the attorney general of New York, made use of the 
Martin Act. The term „Blue Sky‟ comes either from selling „building lots in the blue sky‟ or „speculative 
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky‟; see Eisenhofer and Barry (2010), pp. 2-24. 
496 Conference Board (2009), p. 15 and see Eisenhofer and Barry (2010), pp. 2-38. As long ago as the 1990s 
former SEC commissioner and corporate law professor Roberta S. Karmel wished to issue federal corporate 
governance rules, but could not do so due to the Business Roundtable v. SEC decision of 1990 of the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeal (declaring an SEC rule against “dual-class companies” void). She had already argued 
in favour of independent directors in 1984.  
497 In the UK by Listing Rule 9.8.6(5) and (6) and in the Netherlands by article 2:391,5 DCC. 
498 Pinto and Branson (2009), pp. 3-4. 
  
 187 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
 – shareholder groups: Breeden for MCI, the Council for 
Institutional Investors, CalPERS,
499
 TIAA-CREF,
500
 Risk Metrics 
(now ISS);
501
 
 – companies such as GM in 1992 and by 2004 companies like 
Pfizer, Intel, Frederic W. Cook & Co, Inc., some 96% of all listed 
companies had written guidelines on corporate governance. 
Establishing such internal guidelines has been mandatory for all 
US companies listed on the NYSE since 23 November 2005.
502
 
 
3.4 Composition of US boards 
 
3.4.1 Introduction on composition of boards 
 
 As described in sub-section 2.4.1, the boards of all companies in the three 
countries under study must develop, implement and monitor all the 
following elements: purpose, strategy, policies, risk management, 
succession, evaluation and communication. In each country it is 
questioned how boards should be composed in order to best deal with 
these functions and to limit risks such as an “imperial CEO”, group think, 
loafing and accepting sub-optimal work, lack of teamwork, festering 
disputes and lack of communication. 
 
 Some US corporate governance practices will now be described in the following chapters. 
First, the composition of US boards (section 3.4), second, the division of the roles of US 
board members (section 3.5) and finally, the duties and liabilities of US board members 
(sections 3.6 and 3.7). 
 
 I start with topics concerning the composition of the board, first the tradition of the one-
tier board, the primacy of the board gradually assuming elements of a two-tier board 
                                                     
499 CalPERS is a huge pension fund for California government officials, which was very active in the US in 
1993 in changes at GM and is well known in the UK and the Netherlands. 
500 Teachers Insurance Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), a huge pension 
fund and an activist shareholder and has been successful since 1992 with private communication with listed 
companies that brought change in corporate governance, see Willard T. Carleton, James M. Nelson and 
Michael S. Weisbach, „The Influence of Institutions of Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations, 
Evidence from TIAA_CREFF‟, The Journal of Finance, Vol. L111, No. 4, August 1998, pp. 1335-1361. 
501 Risk Metrics, now called Institutional Shareholders Services, is very influential. For example, in the chapter 
on employee compensation in his 2009 general report to clients, well-known corporate lawyer Martin Lipton 
(pp. 201-206) repeatedly advises them not to ignore the recommendations of Risk Metrics. 
502 Section 303A, subsection 9, of the NYSE Listed Company Manual. 
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(3.4.2); second, the evolution of boards over the last 30 years (3.4.3); third, the 
composition of an average board (3.4.4); and the practice that most officers who are not 
on the board do attend board meetings (3.4.5); as well as the emphasis on counterbalance 
provided by independent directors on the board and committees (3.4.6); and executive 
sessions special to the US, which are meetings of independent directors, without 
executives (3.4.7); the size of the board that should not be too large (3.4.8); the desire that 
independent directors should be in a strong majority on the board and be the sole 
members of board committees, plus qualitative requirements for independent 
directors (3.4.9); a description of the views on term of office of directors (3.4.10) the 
formal documentation of responsibilities (3.4.11) and finally a summary (3.4.12). 
 
 This section 3.4 on the composition of US boards is followed by sections on the roles of 
various types of director (section 3.5), including the four most salient points of US best 
practice, (i) an active role of independent directors in challenging the strategy plans of 
management and debating alternatives and in establishing an orderly succession of 
directors and especially of the succession of the CEO, (ii) the important roles of the 
separate non-CEO chairman or lead director, (iii) further remarks about the executive 
sessions and (iv) the best practices to ensure optimal performance of these roles. 
 
3.4.2 US one-tier board: “primacy of the board” and one-tier turning into two-
tier or multiple-tier board 
 
A saying in the US is “let the officers manage”. This means that the rest 
of the board – the independent directors – should not micromanage the 
company‟s business and order its management team about.503 
 
The unitary or single board of directors is the rule laid down in the Acts 
for US corporations.
504
 Since the early part of the 19
th
 century and 
certainly from the turn of the 20
th
 century the US has had corporations 
with widely spread shareholdings. These corporations have run more and 
more complicated enterprises. Everyone realized that widely spread 
shareholders should not try to direct the business and that control of 
management had to be left to the board.
505
 
 
 Corporation law statutes in every state make it clear that the board of 
directors is the focal point. The Delaware General Corporation Law 
states: 
                                                     
503 Conference Board (2009), p. 20. 
504 Pinto and Branson (2009), p. 131. 
505 Bainbridge (2008), pp. 6-8 and 14; and Berle and Means (1932), see note 404. 
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 “the business and affairs of every corporation … shall be managed by 
and under the  direction of the Board of Directors”.506 
 Put simply, the board is the corporate nexus of contracts between the 
company and the stakeholders. Bainbridge calls this nexus of contacts 
(note 505). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The primacy of the board is a specifically US concept and differs from 
practice in the UK, where the company was originally seen as a 
partnership and where shareholders have absolute power and can discuss 
with the directors whenever they wish and can hire and fire them. The US 
understands that where companies have a vast number of shareholders, it 
is more efficient to discuss strategy in a small group, such as a board, 
than in a meeting of shareholders. This is called “bounds to rationalism”. 
Moreover, because of agency costs, i.e. the costs for shareholders of 
having professional managers run the business, the efficient course is to 
leave control of the company to the board. While in the US the rights of 
shareholders on paper seem to be less strong than in the UK it is clear that 
shareholder pressure groups have fought and are continuing to fight, 
currently together with the federal administration, for just as many rights 
in practice as shareholders have in the UK. 
 
 US boards are one-tier boards. Because of the current practice of (a) 
executive sessions, which are separate meetings of independent directors 
without executive directors, and (b) the importance of board committees, 
such as the audit committee, the nominations committee and the 
compensation committee, and now also a risk management committee, 
                                                     
506 Delaware General Corporation Law (Delaware GCL), § 141(a). 
Managers             Shareholders                Employees 
 
 
 
  Board of Directors 
 
 
 
Creditors               Community          Miscellaneous 
          at large              Constituencies 
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the latest addition, consisting exclusively of independent board members 
and often meeting separately with their own independent advisors, it is 
often said that US boards are gradually turning into two-tier boards. I 
might even say they are turning into multiple-tier boards, i.e. the officers, 
the independent directors and 3 or 4 independent committees, which often 
have separate powers delegated by the full board.
507
 Martin Lipton has 
described this to me orally as the “Balkanization of the board”.508 Indeed, 
although boards in the US consist of a one-tier only according to both 
theory and statute, there are elements of a two-tier system in the division 
between independent directors, who monitor, on the one hand and 
officers, who run the business, on the other. 
 
3.4.3 Evolution of US boards over the last 30 years 
 
 The typical US board of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s was composed of all 
the chief officers and about five non-executive directors. The CEO was 
the chairman. Non-executive directors were often the company‟s trusted 
advisors, such as its lawyer, investment banker, accountant and most 
important customer. They were chosen by the CEO/chairman and their 
role was to give advice.
509
 
 
 From the 1990s shareholder activists fought for more balance. They 
caused change through (1) the requirement that non-executive directors 
be independent; (2) enhancement of the role of independent directors by 
way of committee work and executive sessions; (3) more balance by 
splitting the role of the CEO who is at the same time chairman of the 
board, into a separate CEO and independent chairman, i.e. the non-CEO 
chair, in some companies. However, most US corporations still have a 
combined CEO and chairman, but of late such corporations have tended 
to appoint a lead independent director as counterbalance against the 
combined CEO/chairman. 
 
 Thirty years ago, “managerism” dominated. In both theory and practice, a 
team of senior managers – the officers – ran the corporation with little 
                                                     
507 Balotti Corp 123, Delaware GCL § 141(c). 
508 Martin Lipton and NACD Report, Risk Governance: Balancing Risk and Reward (2009), p. 13 (“NACD on 
Risk (2009)”) too use the words a “fragmented” or “balkanized” investment. 
509 Martin Lipton has orally confirmed to me that these „advising directors‟ were in practice quite independent, 
because of their professional standards. However, see also the quote of Justice Jack Jacobs in his speech of 
2006, in which he describes a typical advisory board of 1985 in the pre-Van Gorkom period as CEO 
entrenched. 
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interference from shareholders, who were essentially powerless, or from 
the directors, who were little more than rubber stamps. Today, American 
corporate governance looks very different. The imperial CEO is a dying 
breed. Most importantly, for our purposes, boards are increasingly active 
in monitoring top management and challenging their strategy rather than 
serving as mere pawns of the CEO. 
 
 Several trends have helped these developments: 
 – director compensation now comes more as stock and less as cash, 
thus aligning director and shareholder interests; 
 – courts have made clear that effective board processes and 
oversight are essential;
510
 
 – shareholder activism; 
 – the Enron and WorldCom scandals of 2001 and 2002; 
 – the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.511 
 
3.4.4 Types of directors on US boards 
 
A typical US board of directors now has about 8 to10 members, of whom 
the CEO is the only executive director and the others are independent 
directors. In an increasing number of listed companies (about 30%), one 
of the independent directors is chairman, separate from the CEO. In the 
other 70% there is a lead director. 
 
 (a) CEO and executives; officers represent the corporation 
  The reason why the CEO is now the only officer on the board and 
the other officers are no longer members, is the general wish to 
have a purely independent board and independent board 
committees.
512
 In practice, the independent directors regularly see 
the other executives called “officers". These usually do attend 
board meetings to make it possible for the independent directors 
to ask questions. The CEO is the leader of the executive team of 
                                                     
510 For example Smith v. Van Gorkom (board members must decide on an informed basis), Caremark (oversight 
necessary with detailed systems), Disney (due process in meetings and advisors necessary) and Lyondell (due 
process in meetings necessary). These cases are described hereunder. 
511 Bainbridge (2008), p. 1. 
512 Section 303A.01 of the NYSE Rules „Requiring a majority of independent directors will increase the quality 
of board oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging conflicts of interest‟. For committees to be composed 
exclusively of independent directors see Sections 303A.04, 05 and 07 of the NYSE Rules. The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act § 301(3) provides that only independent directors can be members of the audit committee. 
  
 192 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
officers and manages and runs the enterprise with that team. The 
officers legally represent the company. Officers are corporate 
agents.
513
 The officers have specific powers, the CF for financial 
or the COO for operational matters and the HRO for human 
resource matters. Each of them gives information to the 
independent directors.  
 
 (b) Chairman or lead director 
  In 2009 over 70% of US listed corporations were led by CEOs 
that were also chairman. Companies with a combined 
CEO/chairman are therefore in the majority, unlike in the UK. 
However, this percentage is decreasing, and the number of 
companies with a separate chairman and CEO is now over 30%. 
The US chairman has many roles, such as leading the board and 
seeing to orderly succession of CEO and board members similar 
to a chairman in the UK. However, in the US the chairman is 
usually less dominant than his UK counterpart. Lead directors do 
not lead the board, but do lead the executive sessions of the 
independent directors and the nomination process. 
 
 (c) Independent Directors 
  Independent directors are occupied with corporate matters usually 
at least two days a month or more. If they are member of a 
committee, this can rise to about four or five days a month. They 
have a double function in that they are supposed to (1) actively 
challenge the strategy proposed and executed by the officers 
(promoting the “upside”) and (2) monitor the execution of the 
business (avoiding the “downside”). All committees are made up 
of independent directors only. 
 
 (d) Executive sessions 
  A typically US concept is the “executive session”, which is 
contrary to what the term suggests a meeting of independent 
directors without any executives present – see 3.4.7 below. 
 
 (e) Corporate counsel 
  Most US listed companies have a corporate counsel, an in-house 
lawyer who, besides heading the in-house legal department, is in 
                                                     
513 Balotti (2010) Corp 142B and Joseph Greenspon‟s Iron & Steel Co. v. Pecos Valley Gas, Co., 156 A. 350 
(Ch. 1931). 
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charge of corporate governance and takes care of all legal 
formalities. Like his Dutch counterpart, his role is less clear than 
that of a UK company secretary. The US corporate counsel 
generally reports to the CEO and is important. Sometimes he is 
also the corporate secretary. In the UK the company secretary is 
vested in the law and assists the chairman directly. 
 
 (f) The board acts and decides as a unitary board 
  When acting for the corporation directors must act as the board. 
Decisions are decisions of the full board.
514
 This is comparable to 
the UK unitary board. In the Netherlands the management board 
decides and the supervisory board merely gives or withholds 
consent, i.e. says yes or no. Here we find an important difference 
between one and two-tier boards. 
 
3.4.5 Most officers who are not on the board do attend board meetings 
 
 The word “officer” comes from US corporate law. Day-to-day business 
of the company is handled by the corporate officers, who are appointed 
by the board of directors. Thus the relationship between the board and the 
officers is defined.
515
 The legal model of US corporate governance is that 
shareholders own shares and the board of directors oversees the 
management of the company.
516
 In a public company the board of 
directors determines the policy and selects the officers who manage the 
business.
517
 The board of directors monitors the officers. In so doing the 
board makes all decisions. Officers, selected by the board, represent the 
corporation. Their authority of representation depends upon their position 
as officer, not on their directorship. Individual directors are not agents, 
unless they are officers.
518
 This is comparable to the Dutch management 
board, in which a director has power to represent the company only if he 
is authorized as such and entered into a public registry as representing the 
corporation. Officers who are not board members may attend board 
meetings on invitation to provide the board with as much information as 
                                                     
514 Balotti (2010) Corp 129 and Bruch v. National Credit Co, NGA 739 (Ch. Cr. 1923). 
515 Balotti (2010) Corp 142B and Delaware GCL § 142. 
516 The business and affairs of the corporation are managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, 
§ 8.01 of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) and Delaware GCL § 141(a). 
517 Pinto and Branson (2009), p. 111. 
518 Pinto and Branson (2009), p. 133 and Balotti (2010) Corp 142B. This signing authority and responsibility is 
also apparent from SOX Rule 302 that the CEO and CFO, both officers, must sign for the correctness of 
accounts. 
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possible. How this is arranged differs from company to company. In 
some companies they sit in the second row and may only respond to 
questions and give presentations on their own area of responsibility, 
whereas in others they can sit in the front row and be involved in the 
discussion on general strategy. Whatever the case, they nearly always 
attend informal gatherings and dinners. By their presence they give 
support to the CEO. Engaging them, and giving them more time to speak 
and sitting on the front row is better, because then (i) the board is better 
informed, (ii) other board members get a feeling for the dynamics within 
the executive team, (iii) it is good for the independent directors to get to 
know all executive officers, because the board has to ensure that there is 
an orderly plan of succession for officers. 
 
3.4.6 Counterbalance provided by independent directors 
 
As stated above, US corporations traditionally have a strong CEO who is 
also the chairman. Nevertheless the American corporate world wants a 
system of checks and balances to guard against an unduly powerful 
CEO/chairman by having a number of independent directors on the board 
and ensuring that committees consist exclusively of independent 
directors. 
 
 This is different from the UK where a small majority of NEDs on the 
board is deemed sufficient to provide for proper balance. 
 
 Another reason why US corporate governance emphasises the role of 
independent directors is that traditionally outside directors simply 
provided advice. The board was protected by defence mechanisms such 
as poison pills, staggered boards and the proxy system and had relatively 
few genuine outsiders. Under the current regulatory environment and 
with shareholder activism encouraging short termism, it is felt to be good 
for the corporation to have truly independent directors who can bring an 
independent view from outside and will give effective consideration to all 
interests concerned.
519
 
 
 It has been argued that this overemphasis on independence is only a 
disguise for the wish to be politically correct. Martin Lipton has said to 
me that he worries about how an “independent” director can know 
                                                     
519 Jeffrey N. Gordon, „The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of shareholder value 
and stock market prices‟, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 59 (April 2007), pp. 1465-1568. 
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enough about the business. Professor Maarten Kroeze makes the same 
point in an article in the Dutch review “Ondernemingsrecht” with 
reference to the US.
520
 The Walker Review of 2009 in the UK also raises 
concern about this point. There is an awareness of the danger of selecting 
directors mainly for their independence without regard to their knowledge 
of the business. 
 
3.4.7 Executive sessions 
 
 The second method of securing proper distance between independent 
directors and the CEO is having executive sessions, a phenomenon 
confined to the US. Contrary to what the words say these executive 
sessions are meetings without any executives. The NY Stock Exchange 
recommends regular scheduling of such meetings, not only to foster 
better communication among independent directors, but also to prevent 
officers from becoming alarmed when such sessions are suddenly 
convened.
521
  
 
 An independent chairman of a US listed company has informed me that 
he first holds an executive session before every board meeting to develop 
alternatives and promote questioning, and then again after each board 
meeting, to hear the views of all the NEDs. The next morning he 
communicates those views to the CEO. Executive sessions merely 
constitute a discussion forum and may not be used for actions which have 
to be taken by the whole board. Detailed minutes are not customary and 
are discouraged.
522
 Another independent chairman has informed me that 
in his company executive sessions normally take 2 minutes, but if there is 
a problem with the CEO they take 2 hours. 
 
 While in the Netherlands the supervisory board nearly always meets 
together with the managing directors, except for the annual evaluation 
meeting, some large Dutch companies already hold separate meetings of 
supervisory directors more often. In the UK, NEDs do not generally meet 
separately more than once or twice a year to evaluate themselves and the 
executives. However, some companies in the UK are now starting to 
adopt the US practice of having regular meetings of NEDs only. 
                                                     
520 Prof. Maarten Kroeze, „Onafhankelijkheid van commissarissen‟, Ondernemingsrecht 2005/92 (“Kroeze, 
Article (2005/A)”). 
521 NYSE Rules Section 303A.03. 
522 Conference Board (2009), p. 42. 
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3.4.8 Not too large 
 
 Most listed companies have between eight to twelve board members.523 
 
 Martin Lipton and Jay W. Lorsch wrote: “We believe that the size of a board should be 
limited to a maximum of ten directors (indeed we would favour boards of eight or nine) 
with a ratio of at least two independent directors to any director who has connections with 
the company ……”.524 Boards need to be large enough to accommodate the necessary 
skill sets and competences, but still be small enough to promote cohesion, flexibility and 
effective participation.525 On this point the US and UK have the same view, see also 2.4.9 
for UK views. 
 
 Martin Lipton said in a speech of 2010: “the trend for the future is for smaller boards to 
become larger so as to have sufficient independent members to fill the audit, nominating 
and compensation committees – and last but not least the risk committee! – as well as 
members for other special expertise, such as IT or derivatives, who may not necessarily 
be independent”.526  
 
3.4.9 Independent directors in a strong majority on the board and as sole 
members of committees, plus requirements for qualifications 
 
 Independent directors in the US play an important role in bolstering 
investors confidence.
527
 After Enron and WorldCom the SEC prompted 
Congress to accept the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which established that the 
audit committee should be exclusively composed of independent 
directors. The NYSE Rules subsequently stipulated that the majority of 
the board should consist of independent directors and that each 
committee should consist exclusively of independent directors.
528
 
 
 There are some qualitative requirements for the audit committee. The 
NYSE Rules require that each audit committee member must be or 
                                                     
523 Conference Board (2009), p. 22 and Jaya A. Conger and Edward E. Lawler III, Sharing Leadership on 
Corporate Boards: A Critical Requirement for Teamwork at the Top, Marshall School of Business Working 
Paper No. MOR 19-09 (April 2009), p. 189 (“Conger and Lawler (2009)”). 
524 Lipton and Lorsch (1992), p. 67-68. 
525 Conference Board (2009), p. 22. 
526 Martin Lipton, „Future of the Board of Directors‟, Speech of 23 June 2010 for Chairmen & CEO Peer Forum 
Board Leadership in a New Regulatory Environment, NYSE (2010) (“Lipton NYSE Speech (2010)”). 
527 NASDAQ Rules: IM 4350-4, Rule 4350(c). 
528 See sub-section 3.4.4(a). 
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become financially literate. In addition, one member of the audit 
committee must be a financial expert.
529
 
 
 The concept of independence has been defined de jure. However, the 
independence of directors must be de facto as well. Outside directors 
need to be more than independent, they need to be independent-minded. 
They must also be courageous.
530
 
 
 In various court cases the concept of independence has been given a 
stricter interpretation. The Oracle Corp. case of 2003 is an example 
where a special litigation committee was “fraught with conflicts”.531  
 
 Vice-Chancellor Strine wrote in the opinion that members of a special litigation 
committee, a committee of outside directors which had to decide whether the company 
should litigate against the executives, must really prove their independence. It is more 
difficult for directors to decide to have a company sue a fellow director than to say no to a 
proposal to sue a friend. In the case of Oracle the special litigation committee had to 
decide whether the company should introduce a derivative case against four directors and 
officers, who were close to the business, and who were accused of insider trading. The 
CEO/chair, the CFO, the chairmen of the audit committee and compensation committee 
had given positive messages about Oracle in the autumn of 2000, sold many shares in 
January 2001 for $30 per share and came with bad news in March 2001, which made the 
share price fall to $16. They were sued for insider trading. These four directors had all 
donated large sums to Stanford University and one of them was a Stanford professor. Two 
members of the special litigation committee were also Stanford professors. One of them 
had been a student of the Stanford professor who was being sued. The Vice-Chancellor 
argued that such a special board committee has to prove its independence and that this 
special litigation committee would not pass the test because of all the Stanford 
connections. (Strine is Chancellor from June 2011.) 
 
 The expectation required of such an extra, higher level of independence 
can also play a role in takeover cases, where directors may have a self-
interest. The same Delaware Vice-Chancellor, Leo Strine, wrote in 2002 
after Enron: “The question of whether a director can act independently is 
inherently situational”.532 
 
                                                     
529 NYSE Rule Section 303A.07. 
530 NACD Report, Board Evaluation: Improving Director Effectiveness (2005) (“NACD (2005)”). 
531 Oracle Corp., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
532 Leo E. Strine, Jr., „Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law Implications of the 
Enron Debacle‟, 57 The Business Lawyer 1341 (2002) (“Strine (2002)”). 
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 The qualitative requirements for independent directors are multiple and 
serious: sufficient time for the job,
533
 diversity and mix of knowledge and 
experience and in some cases specialist knowledge of the business. As 
regards time, directors should not have too many other board 
directorships. Most corporations limit the number of other board 
positions. Executives should usually have not more than one or two other 
directorships. A good many independent board members are limited to 
two other board membership, or three or four at most.
534
 
 
 Diversity is a well-developed requirement in the US. A recent study 
found that greater diversity of board membership is associated with 
higher returns to investors.
535
 There should be at least one woman, one 
academic and one person of colour. Nearly all corporations comply to the 
requirement of at least one woman and one person of colour.
 536
 
 
 A board should also be able to draw on a mix of knowledge and 
experience from its members in the fields of accounting and finance, risk 
management, strategic and business planning, legal matters and 
compliance, human resources, marketing, e-commerce and internet
537
, 
international trade, and industry-specific research and development and, 
on the boards of banks, specific knowledge of the banking industry. 
 
 In the post-Enron business environment, it has become more difficult for 
companies to attract qualified directors. This is partly due to the stricter 
independence rules, partly due to the requirement of a financial expert on 
the auditing committee and lastly because of increased scrutiny by 
enforcement agencies and institutional investors. Other factors include 
the greater risk of liability and the time commitment. The first to feel the 
consequence are CEOs who now rarely join boards of other companies. 
Prestige and the opportunity to gain additional knowledge and experience 
and add value will continue to serve as important incentives for qualified 
persons to wish to join the boards of corporations.
538
 Now we have to 
                                                     
533 Conger and Lawler (2009), p. 188. 
534 Conference Board (2009), p. 26. 
535 Conger and Lawler (2009), p. 188. 
536 Conference Board (2009), p. 22. 
537 NACD Report, The Role of the Board in Corporate Strategy (2006), p. 21 (“NACD on Strategy (2006)”) and 
Conger and Lawler (2009), p. 187. 
538 Conference Board (2009), pp. 21-22. 
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start questioning whether the pool of eligible independents is large 
enough to fulfil the demand. 
 
3.4.10 Term of office 
 
 Directors are elected and re-elected by the shareholders at their annual 
meeting.
539
 The majority of listed corporations now hold annual re-
elections. However, a large number still have staggered boards. Of the 
Fortune 500 companies 25.2% have staggered boards and of all 1411 
NYSE companies 41.8% have staggered boards.
540
 In staggered boards, 
the directors are re-elected every three years, and one third are up for re-
election every year, which system can be used as a defence against 
unfriendly takeovers. The protective system of “plurality voting”, which 
means that directors can easily be reappointed with only a minority of 
shareholders voting in favour and the large majority abstaining, is now 
giving way to the more democratic system of majority voting.
541
 Other 
aspects of the procedure for voting on the reappointment of board 
nominees or for putting forward and voting on shareholder nominees are 
(1) separate notice and record dates for shareholder meetings to eliminate 
the “empty voting phenomenon”, (2) proxy access reform to help 
shareholders gain free access to the proxy solicitation ballot as described 
above in connection with the Dodd-Frank Act and (3) electronic delivery 
of proxy materials.
542
 
 
Proxy access on the company proxy ballot will, in practice, give 
shareholders many further rights. This system may become applicable for 
the 2011 proxy season, if it is not blocked by the pending litigation 
against it.
543
  
 
                                                     
539 Pinto and Branson (2009), p. 131. Shareholders can opt to stagger the election of the board so that directors 
have longer terms, e.g. three years, in which case only a third of the directors are elected at the annual meeting. 
This is a defence mechanism.  
540 Commercial database of Shark Repellant and an e-mail of Adam Emmerich of Wachtell Lipton as per 
10 August 2010, examples Air Product v. Airgas, Sysco.(for more see note 1182)  
541 Conference Board (2009), pp. 50-52. 
542 Conference Board (2009), pp. 52-54. 
543 Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, “Public company alert”, 21 July 2010. 
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3.4.11 Formal documentation of roles  
 
 Decisions are taken by the full board.
544
 The authority of the officers 
consists of the power to represent and run the company in the ordinary 
course of its operations. They enjoy an explicit or implicit agency. US 
principle is that there should be flexibility. Every company can have a 
different structure and division of roles. Companies are sometimes 
inventive in creating new types of functions and systems, such as the lead 
director and the apprentice system. The apprentice system involves a 
retired CEO assisting and coaching his successor for about 6 months. 
This flexibility means that it is a responsibility of the board to describe 
precisely how the roles are divided.
545
 
 
 Explicit authority may be found in bylaws, corporate resolutions made by 
the board or properly approved and detailed employment contracts.
546
 US 
practice is to be clear about who may do what. Decisions of the board are 
taken by the full board and powers of attorney are given to one or more 
officers to execute the action. If there is a non-CEO chairman or lead 
director, their respective functions should be clearly defined.
547
  
 
3.4.12 Summary of the composition of US boards  
 
 (i) The US has a one-tier board system to which it is traditionally 
accustomed. Over the last 50 years there has been a fight to 
introduce independent directors to boards and have committees 
consisting solely of independents. 30% of listed companies now 
have separated the function of CEO from that of Chairman. In the 
past 15 years there has been a trend towards holding more distinct 
meetings in committees and towards independent directors 
meeting separately in “executive sessions”.  
 
 (ii) US boards are composed in such a way as to create a 
counterbalance to the formerly all-powerful CEO (this has been 
due to the efforts of shareholder activists and rule makers such as 
the SEC and stock exchanges). 
                                                     
544 Balotti (2009) Corp 129 on § 141. 
545 Conference Board (2009), p. 20. 
546 Pinto and Branson (2009), p. 135; Conference Board (2009), p. 20; and the NACD on Strategy (2006), p. 4. 
547 Policy briefing no. 4 for the Chairman‟s Forum (2009 text), Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and 
Performance, Chairing the Board: The Case for Independent Leadership in Corporate North America, Policy 
Briefing No. 4, Yale School of Management (2009) (“Millstein Chairing the Board (2009)”). 
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  Counterbalance is provided in the following way: 
 
  – the board is composed by a large majority of independent 
directors (about 8 to 12), there is only one executive: the 
CEO. However, the other officers (CFO, COO, HRO and 
CRO) are always invited to attend the board meetings. 
The aim of board meetings is to create the best long-term 
strategy for the corporation. The independent directors 
challenge the officer‟s proposals and ensure that all 
alternatives are discussed; 
  – independent directors meet in executive sessions, without 
the officers, before and/or after each board meeting; 
  – 30% of US listed companies have a non-CEO chairman. 
The other 70% have a lead director, who leads the 
executive sessions. 
 
 (iii) The composition of boards in the US differs from that of the UK. 
In the UK all executives are members of the board together with 
NEDs who have a small majority. The aim in the UK is to 
achieve balance, rather than counterbalance as in the US. 
Whereas the non-CEO chairman has only recently gained ground 
in the US (still only 30% of all the listed corporations), 99% of 
UK listed companies have separate chairmen. Executive sessions 
are a special feature of the US system. 
 
3.5 Role of US board members 
 
3.5.1 Introduction on role of board members 
 
 As described above at 2.4.1, 2.5.1 and 3.4.1, boards of companies in each of the three 
countries, which are subject of this study, must develop, implement and monitor all the 
elements: purpose, strategy, policies, risk management, succession, evaluation and 
communication. The question is how should these roles be divided. Which board member 
should have which role? And how can these roles best be promoted? 
 
 Main differences in the division of roles between a one-tier board in the 
US and the average two-tier board in the Netherlands are that in the US 
independent directors have on-site and operational information, receive 
more and earlier information and are more involved with the company 
than Dutch supervisory directors. This is because US directors are or can 
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be directly involved in making the decisions and are actively involved in 
challenging the strategy developed by management and discussing 
alternatives, whereas Dutch supervisory directors merely say “yes” or 
“no” to the management‟s proposals. This is a slightly different nuance 
from the position in the UK, where NEDs are involved in developing 
strategy but not in hands on management. By contrast, the role of Dutch 
supervisory directors in most companies and according to the law is 
confined to monitoring strategy development.
548
 
 
 There are also similarities between US independent directors and Dutch 
supervisory directors. Neither represent the company. Only the officers 
(in the US) and managing directors (in the Netherlands) can represent the 
company. 
 
 In this section 3.5 the role of US board members, the officers and the independent 
directors will be discussed under the following headings: first, the definition of the roles 
of the board and its members (3.5.2); the active role of challenging and debating strategy 
by independent directors (3.5.3); a description of US Enterprise Risk Management (3.5.4); 
a description of the discussion in the US about non-CEO chairmen and what roles the 
non-CEO chairman has and, in the alternative, the lead director (3.5.5); a description of 
elements of best practice, early and on-site information, time commitment, evaluation and 
continuing education, teamwork, payment and committees (3.5.6); CEO succession 
(3.5.7); and a comment on US corporate governance at banks (3.5.8). The section will be 
closed by a summary on the role of US board members (3.5.9). 
 
3.5.2 Definition of roles of the board and its members 
 
 All business and affairs are managed by and under the direction of the 
board of directors while the officers represent the corporation.
549
 This 
means that the board has the freedom to arrange a division of roles among 
its members, to regulate internally the tasks of, and define the scope of 
the work of independent directors and officers, of executive sessions and 
committees. A strong and effective board of directors should have a clear 
view of its role in relationship to management. How the board organises 
itself and structures its procedures will vary with the nature of the 
business, with business strategy, size and maturity of the company, and 
with the talents and personalities of the CEO and the directors. 
                                                     
548 A Dutch director of a US company has told me that US corporate directors consider supervisory directors to 
lack commitment. 
549 Delaware GCL § 141(a). 
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Circumstances particular to the corporate culture of a specific corporation 
may also influence the board‟s role. The board focuses principally on 
guidance and strategic issues, the selection of the CEO and other senior 
executives, risk oversight, performance assessment, and adherence to 
legal requirements. The officers implement the business strategy and run 
the company‟s day-to day operations with the goal of increasing 
shareholder value for the long term.
550
 
 
 Based on federal securities laws, state corporation laws and formulations 
developed by the Conference Board, the American Law Institute, the 
Business Roundtable and the NACD, general board responsibilities 
should include (i) approving a corporate philosophy and mission, (ii) 
nominating directors, (iii) selecting, monitoring, advising, evaluating and 
compensating the CEO and officers, i.e. the CEO, CFO, COO, CRO and 
others, if so agreed (iv) orderly succession, (v) reviewing and approving 
strategic business plans, risk management programmes, financial 
objectives and material transactions, (vi) helping ensure ethical behaviour 
and compliance with laws, (vii) assessing itself, and (viii) performing 
other functions required by law or regulation.551 
 
3.5.3 Active role of independent directors in challenging and debating strategy  
 
 Since the Enron, Tyco and WorldCom scandals much emphasis has been 
laid on monitoring. However, the main item on the agenda of the board of 
a US company is still discussing company strategy.
552
  
 
 As the board has the power to initiate and adopt corporate plans and 
actions,
553
 its members clearly have an active strategic role. In the US 
view risk management should be an enterprise-wide, top-down strategic 
effort of the board rather than merely a compliance practice.
554
 
 
 The board and hence the independent directors should be involved in the 
active challenging of the strategy proposed by the officers. It therefore 
                                                     
550 Conference Board (2009), p. 18. 
551 Conference Board (2009), p. 18. 
552 The Conference Board, Corporate Governance Handbook: Legal Standards and Board Practices (2007) 
(“Conference Board (2007)”), pp. 14 and 100; Conference Board (2009), pp. 18 and 144; also Veasey (2005), 
p. 1415. 
553 Pinto and Branson (2009), p. 132. 
554 Carolyn Brancato, Matteo Tonello and Ellen Hexter, The Role of US Corporate Boards in Enterprise Risk 
Management (2006), p. 17 (“Brancato, Tonello and Hexter (2006)”). 
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goes without saying that not only the CEO and his fellow officers, but the 
independent directors too should be involved in determining strategy. The 
full board acts and decides together.
555
 In every opinion of the Delaware 
courts about board decisions, the names of all board members are 
mentioned. In the Disney case it was regarded as an important factor that 
all directors had been involved in the decision making process. The 
following quote shows that the strategy role is the starting point: 
 “An increasing number of directors acknowledge they must oversee 
business risk as part of their strategy-setting role.”556 
 
 The role of NEDs in strategy development in the UK was described in 
2.5.5 above. A description of the role of US independent directors in 
strategy follows below and the differences between the UK and the US 
will be discussed: 
 
 i what is strategy? 
 ii how is strategy discussed? 
 iii at what stage is it discussed? 
 iv is there real creativity? is there debate? 
 v what is the influence of the independent director? 
 vi can he have influence if he is an outsider to the business? 
 vii can he remain a critical monitor once the board has decided on 
the adoption of a certain strategy? 
 
 (i) What is strategy? 
  The answer to this question is the same in the US as in the UK 
(for the UK see paragraph 2.5.5(i) above). In the US too strategy 
also exists in the wider sense, which includes purpose, vision, 
philosophy (this can include questions such as what role or added 
value does the company wish to provide to society), succession, 
enterprise risk management, financial objectives and material 
transactions. Strategy in the narrower sense is making business 
plans, defining core businesses, what to divest or buy and how to 
allocate resources. 
 
                                                     
555 Balloti (2009) Corp 129. 
556 The Conference Board, The Role of US Corporate Boards in Enterprise Risk Management (2007), p. 15 
(“Conference Board, Risk (2007)”). 
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 (ii) How is strategy discussed? 
  It is clear that in the US all directors, including the independent 
directors, have a leading and active role in strategy debate and 
can add value. In practice, the whole board has an annual 
strategic meeting (called “away days”) in a resort for two or three 
days. A strategic element is also discussed at each board meeting 
or at least every third board meeting. In the US the emphasis is 
on flexibility. Corporate law allows directors great latitude in 
how they divide their activities in relation to corporate strategy – 
without undue interference from shareholders or the courts.
557
 
There is not a “one size fits all” division of roles or procedures. 
The board itself decides on the procedure for discussions. 
 
  Officers draft, board actively challenges 
  In most companies officers design a strategic plan (and changes 
to existing plans), whereas the board regularly reviews and 
endorses such plans and changes. To fulfil their responsibilities 
in strategy development, directors should understand the 
company‟s business, the factors driving its growth and the major 
risks and vulnerability to which it is exposed.
558
 This requirement 
of in-depth knowledge is very important and is an integral part of 
being a decision-maker, even as an outside director. Directors 
stimulate, broaden and criticize the quality of the officers‟ 
strategic thinking.
559
 Boards should rarely have to take the 
initiative to draft a company‟s strategy or create its vision, 
mission statement or detailed plan. The officers do that. The 
board‟s role should be to provide strategic thinking, to oversee 
and to encourage, rather than to suggest specific strategic tactics. 
Its members must understand the assumptions and analysis of the 
officers. To obtain this understanding often requires that directors 
become engaged in the formulation of the strategy at an early 
stage. If directors have approved the management‟s proposal for 
a strategy, based on a thorough understanding, they will be better 
able to monitor its execution.
560
 
 
                                                     
557 NACD on Strategy (2006), p. 4. 
558 Conference Board (2009), p. 144 and NACD on Strategy (2006), p. 4. 
559 NACD on Strategy (2006), p. 4. 
560 NACD on Strategy (2006), p. 5. 
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  Step-by-step cooperation 
  In the process there should be step-by-step cooperation between 
the board and the officers. Below is a diagram showing an 
example of such cooperation.
561
 It illustrates the methodical, 
almost scientific, approach to management and business in the 
US. Although this approach is followed more and more in other 
countries where American style business schools have opened, it 
still differs – this is, of course, a generalization – from the style in 
the UK and the Netherlands where business organization is less a 
matter of academics and more of tradition and gut-feeling. 
 
                                                     
561 NACD on Strategy (2006), p. 10. 
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Strategic Teamwork: An Example of Roles and Actions 
 
B 
 
 
M 
 
 
 
T 
 
B 
M 
 
 
 
T 
 
 
 
 
 
M 
 
 
 
 
 
B 
 
 
 
 
 
M 
Spells out broad guidelines for 
future strategy, noting 
expectations and constraints. 
Drafts statements of vision, 
mission, and strategic objectives 
and targets, within given 
guidelines and with board input. 
Reviews drafts and discusses and 
amends drafts as needed. 
Approves revised statements. 
Schedules meetings and 
evaluations, and conducts data 
collection and analyses necessary 
to prepare a preliminary strategy. 
Holds special board meeting or 
retreat in which draft strategy is 
presented, discussed, reviewed 
and amended, including any final 
instructions and directions from 
the board. 
Revises and verifies approved 
draft. Draws up strategic plan. 
Notes and highlights crucial 
assumptions made and proposes 
meaningful milestones for 
execution. 
Reviews points based on crucial 
assumptions and selected 
milestones. Approves final 
strategy and plan. Notes any 
guidelines for preparation of next 
budget. 
Prepares. budget and key 
checkpoints for board approval. 
B 
 
 
 
 
 
T 
 
 
 
 
M 
 
 
 
 
 
B 
 
 
 
T 
Reviews proposed budget. 
Ensures that the budget‟s major 
provisions and thrust are con-
sistent with the strategy and plan 
previously approved. Modifies as 
needed, and approves final draft. 
Reviews all corporate activities 
that have an impact on strategy, 
for example ensuring that 
incentive plans are aligned with 
strategy. 
Makes periodic reports to the 
board (after launching strategy) on 
validity of crucial assumptions, 
milestones, changes in envi-
ronment and competitive 
considerations. 
Monitors execution of strategy by 
monitoring financial performance 
and other measurable milestones 
that have strategic implications. 
Agree to changes in strategy as 
circumstances warrant. 
 
 
*Key: 
M = Management;  
B = Board;  
T = Together 
 
Adapted from a model provided by 
Professor Boris Yavitz Dean 
Emeritus, Columbia University 
School of Business. 
    
 
 
  Examples of step-by-step strategy development 
  Below is a famous example of cooperation between the board and 
the officers in the “bet-the-company decision” on the design of 
the Boeing 787. 
 
  Such a decision could not be made in one sitting, based on one fat binder 
plunked in front of each director. In order to ensure board scrutiny, the officers 
broke up the overall design decision into smaller pieces and had the board 
weigh all three critical go or no-go points in the development of the plane. This 
is the first example. 
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  First, the multibillion dollar budget and timeline for the aircraft‟s development. 
The future of air travel had to be appraised. Airbus had cast its lot by opting for 
the double-decker A380, the huge superjumbo that would appeal to carriers 
serving crowded hub-and-spoke airports. The A380 could carry double the 
normal load with the same number of gates, pilots and takeoffs. Boeing‟s officer 
proposal was banking on a different view of the future. The company believed 
that the traditional hub-and-spoke system was breaking down as passengers 
increasingly demanded direct service between two points. In the proposal it was 
promised that the 787 could operate a long-haul, point-to-point service for 20% 
less cost because of net weight-saving technologies. The directors challenged 
the officers‟ numbers and assumptions. The team returned to the board‟s 
questions in several subsequent board meetings with verified forecasts, 
convincing the board in 2002. 
 
  Second, management asked the board to rule on whether the time was right to 
allow sales managers to discuss the aircraft‟s specifics with the airlines. Was 
Boeing sure to succeed in the lower costs? The directors required evidence and 
authorised the sales team in 2003 to communicate the lower cost. 
 
  Third, the board was asked to give the final go ahead for production of the 
aircraft, which would require Boeing to commit additional billions of dollars to 
the project. Then after that the sales team would secure written orders with stiff 
penalties if Boeing failed to deliver as promised. So directors pressed the 
officers for a detailed production plan and proof that engine suppliers General 
Electric and Rolls Royce could create the required thrust at an acceptable price. 
After many board meetings, Boeing‟s directors voted in 2004 to commence the 
formal product launch. Even after the formal launch, however, the directors 
insisted on monitoring both manufacturing progress and order flow.
 562
 
 
  The board‟s first two decisions were a necessary precursor to the 
third, and all three were required for the full go-ahead. On each 
occasion the directors had sought tangible evidence to support 
management‟s major assumptions. Two principles emerge: 
                                                     
562 Michael Useem, „How Well-Run Boards Make Decisions‟, Harvard Business Review (November 2006), 
pp. 5-7 (“Useem (2006)”). In August 2010 there was a press announcement that some suppliers for the Boeing 
787 were late and that delivery had been postponed to the beginning of 2011 (NRC Handelsblad, 19 August 
2010). The Boeing 787 was successful in obtaining 825 orders before any delivery, which is a record. 
Recently, the delivery of the Boeing 787 has been announced to be postponed even further. However, the 
board process of decision making in stages is still seen as a good example. 
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strategic decisions should be divided into smaller steps and 
directors should remain vigilant and keep on requiring evidence. 
 
  A second example is Tyco International‟s come-back after 2002, which was 
achieved by shedding assets. After Kozlowski was indicted for the $600 million 
fraud and the board had resigned, Tyco‟s new management board concluded 
that the group‟s revival would depend on its swift conversion from a buying 
engine to an operating machine. The new CEO, Breen, and the new lead 
director agreed that there should be a mass disposal of underperforming 
companies and that the board should have a hand in this activity. 
 
  First, the CEO, CFO and the board agreed on the disposal criteria. 
 
  Second, the directors pressed the CEO‟s team to explain the financial and 
strategic pros and cons of disposing of each unit. They questioned the timing. If 
all went on the block at the same time, wouldn‟t that depress prices? And they 
inquired whether another management team couldn‟t resurrect the unit. Some of 
the questions prompted the officers to amend the list.  
 
  This example shows that the decision on disposals can be split 
into steps: first, a decision on the criteria in general and, second, 
a decision on each individual disposal. The same applies to the 
criteria for acquisitions and the decisions on each acquisition.
563
 
 
  A third example is the step-by-step cooperation by the board and management 
of the North Western Company on a 5-year strategy process to transform the 
company through strategic thinking. The process began with a detailed situation 
analysis. Afterwards, management formulated several alternatives to a five-year 
plan, which were challenged and changed. Finally, the board chose from the 
alternatives. They concluded that North Western‟s greatest opportunity was to 
transform itself into “America‟s best service and solution experience”. 
 
  These examples can teach us that strategic thinking evolves over 
time and in a series of many consecutive meetings and that US 
boards can serve best by providing strategic thinking, oversight 
and enhancement rather than suggesting specific strategic tactics. 
Progress on initiatives is not linear and management and directors 
continually reinvent initiatives. Finally, an interactive, 
                                                     
563 Useem (2006), pp. 7-8. 
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participative process nourishes open and full communication 
between management and board.
564
 
 
  Directors should work with management to get a better grasp of 
the current strategic position. In turn, management should draw 
up and propose a number of different long-term strategies. 
Boards should test and challenge them before deciding, with 
management, on the most appropriate strategy.
565
 
 
  Strategy development nearly always involves the following steps: 
 
  1. Management and board should develop a well-defined 
vision and a clearly articulated strategy to achieve this 
vision. 
  2. Management and board should establish procedural 
guidelines for developing the company‟s strategy. If 
possible, the assumptions should be presented by the 
board as a set of alternatives. 
  3. The development of strategy should be a topic at every 
board meeting. 
  4. Management should express the approved strategy in a 
written document.
566
 
 
  To summarize, US independent directors do not develop strategy 
themselves. However, they are actively involved in all the steps 
of the development of strategy. They sometimes require 
management to build up a process of a step by step development 
plan and they challenge management and require further 
evidence of assumptions. Boards also ask management to present 
alternatives. 
 
  The board of directors, while deciding on a long-term strategic 
plan, should be mindful that shareholder value depends on a 
nexus of relations with other business stakeholders, including 
                                                     
564 NACD on Strategy (2006), pp. 29-30. 
565 Robert F. Felton and Pamela Keenan Fritz, „The View from the Boardroom‟, The McKinsey Quarterly, 
Special Edition (2005), p. 55 (“Felton and Fritz (2005)”). 
566 NACD on Strategy (2006), pp. 8-9. 
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employees, suppliers and customers, as well as the local 
communities where the company operates.
567
 
 
 (iii) At what stage is strategy discussed? well in advance and leaving 
ample time 
  The examples under (ii) above, especially the step-by-step 
procedures, show that in the US the board generally gets involved 
well in advance of taking a decision. 
 
  Again, it is seen in practice that the manner of communication 
varies. In many corporations the board takes ample time for each 
board meeting. The Disney case
568
 is an example of one extreme 
sparse communication, where board members did a lot by phone, 
particularly after the chairman/CEO, Eisner, had issued a press 
release about Ovitz‟s appointment.  
 
  In the Lyondell case
569
 the question was whether the board had 
taken sufficient time to consider the options. The Delaware 
Chancellor found that the board had not taken sufficient time for 
discussion. Although the Supreme Court reversed this decision, 
this case serves once again as a warning for many boards to take 
their time for strategy discussions. 
 
  The Time (Warner), Dollar Thrifty and Air Products v. Airgas
570
 
cases were examples where the court considered the time taken 
and the seriousness of the discussions on strategy and the fact 
that there was a long term strategy. In both cases the board 
prevailed. The cases are described below in the list of takeover 
cases in 3.7.3.2.  
 
 (iv) Is there real creativity? Is there debate? 
  Bainbridge describes US research showing that groups of 5 to 8 
come up with better ideas than individuals alone because they 
contemplate more alternatives. This debating of alternatives is the 
                                                     
567 Conference Board (2009), p. 20. 
568 The Disney case (see note 448) is often used in literature such as Conference Board (2009) as a warning of 
the need for better procedures. 
569 Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, Delaware Supreme Court (25 March 2009), C.A. No. 3176. 
570 Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time, Fm 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989), Dollar Thrifty (Del. Ch. 
August 27, 2010), Cons. C.A. No. 5458 – VCS and Air Products v. Airgas, 15 February 2011, C.A. 
No. 5249/5256 CC. 
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US style of discussion.
571
 Some boards have open discussions. 
There are even cases where an outside facilitator leads a group 
discussion to stimulate creativity.
572
 In other boards, the 
discussion is much less open and more an exercise in brisk 
formal decision making based on detailed preparatory work by 
committees. 
 
  Creativity is seriously jeopardised if too many outside lawyers 
are in the room. I have seen a power point slide of Cravath 
Swaine & Moore (a highly ranked New York law firm), saying: 
“stay out of the boardroom”, by which they mean573 outside 
lawyers should steer clear of boardrooms if at all possible. 
Clearly, the problem is recognised. 
 
  Open dialogue also requires the right people to participate, by 
invitation, in boardroom discussions on strategy and risk, 
including all officers, general counsel, controllers and business 
unit leaders.
574
 
 
 (v) What is the influence of the independent director? 
  A 2004 survey by Chris Bart entitled “The governance role of the 
board in corporate strategy” and a 2008 survey conducted by the 
McKinsey Quarterly both revealed that: 
 
  – Most boards claim to be already quite involved in their 
organisation‟s strategy formulation process (both 
reports). In over 60% of cases, boards reported that they 
were involved to a “considerable” or even greater extent 
in discussions on strategy (both reports). Specifically, 
strategic discussions tend to focus on the strategic 
planning process, the company‟s mission, vision and core 
values as well as objectives senior executives should be 
held accountable for, as budget approval, monitoring the 
                                                     
571
 On p. 15 of the Conference Board (2007) there is an interesting list of all the elements that can be 
considered in strategy-related matters. The source is PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Corporate Governance and the 
Board (2000), p. 5. It gives a list of 17 questions. The first is about what alternate strategies exist and further on 
it contains risk factors and best, worst and most likely scenarios.  
572 NACD on Strategy (2006), p. 51. 
573 Richard Hall, a partner in Cravath Swaine & Moore, has explained this to me in conversation. 
574 NACD on Risk (2009), p. 17. 
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execution of strategy and its achievement, and approving 
changes to strategy as warranted (both reports). 
 
  – Boards performed their strategic governance role for a 
couple of hours at every third board meeting, which was 
often supplemented by a two-day strategic retreat. By 
their own admission, however, respondents recognised 
that the time currently spent on those discussions was 
insufficient (Bart). Board members freely acknowledged 
the need to continue increasing their strategic advisory 
role, especially with respect to issues of talent 
development that are directly related to strategy (e.g. 
executive compensation issues and CEO succession 
planning) (McKinsey). 
 
  – The frequent lack of an adequate set of extra financial 
indicators of performance in the communication between 
management and corporate directors pointed to a major 
shortcoming in strategy planning (both reports).
575
 
 
 (vi) Can he have influence if he is an outsider to the business? 
  The US concept of board activity is that directors should have 
their own specialism and they should know the business well or 
at least get to know the business quickly. They should quickly 
become well educated about the business so they can contribute 
added value. It is essential that they have received full 
information.
576
 In the US knowledge of the business is highly 
cherished.  
 
 (vii) Can he remain a critical monitor once the board has decided on 
the execution of strategy? 
  The US view on corporate governance is that a director can be a 
better critical monitor of the execution of strategy if he has been 
involved in its development.
577
 Because he has been involved in 
                                                     
575 Conference Board (2007), p. 146; Conference Board (2009), p. 146. The McKinsey Quarterly, March 2008, 
which surveyed 378 private and 161 public companies, and Chris Bart, „The Governance Role of the Board in 
Corporate Strategy: An Initial Progress Report‟, International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 
Vol. 1, No. 2/3 (2004), pp. 111-125. 
576 Conference Board (2009), p. 19. 
577 NACD on Strategy (2006), p. 5. 
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the decision making, he has more understanding of the issues and 
can add value in being a critical monitor. 
 
3.5.4 Special aspects of enterprise risk management, standards of supervision 
and care 
 
Overseeing risk management (also called enterprise risk management or 
ERM) is an increasingly important task for US boards. A Conference 
Board survey of 2006 showed that progress had been made in the 
development of ERM practices under pressure of external stakeholders.
578
 
Agood many large and excellent corporations in the US have now 
developed exemplary enterprise risk management systems and important 
new ideas. 
 
 1. Understanding the critical link between strategy and risk and 
the necessity of continual dialogue 
  Every business model, business strategy and business decision 
involves risk. In business there is no reward without risk. Risk is 
not merely something that can be avoided, mitigated and 
minimalized; risk is integral to strategy, it should be weighed 
against the probability and the size of the reward; decisions 
should be made about the risk appetite. Boards should encourage 
management to pursue prudent risks in order to generate 
sustainable corporate performance and value.
579
 An increasing 
number of directors acknowledge they must oversee business risk 
as part of their strategy formulation.
580
 As Ralph Larson, director 
of GE and Xerox, has said: “… risk is embedded in every product 
or management decision”.581 Although in the period immediately 
after the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, audit 
committees felt obliged to look at micro risks, directors now 
understand they must look at the big picture, the whole format.
582
 
 
  The board‟s overseeing of risk should be based on the assumption 
that the company‟s strategy and risk are appropriate. Essential for 
such balancing is the understanding and acceptance of the 
                                                     
578 Conference Board, Risk (2007). 
579 NACD on Risk (2009). 
580 Conference Board, Risk (2007), p. 15. 
581 Conference Board, Risk (2007), p. 21. 
582 NACD on Risk (200), p. 4. 
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amount of risk the organisation is willing to run or absorb. Its 
“risk appetite” should be based on foreseeable risks, 
shareholders‟ expectations, available capital, management skills, 
possible rewards and acceptable volatility.
583
 The concepts of risk 
appetite and risk tolerance are often confused. Appetite refers to 
the amount of risk that the enterprise is willing to accept, whereas 
tolerance refers to the degree of variance from the level of 
appetite that the enterprise is willing to accept. 
 
  Too often boards limit themselves in strategy matters to “review 
and concur”. Real board engagement and assessment of risk 
require choices and alternatives. If the board is provided with 
several strategic alternatives, together with management‟s 
assessment of different scenarios of risk and return, it can provide 
more meaningful input. The board can also ask for further 
evidence of the assumptions. The strategy and risk dynamic is not 
an annual or semi-annual activity. It requires a dialogue at all 
board meetings and an ongoing effort by the board to evaluate 
shifting internal and external factors.
584
 
 
 2. The role of the board and the standing committees in risk 
management 
  The NYSE rules
585
 impose some risk oversight responsibilities on 
the supervisor of risk on the audit committee. This may create 
confusion. It adds “not the sole body”. Increasingly, it is 
understood that risk monitoring cannot be delegated to the audit 
committee. The unitary board has overall responsibility and 
should look at the broad picture. The other committees too have 
their specific roles in the supervision of risk; the Risk Committee 
should oversee the connection between all the risks in its 
coordinating role, the Nomination Committee should monitor the 
risk of making wrong appointments and the Compensation 
Committee should assess the risk of short-term bonuses, which 
could result in the wrong corporate culture. 
 
                                                     
583 NACD on Risk (2009), p. 6. 
584 NACD on Risk (2009), p. 7, and see the Boeing 747 case described above. 
585 Section 303A of the NYSE Listed Company Manual. 
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  It is important for the board to make clear and transparent 
divisions of responsibilities, of those who deal with risk 
management. An example of a structure at a bank could be: 
  – an annually updated list of staff involved in risk 
management; 
  – a chief risk officer who designs plans and systems that 
deal with risk interplay and who invites the board to 
comment if the bank develops new products that are not 
mentioned in its strategy and in risk paragraphs in the 
annual accounts; 
  – a clear assignment to the various board committees of 
specific kinds of risks; 
  – procedures to keep the board well informed about 
different kinds of risks and their treatment. 
 
 3. Interplay of risks 
  Risks are not isolated, but interrelated. Problems often occur in 
groups, thereby making the sum of the risks much greater. In 
other words, the proverbial “perfect storm”. Many little “yellow 
flags” can add up to a “red flag”. The board, acting in its 
oversight role, is well positioned to consider the interplay of 
various risks.
586
 
 
 4. Underlying assumptions of strategic direction should be 
challenged 
  To be effective, independent directors should challenge CEOs 
and ask for evidence of assumptions of risk factors in company 
strategy.
587
 
 
 5. Realize that corporate culture may be the largest risk 
  More and more directors are realising the importance of corporate 
culture and that it is necessary to cure the causes and not just the 
symptoms.
588
 The NACD suggests that directors ask themselves 
the following questions: 
  – What is the style of management? How do they get things 
done? 
                                                     
586 NACD on Risk (2009), p. 10. 
587 NACD on Risk (2009), p. 11. 
588 NACD on Risk (2009), pp. 4 and 17 and Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), Risk and 
Reward: Tempering the Pursuit of Profit (June 2010), p. 11 (“ACCA (2010)”). 
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  – Are open and candid communications encouraged? 
  – Does management use directors as sounding boards to 
test assumptions or as rubber stamps? 
  – Is there an effective process to facilitate information 
flow? 
  – Are incentive compensation targets realistic and focused 
on the long term? What risks do the incentive structures 
pose to the enterprise? 
  – Is there a commitment to competence throughout the 
organisation? 
  – How does senior management demonstrate its 
commitment to an appropriate corporate culture? 
  – Are reputational issues for the corporation considered in 
strategic planning? 
 
  Formulating a proper corporate culture also requires 
transparency, not only between the board and management but 
also between the company and shareholders. Disclosure should 
include which committees oversee which aspects of risk and 
how. The board should also disclose how it has assessed its risk 
appetite and tolerance level.
589
 
 
 6. It is vital that directors are well informed 
  Directors must have a sound understanding of the company‟s 
business. Continuing education for management is important. 
Directors must “kick the tyres” and visit business locations,  
including foreign offices. Directors must also find time to read 
extensively about the business, the competition, regulatory 
aspects and environmental issues.
590
 
 
 7. Questions, questions, questions 
  US literature on business contains plenty of pertinent questions 
that should be asked by directors. For a good example, see the list 
under 5 above of this sub-section on page 180. 
 
 8. Legal aspects of risk management 
  The Delaware Court of Chancery is developing its interpretation 
of the duties of care, loyalty and good faith that define director 
                                                     
589 NACD on Risk (2009), p. 18. 
590 NACD on Risk (2009), p. 14. 
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responsibility. In the area of risk management relevant cases are 
those that deal with supervision and oversight. 
 
  In general, the main points of these cases are that (1) the board 
has the authority to manage the business of the corporation, 
(2) the board has the duty of loyalty to put in place “due 
corporate information and reporting systems”, (3) the board must 
react to obvious warnings or red flags, and (4) although all 
directors are basically equally liable there are examples of 
individual exculpation on the one hand and on the other hand the 
demand of a higher standard of care for insiders (i.e. managers 
and officers) than for outside independent directors. 
 
  According to Section 141(a) of the Delaware GCL, the business 
and affairs of the corporation are “managed by and under the 
direction of the board of directors”. The law does not say “by the 
board of directors”. This implies that the board has authority and 
leeway for arranging management and having the necessary 
systems set up for the gathering of information and reporting. It 
may delegate certain tasks, which implies that insiders have a 
higher standard of care than outsiders and that it may trust 
employees, provided the board keeps an eye on its agents and 
reacts to red flags. 
 
  Standards of supervision 
  Important cases relevant to this item are Bater v. Dresser,
591
 
Graham, Caremark, Stone v. Ritter, Citigroup and AIG.
592
 These 
cases are described below, as well as under liability in paragraph 
3.7.3.1. 
 
  Bater v. Dresser (1920) 
  Coleman, the bookkeeper of a small bank in Cambridge, defrauded the bank. 
Semi-annual examinations had not revealed any wrong doing. A claim for 
damages was filed against the directors. The US Supreme Court made a 
distinction between Dresser, the president, and the other directors. As Dresser 
was at the bank for many hours every day and had received several hints and 
                                                     
591 Bater v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920). 
592 Graham (Delaware Supreme Court 24/1/1963, 188 A.2d 125), Caremark (A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)), 
Stone v. Ritter (Delaware Supreme Court, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006)) and AIG (Vice-Chancellor Strine, 965 
A.2d 10/2/2009) and Citigroup (964 A.2d 106, Del. Ch. 24/9/2009). 
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warnings, he was held liable. The other directors, who were outsiders and had 
been persuaded by the president and the semi-annual examinations that nothing 
was wrong, were held not to have been negligent. This case is important 
because it makes clear that the US courts distinguish between insider directors 
and outsider directors in liability cases.
593
 
 
  Graham (1963) 
  Graham, the plaintiff, alleged that the directors of Allis-Chalmers had 
knowledge of anti-trust price-fixing arrangements, although the corporation had 
agreed to a consent order 20 years earlier not to violate antitrust laws. Allis-
Chalmers manufactured a variety of electrical equipment and had 31,000 
employees, 24 plants and annual sales of $ 500 million. Its policy was to 
decentralise management and to have prices set by particular department 
managers. The 14-strong board, which consisted of 4 executive and 10 non-
executive directors, met once a month and was supplied with financial and 
operating data. They made all decisions on general business policy. In this case 
some of the company‟s employees were suspended, interrogated and indicted. 
The board members were not. Graham wished to sue the board members for 
damages on the grounds that they knew of the anti-trust activities. The 
Chancellor and the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the individual directors 
were not liable because they had not known of the activities. Some employees 
of Allis-Chalmers had violated the anti-trust laws and thus subjected the 
corporation to a loss. There was no duty upon the directors to install a corporate 
system of espionage if they had no reason to suspect wrongdoing. They were 
entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of the employees. This was 
especially true given the large size of the organisation. In short, there were no 
red flags. Directors are liable for mistakes of employees only if they have 
recklessly reposed confidence in an obviously untrustworthy employee. 
 
  The modern view is that directors should implement procedures and 
programmes to assist them in their monitoring role.594 Federal sentencing 
guidelines have provided for lesser sentences to corporations that have 
implemented compliance programmes. 
 
  Caremark (1994) 
  This case recognised the trend and interpreted the Graham standard more 
narrowly. The directors of Caremark Int. Inc. were successful in their motion to 
dismiss the case against them. The plaintiffs had claimed that Caremark 
                                                     
593 Pinto and Branson (2009), pp. 220-221. 
594 A.L.I. Corp. Gov. Proj. § 4.01. 
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directors should have known that officers and employees of Caremark were 
involved in violations of the federal Anti-Referral Payments Law. That law 
prohibits health care providers from paying any sum of money to induce referral 
of Medicare or Medicaid patients. The court held that “It is important to be 
reasonably informed that the board exercises good faith (under loyal) judgment 
that the corporation‟s information and reporting system is adequate to assure the 
board has appropriate information in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary 
operations. However, directors cannot be required to possess detailed 
information about all aspects of the enterprise. Only a sustained or systematic 
failure of the board to exercise oversight, such as an utter failure to attempt to 
assure a reasonable information and reporting system, will establish the lack of 
good faith (under the duty of loyalty) as a necessary condition for liability”. 
Boards have the duty (a) to institute a system of supervision and (b) to record 
and monitor that the system functions, but do not have the duty to possess 
detailed information about the activities of all employees. Some form of 
monitoring system must therefore be in place. 
 
  Stone v. Ritter (2006) 
  Stone was shareholder in AmSouth. In 2004 AmSouth Bank paid $ 40 million in 
fines and $ 10 million in civil penalties arising from violations of anti-money 
laundering regulations, alleged to be the largest ever of its kind. KPMG 
confirmed that AmSouth had a longstanding compliance programme. There 
were many AmSouth employees involved: BSA officer, BSA/AML Compliance 
Department, Corporate Security Department and Suspicions Activity Oversight 
Committee. The BSA officer trained the board of directors annually. The board 
at various times enacted written policies, e.g. a board-wide policy directing all 
AmSouth employees to immediately report suspicious transactions. The claim 
that directors are liable for employees‟ failures is “possibly the most difficult 
theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment” 
[...] “Only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight 
[...] will establish the lack of good faith (under the duty of loyalty) that is a 
necessary condition to liability. “In the absence of red flags, good faith in the 
context of oversight must be measured by the directors‟ actions to assure a 
reasonable information and reporting system exists,” as noted in the Caremark 
decision. The Chancery Court and the Supreme Court dismissed the case. The 
directors are therefore only liable for failure to implement a reporting system or, 
if there is a system, for consciously failing to monitor the system. 
 
  AIG (February 2009) 
  A motion by AIG directors Maurice R. (Hank) Greenberg and Smith to dismiss 
the complaint filed by the plaintiffs was not accepted by Vice-Chancellor Strine 
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in a 108-page opinion. In this case a litigation committee of independent 
directors had been appointed. This committee had decided to institute the 
litigation initiated by plaintiffs against Greenberg and Smith and the “inner 
circle”. 
 
AIG had invested hundreds of millions in offshore subsidiaries and then entered 
into worthless reinsurance contracts with them. Also, AIG invested in buying up 
for itself elderly people‟s existing insurance policies while telling the public it 
was issuing new insurance policies. Greenberg and his inner circle inspired and 
oversaw a business strategy premised in substantial part on the use of improper 
accounting and other techniques designed to make AIG appear more prosperous 
than it in fact was. Each of the inner circle had been awarded an enormous 
amount of stock by Greenberg; they had supervisory authority over AIG‟s 
investments and served on AIG‟s finance and executive committees. In some of 
the wrongdoings Matthews, one of Greenberg‟s top managers, was kept in the 
dark by Greenberg and his inner circle. Here Greenberg and Smith and the 
“inner circle” were likely to be liable because they had acted in this way without 
informing the other directors. The motion to dismiss was not accepted and the 
case will go on to trial. 
 
Citigroup (September 2009) 
Citigroup suffered huge losses because of direct and indirect investments in 
subprime markets. These investments turned out very poorly. However, risk 
management systems were in place and there was an audit and risk management 
committee that had the duty to assist the board in monitoring the risk analysis. 
This committee met about 11 times a year. The Chancery Court considered that 
the board knew of the deterioration of the subprime market and of the 
possibility of further deterioration. The plaintiffs in this shareholder derivative 
suit did not even specify how the monitoring system was inadequate. The Court 
held that the “red flags” mentioned by the plaintiffs were only general market 
circumstances and therefore more a sign of poor decision making than of acting 
in breach of fiduciary duties. The plaintiffs were denied the right to start 
litigation and the motion to dismiss was accepted. Again, if there are risk 
management systems in place and there were no specific red flags, the directors 
are not liable. 
 
  While courts continue to adhere to the Caremark case, the 
possibility of demanding higher standards of care for directors of 
financial institutions could be extended to all corporations. 
Specialized committees, use of expert consultants, tutorials and 
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expanded director education will go a long way to enable boards 
to meet even a strengthened duty of oversight obligations.
595
 
 
  There are many developments in this area. The NYSE requires 
risk assessment and management policies.
596
 The SEC endorses 
self-regulatory frameworks, that is the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Enterprise 
Risk Management – Integrated Framework of September 2004.597 
The framework is a regulation of systems that is followed by the 
corporation. The COSO Framework is also used in the 
Netherlands. Amendments to the Securities Exchange Act 1934 
require risk factor disclosure in annual and quarterly reports.
598
 
As mentioned above, a federal sentencing guideline provides for 
more lenient treatment of corporate crimes if the organisation had 
established a well-functioning and qualifying compliance 
programme.
599
 Certain industries – especially banks and 
insurance companies – are adopting leading “best practices”. 
Rating agencies are becoming more attuned to companies‟ 
systems of enterprise risk management systems. 
 
3.5.5 What is the status of the discussion about non-CEO chairmen? What roles 
does a lead director have? 
 
As mentioned earlier, the US was used to having companies with a sole 
leader who combined the function of CEO and chairman. Since 1994, 
following the changes promoted by GM and CalPERS, and especially 
since 2002, subsequent to Enron and WorldCom, there has been a strong 
lobby, led by Ira Millstein and the Blue Ribbon Chairman‟s Group, to 
have separate non-CEO chairmen. However, the Business Roundtable, 
the association of CEOs, has raised doubts and objections against this 
trend. As mentioned before, 30% of the larger listed companies have non-
CEO chairmen and the other 70% have a combined CEO/chairman, but 
do have a lead director who presides over the executive sessions. 
Pressure groups, such as Risk Metrics, are attending shareholders‟ 
                                                     
595 Lipton NYSE Speech (2010). 
596 Section 303A of the NYSE Listed Company Manual. 
597 Conference Board (2009), p. 154. 
598 Item 1A of Securities Exchange Act Forms 10-K and 10-Q and item 503(c) of Regulation S-K. 
599 Chapter 8 (Sentencing of Organisations), Amendment 673 (Supplement to Appendix C, 2004 Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual). 
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meetings to get boards to agree to split the functions of CEO and 
chairman. This is the third important structural change in US boards after 
the switch to a strong majority of independent directors and the adoption 
of executive sessions. Activists argue that oversight of the CEO by an 
independent chair might have helped mitigate the risk-taking that 
contributed to the recent financial meltdown.600 
 
 Risk Metrics, now called Institutional Shareholder Service, in its 
February 2010 report entitled “U.S. Season Preview on Governance”, 
implies that an even greater use of outside directors is the appropriate 
response, specifically the use of an outside chairman. The report calls 
2009 a breakthrough year for advocates of an independent chairman, 
inspiring it with the hope that it would continue to earn more support for 
these proposals. Risk Metrics cites investor advocates who had noted that 
no large financial firms had an independent chairman before the crisis 
and had argued that such companies were too large and complex to be run 
by a combined CEO and chair. Risk Metrics are putting pressure on large 
companies to move to the non-CEO chairman model within 3 years. 
Many companies such as Microsoft, Intel, Citigroup, Sara Lee and 
NYSE/Euronext have already introduced it. 
 
 Discussion on a separate chairman to balance the CEO 
 Traditionally, in US public companies, the CEO heads the management 
team overseen by the board and is also a member of the board. Those 
who favour preserving this traditional structure of duality argue that a 
single leadership fosters more operational efficiency, facilitates internal 
communication with the board, and ultimately allows better business 
performance. The Business Roundtable, for instance, believes that most 
American corporations have been “well served” by a structure where the 
CEO also operates as chairman of the board, since it bridges management 
and directorship levels while ensuring that both act with a commonality 
of purpose. On the other hand, detractors of this practice observe that 
separating the roles gives boards an organizational basis for acting 
independently of management and avoiding dangerous instances of CEO 
                                                     
600 Conference Board (2009), pp. 33-35. Only 29.3% of large companies with revenues of 9 billion or more 
report separating the CEO and board chairman positions; however, 68.1% of the same sample report having 
appointed a lead director. Variations can also be observed from industry to industry, with only 31.6% of 
companies in the energy industry with a non-CEO chair compared to over 50% in other sectors (including 
insurance and financial services). 
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imperialism and avoids a conflict of interest for the CEO who otherwise 
monitors himself. These arguments are discussed hereafter. 
 
 The arguments for having a separate chairman used by the Chairman‟s 
Forum
601
 can be summarized as follows: 
 (1) Experience in countries, such as e.g. the UK and Canada, has 
shown that the model of a separate chairman works well. The 
CEO is accountable for running the company in the interests of 
the shareholders. This is a separate and time- intensive 
responsibility. The independent chairman curbs conflicts of 
interest, promotes oversight of risk, manages the relationship 
between the board and the CEO, and serves to know the views of 
shareholders. The idea of the separate chairman is a logical next 
step in the development of an independent board. 
 (2) In the context of the economic crisis peer independent chairmen 
believe that lead directors are not considered the equivalent of 
board chairmen by the board or shareholders. “He who sits at the 
head of the table runs the meeting.” 
 (3) The responsibilities of managing a complex enterprise are not 
necessarily the same as those required to lead the board in 
overseeing management. Moreover, given the time and effort 
required to manage in today‟s context, managing and promoting 
the business is a very different function from leading the board. 
 
 What‟s next? 
 In view of the present crisis and the many bank failures, the need for a 
next step is apparent. US corporate governance has come a long way 
from managerial capitalism to independent board monitoring and 
executive sessions. Notwithstanding the improvements, many boards are 
still led by a person with a potential conflict of interest, being required to 
monitor himself, as CEO and to monitor senior management. The next 
step is to have a separate independent chairman. 
 
 The main arguments in favour of a separate chairman are that the CEO as 
chairman is the leader of the monitoring body, and has a conflict of 
interest, when monitoring himself; and that the growing demands on 
management, i.e. strategy, process and shareholder contact, require two 
persons. 
 
                                                     
601 Millstein Chairing the Board (2009). 
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 Objections to a separate chair refuted
602
 
 “US boards are well served, so why fix what is not broken” say the objectors. The 
response is that in the many scandals over the last 30 years the main cause has been 
insufficient monitoring by the board. The majority of financial institutions that failed in 
the recent crisis had a combined CEO/chair. Moreover, foreign institutional investors 
want the roles to be separated.  
 
 The objectors point to a dearth of evidence that separation of the roles positively impacts 
share price. The proponents respond that there is no evidence to the contrary. The 
evidence is, as with all corporate governance changes, neutral. It cannot hurt, but might 
help. 
 
 The objection is that it creates potential confusion and duplication. In the opinion of the 
proponents of a separate chair it creates a well-delineated division of functions. 
 
 The objectors fear potential animosity between the CEO and the chairman. The 
proponents respond that better monitoring means that difficult questions will not be 
avoided. Rubber-stamping the activities of executives is not what is required. 
Improvement of oversight functions is what is needed. 
 
 One leader is sufficient for decision making, say the objectors. The response is that a  
group usually takes wiser decisions than one individual on his own. 
 
 The objectors argue that a separate chairman creates extra cost. The proponents respond 
that having a separate chairman can ensure that executives are not overpaid or “paid for 
failure”. 
 
 The objectors say potential disruption could occur if the CEO becomes demoralised. The 
timing of the change is difficult. The advice of the Chairman‟s Forum is to change when 
the CEO changes. Its view is “better late than never”. 
 
 The objectors say CEOs prefer the combined role. The proponents say independent 
monitoring may not be popular with CEOs, but it is efficiency enhancing. Just because 
one constituency does not like it, is no reason not to do it. 
 
 The objectors say that in practice the separate chair is unworkable. The response is that 
72.8% of interviewed directors with experience with an independent chairman are 
positive.603 
                                                     
602 Millstein Chairing the Board (2009), pp. 18-20. 
603 This has risen to 86.7%, according to the NACD, Public Company Governance Survey (2009), p. 16. 
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 The objectors say that having a lead director is just as good. The response is that the 
experience is different. A lead director does chair the executive sessions, but not the full 
board meetings. “He, who sits at the head of the table leads”. This also gives the chairman 
the possibility of asking the views of officers other than the CEO and to take time out if 
the chair senses disagreement.  
 
 Objectors say that one size does not fit all. True, say the proponents, but it fits most. 
72.8% of interviewed directors say that if a company board explains to shareholders and 
they agree, there can be an exception to having a separate chair. It does not have to be 
mandatory. When companies deliberate about which structure to adopt, they should take 
into consideration factors such as their culture, stage of development, performance, 
concerns by investors, etc. No one model provides an absolute guarantee of business 
success.604 In a family business where the CEO holds most of the shares there does not 
have to be a separate chairman, is the general view, even of the defenders of the 
separation of the functions of the CEO and Chairman. 
 
 Another issue about the non-CEO chairman model is whether a CEO who 
sits on the board with about 8 to 12 independent directors would not be 
overpowered by them. The answer given to me by Professor Ira Millstein 
of Yale University is that board dynamics do not weaken the CEO. The 
CEO knows the business better than any other board member. His 
proposals are being discussed. That gives the CEO the power to convince 
and gives him prestige. Usually things go somewhat as follows. The 
CEO‟s proposals are being discussed; he has all the information to defend 
his plans. The CEO is supported by his officers, who attend the board 
meeting and show support by their presence and body language. If the 
CEO is not sure of their support, he should inform the board in advance 
about any dilemmas he and/or his officers have or first try to convince the 
officers with his arguments. The CEO prepares the board meetings with 
the chairman and will know before the meeting whether any independent 
directors have doubts about his proposals, in which case he can try to 
convince each of them before the meeting. He can also ask the chairman 
to adjourn such an agenda point. 
 
 The most recent legislative proposal from the SEC would require 
disclosure of a company‟s leadership structure as well as the rationale for 
believing that such a structure is the best for the company.
605
 This 
                                                     
604 Conference Board (2009), p. 35. 
605 Conference Board (2009), pp. 33-35. 
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approach is, of course, a “comply or explain” concept, which is now 
confirmed and repeated in the Dodd-Frank Act of 21 July 2010.
606
  
 
 With these developments and with pressure through shareholder proxy 
resolutions it is reasonable to assume that in a few years separation of the 
functions of CEO and chairman will be more widespread.
607
 
 
 Functions and qualifications of the separate chair 
 The functions of a non-CEO chairman are to (i) convene and preside over 
board meetings and executive sessions; (ii) lead the board and uphold 
high corporate governance and ethical standards; (iii) establish the 
operating procedure for the board and committees; (iv) organise the board 
agenda with assistance of the CEO, board committee chairs and corporate 
secretary, and provide sufficient time for discussion of agenda items and 
focus the board‟s attention on relevant matters, limit distraction and 
discord, and work towards consensus; (v) supervise circulation of proper, 
timely and relevant information to the directors; (vi) ensure that all 
directors contribute at the meeting; (vii) communicate effectively with 
management on a regular basis and act as sounding board for the CEO; 
(viii) take the lead in board evaluation and succession planning of the 
CEO and other directors; and last but not least (ix) ensure good 
communication with shareholders. 
 
 The qualities required of the non-CEO chairman are independence and 
the courage to ask questions, to have experience in a similar industry and 
the ability to commit enough time, e.g. 2 to 3 days a week, not 
necessarily at the office, but full time in times of crisis, to be a good 
communicator, and have a sense of modesty and humility. 
 
 Clear documentation of functions and qualities 
 It is important to clearly document the duties of the chair and the CEO to 
avoid duplication and/or conflict and put this information on the website. 
 
 Timing of change to separate non-CEO chairman 
 Timing the change from imperial CEO – combined CEO/chairman – to 
CEO and independent chair is not easy. The CEO will see change as an 
insult. Probably the best moment is when a new CEO is appointed, 
although this too may be seen as criticism and offering a new person a 
                                                     
606 See section 3.1.2 towards the end. 
607 Lipton NYSE Speech (2010).  
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downgraded job. Risk Metrics, now called Institutional Shareholder 
Services, is advising some large corporations to make the change before 
the end of three years.  
 
 Appointing a lead, presiding or senior independent director 
 When boards do not choose to separate the chairman and CEO positions, 
a lead, presiding or senior director can be appointed. He should meet the 
independence requirements under the applicable listing standards. The 
responsibilities of the lead director (or other equivalent designation) 
would include chairing executive sessions, but not the full board, i.e. the 
independent directors plus the CEO/Chairman, serving as the principal 
liaison between management and independent directors, and working 
closely with the CEO/chairman to finalise board meeting agendas. In 
practice he has a veto on setting the agenda. The lead director would also 
be in charge of approving the information flow to the board and of other 
operational aspects of board functioning, of the evaluation of the CEO 
and he would take over the CEO office temporarily when it is 
unexpectedly vacant.
608
 
 
 The separate non-CEO chairman does have a stronger position than a lead 
director: (i) the chairman shapes board dialogue and sets the tone and the 
agenda; he determines which of the officers other than the CEO should be 
involved in the dialogue; he also ascertains whether there is disagreement 
among the executives and it is easier for him to stimulate other 
independent directors to be active in the discussions; (ii) the chairman has 
visibility and can, if necessary, communicate independently with other 
parties; and (iii) the chairman has board leadership of the board. 
Moreover, if there is a non-CEO chairman the other directors will feel 
less inhibited in challenging the CEO in a full board meeting.
609
 
 
 The trend to have at least a lead director, even if the CEO is also 
Chairman, may also be explained by the fact that NYSE rules
610
 now 
require that an outside director should preside over executive sessions of 
the boards of listed companies. Thus, companies whose CEOs function as 
board chairmen – almost 70% of listed companies – do need lead or 
independent directors to comply with this requirement. 
 
                                                     
608 Wall Street Journal, 13 September 2010. 
609 Conger and Lawler (2009), p. 185. 
610 Section 303A of the NYSE Listed Company Manual. 
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3.5.6 Elements of best practices 
 
 Early and on-site information 
 The performance of the corporate board ultimately depends on the ability 
of directors to access in good time all useful business information needed 
to make informed decisions in the interest of the company. Senior and 
lower managers are the major providers of such information. They owe a 
duty of candour to members of the board. To maintain objectivity, the 
board must receive data from external sources too, such as market trends, 
analyst reports and competitive analysis. The board should also examine 
the books and inspect the facilities.
611
 In most cases they give the CEO 
advance notice of such visits. 
 
 It is US practice to provide directors with timely and detailed information 
by means of extensive “information packs” before every meeting. Since 
the Enron debacle, independent directors do their homework well. There 
is more emphasis on receiving information from lower management and 
separate divisions. 
 
 Directors need to be more actively involved and have information in three 
main areas, i.e. the company‟s long-term strategy and health (its ability to 
survive and develop over the longer term), its short-term financial 
performance, its strategy and assessment of risk and its leadership and 
succession.
612
 
 
 For the board‟s role in its monitoring risk oversight role the directors 
need to be informed about all essential aspects of the business. They must 
also pay on site visits, meet officers of subsidiaries and understand the 
business. They should not be burdened with an information overload, but 
should instead be supplied with succinct information especially put 
together for them.
613
 
 
 Boards should have regular tutorials by both company employees and 
outside advisers. Board retreats of two or three days will have longer 
agendas for the education of directors about special issues.
614
 
 
                                                     
611 Conference Board (2009), pp. 19-20 and NACD (2005). 
612 Felton and Fritz (2005). 
613 NACD on Risk (2009).  
614 Lipton NYSE Speech (2010). 
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 Time commitment 
 Board members need to give sufficient time to the company. This is 
important in order to develop teamwork on the board and between the 
board and management. Generally CEOs take on few other board 
positions. Jack Welch, when CEO of General Electric, refused to be on 
any other outside board. This is rather extreme given that CEOs can gain 
experience when sitting on other boards. The general US opinion is that 
CEOs should be on no more than one or at most two other boards. Retired 
executives might sit on a few more boards.
615
 
 
 The number of times the whole board meets in the US is not much more 
than that of Dutch supervisory boards, i.e. six to nine per annum (six in 
industry, food and utilities and nine in commercial banks). In the US the 
number of board meetings is not influenced by the size of the company, 
but there is far more material to be studied in boards of larger 
companies.
616
 However, US board committees meet more frequently than 
Dutch Committees. In 2008, its audit committees met on average 9.1 
times per year,
617
 compensation committees 6.6 times
618
 and nomination 
committees 4.5 times.
619
 These figures were not much higher than the 
2007 averages. Other differences between US and Dutch companies 
which indicate that US independent directors put more time into their task 
than Dutch supervisory directors do are the frequency of on-site 
inspections and informal get-togethers and the volume of information 
packs in the US. Each meeting usually involves a dinner plus a whole day 
(either afternoon meeting, dinner and morning meeting or dinner and 
meeting next day). The directors often fly in. Furthermore, the fact that 
directors really make the decisions (the board decides as a whole) gives 
them a greater sense of involvement. In the US independent chairmen and 
lead directors devote even more time to the company business than the 
other independent directors. 
                                                     
615 Conger and Lawler (2009), p. 188. 
616 Conference Board (2009), p. 41. 
617 Conference Board (2009), p. 95, for Netherlands: De Bos and Lückerath (2009/0), p. 16. 
618 Conference Board (2009), p. 79. 
619 Conference Board (2009), p. 48, for UK see pp. 82-83 of this study. 
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  Overview of meetings of boards in listed companies 
  UK US Dutch 
  NEDs Independent Supervisory 
   directors directors 
  (2006) (2008) (2009) 
 Board 9 9 7 
 Audit 4 9 4 
 Remun. (4) (6,6) (4) 
 None (4) (4,5) (4) 
 Other 5 5 
 Prepare 5 10 5 
 On site 4 4  
 Total 27 37 17 
 
 Increasing time demands on board members will result in a greater use of 
modern conferencing and communication technology so that travel time 
can be reduced, committees can meet apart from meetings of the whole 
board and special meetings with consultants can be arranged. Dealing 
with crises and important issues will demand more frequent special 
meetings with outside consultants.
620
 
 
 Evaluation and continuing education 
 Evaluation of the board as a whole and individually of its members and of 
the CEO takes place under the leadership of the nominating committee. 
There is a three-level assessment of the complete board, the committees 
and of individual directors. Most companies assess the first two annually. 
The assessment of individual directors often takes place only before 
reappointment or retirement. Normally, the non-CEO chairman or lead 
director chairs the nominating committee.
621
 The fact that there will be a 
formal evaluation and the manner in which it will be conducted has to be 
made public by being placed on the website. The result of evaluations 
themselves are confidential and aim to promote teambuilding.
622
 Risk 
Metrics, now called Institutional Shareholder Services, has been factoring 
director training into its governance ratings or assessments, which has 
                                                     
620 Lipton NYSE Speech (2010). 
621 Conference Board (2009), p. 62. 
622 Conference Board (2009), pp. 61-62. 
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acted as another key driver for companies to arrange continuing 
education for their directors.
623
 
 
 Teamwork 
 US companies devote much time and care to promote teamwork, but are 
aware of the constraints. Board members are often unable to spend 
enough time together and then resort to phone calls and email 
communication among themselves. Limitations include other demanding 
jobs and the fact that there is only one full-timer on the board, i.e. the 
CEO, who can control most information. There is a tendency for board 
members, often former or present CEOs or executives in other 
companies, not to challenge the CEO too seriously and too often.
624
 Some 
board members have connections with or are nominated by different 
shareholder groups. There are other interests which some board members 
feel close to, and there are – as in every organisation – ego clashes. Some 
directors are extrovert or dominant and some are more reserved. The 
present day over-emphasis on committee work, caused by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act divides up the board in many separate meetings, all factors 
which make teamwork difficult.
625
 
 
 Various suggestions have been made for improving teamwork.
626
 Having 
a separate non-CEO chairman or lead director could promote a shared 
leadership approach. In these cases the CEO and the chairman or lead 
director would always prepare for board meetings together and, again 
communicate with each other after each executive session. Effective 
chairmen have techniques such as “calling on directors” for comment on 
each item, “going around the room/asking all directors”, polling the board 
and having pre-meeting conversations with individual directors, 
encouraging them to speak to one another, making sure directors are 
selected with ample time and an appropriate mix of team members of 
varied areas of expertise and backgrounds, as well as creating an 
appropriate mix of team members with varied areas of expertise and 
diverse backgrounds.  
 
                                                     
623 Conference Board (2009), p. 62. 
624 Conger and Lawler (2009), pp. 184-185. 
625 Jay Lorsch and Robert C. Clark, „Leading from the Boardroom‟, Harvard Business Review (April 2009), p. 1 
(“Lorsch and Clark (2009)”). 
626 Conger and Lawler (2009), pp. 185-188. 
  
 233 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
 It is worthwhile for the board to evaluate the extent of the board‟s 
teamwork with rigour and candour. In this evaluation the board should at 
given times be assisted by outsiders. The evaluation confirmation should 
be laid down in writing and discussed in meetings. Boards should not be 
too large (8 to 12 members), on the assumption that leadership involving 
specific problems is often provided not only by the CEO, the chair and 
the lead director, but sometimes also by committee chairs or sometimes a 
specialist or simply each director.
627
 
 
 Committees 
 – Audit committee 
  The audit committee may only have independent members.
628
 
There must be at least three members who are financially literate. 
One member must have accounting and related financial 
management expertise.
629
 The company must disclose whether 
there is a financial expert. The committee is responsible for 
hiring and firing the outside auditor. The liability of outside 
auditors should not be limited. Meetings should be held with an 
outside auditor and also with the chief legal counsel at least 
quarterly. The audit committee should be free to hire independent 
advisors. In 2005 the Fortune 1000 audit committees met on 
average nine times a year, which was up from five a year in 
2002.
630
 This number of meetings a year was still nine in 2008. 
 
 – Compensation committee 
  The corporate articles of association should describe the scope of 
authority, the power to delegate, the role of any executive in 
determining the compensation of any other executive and the role 
of the compensation consultant. 
 
  The Dodd-Frank Act confirms that all compensation committee 
members must be independent. The role of the compensation 
committee is to oversee the corporation‟s overall compensation 
structure, review the corporate goals and objectives relating to 
executive compensation and performance measurement, evaluate 
executive performance in light of those goals and objectives and 
                                                     
627 Jay Lorsch and David A. Nadle, NACD Board Leadership Report (2004), p. 2. 
628 SEC rule 10A-3. 
629 Item 401 of Regulation S-K. 
630 Conference Board (2007), p. 230. 
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determine and approve executive compensation. The committee 
should oversee the company‟s disclosure practice with respect to 
executive compensation and play an integral role in preparation 
of the compensation discussion and the analysis to be included in 
the proxy statement and annual report. The compensation 
committee should regularly report to the independent directors, 
who should review and ratify committee decisions. The 
committee should maintain appropriate communication with 
shareholders and provide full disclosure on compensation 
matters. Other functions are to ensure that a strong executive 
team is in place, to work closely with the nominating committee 
to ensure leadership and effective succession planning and to 
ensure consistency of pay practices at all levels. 
 
  Compensation committees met 5 times on average in 2005.
631
 
This rose to 6.5 times in 2008.
632
 
 
 – Nominating/Corporate Governance committee 
  The functions of this committee are to select candidates and make 
nominations for appointments to the board of directors, including 
the position of CEO in case of succession, and to take initiatives 
relating to corporate governance principles of overseeing the 
board and overseeing offers to evaluate and hire search firms. 
These committees meet 4.5 times a year on average.
633
 
 
3.5.7 CEO succession 
 
 CEO succession has always been an important issue for the board in the 
US. Generally US companies are very good at career development, 
training those persons with the highest potential and grooming them for 
top positions. In the US it is often quite clear who is promising among 
their staff. The ladder practice, also called “auditioning”, is being 
increasingly used.
634
 Who has the potential to be CEO is often quite clear 
in advance. In many cases “laddering” goes more or less as follows: a 
potential CEO is first appointed as COO, then as President and only 
                                                     
631 Conference Board (2007), p. 230. 
632 Conference Board (2009), p. 79. 
633 Conference Board (2009), p. 48. 
634 Conference Board (2009), p. 66 and Per O. Karlson and Gary L. Nielsson, CEO Succession 2008: „Stability 
in the Storm‟ (May 2009), p. 4. 
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afterwards, if he has fulfilled expectations, as CEO. The successor is 
never publicly announced, but often there is an awareness of who is being 
groomed.
635
 Often there are several persons to choose from, who have 
demonstrated their abilities as heads of divisions. The effectiveness of 
this long-term process has been mentioned to me by Dutch captains of 
industry as an example of good US practice. Indeed, Dutch directors who 
work in large US corporations have told me that even at lower levels two 
or three candidates are named and groomed for key positions. 
 
 In the past the CEO/chairman took the lead in the process of selecting his 
own successor and asked the board for agreement at the last moment. 
Ovitz‟s appointment as COO by the Disney board in 1995, which was 
planned by CEO/chair Eisner, was an example that worked out badly, but 
has served as a warning for many companies and boards.
636
 At GE the 
appointment of Immelt to replace Welch, which was prepared 5 years in 
advance, was an example of how things should be done. 
 
 The framework within which US boards work on succession matters has 
changed radically in the past few years. Regulations and guidelines, 
especially concerning the nominations committee and disclosures, 
required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, NASDAQ and NYSE, have 
increased the pressure to ensure effective CEO succession. Shareholders, 
investors and employees are holding boards accountable for CEO 
performance. As a result, directors are getting more involved in 
succession planning. 
 
 It is crucial to assign the oversight of the CEO succession planning to the 
independent nominating committee and to have the lead director or 
independent non-CEO chairman chair that committee. It follows that 
control over this critical strategic factor has shifted from the CEO to the 
independent directors.
637
 
 
 Best practice advice to independent directors concerning CEO succession 
is to plan three to five years in advance and ensure that there is full board 
                                                     
635 NACD, The Role of the Board in CEO Succession, Board Leadership Series (2006) (“NACD, CEO 
Succession (2006)”). 
636 John W. Anderson and Karen L. Pascale, „THE DISNEY CASE:  A Virtual Roundtable Discussion with 
William T. Allen, John C. Coffee, Jr., Lawrence A. Hammermesh, and James B. Stewart‟, Delaware Lawyer 
(Winter 2005/2006), pp. 26-36 (“Anderson and Pascale (2005)”). 
637 Conference Board (2009), p. 78. 
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involvement. Succession planning should also integrate business strategy 
and risk management.
638
 
 
 Other measures generally promoted are to establish an open and ongoing 
dialogue and annual review and make the process transparent, to develop 
and agree on selection criteria, to use a formal assessment process of all 
internal (and, if any, external) candidates for their work in prior years, to 
interact with internal candidates by having managers make presentations 
at board meetings, attend offsite meetings, retreats and social events and 
have managers meet individually with board members. The best way to 
test potential candidates is to have them discuss strategy in a board 
consisting of strong, opinionated people. An often heard warning stresses 
the need of not leaving career development to the Human Resource 
department, but having directors themselves meet the top 50 staff 
members of the company. This is one of the reasons for on-site visits. It is 
also advisable to stage the succession, but avoid horse races. The 
consensus among directors is that “having a clear front-runner is the right 
way to go”. However, if a board is developing multiple prospects, it 
should never publicly announce who is being considered for the role and 
should develop internal candidates rather than recruiting externally. 
Internal candidates are familiar with the company‟s unique business and 
culture.
 639
 Companies like General Electric, Lowe‟s, Microsoft and 
McDonalds have processes that strongly favour internal candidates. 
These companies all have effective executive development programmes. 
Companies that have the best development programmes will have the 
best internal candidates.
640
 
 
 The next best practice, at a change over, is to either have the outgoing 
CEO leave, or stay on as a chairman for a limited period of up to 6 
months. Most directors are in favour of the CEO leaving immediately. 
“Welch (at GE) isn‟t trying to tell Immelt what to do”. If the outgoing 
CEO stays on briefly, this works best, when there is absolute clarity about 
the division of roles and the symbols of leadership. For example, the 
office of the outgoing CEO should be moved to another floor. It can be 
useful if the lead director is prepared to act as mediator and if the 
outgoing CEO gets coaching during the interim transition and the other 
directors help as well. This short period of 6-12 months, during which the 
                                                     
638 Conference Board (2009), p. 78. 
639 NACD, CEO Succession (2006), p. 1. 
640 Conference Board (2009), p. 64. 
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outgoing CEO stays on as chairman, is called the “apprenticeship model”. 
This “apprenticeship” system has become increasingly popular over the 
years in the US.
641
 
 
 It is certainly advisable to prepare a comprehensive emergency 
succession plan. McDonalds is often mentioned as the perfect example. 
When the company‟s 60-year old CEO suddenly died from a heart attack, 
the board had “a good plan” in place and acted immediately by naming a 
respected insider, thus reassuring franchises and investors that the same 
strategy would continue to be followed. Steps to be taken by directors in 
connection with the emergency plan are to ask the current CEO who the 
internal candidates are, make a requirement of having an emergency plan 
and be prepared to replace the entire executive team when necessary, 
have a communication strategy and prepare for a search. 
 
3.5.8 Corporate governance at banks 
 
 A report of Nestor Advisors of April 2009 entitled “A comparative case 
study of six US investment banks”642 shows that two failed banks – Bear 
Sterns and Lehman Brothers – had “stale”, entrenched boards with high 
stakes in shares, whereas Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan Chase had 
younger boards with a higher percentage of independent directors with 
experience of financial institutions. All these banks had a combined 
CEO-chairman. Citigroup, after it had to be rescued too, now has a 
separate non-CEO chairman. 
 
3.5.9 A summary of the role of board members in the US 
 
 (i) US corporate tradition gives primacy to the board, the nexus of 
the corporation; shareholders traditionally have fewer rights on 
paper  than in the UK. From 1972 onwards the SEC supported 
audit committees by advocating that they should consist solely of 
independent directors and from 1977 onwards endorsed them. In 
1977 the term “corporate governance” was used first in the US. 
Since 1992 shareholder activists have won rights and promoted 
private codes. After the Enron and WorldCom collapses and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the SEC encouraged stock 
exchanges to develop codes that give best practice rules for the 
                                                     
641 Conference Board (2009), p. 66. 
642 Nestor Advisers of April 2009. 
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nominations of independent directors and more shareholder 
rights; in response a number of aspirational private codes have 
been launched. The move towards more shareholder rights is 
continuing and the Dodd-Frank Act provides direction in many 
areas. Shareholder activists are urging for changes in majority 
voting for directors, elimination of staggered boards and separate 
non-CEO chairmen for all listed companies. 
 
  The main new features of change for US boards are independent 
directors, executive sessions and the growing number of non-
CEO chairmen.  
 
  The emphasis on shareholders‟ rights and sharp focus on stock 
prices, cause growing pressure from outside on the company. 
This has put independent directors in the limelight and has forced 
them to concentrate on monitoring and challenging, optimizing 
the results of the company and the interest of long-term investors 
and a score of other stakeholders. 
 
  The major role in creating an orderly succession has passed from 
the CEO to the independent directors, and US career 
development programmes have become an example for other 
economies. 
 
 (ii) The members of a US one-tier board have joint responsibility for 
developing, achieving and monitoring all aspects of corporate 
strategy. They take all decisions jointly. The division of board 
roles between executives and non-executives is flexible, but must 
be clearly documented in writing. 
 
 (iii) Independent directors are playing a more enhanced role in 
debating strategy options and in challenging officers on their 
development of strategy as well as in monitoring the 
achievements of these officers. Particularly noteworthy is the 
cooperation between US executives and non-executives in 
dividing up strategy development into steps, so that the non-
executives effectively have an active role even if the drafts are 
made by the executives. This active role of independent directors 
in the US in challenging strategy differs from the general position 
of supervisory directors in the Netherlands, whose sole function 
is to supervise. It also differs from NEDs of the UK, who are 
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supposed to do more than challenging strategy proposals, in that 
NEDs are actively involved in the development of the strategy. 
 
 (iv) Adopted measures for promoting the better functioning of 
independent directors include the provision of early information 
and on-site information, time for debate about strategy and 
systems for enterprise risk management, introduction, training, 
time for the job, income, evaluation and, last but not least, proper 
succession procedures. 
 
 (v) The majority – 70% – of US listed companies still have a CEO 
who is also the Chairman. In these corporations the leadership 
role of the independent directors is fulfilled by a lead director, 
who chairs the executive sessions. He is the one who also takes 
all measures to promote the proper functioning of the 
independent directors as mentioned at (iv) above. 30% of listed 
corporations have a separate non-CEO chairman. The separate 
chairman does what the lead director does, but as he also chairs 
the full board meeting and therefore influences the debate, he has 
more knowledge of the performance of the officers. He is 
complementary to the CEO and acts as his partner. He is less 
involved in day-to-day business and goes to fewer meetings with 
shareholders than a UK chairman. Dutch chairmen can learn from 
both these systems. 
 
 (vi) As far as a US-UK comparison is concerned, points (ii), (iii) and 
(iv) show that US boards and independent directors have more or 
less the same roles as UK boards and NEDs. On the whole, US 
independent directors have slightly less influence in the shaping 
stage of strategy than UK board members. The main formal 
differences are that in the US independent directors hold 
executive sessions and only 30% of listed companies have 
separate non-CEO chairmen. Most of the other 70% have lead 
directors. 
 
3.6 Duties of independent directors 
 
3.6.1 Introduction on duties of independent directors 
 
 The two previous sections (3.4 on the composition of the board and 3.5 
on the role of independent directors) complement each other. Similarly, 
  
 240 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
there is a connection between sections 3.6 on the duties of independent 
directors and 3.7 on their liabilities. 
 
 In the comparable parts of the chapter on the UK, section 2.6 on the 
duties of NEDs receives much more emphasis than 2.7 on the liability of 
NEDs because in the UK the duties are extensively described in corporate 
governance codes under the “comply or explain” concept and in the 
Companies Code of 2006. Moreover, the UK has produced little in the 
way of only sparse liability litigation, but more disqualification cases. 
 
 In short, there is more emphasis in the UK on aspirational and best 
practice duties, whereas in the US the emphasis tends to be on liability 
litigation. Therefore this section on duties in the US situation is shorter 
than the next section (3.7) on liabilities. 
 
 The Netherlands has a large volume of Civil Code law on companies, a 
best practice code, case law in a special court for the inquiry of the 
mismanagement of companies, called the “Enterprise Chamber” and 
separately from that there is liability litigation in the civil courts. The 
balance between duties and liability in the Netherlands could be said to 
be somewhere in the middle, between the UK and the US. 
 
 The following topics are dealt with in respect of duties and liabilities of directors in the 
US: the distinction between duties and liabilities, best practice codes (3.6.2), the 
developments since Enron of 2002 (3.6.3), the basis for duties (3.6.4), to whom do 
directors owe duties? (3.6.5), the pressures on boards (3.6.6). The section will be closed 
by a summary on duties (3.6.7). 
 
 The topics covered in section 3.7 on the liability of independent directors are: who can 
sue? (3.7.1), the procedural complications (3.7.2.), the liability standards in various 
proceedings, including corporate liability cases, the business judgment rule and the duties 
of loyalty, including good faith and duty of care as well as securities cases and creditor 
cases (3.7.3), the protection of directors by means of indemnification and insurance 
(3.7.4). The section will be closed by a summary on director liability in the US (3.7.5). 
 
3.6.2 Distinction between duties and liabilities, best practice codes 
 
In the US a clear distinction is made between best practice duties and 
duties based on law. The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) of 
2002 makes the distinction between “standards of conduct” in § 8.30 and 
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“standards of review” in § 8.31.643 Standards of conduct include conduct 
that is required of directors and aspirations for what is expected of 
directors. Standards of review, on the other hand, govern whether 
directors will be held liable. The Dutch terms for standards of conduct 
and standards of review are respectively “gedragsnormen” and  
“toetsingsnormen”.644 Although this distinction is implied in Delaware 
case law and has been mentioned in speeches and articles, it has not been 
developed in liability cases.
645
 
 
 A review of standards of conduct in general can best start with the duties 
and responsibilities of directors. Directors must direct the management of 
the corporation. They also have a duty of oversight – the American word 
for supervision – while confusingly the British meaning of the word 
oversight is the opposite: “an unintentional failure to notice something”. 
They have the duty to monitor management, albeit without going into 
micromanaging. They must carry out their responsibilities in accordance 
with principles of fiduciary duty. Although the business judgment rule 
applied by the courts is the standard of review, these fiduciary duties are 
embodied in the rule itself. That is, directors are expected to act – and are 
presumed to act, unless the presumption is rebutted – “on an informed 
basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in 
the best interests of the company”.646 
 
 As mentioned before basic responsibilities of the board of directors stem 
from the Delaware General Corporate Law, which requires that “the 
business and affairs of …. [the] corporation …. be managed by or under 
                                                     
643 See ABA Corporate Laws Committee, The Corporate Director‟s Guidebook, American Bar Association 
(ABA), Business Law Section. See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, „The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and 
Standards of Review in Corporate Law‟, 62 Fordham Law Review 437 (1993). 
644 See B.F. Assink, „Pre-advices to the Association of Commercial Law‟, in B.F. Assink and D. Strik, 
Ondernemingsbestuur en risicobeheersing op de drempel van een nieuw decennium: een 
ondernemingsrecheljke analyse (2009), pp. 75-77 (“Assink in Assink and Strik (2009)”); Levinus Timmerman, 
„Toetsing van ondernemingsbeleid door de rechter, mede in rechtsvergelijkend perspectief‟, 
Ondernemingsrecht 2003/15 (“Timmerman (2003)”) and Levinus Timmerman, „De grondslagen van geldend 
ondernemingsrecht‟, Ondernemingsrecht 2009/1 (inaugural speech as professor in Rotterdam) (“Timmerman, 
Speech (2009)”); and Willem J.L. Calkoen, „Actualiteiten, Discussie over Commissarissen en belang van 
Chairman‟, Ondernemingsrecht 2010/88 (“Calkoen (2010)”). 
645 Norman Veasey, former Chief Justice of Delaware Supreme Court, Veasey (2005). 
646 Veasey (2005), p. 1417 and Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
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the direction of the board of directors”.647 One of the meanings of the 
noun “direction”, and the verb “direct”, is defined in Webster's 
dictionary, besides “control of operations”, “tell or show someone the 
way”. Both meanings when applied to corporations “strategic control and 
goal orientation”. Webster‟s dictionary expresses the meaning of the 
noun “direction” even more forcefully: “guidance or supervision of 
action, conduct, or operations”, and “something that is imposed as 
authoritative instruction”.648 The meaning of the verb “direct” follows 
from these definitions. The root “direct” in this statutory mandate for 
directors has two components: (1) to determine policy in their decision 
making role of “telling the way” and “imposing authoritative instruction”, 
what the law calls” managed by” and (2) to guide and supervise in their 
oversight function what the law expressed with “under the direction. 
Thus, directors “manage and are not merely the supervising group that 
hire and fire the CEO and advise management.
649
 This is an essential 
point for a one-tier board. The board members, including the independent 
directors, are involved in decision making.  
 
 In a two-tier board system the supervisory directors are not involved in 
the development of decision making. They only veto or give consent. 
 
 The marketplace is developing the expectation that directors will engage 
in best practices, i.e. an extra-legal standard of conduct or “soft law”. 
This expectation is, for now, primarily an aspirational standard of 
conduct. Failure to adhere to the standard of conduct reflected in 
aspirational best practices may not necessarily result in liability, as the 
Delaware Supreme Court made clear in the Disney case.
650
 
 
 This is a case about whether there is personal liability of the directors of a Delaware 
corporation to the corporation for lack of due care in the decision making process and for 
waste of corporate assets. This case is not about the failure of the directors to establish 
and carry out ideal corporate governance practices. All good corporate governance 
practices include compliance with statutory law and case law establishing fiduciary 
duties. But the law of corporate fiduciary duties and remedies for violation of those duties 
are distinct from the aspirational goals of ideal corporate governance practices. 
                                                     
647 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). 
648 Webster‟s Third New International Dictionary (3rd ed., 2002), p. 650. 
649 Veasey (2005), p. 1419. Here I see the dual function of active involvement in (i) strategy determination and 
(ii) monitoring. 
650 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (the appeal in the first Disney case).  
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Aspirational ideals of good corporate governance practices for boards of directors that 
go beyond the minimal legal requirements of corporation law are highly desirable, often 
tend to benefit shareholders, sometimes reduce litigation and can usually help directors 
avoid liability. But they are not required by corporation law and do not define standards 
of liability.651 
 
 This is a good example of Delaware judges expressing their views about 
better corporate governance, but at the same time making clear what the 
law on liability is. 
 
 The Disney cases
652
 have had a huge impact on corporate governance 
counselling , especially on proper board procedures and on the use of 
external advisors by nomination and compensation committees. It is often 
repeated by Delaware judges and retired judges that, as a matter of 
prudent counselling, the directors‟ conduct may be measured not only by 
evolving expectations of directors in the context of Delaware common 
law fiduciary duty but also by other standards, such as standards from the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, rules of the SEC, Listing Requirements of the 
NYSE and NASDAQ and even the best practice codes of all private 
institutions. These corporate governance codes set a high standard of 
board behaviour that most boards aim to comply with, but this standard is 
not identical to the standard of review required by the courts, which is 
lower. 
 
 The difference between preaching by Delaware judges and immediate 
judgments about transactions is described clearly by Professor Ed 
Rock:
653
 
 “These opinions illustrate a striking feature of the Delaware fiduciary 
duty cases, specifically, the multivalent character of the outcomes. In 
these cases, and in the ones that follow, the courts avail themselves of one 
of three options: denying the request for an injunction and blessing the 
behaviour; denying the motion for an injunction and criticizing 
defendants‟ behaviour; or granting the injunction. The intermediate 
position plays three roles. First, it provides guidance applicable to future 
cases, that is, what kind of behaviour the courts are likely to find to be a 
                                                     
651 See Anderson and Pascale (2005) interviewing a professor and former vice chancellor and Wendi J. Powell, 
„Corporate Governance and Fiduciary Duty, The Mickey Mouse Rule‟ (2007), File: Powell Doc. 
652 See sub-section 3.1.2 above. 
653 Prof. Edward B. Rock, „Saint and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work‟, 44 University of 
California at Los Angeles Law Review 1009 (1997) (“Rock (1997)”). 
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breach of fiduciary duty. Second, in these intermediate cases, although 
the court denies plaintiffs‟ motion for a preliminary injunction, it also 
typically denies defandants‟ motion to dismiss, leaving defendants with 
some substantial damages exposure. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly – and certainly least notices – it tells directors, who we may 
suppose are generally trying to do a good job, what they should do.” 
 
3.6.3 Developments since Enron (2002) 
 
 In the last seven years the ways of independent directors of large 
corporations have fulfilled their duty to develop the strategy and monitor 
the corporation‟s affairs, has attracted wide spread and critical political 
attention. Given the WorldCom and Enron debacles, the recent meltdown 
in the US financial sector, the dependence of workers on equity 
investments to secure their retirements, the globalisation of American law 
principles and the complexity of managing corporations with 
international operations, legal standards used to evaluate whether 
directors have complied with their duties are the subject of growing 
national US and world interest. US policymakers know and realize this. 
The reaction to WorldCom and Enron was the enactment of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, which also led to reform of SEC regulations and 
NYSE and NASDAQ Rules. The Dodd-Frank Act will also have 
substantial influence.
654
 The effect on US independent directors has been 
to prompt them to perform their duties more diligently. Directors of 
foreign companies listed on US stock exchanges have felt obliged to 
devote more time and energy into monitoring their risk management and 
their accounting systems, and following SEC requirements or 
recommendations. 
 
3.6.4 Basis of duties 
 
 Although boards usually feel obliged to abide by codes and best practice 
rules, their duties are essentially based on state statutes, common law, 
court decisions and US federal laws and regulations as well as the rules of 
any stock exchange. 
 
 The board owes fiduciary duties to the company and thereby indirectly to 
the shareholders as a class as well as to all other stakeholders. When a 
person buys shares in a company, his relationship with the company, its 
                                                     
654 Signed by President Obama on 21 July 2010. 
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board and most other interested parties is regulated by contractual 
relationships. Under the contract theory, shareholders of a corporation 
buy into a “hierarchy” of laws and other provisions that define the 
respective rights and responsibilities of the corporation, its shareholders, 
and its directors. This “hierarchy” rests on the following sources: 
(1) federal and state constitutions, (2) federal and state statutes, 
(3) common law, i.e. case law of the courts, (4) the corporation‟s 
certificate of incorporation (also known as the articles of incorporation) 
and (5) the corporation‟s bye-laws.655 
 
 Many provisions of state statutes facilitate the position of the boards by 
giving corporations the possibility of making their own particular 
arrangements for organizing the board and their liability exposure. 
Section 3.7.4 below describes the scope for insulating the directors from 
liability by means of indemnification and insurance by the company. 
Virtually all state corporate statutes recognise the rule that corporate 
powers are exercised by the board and that the business and affairs of the 
corporation are controlled by the board.
656
 In contrast, the rights and 
powers of shareholders are generally restricted. While shareholders have 
the right to elect directors, which is an important right, other rights are 
restricted. For example, shareholders have the right to “propose certain 
action to be undertaken” (only propose, not instruct) and to “approve or 
disapprove” of certain extraordinary transactions which “fundamentally 
affect the character or nature” of the corporation (e.g. mergers, 
dissolutions and amendments to the articles of incorporation or bye-
laws).
657
 
 
 Some specific stipulations in the Delaware GCL are of interest to 
directors. These are the right of corporate directors to rely in good faith 
on the corporation‟s records and information presented to them,658 the 
                                                     
655 Eisenhofer and Barry (2010), pp. 2-53. 
656 Delaware GCL § 141(a); MBCA § 8.01(b). 
657 Eisenhofer and Barry (2010), pp. 2-57. The list of consent powers for shareholdersin the US is more limited 
than the comparable article 2:107(c) DCC in the Netherlands and than the UK listing rules. In Delaware a 
board would not need shareholder consent to sell off a subsidiary worth 50% of the group‟s equity, whereas in 
the Netherlands consent would be needed to sell off a subsidiary worth one third of the balance sheet total. The 
criterion in Delaware CGL § 271 is divestment by a company of „substantially all its assets‟. 
658 Delaware GCL § 141(e) and § 172. This is interesting in connection with the case law on supervision, see 
3.7.3 below. 
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right of the company to void transactions due to a conflict of interest
659
 
and the right of shareholders to demand inspection of corporate books 
and records in certain circumstances.
660
 
 
 The articles of incorporation can be changed only by resolution of the 
board supported by the majority of shareholders.
661
 The articles of 
incorporation are usually short and may contain some limitations on the 
board‟s powers and provisions concerning the qualifications of directors 
and exclusion of the liability of directors. 
 
 Bye-laws form the operational document of the corporation. They are 
normally longer than the articles of incorporation and are typically 
described as a “contract” between the corporation and its shareholders. 
The majority of shareholders can change the bye-laws at their own 
initiative.
662
 It is of interest that the board may object to changes in the 
bye-laws, if the stipulation would impose restrictions on the ability of the 
company‟s board of directors to manage the corporation. Below are two 
examples of litigation on this subject. 
 
 – Professor Bebchuk, as a shareholder of CA Inc., wanted a change in the bye-
laws to limit the ability of the board to implement a “poison pill” which in this 
case was a shareholder rights plan. CA Inc. refused, arguing that such a 
limitation would be illegal because it restricts the board‟s exercise of its power 
to manage the affairs of the company. The court held that Professor Bebchuk‟s 
claim was not yet “ripe for decision”, but also mentioned that there was tension 
between the provisions in Delaware GCL Section 109 giving the right of 
stockholders to change the bye-laws and Section 141(a) of the Delaware GCL, 
which requires the board to direct the business of the corporation.663 
 
 – AFSCME Employees Pension Plan wanted a change in the bye-laws, once again 
of CA Inc., by including a clause requiring the corporation to reimburse 
reasonable proxy expenses incurred by a director candidate, if nominated. CA 
Inc. refused. The court ruled that, in principle, such a clause would be legal, but 
this clause was not legal, because it was completely without any nuance, i.e. it 
                                                     
659 Delaware GCL § 4. 
660 Delaware GCL. This procedure is often used to start litigation, see also Veasey (2005), p. 1498. 
661 Delaware GCL § 242(b); MBCA § 10.03. 
662 Delaware GCL § 109(a); MBCA § 10.20(a). 
663 Bebchuk v. CA Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 742 (Del. Ch 2006). 
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did not contain an exception for the costs made for purely personal interests or 
for cases of petty concerns.664 
 
 These cases are of interest because they show that the principle that the 
board should be free to manage the company is upheld to a large extent 
by common law. They also illustrate the determination of shareholder 
activists, including academics such as Professor Bebchuk. 
 
 As mentioned above, in principle management should be free to manage 
the business of the corporation as it wishes. However, there is one area 
where the board should give shareholders room and that is the right of 
shareholders to vote directors in and out in the general meetings of 
shareholders. This is made clear in the following cases: 
 
 – In Schnell v. Chris-Craft665 the board of Chris-Craft faced a proxy fight over 
issues of managerial underperformance. The board took action, within its legal 
powers, by holding the general meeting in December, at short notice, in some 
little town in upstate New York instead of in January in Manhattan, as usual. 
The aim was to dampen the turnout and leave the dissidents little time to solicit 
proxies. The Chancery Court of Delaware ruled on the basis of legal 
technicalities that the board‟s action was permissible. The Supreme Court went 
the other way and ruled, in equity, that because the aim was to frustrate the right 
of shareholders to vote the action was not permitted. 
 
 – In the Blasius case666 Chancellor Allen ruled against the Atlas board, which had 
wanted to quickly appoint two directors to prevent Blasius, which was regarded 
as a dangerous oppressor, from being in a position to appoint a majority of 
directors. The Chancellor made clear that boards should be very careful when 
acting in an election context. 
 
 – In hostile takeover cases the courts often permit defence mechanisms, if 
proportional, since they reason that the oppressor can always start a proxy 
fight.667 
                                                     
664 CA Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008). 
665 Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971) and Leo E. Strine Jr., „If Corporate Action Is Lawful, 
Presumably There Are Circumstances in Which It Is Equitable to Take That Action. The Important Corollary 
to the Rule of Schnell v Chris-Craft‟, 60 The Business Lawyer 877 (2005), p. 29 (“Strine (2005)”) in an article 
in which Leo Strine compared elements of law and equity. 
666 Blasius Industries Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) and Strine (2005), p. 38. 
667 Moran v. Household International, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) and Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund 11, L.P. v. 
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 Common law is, of course, the main basis for the duties of directors in the 
US. Delaware‟s common law process, which places case law at the 
forefront of corporate law, and has become the functional equivalent of 
judicial legislation. Delaware law on fiduciary duty is judge made. It 
offers corporations a variety of benefits, including flexibility, 
responsiveness, insulation from undue political influence and 
transparency.
668
 The US concept of common law is that of a “clear” law, 
because the background principles, which are applicable to all cases, 
provide predictability. No viable corporate governance regime can be 
founded on a “one size fits all” notion. Fiduciary law is based on 
equitable principles.
669
 
 
 Below is a quote of former Chief Justice Norman Veasey of the Delaware 
Supreme Court on the duties of independent directors.
670
 
 “As I see it, there are seven normal expectations that a stockholder 
should have of a board of directors. Although others may apply in some 
situations, the stockholders expect at least that (i) the stockholders will 
have a right to cast a meaningful vote for the members of the board of 
directors and have a right to vote on fundamental structural changes, 
such as mergers; (ii) the board of directors will actually direct and 
monitor the management of the company, including strategic business 
plans and fundamental structural changes; (iii) the board will see to the 
hiring of competent and honest business managers; (iv) the board will 
understand the business of the firm and develop and monitor a business 
plan and the operations of the company; (v) when making a business 
decision, the board will develop a reasonable understanding of the 
transaction and act in good faith, on an informed basis, and with a 
rational business purpose; (vi) the board will carry out its basic fiduciary 
duties with honesty, care, good faith, and loyalty; and (vii) the board will 
take good faith steps to make sure the company complies with the law.” 
 
                                                                                                                                    
Riggio, C.A. No. 5465 – VCS (Del. Ch. 11 August 2010). 
668 Prof. Jill Fisch, „The Peculiar Role of Delaware Courts in Competition for Corporate Charters‟, 68 University 
of Cincinnati Law Review 1061, 1074-5 (2000).   Although the Delaware statute provides general guidelines 
about corporate formalities such as the scheduling of annual meetings and the required components of a 
corporate charter, the statute does not deal with the fiduciary principles that provide the foundation of 
corporate law and allow, under appropriate circumstances, judicial scrutiny of corporation decision making … 
669 Veasey (2005). 
670 Veasey (2005), pp. 1414-1415. 
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 Stockholders also have expectations of the courts that are overseeing the 
stockholders‟ expectations of the board. Stockholders look to courts to 
enforce fiduciary duties in highly textured fact situations by applying the 
general principles that underlie the relationship between the investors 
and the board of directors. As I see it, the courts have at least seven key 
obligations. They are (i) be clear, (ii) be prompt; (iii) be balanced; (iv) 
have a coherent rationale; (v) render decisions that are stable in the 
overall continuum; (vi) be intellectually honest; and (vii) properly limit 
the function of the court. 
 
 As we have seen, independent directors are obliged to fulfil their duties to 
(i) let shareholders vote on board appointments and mergers, (ii) direct 
and monitor, including active directing and monitoring of strategy, (iii) 
arrange for succession, (iv) understand the business and develop and 
monitor strategy (dual function), (v) when deciding, understand the 
details and act in good faith, on an informed basis, with a rational 
business purpose, (vi) carry out fiduciary duties with honesty, care, 
good faith and loyalty and (vii) make sure the company complies with 
the law (which, of course, includes all federal laws such as the Securities 
Law and the Anti-Trust and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). 
 
3.6.5 To whom do directors owe duties? 
 
 Directors are the nexus of the company. Their first duties are to the 
corporation, i.e. the corporate enterprise. In their capacity as directors of 
the corporation they have duties in their contractual relationships with 
employees, customers, society, creditors and shareholders. Their main 
fiduciary duties are to serve the long-term interest of shareholders, 
because shareholders have the least chance of having a good contract 
with the board.
671
 In the event of insolvency or looming (called “near”) 
insolvency their main duty shifts to the creditors. And in the event of a 
takeover of the corporation, they generally have even stronger enhanced 
duties to the corporate enterprise. In special cases, when the company is 
clearly put up for sale and there will be a change of control, they have 
short-term duties to the shareholders.  
 
                                                     
671 Bainbridge (2008), p. 37, Assink in Assink and Strik (2009), p. 81; Veasey (2005), p. 1422. North American 
Catholic Educational Programming Foundation Inc v. Gherwalla (Del. 2007). 
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3.6.6 Pressures on boards 
 
 It is typical for Americans to be active, free entrepreneurs. The US 
believes in the primacy of the board and lets board members get on with 
management, hence the business judgment rule. At the same time these 
boards work under pressure caused (a) by competition from peers, (b) by 
litigation in the form of corporate litigation in state courts and federal 
securities litigation (Sections 11 of the Securities Act and 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act) and often by class actions led by an active 
plaintiffs‟ bar, (c) by the SEC and state securities litigation, civil and 
criminal and (d) by shareholder activists who fight hard and are rapidly 
getting more rights, especially in the areas of proxy access for elections 
and say-on-pay and (e) the media. 
 
3.6.7 Summary of Duties 
 
There are many initiatives in the US to introduce best practice codes. 
These are mostly of a private nature, rather than government initiated. 
They set standards of conduct. Court cases, such as Disney, make clear 
that these aspirational standards exist, but they also make clear that 
falling short of standards of conduct is not automatically deemed to be a 
breach of the standards of review held by the courts and leading to 
director‟s liability. 
 
3.7 Liability of independent directors 
 
3.7.1 Who can sue? 
 
3.7.1.1 The company in a shareholder derivative lawsuit 
Directors have fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the corporation. If 
they fail to perform these duties, they are potentially causing direct harm 
to the corporate entity and indirect harm to others, including 
shareholders, creditors and employees. Only the corporation itself has the 
power to enforce and seek remedy for violations by directors. In 
recognition of this issue, corporate law allows shareholders to bring a suit 
on the corporation‟s behalf in a derivative lawsuit. This is described in 
more detail in sub-section 3.7.2.1 below. 
 
3.7.1.2 Creditor‟s rights 
 The rationale of the fiduciary duty owed by directors to shareholders is 
that corporate law and its case law provide the only protection for 
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shareholders of a company whereas other parties have contractual 
protection. However, when a firm is near insolvency, it is generally 
established that directors should extend the circle of beneficiaries of their 
duties to include creditors. 
 
3.7.1.3 Shareholders directly against directors 
 Sometimes shareholders have a direct claim against directors, such as in 
the Smith v. Van Gorkom case,
672
 where the CEO/chairman (“imperial 
CEO”) had sold off the shares of the company at what shareholders later 
argued was an unduly low price. This decision had been rubber-stamped 
by the board in a two-hour meeting based on a 20-minute oral 
presentation by the CEO without producing copies of any agreements or 
documents. The board gave its approval without any investigation, 
thereby causing damage to shareholders, as the court decided. 
 
 Most lawsuits brought by shareholders against the company (issuer) and 
directors and advisors are securities cases under Section 11 of the 
Securities Act 1933 and also under Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 for misleading statements. This is described in 
more detail in 3.7.3.5.  
 
3.7.1.4 Regulatory action 
 Through federal or state prosecutors the government can bring criminal 
or civil actions against directors under federal and state “blue sky” 
securities laws.
673
 The SEC can bring civil actions for securities laws 
violations. The US Department of Justice is the regulatory entity that 
enforces federal criminal law by prosecuting criminal conduct. For 
example, the Department of Justice successfully brought charges against 
Bernie Ebbers, former chairman and CEO of WorldCom, resulting in a 
25-year prison sentence. Directors can also be held liable under many 
other laws, e.g. environmental or foreign corrupt practice regulations. 
 
3.7.1.5 ERISA 
ERISA claims are new claims instituted since the introduction of the 
Employee Risk Investment in Securities Act (ERISA) of 2000. They are 
                                                     
672 Smith v. Van Gorkom, Delaware Supreme Court 14 March 1985, 488 A.2d 888 (1985). 
673 All the states have their own Securities Laws, which are called “blue sky” laws. The name “blue sky” comes 
from the proverbial positive promising “only good weather” information provided by the issuers of securities. 
Young associates in law firms do “blue sky serveys” for issuing clients and check all the state laws. 
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claims brought on behalf of employees concerning their stock ownership 
plans (ESOPs). 
 
3.7.2 Procedural complications 
 
3.7.2.1 Derivative lawsuits 
 If shareholders wish to hold directors liable for violations of duties to the 
corporation, they can take the following action to have the corporation 
sue the director or obtain leave to sue the directors themselves. Plaintiffs 
must either address a demand to the company‟s board for the company to 
pursue the suit against its own directors or persuade the court that making 
such a demand would be futile. To succeed in showing futility, the 
plaintiff must allege specific facts that “create a reason to doubt that (1) 
the directors are disinterested or independent or (2) the challenged 
transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business 
judgment”.674 These defaults refer to the board as a whole, which means 
that a majority of the board or the relevant committee must have been 
compromised in one of these respects or must have been dominated by a 
powerful director who has raised doubt about his loyal independence or 
his good faith care. 
 
 Even if the plaintiff succeeds at the demand stage, the company may, at 
any point in the course of the case, establish a special litigation 
committee comprised of independent directors to consider whether the 
company should move to dismiss the case. Grounds for moving to 
dismiss include a determination by the committee that the case is not 
meritorious or, even if it is meritorious, that “ethical, commercial, 
promotional, public relations, employee relations, fiscal as well as 
legal”675 factors support dismissal. There is no guarantee that a special 
litigation committee will conclude that the case should be dismissed, 
especially if there has been a change in the board composition as often 
occurs in the wake of serious fraud. If, however, a special litigation 
committee does recommend dismissal, a court will subject the 
committee‟s determination to a moderate level of scrutiny provided it 
finds that the committee was independent and that it followed a careful 
deliberative process in reaching its resolution.
676
 If the court finds that 
                                                     
674 Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 825 A.2d 275, 285 (Del. Ch. 2003) (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 
814). 
675 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981). 
676 Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins and Michael Klausner, „Outside Director Liability‟, 58 Stanford Law 
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this was not the case, scrutiny will be more severe again, no second 
guessing. 
 
3.7.2.2 Creditors suits in bankruptcy 
 The potential for a suit to be brought by bankruptcy trustees or creditors‟ 
committees if the company is insolvent makes litigation based on an 
allegation of a breach of duty by directors technically more difficult for 
the defendants. These are suits based on a breach of fiduciary duty to the 
corporation and are brought in the name of the corporation.
 
The recovery, 
if any, goes to the corporate estate for the ultimate benefit of creditors. 
The Delaware Courts have ruled that, in these cases, outside directors 
have the protection of exculpatory charter provisions, authorised by 
Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware GCL, and of the business judgment 
rule, just as they do in shareholder derivative suits.
 
Consequently 
fiduciary duty suits initiated by creditors on behalf of the bankrupt estate 
do not differ greatly from derivative suits brought by shareholders. 
Outside directors sued on the basis of a breach of loyalty face the risk of 
having to pay out of their own pockets, but those being sued for a failure 
to exercise sufficient oversight face hardly any danger. 
 
 In the procedure, outside directors have less protection in creditors‟ cases 
than they do in suits brought by shareholders. There is no demand 
requirement of and no possibility to ask for the institution of a special 
litigation committee in creditor suits. If the merits of a case against 
outside directors are strong, creditor-initiated fiduciary duty cases pose a 
greater threat of at least nominal liability than do shareholder derivative 
suits where the company is solvent. Nevertheless, only in one case, 
Credit Lyonnais v. Pathé of 1991, did an outside director have to make an 
out-of-pocket payment in such a litigation.
677
 Bankruptcy cases are 
usually dealt with in Federal Courts. In Gheewalla the creditor did not 
                                                                                                                                    
Review 1055 (2006), p. 1092 (“Black, Cheffins and Klausner (2006/A)”). In the Oracle case described above, 
the court held that the committee was not independent because of all the Stanford connections where the CEO 
donated $100 million to Stanford and four of the directors were Stanford professors. 
677 Black, Cheffins and Klausner (2006/A), p. 1092. See also Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathé 
Communications, Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991) No. (1991) 12150, Del. Ch. Lexis 215, in which 
Paretti voted in bad faith with respect to a corporate government agreement with Credit Lyonnais by forcing 
Credit Lyonnais‟ representative out of the board and Paretti was held liable. The Chancellor said in his 
opinion: “I do not lightly conclude that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was violated here, but the 
entire course of conduct forces me to this conclusion”. See also Veasey (2005), pp. 1429-1430. 
  
 254 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
win against the directors.
678
 Both the Court of Chancery and the Supreme 
Court of Delaware ruled that if a company was in the zone of insolvency 
the directors owe fiduciary duties to the company and shareholders. 
Creditors do not have a derivative action in the period before insolvency. 
The facts must be very special. 
 
 Most cases against directors in insolvency cases are started by receivers 
in the federal bankruptcy courts, but these cases are rare. 
 
3.7.2.3 Direct shareholder damage and securities class action lawsuits 
 Sometimes shareholders do not have to go the route of the derivative suit 
and can bring a direct claim for damages against directors, as in Smith v. 
Van Gorkom, where the board gave a rubber stamp agreement without 
any investigation leading to a loss for the shareholders. 
 
 The largest volume of shareholder claims involve securities cases. A 
typical securities class action seeks damages on the grounds that the 
company has misled investors. The defendants typically include the 
company itself, the CEO and the CFO. Outside directors are named in 
50% of the cases based on Section 11 Securities Act 1933 and in 15% of 
the Section 10(b) Securities Trading Act 1934 cases. Other defendants 
may include the company‟s auditor and investment banker. In all these 
cases the court appoints a lead plaintiff, as in all class actions, and 
directors can file a motion to dismiss the case, for lack of prima facie 
facts presented by the plaintiff to suggest liability. Of all actions it is the 
Section 11 action that is most feared by outside directors, because the 
standard of conduct there is negligence, and the outside directors have the 
burden of proving an absence of negligence. 
 
3.7.2.4 SEC enforcement 
 The SEC can take action to involve the US Justice Department, which 
can initiate criminal proceedings against directors and seek prison 
sentences. The SEC can also start civil proceedings against a director to 
relieve him of any gains or to levy a civil fine. 
 
 State prosecutors can also take action based on state securities laws. The 
New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, did so successfully in the 
post-Enron era.
679
 
                                                     
678 North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007). 
679 Monks and Minow (2008), pp. 32, 577 and 607. 
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3.7.2.5 ERISA 
 A fairly new source of liability risk for outside directors (since 2000) is 
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). ERISA class 
action suits resemble securities class actions, but are brought on behalf of 
employees whose retirement plans include company shares. These plans 
can be either employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), whose principal 
purpose is to invest in company shares, or self-directed defined 
contribution 401(k) plans, for which an investment in company shares is 
an option. If the shares were purchased while the company‟s market price 
was inflated by improper disclosures, the employees can attempt to show 
that the outside directors were ERISA fiduciaries, that they failed to 
adequately supervise the plan, and that they should therefore be liable for 
employee losses when shares later decline in value. Outside directors 
have a realistic opportunity to succeed in a motion to dismiss if plaintiffs 
cannot show that the outside directors were ERISA fiduciaries and/or 
cannot make a prima facie showing negligence by the outside directors.
680
 
 
3.7.3 Liability standards of directors in various proceedings 
 
3.7.3.1 Fiduciary duty violations under corporate law, business judgment rule, 
duty of loyalty, duty of care 
 
The source of the law on corporate fiduciary duty is the case law of the 
courts. Clear law on this subject has been developed by the Delaware 
Chancery Courts and the Delaware Supreme Court as most listed 
corporations are registered in Delaware and the Delaware judges, chosen 
on merit from experienced corporate lawyers. They write lucid opinions 
which are instructive for corporate lawyers and hence also for the whole 
US corporate world. Moreover, they take their decisions quickly. Director 
liability cases, usually derivative cases, start with a motion to dismiss. 
These motion cases are dealt with quickly in days, weeks or a few 
months. These decisions are important for the negotiations between 
parties. When the case does go to trial, i.e. the motion to dismiss failed, 
the procedure will take longer. The injunction cases, such as all the 
takeover cases, are dealt with in days or weeks, therefore very quickly. 
 
                                                     
680 Black, Cheffins and Klausner (2006/A), pp. 1355-1357. 
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 Business judgment rule 
 The basis of Delaware and US corporate law is the business judgment 
rule, which protects directors in that the courts may not second-guess 
board decisions provided they are taken with (a) loyalty and (b) care. 
These two elements are therefore the only areas which the judge may 
review. Judges should not (even marginally) question the wisdom of the 
decision itself. This means that a plaintiff can win a case only if he proves 
(a) disloyalty or (b) insufficient care or (c) good faith in exercising 
loyalty and care. 
 
  The Court of Chancery of Delaware in Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. 
Benihana, Inc. of 2007 gives a clear reference: “In Re RJR 
Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, the Court stated: The 
business judgment form of judicial review encompasses three 
elements: [1] a threshold review of the objective financial 
interests of the board whose decision is under attack (i.e. 
independence), [2] a review of the board‟s subjective motivation 
(i.e. good faith), and [3] an objective review of the process by 
which it reached the decisions under review (i.e. due care). In 
this case, I have followed those steps and I have concluded that a 
majority of the disinterested and independent directors approved 
the (…) transaction. Then, I found that the directors acted with a 
good faith belief that equity financing represented the best 
method to finance Benihana‟s (…) Plan and that the directors 
believed equity financing best served the interests of the 
Company. Finally after reviewing the process through which the 
directors approved the Transaction I have found that the 
directors reached their decision with due care. Consequently, the 
Board validly exercised their business judgment in approving the 
(…) transaction. This court will not disturb that decision.” 681 
 
 The old cases that are often cited as business judgment cases are:  
 
 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (1919) 
682
 
 Ford Motor Company listed in 1903 thrived so extraordinarily well that the retained 
earnings or surplus above stock in 1916 was $111,960,907.53. Henry Ford announced 
                                                     
681 Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana Inc. (Del. Ch. 2000). See also B.F. Assink, Rechterlijke toetsing van 
bestuurlijk gedrag – Binnen het vennootschapsrecht van Nederland en Delaware (2007), p. 245 (“Assink 
(2007)”).  
682 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (Michigan Supreme Court 7/2/1919, 284 Mich. 458 (1919)). 
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plans for raising salaries, lowering the price of cars by $80, building new assembly plants, 
iron mines and smelteries as well as ships to transport the iron. He also announced – 
rather haughtily – that no further special dividends would be paid. Shareholders had 
already collected much more than their investment. The Dodge brothers, who were 
minority shareholders, asked the Court of Michigan for a restraining order in respect of all 
the investment plans and an order for the company to pay out all surplus above stock as 
dividend, i.e. about $50,000,000. The Court issued a restraining order for the iron 
producing and transport investments and ordered a payment of $19,275,385.96 in 
dividends, which was 50% of the surplus cash. Henry Ford and the company appealed. 
The plaintiffs, the Dodge brothers, contended that Ford was motivated by considerations 
of improper altruism towards workers and customers. The Supreme Court of Michigan 
agreed and strongly rebuked Ford, holding that “A business corporation is organised and 
carried on primarily for the profit of stockholders”. The discretion of directors is to be 
exercised to that end, and does not extend to a change in that end itself, to the reduction of 
profits or to the non-distribution of profits among shareholders in order to devote them to 
other purposes. This is the fiduciary duty to shareholders rule. 
 
 On the other hand, the Michigan Supreme Court went on famously to invoke the business 
judgment rule in refusing to enjoin Henri Ford‟s plans to expand production. As 
justification for its decision, it modestly observed that “The judges are not business 
experts”. The Supreme Court of Michigan confirmed the order to pay dividends, but 
assuming that the expansion plans were in the interests of the company, reversed the 
restraining order for the expansion into iron production and transport.  
 
 And Shlensky v. Wrigley (1968)
683
 
 Shlensky was minority shareholder in the Chicago National League Ball Club (Inc.), 
which owned Chicago Cubs and Wrigley Field. Wrigley was majority shareholder and 
president. In 1961-1965 the Cubs consistently lost money. Shlensky brought a derivative 
suit and contended losses were due to low home attendance and that this was attributable 
to the refusal of Wrigley and other directors to permit the installation of lights and night 
baseball, because Wrigley believed (1) baseball was a daytime sport and (2) night baseball 
might have a negative impact on the neighbourhood. The court dismissed the case, 
because the board could have business reasons for its decision, for example that “the 
effect on the surrounding neighbourhood might well be considered by a director” and “the 
long-term interest […] might demand […] consideration […] of the neighbourhood […]. 
We do not mean that we have decided the decision was the right one. We are merely 
saying that the decision showed no fraud, illegality or conflict of interest […] Directors 
are elected for their business capabilities and judgment […] Courts cannot decide these 
questions in the absence of a clear showing of dereliction of any duty.” The Illinois Court 
                                                     
683 Shlensky v. Wrigley, Illinois Appellate Court 25/4/1968, 95 Ill.App.2d 173 (1968). 
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dismissed the case and did not even allow Shlensky to get up to bat! The Shlensky v. 
Wrigley case gives directors broad discretion in making business decisions and in 
considering interests other than those of shareholders.684 
 
 The board must develop and execute the strategy of the corporation in the 
following manner: 
 1. it must not favour any interest which is alien to the corporation, 
but must only act in the interests of the corporation (duty of 
loyalty); 
 2. it must be diligent and well-informed and act prudently and 
precisely (duty of care); 
 3. and it must act subjectively in good faith (duty of good faith, 
which is part of the duty of loyalty). 
 
 Below I discuss the duties of (a) loyalty and (b) care and also good faith, 
which can be classified under the category of loyalty. To have a chance 
of winning a case a plaintiff must prove (a) disloyalty or (b) insufficient 
care. 
 
 (a) The duty of loyalty 
 
  The duty of loyalty is necessary because of the separation of 
management from ownership. The duty of loyalty has two 
elements, the negative element (no violation of trust of 
shareholders) and the positive element (subjective bona fides). 
 
  The fact that bona fides – good faith – falls under the duty of 
loyalty follows from cases such as Stone v. Ritter.
685
 
 
  Good faith 
  While loyalty and care are taught as the two duties that judges 
always check in fiduciary cases, the terms “good faith” and “bad 
faith” appear very often, most recently in 2009, in the Citigroup 
case.
686
 
                                                     
684 For those interested in sports and society, the following may be of interest. Later, after the team was sold to 
the Tribune Company, efforts to install lights were opposed by fans. Finally, Major League Baseball forced the 
club to install lights 20 years later. 
685 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
686 Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
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   “Delaware law does not permit that kind of “judicial 
second-guessing of director” business decisions – even 
decisions that turn out to have catastrophic results – as 
long as those decisions were not made in bad faith.” 
  The criterion of good faith also appears in the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, 
  – § 141(e): “directors are protected … in relying in good 
faith upon records … and information …” 
  – § 145(a) and (b): directors can be indemnified “if such 
person acted in good faith and in a manner such person 
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best 
interests of the corporation” 
– § 102(b)(7): to protect directors from personal liability 
for gross negligence,
687
 but not “(i) for any breach of the 
director‟s duty of loyalty …. (ii) for acts or omissions not 
in good faith ….. (iii) under § 174 (wilful incorrect 
dividends, explanation author), (iv) ….. improper 
personal benefit”. 
–  
  In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (1993),
688
 the Delaware 
Supreme Court announced for the first time that directors owe a 
“triad” of fiduciary duties, including not only the traditional 
duties of loyalty and care, but a third duty of good faith. 
 
  The term good faith appears in many Delaware decisions, before 
and after Technicolor. There have been many articles in law 
reviews about the question of the applicability of 
Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware GCL, i.e. non-liability of 
directors for gross negligence if they have acted in good faith, as 
mentioned above. 
 
  Former Chief Justice Veasey does not really mind whether it is a 
separate fiduciary duty. In discussing whether a director with 
extra knowledge has a heightened liability, he takes the view that 
this is not always necessarily so, though if the director has any 
particular knowledge he should inform his fellow directors. 
Accordingly, Veasey does consider that “good faith” can be one 
                                                     
687 This section was included in 1986 after the alarming Smith v. Van Gorkom case. 
688 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).  
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of the elements when judging a director‟s loyalty.689 In Stone v. 
Ritter (in 2006 after the retirement of Chief Justice Veasey), the 
Delaware Supreme Court made absolutely clear that “good faith” 
is important, but falls under the duty of loyalty.
690
 
 
  As for the definition of good faith it is clear that it draws much of 
its content from the directors‟ subjective state of mind. A sincere 
belief that one is acting in the best interests of the company is not 
enough. In addition, there must be some objective basis. Veasey 
says: “Directors must not act irrationally, irresponsibly, 
disingenuously, or so unreasonably that no reasonable director 
would accept the decision or conduct”.691 
 
  This brings us back to the duty of loyalty. Each director has the 
duty to be disinterested (no interest other than the corporation and 
shareholders) and independent. Disinterestedness means a 
director may not stand on both sides of a transaction, may not 
engage in self-dealing, may not be entrenched, may not have 
material advantage and, if he notices a corporate opportunity or a 
problem, must inform the whole board (positive requirement). 
 
  In cases of self-dealing or whenever the directors have an 
interest, the business judgment rule is not applicable to them. 
Instead, unless the transaction is approved by a disinterested 
majority of directors or shareholders, the burden of proof is on 
the directors to show that the transaction was intrinsically fair to 
the corporation. 
 
  In Aronson v. Lewis of 1984
692
 a 4.7% stockholder, who was also 
CEO, secured for himself a lucrative employment contract by 
obtaining the approval of the other directors who, the plaintiff 
alleged, were under the control of the CEO stockholder. A 
special form of self-dealing occurs where a director exploits a 
corporate opportunity for himself and does not inform the full 
board. Independence means a director makes decisions 
                                                     
689 Veasey (2005), pp. 1444-1445. 
690 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hammermesh, R. Franklin Balotti, Jeffrey M. Gorris, „Loyalty‟s Core 
Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law‟, 98 Georgetown Law Journal (2009), pp 1-90. 
691 Veasey (2005), p. 1453. 
692 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
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independently under no pressure from third parties, e.g. the CEO 
or a major shareholder. “Directors must be able to debate and 
confer and not simply follow a dominant director”. The directors 
were liable, because they had been entrenched by the CEO. 
 
  Oversight and supervision cases since Stone v. Ritter of 2006
693
 
fall under the category of loyalty. It is a duty of loyalty to have 
“due corporate information and reporting systems”. Indeed the 
judicial standard for liability is loyalty, while the behavioural 
duty is care. But some experts classify oversight under care.
694
 
 
  Supervision and oversight 
  According to Section 141(a) of the Delaware GCL, the business 
and affairs of the corporation will be managed by and under the 
direction of the board of directors. 
 
  Cahall v. Lofland of 1921 and Bater v. Dresser of 1920695 made a distinction 
between administration, supervision, direction and control which the courts 
assigned to directors and details of business being delegated to officers, which 
the courts classified under “management”. The concept of different roles was 
codified in the Delaware General Corporation Law in the phrase “and under the 
direction of” in Section 141(a). This also means that a director may have 
another onus of duty, than an officer, depending on the role he played. So 
exculpation is possible in certain circumstances. 
 
  The legal standard for liability applicable to a director‟s 
supervisory authority, was explained in Graham in 1963.
696
 
“Directors are entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their 
subordinates until something occurs to put them on suspicion that 
something is wrong” … “or unless he has recklessly reposed 
confidence in an obviously untrustworthy employee”. These 
issues were addressed again in 1996 in Caremark
697
 a case also 
involving violations of federal law by employees. The Delaware 
Court of chancery ruled: “It is important that the board exercise a 
good faith judgment that the corporation‟s information and 
                                                     
693 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
694 Assink (2007), p. 186. 
695 Cahall v. Lofland, 114 A. 224, 229 (Del. Ch. 1921) and Bater v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920). 
696 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
697 Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
  
 262 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
reporting system is, in concept and design, adequate to assure the 
board that appropriate information will come to its attention in a 
timely manner as a matter of ordinary operations.” “Duty to 
attempt in good faith to assume that a corporate information and 
reporting system … exists.” In the Caremark case there was also 
the test of subjective good faith as again in Gagliardi v. Trifoods 
International (Del. Ch. 1996).
698
 
 
  The Supreme Court of Delaware approved the court‟s decision in 
Caremark in 2006, in the case of Stone v. Ritter,
699
 holding 
director oversight liability in circumstances where “(a) the 
directors utterly failed to implement any reporting system or 
controls or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, 
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations, thus 
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems 
requiring their attention. If the board fails to act in the face of 
obvious warnings, then the board‟s behaviour could suggest a 
reckless or intentional disregard of the duty of care. Such 
allegations could be sufficient to rebut the presumption of the 
business judgment rule.” 
 
  So, in short, directors are not disloyal if there is an adequate 
system of controls and no red flags have been raised. 
 
  Legal standards 
  A basic principle is that directors owe fiduciary duties to their 
corporation and its shareholders to act in the best interests of the 
corporation and to show the loyalty and care in the management 
of the corporation‟s business that ordinarily careful and prudent 
men would use in handling their own affairs.
700
 The new cases of 
2009 are Citigroup
701
 (motion to dismiss the case accepted 
because the directors, who had ensured that control systems were 
in place, should not be liable for failing to recognise the extent of 
a company‟s business risk) and AIG702 (motion to dismiss refused 
                                                     
698 Assink (2007), pp. 200-201. 
699 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
700 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963), and Smith v. Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 
1985). 
701 Citigroup (964 A.2d 106 Del. Ch.) 24/9/2009. See for this case also 3.5.4 above. 
702 AIG (965 A.2d (Del. Ch. Vice-Chancellor Strine 10/2/2009)). See for this case also 3.5.4 above. 
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because a core group of directors had kept to themselves 
decisions about information systems that would put them on 
notice of fraudulent and criminal conduct and had not involved 
the other directors). These oversight cases are of great interest in 
these times of worry and concern about monitoring and risk 
management. Delaware makes a distinction between failing to 
recognise business risks while having reasonable information 
systems which do not lead to directors‟ liability and 
constructively failing to have systems to check fraudulent and 
criminal conduct, for which directors are liable. 
 
 (b) The duty of care 
 
  The duty of care makes its appearance when it comes to decision 
making by the board. In Aronson v. Lewis of 1984
703
 the directors 
rubber-stamped the decision of the CEO/shareholder, who 
awarded himself a lucrative contract. The directors were liable 
because they had been “entrenched” by the CEO and had not 
taken proper care when they made the decision. 
 
  Under the business judgment rule the courts accord directors a 
broad discretion in business decisions. Thus, in general, the 
courts will not second guess business decisions made in good 
faith by an independent and fully informed board. The test for 
whether a board is fully informed – and therefore has met its duty 
of care – is one of gross negligence (see Smith v. Gorkom,704 
where the directors did nothing to inform themselves). The test of 
care is not whether the content of the board decision leads to a 
loss, but more the consideration of good faith or rationality of the 
process of decision making (Caremark
705
). However, when 
directors fail to exercise any business judgment this may possibly 
be a failure to act in good faith (Disney,
706
 where directors did 
exercise some business judgment). 
 
  Section 141(e) of the Delaware GCL repeats that directors are 
protected if they rely in good faith on the records of the 
                                                     
703 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
704 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
705 Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
706 Walt Disney Co. Motion 1, 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
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corporation.
707
 Decisions with respect to how much information 
to obtain and from what sources are themselves business 
decisions: Cede & Co. v. Technicolor of 1993, in which case the 
Delaware Supreme Court found that the directors had not taken 
enough time to obtain sufficient information.
708
  
 
  The business judgment rule was given a different perspective in 
Cinerama v. Technicolor.
709
 The court found that the directors 
had not fully informed themselves in approving the merger 
transaction but despite the board‟s lack of full information, the 
merger was entirely fair. The Supreme Court upheld the 
Chancery Court‟s finding. The “entirely fair” solution is a 
different manner of not holding directors liable even if there was 
insufficient care.Besides, a corporation can in its articles of 
incorporation eliminate the liability of directors for the duty of 
care pursuant to Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware GCL. This 
would not have protected directors from monetary liability in 
cases like Smith v. Van Gorkom of 1985,
710
 where they had been 
very sloppy. In fact, they did nothing at all to collect information, 
and were therefore liable. The elimination of liability only 
applies if there was no duty-of-disloyalty. 
 
  In Aronson of 1984
711
 the board did collect information before 
taking a decision. The court applied the business judgment rule 
and declined to say that the decision taken was wrong. Self-
imposed time limits could be an infringement on the duty of care 
if that means that the board could not collect sufficient 
information. 
 
                                                     
707 § 141(e) Delaware GCL says: “A member of the board of directors, or a member of any committee 
designated by the board of directors, shall, in performance of such member‟s duties, be fully protected in 
relying in good Faith upon the records of the corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports or 
statements present6ed to the corporation by any of the corporation‟s officers or employees, or committees of 
the board of directors, or by any other person as to matters the member reasonably believes are within such 
other person‟s professional or expert competence and who has been slected with reasonable care by or on 
behalf of the corporation.” 
708 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993). 
709 Cinerama Inc. v. Technicolor Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995). 
710 See note 672. 
711 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
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  Disney was a case about the collection of information necessary 
to take a decision. The conclusion is that the board should not be 
sloppy in collecting information.  
 
3.7.3.2 Enhanced business judgment rule, hostile tender offers, merger cases and 
deal protection measures 
 
 While the business judgment rule applies to most decisions, acts and 
omissions, i.e. the court will not second-guess management if it is not in 
breach of its duties of loyalty or care, there is a slight difference in the 
event of hostile takeover and merger cases. 
 
 Whereas in the UK the board remains passive in hostile takeovers and 
may not make use of legal defence mechanisms,
712
 in the US the board 
may or indeed should be active in hostile takeovers and may make use of 
defence mechanisms. In this respect, Dutch law is closer to US law than 
to UK law.
713
 
 
 Actions of directors in reacting to offers or other threats to control are 
subject to the “enhanced business judgment rule”, “modified business 
judgment rule” or “proportionality test” developed by the Delaware 
Supreme Court, also known as the “Unocal standard”.714 
 
 Some defended hostile tender offers as beneficial to the “market of 
corporate control”. This view is based on the hypothesis that the market is 
efficient and values all listed corporations correctly. If a company is 
undervalued, this means that its management is not good enough and 
should be replaced. Minority shareholders do not take the time and 
trouble to replace directors. Bidders who assume control by a public offer 
and/or a proxy fight usually force a change of management. Therefore 
management that is not protected by defence mechanisms will be more 
intent on not being lax in their management and on producing shareholder 
value. Easterbrook and Fischel were proponents of this theory.
715
 One of 
                                                     
712 In the UK the debate is now just started due to the Cadbury and Craft merger with a consultation paper of 1 
June 2010 of the Takeover Panel raising thresholds for public officers. 
713 M.J. van Ginneken, Vijandige Overnames: De Rol van de Vennootschapsleiding in Nederland en de 
Verenigde Staten, thesis (2010) (“Van Ginneken (2010)”). 
714 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). This and the following cases are discussed 
in detail in this sub-section. 
715 F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, „Proper Role of Target‟s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer‟, 
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their arguments was that public offers are good for shareholders because 
on top of the true value of their shares they often receive a premium.
716
 
 
 Opponents of hostile public offers argued that they were harmful to 
shareholders because the future value of the target would be higher than 
the bidder‟s offer and thus potential future shareholder gains accrue to the 
bidder. Some of the tender offer tactics such as “front-loaded two-tier 
tender offers”, where a bidder willing to pay, say $25 a share, offers $30 
in cash for the first 51% and $20 in shares for the rest, exerted undue 
force on shareholders. Moreover, public offers might be harmful to others 
with an interest in the corporation, such as employees, creditors and the 
community at large. Opponents maintain that hostile takeovers hurt the 
economy as a whole by merely reshuffling assets at substantial expense. 
There was concern that, in reality, takeovers were aimed not at inefficient 
companies but at well-run corporations. Hostile offers tended to put the 
emphasis on short-term profit-making. Furthermore, the use of debt to 
finance offers created problems. Some also attacked the “efficient market 
hypothesis”. Martin Lipton was and is a strong proponent of the anti-
hostile takeover view.
717
 
 
 In the end, it was generally conceded that target shareholders did benefit 
by receiving premiums. In many cases the bidders‟ shares did not 
appreciate as many of the acquisitions did not create better enterprises. 
Unsurprisingly, one plus one often turned out to be just two and not more, 
but often less. 
 
 In the 1980s those who were the targets of takeover battles developed 
ever more ingenious tactics to facilitate or frustrate bidders. Battles were 
fought in boardrooms, shareholders meetings and, increasingly, in the 
courts. 
 
 A bidder has two main ways of obtaining control: a hostile tender to 
acquire the majority of shares and thereby of the votes to replace the 
board, and a proxy fight, to obtain not the majority of shares, but only the 
votes to replace the board. Sometimes a combination of these two 
methods is used. When a tender offer is opposed by defence mechanisms, 
a proxy fight could result in the majority voting down the defence 
                                                                                                                                    
94 Harvard Law Review 1161, 1173-74 (1981). 
716 Van Ginneken (2010), describes all the US arguments pro and con on p. 361. 
717 Martin Lipton, „Takeover Bids in the Boardroom‟, The Business Lawyer 101 (1979) (“Lipton (1979)”). 
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mechanism. Proxy fights are expensive and there are many regulations, 
complicating the matter. The outcome is fairly uncertain because of 
shareholder laxity. Offers to acquire a majority of the voting shares are a 
surer way of obtaining control. There are many sharp tactics such as the 
front-end, two-tier tender offer. Some regard this as a form of coercion. 
Bidders‟ use of debt to finance a purchase has given rise to problems 
when they, upon success, repay the debt by selling assets of the target 
company. A “bust-up” takeover of this kind can adversely affect both the 
target by destroying know-how and goodwill, and its employees. 
 
 Defence tactics available to target companies include amending the 
articles of association and bye-laws, either to frustrate the vote to have 
the board replaced or to frustrate or block the tender offer. Examples of 
how to frustrate the vote include staggering the three-year terms of office 
of directors so that only one third of the directors are elected each year, 
having a super majority requirement for any changes to the articles, or, 
more extremely, having two classes of shares, one of which holds the 
significant voting power and is in the hands of the board. 
 
 To frustrate a public offer, the target board can also make use of 
restructuring tactics such as the “crown jewel defence” (selling off 
significant assets or granting an option to sell them), splitting the 
corporation, or purchasing its own shares. Alternatively, it may try to 
attract a “white knight”, ready to come to the target‟s rescue, or a “white 
squire”, i.e. a shareholder willing to sign a “standstill” agreement, i.e. an 
agreement not to buy or sell shares in that company for a specific period. 
Sometimes employees have options to buy shares and act as white 
squires. 
 
 The most potent defensive tactic is the “shareholder rights plan” or 
“poison pill”, because of its ability to thwart an unfriendly takeover and 
give control to the target directors. The plan is generally triggered by a 
predetermined event, usually the announcement or threat of a tender 
offer. Thereupon, the target issues certain “rights” to its shareholders, i.e. 
options to obtain securities at a substantial discount. The relevant 
securities that can be obtained by existing shareholders of the target can 
be the shares in the bidder corporation (“flip-over” plan) or shares in the 
target (“flip-in” plan). The poison pill in Moran v. Household 
International Inc. of 1985, discussed below, was a flip-over. The poison 
pill in Unocal of 1985 was a flip-in. Both are discussed below and were 
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upheld by the courts as they were judged proportionate to the threat posed 
(the Unocal standard). 
 
 When a target‟s board institutes actions to defend the corporation from a 
hostile takeover, they are usually faced with a charge of breach of 
fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders under state law. 
Fiduciary duty is generally divided between on the one hand the duty of 
care and loyalty for the business judgment rule and, on the other hand in 
case of takeovers, the modified business judgment rule. The most 
important court cases are discussed here in chronological order. The 
business judgment rule has been described above in 3.7.3.1 and, in short, 
means that directors are free in their business judgment, unless they are in 
breach of loyalty or care. The modified business judgment rule has been 
developed in takeover jurisprudence and requires an extra proportionality 
test. 
 
 Many states introduced laws intended to make defence mechanisms 
possible. The rationale was often to protect local business, while some of 
these laws ostensibly gave power to officials to block offers if they were 
unfair or gave lax information. At first, some of the laws were held to be 
unconstitutional, but upon further testing in court, most of them were 
upheld. In 1982 the prevailing mood was not against hostile takeovers, 
but attitudes had started to change by 1987.
718
 
 
 The takeover cases 
 The main standards for the board‟s fiduciary duties in the event of hostile 
takeovers were set by the Delaware courts, i.e. the Chancery and 
Supreme Courts, in very important cases in 1985. 
 
 The first case in 1985 was a “sale of company” case, but did not refer to a hostile tender 
offer, defence mechanism or deal protection. It was the famous case of Smith v. Van 
Gorkom.719 Just before his retirement, Van Gorkom, the “imperial” CEO/chairman of the 
publicly listed Trans Union Corporation, had sold off all the shares to a Mr Pritzker. The 
sale was at a 50% premium, but the board failed to consider that the share value was well 
below the intrinsic value because of substantial hidden value in investment tax credits. 
The board gave its consent after a 20 minute oral presentation by Van Gorkom and a 2-
hour meeting, without even looking at the documents. A damage claim was filed by Smith 
on behalf of the existing shareholders. The Supreme Court – by a split vote – held the 
                                                     
718 Pinto and Branson (2009), pp. 392-402. 
719 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 14 March 1985, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
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directors liable for gross negligence and referred the case to the Chancellor to determine 
the damages suffered by the other shareholders because their shares were sold off in a 
friendly tender offer at too low a price, i.e. the difference between the price paid, 
including premium, and the higher intrinsic value, which had been neglected. The case 
was settled by Pritzker, the buyer, paying $23 million more to shareholders.720  
 
 It has been said by Justice Jacobs: “At the time of Van Gorkom corporate boards were 
regarded as essentially passive advisors, with the CEO being completely dominant and the 
board having no prescribed role other than to give advice when asked for and to approve 
executive proposals when presented”. Van Gorkom changed the corporate culture of 
American public company boards, by sending a strong message that corporate boards had 
an affirmative duty to be sceptical, to act with due care and to make a carefully informed 
decision, independent of management.”721 
 
 This case emphasises that the board should decide in its entirety, be well 
informed and take time to discuss all alternatives. The board should not 
be passive and let shareholders decide. This case was widely discussed 
and received a lot of attention. It led, in 1986, to the addition of 
Section 102(b)7 to the Delaware GCL, permitting a company to include 
in its articles of association an exclusion of liability for directors, even in 
cases of gross negligence. 
 
 The first and most important public offer case is Unocal of 1985. In Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co.722 the bidder Mesa Petroleum, controlled by the famous T. Boone 
Pickens,723 owned 13% of Unocal and commenced a front-loaded, two-tier takeover bid 
for the target. The first step was to buy up to 51% at $54 cash and the second to acquire 
the remaining 49% with shares for $54, but in fact at a lower value because these 
exchange shares were heavily subordinated to junk bonds. The target board, the majority 
of whose members were outside directors (this was regarded as important by the 
Delaware Supreme Court), decided in a 9-hour meeting, which included an executive 
session, that the tender offer was inadequate in price and coercive. It responded by 
making a self-tender of $72 cash per share to purchase 49% of the Unocal shares not 
included in Mesa‟s first offer. The target‟s self-tender excluded the 13% owned by Mesa 
and was funded with new Unocal debt. This debt made Unocal highly leveraged, which 
hampered Mesa‟s ability to finance its tender offer. Mesa challenged the self-tender. It 
                                                     
720 Pinto and Branson (2009), p. 229. 
721 Delaware Supreme Court, Justice Jack Jacobs in a speech at an OECD Explanatory Meeting in Stockholm on 
20 March 2006. 
722 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
723 Strine (2005), p. 30.  
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argued for a standard of “entire fairness”, because it was excluded. Unocal, on the other 
hand, argued that it was acting in good faith (loyalty) and with due care to protect the 
company and its shareholders.  
 
 The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the Vice-Chancellor‟s opinion that the defensive 
mechanism was selective and hence unlawful as it was not entirely fair to Mesa. The court 
held that the board must prove (i) that it had reasonable grounds for believing that a 
danger to the corporate policy existed (the threat) and (ii) that the defensive tactic was 
reasonable to the threat posed (the response). In addition, the presence of a majority of 
independent directors unaffiliated with the target materially enhances the credibility of 
directors when they conclude that a threat exists and the response taken was proportional. 
This test differs from the normal application of the business judgment rule by placing the 
initial burden of proof on directors and allowing some scrutiny of not just the process but 
also of the substance of the decision (i.e. whether the response was proportional to the 
threat). This has been named the modified business judgment or the proportionality test.  
 
 The Delaware Supreme Court cleverly found innovative middle ground 
which did not leave corporations and their boards unprotected, but also 
did not defer completely to directors. Its solution was to require boards to 
demonstrate that their defensive measures passed the test of 
reasonableness and that their defensive actions addressed a legitimate 
threat to corporate interests. This is the proportionality test.
724
 
 
 In Moran v. Household International, Inc.,725 also of 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court 
confirmed the Vice-Chancellor‟s decision to uphold the poison pill drafted by Martin 
Lipton as lawyer for Household, which was a two-step “flip-over”, i.e. the right of 
shareholders of the target to acquire shares in the bidder corporation at a discount, making 
the offer economically disastrous for the bidder and its shareholders. 
 
 The two top corporate lawyers of the US post-war era, Joseph Flomm (for Moran) and 
Martin Lipton (for Household, the target)726 squared off. Flomm argued that the Delaware 
corporate law statute was not intended to allow boards to create illusory “rights” to 
preclude, and effectively veto, a hostile offer. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected 
Flomm‟s arguments. In this case the bidder could have bought 19.9% of the outstanding 
shares in Household available in the market and initiated a proxy fight to oust the board 
                                                     
724 Pinto and Branson (2009), p. 379; and Strine (2005), pp. 32-33. 
725 Moran v. Household International, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). The Moran case was argued on May 21, 
1985. Unocal was decided less than a month later, which meant that good lawyers could predict the result of 
Moran, which was published in November 1985 and cited Unocal heavily. 
726 Strine (2005), p. 33. 
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and then redeem the pill. The court cited Unocal and repeated: “Our corporate law is not 
static. It must grow and develop in response to, indeed, in anticipation of, evolving 
concepts and needs. Merely because general corporation law is silent as to a specific 
matter, does not mean it is prohibited.” 
 
 As it turned out, it is not statutory law – takeovers are not dealt with in 
the statutes – but jurisprudence – in the form of the new “reasonableness 
review” introduced by Unocal – that regulates the power of boards.727 
The court confirmed that the use of poison pills is acceptable. The court 
considered that the poison pill did not preclude the bidder from starting a 
proxy contest. The court also ruled that in this case the poison pill could 
be used, applying Unocal, since the threat was considered reasonable and 
the response was proportionate. 
 
 In Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding Inc.728 also of 1985, the Delaware 
Supreme Court was faced with the application of the Unocal test. Initially, the bidder tried 
to negotiate a friendly acquisition, but was rebuffed by Revlon claiming an inadequately 
priced offer. Revlon used several defensive tactics, including a poison pill and a self-
tender. The tactics had the positive effect of inducing the bidder to raise the tender offer 
bid. However, Revlon found a white knight, Forstman Little, which was willing to make a 
competing bid in return for (1) a “no-shop” provision (Revlon would not look for another 
bidder), (2) a $25 million cancellation fee if the bid failed, and (3) a crown jewel lock-up 
(the white knight could buy a valuable division of the target at a discount if its offer 
failed). Of course, the defence mechanisms of poison pill and self-tender were withdrawn 
to ensure that they could not be activated against the white knight upon its tender offer. 
 
 The first bidder challenged the actions of Revlon‟s board as a breach of fiduciary duty and 
asked the court to prohibit the lock-up. The court indicated that lock-ups that encourage 
other bids are permissible, whereas those that end bids are not. In finding a competing bid, 
Revlon had effectively been put up for sale by the directors and the break-up of the 
company had become a reality. The deal with the white knight had in fact closed the way 
for other bidders. The court therefore prohibited the lock-up and, applying the Unocal 
rule, required further enhanced scrutiny and held that when a target is up for sale the 
board cannot “play favourites”.  
 
 As a result of Revlon, the target directors‟ duty is not only to preserve the 
corporation, but under circumstances to maximise its value for 
shareholders. If the corporation is up for sale, as a result of board actions, 
                                                     
727 Strine (2005), p. 34. 
728 Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (1985), decided just after Moran. 
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the directors have to behave as auctioneers and get the best price for 
shareholders. 
 
 As became apparent, three years later, in Blasius
729
 of 1988, boards 
cannot, by deliberate action, thwart the right of the shareholders to vote 
and elect the directors they wanted in a takeover case. The Delaware 
Vice-Chancellor held that the board has less leeway in the context of the 
basic right of shareholders to elect directors.  
 
 In the Blasius case the board of Atlas, a gold mining company, had seven directors. Under 
the articles of association there was a staggered board (a protection against the board 
being ousted in a single round of voting). However, for this protection to be effective, it 
would have been necessary for the board to be composed of 15 directors, which was the 
maximum number under the bye-laws. With only 7 directors the board was vulnerable to 
the majority of shareholders voting in 8 other directors. The board could avoid this by 
proposing to the AGM to appoint two more directors, thus bringing the number up to 9. 
Before the board fixed the problem, a raider, Blasius Industries, emerged, suggesting a 
plan to pay Atlas stockholders immediate cash up front, with the promise of an additional 
reward later. 
 
 Vice-Chancellor Allen considered the Blasius plan to be dangerous and found that the 
board had appointed two really independent directors. However, even if the board had 
acted with subjective good faith, it was not a question here of the board‟s business 
judgment in managing the corporation‟s property; instead, it involved usurpation of the 
power of the shareholders to vote on the election of directors. Vice-Chancellor Allen 
applied a stringent test for judging if it is acceptable for a board to purposefully impinge 
on the stockholders‟ ability to elect a controlling vote in a new board, but only if the board 
could show a “compelling justification” for that decision. In this case, the board did not 
succeed in meeting this onerous standard.  
 
 Blasius obviously taught boards and their advisors to be very careful in 
matters relating to board elections.
730
 
 
 Fifteen years later, in 2003, in MM Companies Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.,731 the 
Delaware Supreme Court clarified the Unocal proportionality test and the Blasius 
“compelling justification” test. The bidder, MM Companies, sought to buy the target 
Liquid Audio, but was opposed by the target‟s directors. There was a complicated proxy 
                                                     
729 Blasius Industries Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
730 Strine (2005), p. 38. 
731 MM Companies Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (2003). 
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fight involving proposed changes to the bye-laws regarding the number of directors and 
elections to the board. The board elected 2 directors and, although this made the 
procedure more difficult for the bidder, it did not absolutely preclude the bidder from 
taking control of the board. This was unlike Blasius, where the board really did try to 
preclude the insurgents from taking control of the board. Here, in MM Companies, the 
board only diminished the bidder‟s chances, but did not preclude the possibility of the 
bidder obtaining control. It was therefore decided that Blasius did not apply and the court 
could apply Unocal and Unitrin, described two pages hereafter, and conclude that the 
measure was not draconian and therefore permissible. 
 
 Together, Unocal and particularly Revlon suggest that the Delaware 
courts were taking a more active role in scrutinising defensive tactics and 
putting greater emphasis on shareholder concerns. At that time it was still 
unclear if and when the Revlon obligations to auction the company would 
apply. In the Time Warner case of 1989,
732
 the Delaware Supreme Court 
put to rest the idea that the courts would actively substitute their 
judgment for that of outside directors on takeover issues.  
 
 The Time directors spent more than a year negotiating a deal with Warner Brothers which 
would enable Time to keep its culture of journalistic independence and retain important 
board positions. The aim of the Time board was an effective merger, not a takeover of 
Time by Warner. Paramount, as third party, announced a substantial cash offer for Time. 
The Time directors were able to defend the company from a Paramount takeover. Time 
changed the original deal with Warner to a cash offer by Time for 51% of the shares in 
Warner, for which Time did not need shareholder consent. The remaining 49% in Warner 
would be acquired later for cash and securities. The court rejected the use of the Revlon 
ruling. The court did not find that the negotiations with Warner amounted to a dissolution 
or break-up of Time. Time was allowed to pursue its long-term strategy of combining 
with Warner. 
 
 Applying the Unocal test, the threat was that Paramount‟s non-coercive 
bid, and the high premium, would confuse the Time shareholders and 
disrupt the planned merger with Warner. The response of Time‟s board of 
protecting a long-term pre-existing plan of the board was reasonable. The 
big difference with Revlon was that there was no planned break-up of 
Time. The court indicated that in this case it was up to the directors to 
decide which was a better deal for shareholders. 
 
                                                     
732 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
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 The Delaware Supreme Court‟s opinion in QVC in 1994,733 however, suggested that the 
scope for directors to decide was not so broad. Paramount, not courting this time but 
being a willing bride, agreed to be acquired by Viacom in a friendly acquisition for cash 
and Viacom shares worth $69.14 a share. The agreement included (1) a “no shop” 
provision, which limited Paramount‟s ability to accept another bid, (2) a $100 million 
termination/break-up fee and (3) an option for Viacom to buy 19.9 % of Paramount shares 
at $69.14. After the merger Viacom‟s controlling shareholder, Summer Redstone, would 
directly and indirectly own 70% of Paramount. QVC, as third party, offered a higher price 
than Paramount. Paramount‟s directors viewed the Viacom offer as fitting into its long-
term business strategy and relied on the Time Warner decision, which, ironically, 
Paramount had lost. They paid no attention to the QVC bid, which was $1.3 billion higher 
than Viacom‟s bid. QVC successfully sued to block Viacom‟s offer and all Paramount‟s 
defensive tactics, i.e. the termination fee and the option. 
 
 The Delaware Supreme Court applied Revlon and not Time Warner; 
boards should leave the decision to shareholders when there is a chance 
of competition between bidders, because in the QVC case there had been 
a change of control as Viacom had a single controlling shareholder which 
would have a majority of the shares in the combined company. The court 
found that, although directors do have the room to make a choice between 
bidders, as a matter of process they must at least investigate the 
competing bid if the target is potentially being sold to a controlling 
shareholder, i.e. directly or indirectly controlling shareholder. 
 
 Practitioners are often faced with Revlon issues when advising boards in 
connection with the sale of a company. In particular, bidders often insist 
on “lock-up options”, “break-up fees” and “no shop” provisions. QVC is 
the leading case in this area. Whereas the Delaware Supreme Court 
invalidated the provisions in QVC, the Court of Chancery and Supreme 
Court permitted them in “Rand”.734 Arguably the option in favour of the 
acquirer was “draconian”, but by the time the board agreed to the clause 
the market of potential acquirers had been fully canvassed and it turned 
out there was only one potential acquirer and there were no others 
interested to make a public offer, and therefore the option did in practice 
not restrict the circle of bidders and did not have to be invalidated. 
 
                                                     
733 Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
734 Rand v. Western Air Lines Inc., C.A. No. 8632 1994 WL 89006, affirmed 659 A.2d 288 (Del. 1995). 
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 In Unitrin of 1995735 the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Chancellor‟s injunction 
barring Unitrin to repurchase its own shares in order to thwart American General‟s hostile 
takeover. The Unitrin directors, who owned 23% of the shares, did not sell their shares to 
Unitrin in the self-tender, which brought their shareholding up to 28%. The Delaware 
Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that, by the Unocal standard, the threat had 
been reasonably investigated (and deemed real, namely an inadequate price). The 
Supreme Court differed with the lower court by accepting that the self-tender, bringing 
the directors‟ shareholding up to 28%, was proportionate because, although difficult, the 
bidder could still organise a proxy fight in order to replace the directors, redeem the extra 
poison pill and try in that way to achieve a friendly merger. The court did not consider the 
self-tender to be “draconian”.  
 
 Gradually thereafter, the important cases became “deal protection” cases. 
In fact, the Revlon, QVC and Unitrin cases had already been about “deal 
protection” and application of the “Is the measure draconian?” criterion.  
 An important more recent deal protection case was Omnicare in 2003.736 Here NCS was 
subject to competing bids by Omnicare and Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. (Genesis). NCS 
was in financial distress, having defaulted on debts of $350 million. Omnicare was invited 
by NCS to make a public offer for the NCS shares. It declined and only offered an asset 
purchase in bankruptcy, which would have left the shareholders completely unpaid. 
Genesis came up with a better offer for the shares and NCS‟s only option seemed to have 
to accept to be acquired by Genesis. NCS, represented by a special independent 
negotiating committee of directors, and Genesis agreed to a deal involving protective 
devices, which were exclusivity agreements without a “fiduciary out”. The deal, as 
contested in this case, was approved in advance of the shareholders‟ meeting by two 
controlling shareholders of NCS, its chairman John Outcalt and its CEO Kevin Shaw, 
who had a clear majority of the voting power. Moreover, the deal included a “force the 
vote” provision, i.e. a provision that a merger may be put to a shareholder vote even if the 
complete board no longer recommends the merger, which in this case made the 
exclusivity complete. The special negotiating committee had excluded Outcalt and Shaw 
from the negotiations. Omnicare then made a slightly higher bid than Genesis for the NCS 
shares, which therefore included an amount for all the shareholders, but the NCS 
committee did not respond. Genesis then raised its bid, but demanded an immediate 
acceptance or it would walk away. The NCS committee accepted. Omnicare sought to bar 
the merger. Vice-Chancellor Lam applied Unocal and found that the threat of loss of any 
deal was large and that the response, although it gave one bidder exclusivity without a 
fiduciary out, was reasonable.  
 
                                                     
735 Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (1995). 
736 Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). 
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 The Delaware Supreme Court – there are five justices – in a rare split 
decision of 3 to 2, did not agree with the vice-chancellor‟s conclusion and 
decided there was a threat under Unocal, but that the response – an 
absolute exclusivity with no “fiduciary out” – was not proportionate. The 
majority of 3 seemingly set a bright-line rule that absolute exclusivity 
with no “fiduciary out” is not permitted. Chief Justice Norman Veasey 
and his successor, the present Chief Justice, Myron Steele, however, 
wrote strong dissenting opinions, in which they reasoned that there can 
always be circumstances where absolute exclusivity may be given, 
especially since NCS was nearly bankrupt and this was the end of a 
negotiating process.
737
 
 
 NCS was in financial distress and had been thoroughly shopped around, 
i.e. the board had done everything it could to find interested parties and 
seemingly had no option but to merge with Genesis. NCS and Genesis 
agreed to a deal including protective devices. The majority of three 
justices against two found that, in concert, the protective devices were 
coercive, because they did not include a “fiduciary out”. But still, the 
Vice-Chancellor and the largest minority of the Supreme Court, i.e. two 
of five members found that the context of the near insolvency of NCS 
was of such a nature that the board had acted correctly in agreeing to the 
protection devices.  
 
 Another case was “Orman”738 of 2004 in which the Court of Chancery 
went the other way, and upheld the protective devices by finding that the 
facts of that case indicated that there was a “fiduciary out”. 
 
 Deal protection measures and their validity are quite context dependent. 
Veasey is of the view that the courts should not be too quick in striking 
them down, but that advisors should be cautious in proposing such 
measures.
739
 
 
 It is of interest to note that the Unocal standard still applies today. In 
Yucaipa in 2010
740
 Vice-Chancellor Strine, citing “decades of settled 
law”, upheld the validity of a standard shareholder rights plan, i.e. an 
                                                     
737 Veasey (2005), pp. 1459-1461 and Strine (2005), p. 47, who seems to agree with Vice-Chancellor Lam and 
the minority of the Supreme Court. 
738 Orman v. Cullman, C.A. No. 189039 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
739 Veasey (2005), p. 1461. 
740 Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund 11, L.P. v. Riggio, C.A. No. 5465 – VCS (Del. Ch. 11 August 2010). 
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issue of favourable securities to existing shareholders, to address not only 
threatened takeovers, but also acquisitions of substantial, but not 
controlling positions, especially if the shareholder/bidder could in fact 
start a proxy contest.  
 
 In the Yucaipa case activist investor Ronald Burkle acquired 8% of Barnes & Noble and 
met its founder and largest shareholder in March 2009 to promote his ideas of strategy for 
the company. When Barnes & Noble declined to accept those ideas, Burkle increased his 
stake in the company to 17% in November 2009 and filed notice of his possible intention 
to acquire more or even bring about a change of control. Barnes & Noble adopted a rights 
plan that would be triggered when any shareholder acquired more than 20%. The plan 
“grandfathered” the founder, who held 29%, but would be triggered if he acquired more. 
The Vice-Chancellor rejected Burkle‟s challenge of the board‟s rights plan, holding that 
the defensive action was a reasonable and proportionate response to Burkle‟s threat and 
that Burkle could still run a proxy contest. He made especial mention of the “influence 
over the vote” of proxy advisory firms such as Risk Metrics. He added that the rights plan 
was permitted, even in combination with the staggered board defence, stating that “the 
reality ….. that even the combination of a classified board and a rights plan are hardly 
show-stoppers in a vibrant American M&A market”. 
 
 The August 2010 Dollar Thrifty
741
 decision of Vice-Chancellor Strine 
represents another marker in a long line of cases endorsing the primacy of 
corporate directors‟ strategic decisions. The court held that the board 
reasonably focussed on the “company‟s fundamental value” and 
remained ready to respect a sales process, even a limited one, that is 
structured in good faith by an independent and well-informed board. 
 
 Again, in February 2011 in Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, 
Inc.,
742
 Chancellor Chandler confirmed that the directors of Airgas Inc. 
could refuse to redeem the company‟s poison pill in the face of an 
inadequate hostile offer, even if the majority of the stockholders, many of 
whom were merger arbitrageurs, would likely tender. This is a 
reconfirmation of the “just say no” doctrine. Again, it was important that 
Airgas had a long term strategy plan, that it discussed regularly. 
 
 Although the judicial decisions on hostile bids, starting with Unocal, 
were initially deemed “management friendly”, they made a significant 
contribution to consolidating board centrality in corporate governance. 
                                                     
741 Dollar Thrifty (Del. Ch. 27 August 2010, Cons. C.A. No. 5458-VCS). 
742 Air Products v. Airgas, 15 February 2011, Chancellor Chandler C.A. No. 5249/5256 CC. 
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The Delaware cases permitting poison pills were a clear management and 
board victory in takeover battles and a victory for Martin Lipton‟s 
“stakeholder theory”.743 The judgments stressed that boards were at the 
centre of the corporate decision making process and contributed to a 
power shift from management to boards.
744
 The board was helped in 
Court in these cases if the decisions were taken by independent directors 
and if a thoughtful strategy had been adopted by the whole board after 
consideration of all the options. 
 
3.7.3.3 The duty of disclosure 
 
 The word “candour” has crept into case law. In Stroud v. Grace745 of 
1992, the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed its preference for the 
materiality standard over the concept of “candour”, which it found 
“confusing and imprecise”. Next to federal law Delaware State law and 
state courts can certainly be applicable to cases of misinformation or 
incomplete information by the board to stockholders in proxy material.
746
 
 
3.7.3.4 Conflict-of-interest transactions 
 
 Section 144 of the Delaware GCL makes clear that transactions between 
the company and a director or a third party will not be voidable solely 
because they are entered into by a director, who has a conflict of interest, 
if any of three provisions applies: (1) the director‟s interest was disclosed 
and was authorised by disinterested board members in good faith, or (2) 
the director‟s interest was disclosed and approved by the shareholders, or 
(3) the contract is fair when authorised by the board or approved by 
shareholders. There is no reason why the conflicted director should not 
attend the debate in the board. Indeed, it is actually deemed better if he 
does. 
 
3.7.3.5 Securities Law duty violation 
 
 There are two types of securities claims, which are both usually class 
action claims by shareholders: 
                                                     
743 Martin Lipton, in a widely cited article Lipton (1979); Martin Lipton, „Corporate Governance in the Age of 
Finance Corporatism‟, 136 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1 (1987). 
744 Bainbridge (2008), pp. 137-139 and Rock (1997).  
745 Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992). 
746 Veasey (2005), pp. 1476-1477. 
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 (i) Section 11 of the Securities Act 1933: 
  These are claims for misstatements or omissions in any 
registration statement filed with the SEC for public offerings, in 
other words prospectus liability. The company usually called 
“issuer” has a strict liability. It has no defence. The directors, 
inside and outside, and advisors have a due diligence defence. 
The standard is negligence. Section 11(b)(3) of the Securities Act 
1933 determines that outside directors are under a lesser duty to 
investigate than inside directors.
747
 The inside directors, the 
advisors and the company are jointly and severally liable. The 
Section 11 obligations are the disclosure obligations of going 
public. The outside directors are only proportionally liable and 
usually do not have to pay out of pocket.
748
 
 
 (ii) Section 10(b) of the Securities Trading Act 1934: 
  These are claims for material misstatements or omissions in any 
documents concerning the purchase and sale of securities. The 
relevant documents can be any of annual or quarterly accounts or 
any other statements. The misstatements or omissions must be 
“scienter”, i.e. in making the material misstatement there must 
have been “knowledge” or “a high degree of recklessness” on the 
part of the defendants. It is logical that outside directors run a 
lower chance of liability. The explicit difference between inside 
and outside director applies as well in the obligation under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act for the CEO and the CFO to sign a “control 
statement”. This obligation is also a Section 10(b) obligation. The 
Section 10(b) obligations are all the disclosure obligations of 
being public. Furthermore, the liability is not joint and several, 
but percentage-based. This is yet another reason why outside 
directors have minimal liability. 
 
 The main securities statutes are federal. However, there are also many 
state securities acts. Shareholders may file cases in federal or state courts 
and combine them with actions for common law fraud, arising out of 
securities transactions. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
1998 (SLUSA) coordinates all of this. Between 1991 and 2004 3,239 
                                                     
747 Paul Vizcarrondo Jr. and Andrew C. Houston, Liabilities under Federal Securities Laws, of Wachtell Lipton, 
July 2010, p. 18 (“Vizcarrondo and Houston (2010)”). 
748 Black, Cheffins and Klausner (2006/A), p. 1081. 
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cases were filed in US federal courts, an average of just 230 a year. 
About 140 fiduciary duty cases are filed in Delaware each year. Most 
cases are settled within the maximum of the insured value. Only in about 
11 cases did outside directors have to pay. 
 
3.7.3.6 Insolvency, creditors rights 
 
 In cases of insolvency the fiduciary duty standards do not change. 
However, the primary duty is no longer owed to the company and the 
shareholders, but to the creditors. 
 
3.7.3.7 Criminal law cases 
 
 The SEC, the Department of Justice and state prosecutors such as Eliot 
Spitzer can start many cases under the Securities Acts and also under 
legislation such as the Anti-Trust Act, the Shearman, Clayton and Hart-
Scott-Rodino Acts and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Acts. 
 
3.7.4 Insulation of directors from out-of-pocket payments 
 
Various measures can be taken to protect directors from the threat of 
litigation.  
 
 (a) Indemnification 
  Most listed companies have a clause in their articles by which the 
directors are indemnified against all claims of the company and 
of third parties, including criminal fines. Legal costs too can be 
reimbursed if the director wins. Indemnification is conditional 
upon the director having acted “in good faith and in a manner 
such person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the 
best interests of the corporation”.749 Indemnification against the 
consequences of securities laws is sometimes refused by the 
courts, in any case if the infringement is committed “with 
knowledge”. Sections 102(b)(7) and 145 of the Delarware GCL 
make I possible for the articles of companies to eliminate or limit 
the personal liability of a director for all cases except for (i) 
authorizing unlawful corporate distributions, (ii) failing to act in 
good faith, (iii) international misconduct or (iv) knowing 
                                                     
749 Delaware GCL § 145 and § 102(b)(7), which is an exculpation clause, which is an extra cause for judges to 
look at the circumstances of each director to see if he has different duties. 
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violations of the law. This means, provided there is good faith, 
there is even indemnification in cases of gross negligence. There 
is therefore indemnification in “care” case, but not in “disloyalty” 
cases.
750
 
 
  Indemnification does not have a positive effect for the directors 
in case the company is insolvent or insufficiently solvent to cover 
the directors‟ damages. The SEC precludes indemnification in 
Section 11 cases, i.e. prospectus liability.
751
 Indemnification 
works in Section 10(b) cases, i.e. in connection of regular 
disclosure and it works as exculpation in derivative cases and 
especially in derivative oversight cases.
752
 The scope for 
indemnification is greater than in the UK, where indemnity 
against claims of the company and criminal fines is excluded. 
 
 (b) D&O insurance 
  Section 145(a) of the Delaware GCL also permits the corporation 
to buy D&O (directors and officers liability) insurance. The 
policies exclude “criminal or deliberately fraudulent misconduct” 
or “any personal profit or advantage to which he is not legally 
entitled”. These definitions are narrower than the “good faith” 
standards of indemnifications. Sometimes policies have full 
“severability of conduct” clauses, which cause outside directors 
to suffer from acts of inside directors. Insurance can furthermore 
be rescinded in case of incorrect information of the inside 
directors to the insurance company. New policies have clauses to 
provide separate coverage for innocent outside directors. 
Problems can also arise in the event of the corporation‟s 
bankruptcy. The court may decide that the corporation is entitled 
to the insurance proceeds. However, the policy may cover this 
eventuality as well.  
 
3.7.5 Summary of director liability 
 
A great many cases come before the Delaware Courts, some of which are 
of great importance. The rulings are clear and swift. The Citygroup and 
                                                     
750 Vizcarrondo and Houston (2010), partners of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, p. 124. 
751 Black, Cheffins and Klausner (2006/A), p. 1084. 
752 Black, Cheffins and Klausner (2006/A), pp. 1093-1095. 
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AIG cases are good examples of the law on oversight of risk 
management. 
 
 The Delaware courts make a clear distinction between the standards of 
(best) conduct and standards of liability. The Disney case is an example 
of guidance on better procedures in board meetings. The courts do give 
an opinion about standard of (best) conduct, but without any legal 
consequence. These “views” of the court, one could call it “preaching”, 
do have effect on corporate governance standards. They mainly give 
opinions as to liability and these are not based on standard of (best) 
practices, but on the Business Judgment Rule. 
 
 The merit of US law is that by sticking to basic principles such as the 
business judgment rule and the fiduciary duties of loyalty, including good 
faith, and due care, as reflected in case law, it can be flexible and yet 
fitted to the facts of any specific case in a predictable manner.  
 
 In hostile takeover cases and in deal protection cases, case law serves as a 
solid beacon for practising lawyers as well, Unocal, Moran, Revlon, Time 
Warner and QVC are good examples. 
 
 The federal securities laws of 1933 and 1934, amplified by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, are highly relevant 
to the day-to-day activities of directors. Especially the Section 11 
Securities Act 1933 on prospectus liability cases are a worry for directors 
and to a lesser extent the Section 10 Securities Trading Act 1934 on 
regular filings are worrisome as well. 
 
 There is a vast legal activity in the US, because first the parties pay their 
own costs without the loser having to repay the winner for its costs, 
second the class action system and third the no cure no pay practice, 
where the winners lawyer gets a substantial profit. 
 
 US policymakers (lawmakers, rule making institutions, e.g. SEC and 
judges) realize that it is important to attract good candidates to be 
directors of corporations and therefore not to make them personally liable 
to pay out-of-pocket expenses if they act in subjective good faith and do 
not commit deliberate fraud, collect illegal profits, profit from self-
dealing or deliberately neglect their duties. Judges, academics and, above 
all, external and in-house legal and other counsellors play a very 
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important role in advising boards about best practices and standards of 
conduct in board processes. 
 
 Although outside directors in the US are frequently sued, which is not 
only very expensive and time consuming but also a source of much 
anxiety and worry about media exposure for them, they are rarely ordered 
to pay damages. There are various reasons for this.  
 
 (a) Owing to the standards applied by the courts in corporate liability 
cases, in particular the “business judgment rule” and the duties of 
“loyalty” and “care”, liability exists only in exceptional cases. 
 
 (b) As shareholders can attack directors in corporate liability cases 
only via derivative procedures the procedural hurdles are not easy 
on the plaintiffs. 
 
 (c) Even under Section 11 of the Securities Act, which requires that 
the company‟s registration statements when getting listed are 
without material misstatements or omissions, where the evidence 
requirements of plaintiffs are the easiest, all directors have a due 
diligence defence (i.e. “reasonable investigations” and 
“reasonable grounds”). This is a negligence standard and it is 
easier to defend outside directors than inside directors. 
 
 (d) Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, those 
responsible for material misstatements or omissions can be held 
liable while getting listed, the standard for a successful claim by 
shareholders is not as easy to satisfy as under Section 11 of the 
Exchange Act. The standard of Section 10(b) is “scienter” and 
only comes into play when there is a high degree of recklessness 
with regard to truth, for example where directors fail to 
investigate reports of problems (“red flags”) in their corporation. 
 
 (e) Practically all listed corporations include full indemnity clauses 
in their articles of incorporation, by which the company pays 
directly or reimburses all expenses, including damage claim 
amounts and costs of the directors, provided the directors have 
acted “in good faith and reasonably in the interest of the 
corporation”. 
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 (f) Practically all listed corporations have good D&O insurance 
policies and there are economical reasons to settle cases at or 
below the maximum insured value. 
 
 The end result of all this is that although there are over 230 federal 
securities class action cases filed in the US federal courts each year and 
approximately 140 public companies annually facing lawsuits alleging 
breaches of corporate fiduciary duty by their directors in the state courts 
such as Delaware, most of these cases are settled and few come to a final 
trial verdict. In all settlements and judgments involving large companies, 
only in the Smith v. Van Gorkom,
753
 WorldCom and Enron cases and 
about 10 other cases since 1980 have outside directors had to pay 
amounts out of pocket.
754
 
 
                                                     
753 In the end the case was settled by the buyer paying $23 million to the shareholders. 
754 Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins and Michael Klausner, „Outside Director Liability: A Policy Analysis‟, 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 162 (2006), pp. 10-11 (“Black, Cheffins and 
Klausner (2007/B)”). Also Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins and Michael Klausner, „Outside Director 
Liability‟, University of Texas School of Law, Working Paper No. 26 (2004); and Black, Cheffins and 
Klausner (2006/A), p. 1086. 
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4.  THE NETHERLANDS 
 
4.1 History and Culture 
 
I would once again stress at the outset that boardroom dynamics in the 
Netherlands too have been deeply influenced by history and culture. This 
section starts by listing in telegram style some of the characteristics of 
Dutch culture.
755
 It is followed by a historical overview and a more 
detailed description of some aspects of Dutch boardroom culture. By their 
very nature generalisations do not apply to all circumstances. I have had 
many conversations with experienced observers and read much of what 
has been written on the subject to help form my observations. 
 
4.1.1 General characteristics 
 
 Some keywords of Dutch corporate boardroom culture are: 
 
 a) Consultation and consensus 
  Dutch directors like to reach and maintain consensus. They 
consult readily, rarely debate principles and conduct their 
discussions at a pragmatic level. All participants are free and 
have an equal voice; relations are open and direct and there is 
little hierarchy. 
 
 b) Plurality of interests 
  Water, dikes and a densely populated country of semi-sovereign 
cities have contributed to a tradition of taking into account a 
variety of sometimes mutually opposing interests; concerns about 
the environment and the well-being of employees are important. 
 
 c) Two-tier board system 
  There is a long tradition of supervisory directors, who monitor at 
a distance from management directors; they were and are 
supposed to take all interests of the enterprise into account, not 
only those of the shareholders. 
 
 d) Oligarchic tendencies 
  Board members have always been well protected and have often 
been able to co-opt their successors either directly or indirectly 
                                                     
755 See Zahn (2005), p. 130 for a description of Dutch, German, French, UK and UK culture in telegram style. 
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also with help of supervisory directors. In the early years of the 
21
st
 century shareholders have acquired more influence, which 
has been a shock to many directors. 
 
4.1.2 Historical influences on Dutch boardroom culture 
 
 Water, trade and a long history of corporate governance are three factors 
that have influenced boardroom culture. 
 
 Water 
 The ever present awareness of water as friend and foe has been at the root 
of the Dutch talent for cooperation in small groups, with a free voice for 
each member and with minimal hierarchy. The topic of discussion was 
usually a practical problem and the solution had to reflect the interests of 
all concerned. In the beginning, large parts of the territories that would 
become the United Provinces of the Netherlands were marshes, lakes and 
river deltas along the coast of the North Sea. The Dutch had to fight the 
tides and floods. They built dikes, dug channels and constructed 
windmills to pump the marshes dry and change them into “polders” 
where they could farm and build their cities. Although they succeeded in 
taming the water, it was still everywhere. Ships plied the inland 
waterways, making the exchange of people and ideas easier. Soon Dutch 
ships were exploring the world, taking cargo to and from the Baltic, the 
Americas and the Indies. From the end of the 19
th
 century, shipping once 
again triggered growth.  
 
 Trade and cities 
 The successful organisation of cargo trade and the operation of merchant 
ships depended on the responsibility of many a captain, boatswain, 
mariner, stevedore, shipowner and middleman. People learned to 
cooperate and to respect one another‟s responsibility and initiative. The 
exchange of goods led to a spirit of give and take. As the land was split 
up by rivers and lakes, the population was obliged to concentrate in small 
communities, which grew into towns and cities as early as the 13
th
 
century. The minor land owners, local counts and bishops had to 
cooperate with these townspeople to keep the land dry and the public 
treasuries filled. These circumstances naturally led to forms of 
commercial cooperation for a specific polder and its management, the 
equipment of a merchant ship or fleet, initially perhaps for one specific 
voyage and later for general shipping and trading and for the colonisation 
of overseas territories. The Netherlands was and is a collection of cities 
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and small cooperatives. In all the cities successful merchants assumed the 
reins of government. In the absence of hereditary aristocracy or a central 
King‟s Court, local elites became a ruling oligarchy rooted in trade and 
shipping.  
 
 The development of corporate governance  
 Efforts for which many hands, heads and purses are needed in a spirit of 
give and take and mutual respect for one another‟s interests usually focus 
on finding practical solutions to problems. The lack of hierarchy and the 
absence of a central, monarchical power was compensated for by the 
respect for an oligarchy consisting of the most able and successful 
entrepreneurs, shipowners and merchants, who at the same time governed 
the cities. In effect, the concept of a single king commanding the 
allegiance of the nation was replaced by that of a hundred small kings 
cooperating with each other and with the people who made these efforts 
possible.  
 
 Throughout the corporate history of the Netherlands companies have 
tended to be led by a small group of directors who consult together in 
order to achieve consensus. Usually this has been arranged in a two-tier 
system, where some are responsible for day-to-day management and 
others play a supervisory role. Supervisory boards as we know them 
today have existed since 1623, when the Dutch East India Company (the 
VOC) created such a body. This two-tier system continued down the 
centuries. In 1898 Royal Dutch Petroleum
756
 used defensive clauses in its 
articles of association, effectively allowing the board to co-opt members 
in order to ward off Standard Oil. A tradition of supervisory boards with 
oligarchic provisions in the articles of association allowed boards of 
public limited liability companies (NVs) to continue to manage 
companies by means of consultation aimed at consensus throughout the 
20
th
 century and was considered to be the Dutch tradition of governance. 
The evolution of Dutch corporate governance is described in detail in 
4.1.5 and the cultural development of Dutch supervisory boards is related 
in 4.1.6(c) after discussing the influences of water in 4.1.3 and trade in 
4.1.4. 
 
                                                     
756 The full name of Royal Dutch Petroleum was Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot Exploitatie van 
Petroleumbronnen in Nederlandsch-Indië, later N.V. Koninklijke Nederlandsche Petroleum Maatschappij 
(referred to below as Royal Dutch Petroleum). 
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4.1.3 Water: friend and foe 
 The term used by the Dutch to describe their consultation mentality, their 
search for compromise and their willingness to abide by the resulting 
consensus is “polder model”, with its accompanying verb polderen. 
These words are actually quite new and were introduced by Prime 
Minister Wim Kok in 1994.
757
 A “polder” is an area of reclaimed land 
enclosed by dikes.  
 
 Free peat farmers AD 1000-1200 
 Until about AD 1000 roughly half of what is now the Netherlands was 
uninhabited. The northern and western territories, called the maritime 
provinces, consisted mainly of marshes, lakes and rivers. Sand dunes 
along the coast of the North Sea and some sandy ridges in the provinces 
of Holland, Zeeland and Friesland and part of Utrecht provided a meagre 
and fearful existence for a small and unruly population as well as a poor 
Count and some hard-working monks under a colonising bishop in the 
city of Utrecht, which was founded by the Romans. Around AD 1000, the 
Count of Holland, Dirk III, found that the marshy peat land behind the 
dunes on the west coast could be exploited if it were drained and the 
water controlled.  Some Frisians from the northern provinces came and 
made an enterprising deal with Dirk III. He gave marsh land to groups of 
Frisian farmers under the leadership of a developer. Each farmer received 
a plot of 100 by 1,250 meters, 12½ hectares, a viable area for one farming 
family. The farm houses were to be built facing a drainage canal dug 
along the short side of the plot. The farmers paid a nominal amount of 5 
cents a year to confirm the sovereignty of their overlord.
758
 In exchange, 
the Count granted the plot in perpetuity and confirmed that the farmer 
was a free person. Elsewhere under the feudal system farmers were 
treated by their overlords as serfs. The free farmers under Dirk III and his 
successors worked to drain the marshes, dig the drainage ditches between 
their plots and build their villages, activities that required cooperation, 
consultation, consensus and compromise. 
 
 Polders, dikes and windmills from AD 1200 
 The early settlers found the peat on their plots useful. When cut into 
bricks and dried, it provided excellent fuel. They had to remove the upper 
                                                     
757 D. Bos, M. Ebben and H. te Velde, Harmonie in Nederland, het Poldermodel van 1500 tot nu (“Bos, Ebben 
and Te Velde (2007)”). 
758 Jona Lendering, Polderdenken: De Wortels van de Nederlandse Overlegcultuur (2005), p. 25 (“Lendering 
(2005)”). 
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layer of peat in any case, in order to reach the fertile soil underneath. This 
could then be turned into pasture land for cattle.
759
 The sea, however, 
remained the biggest threat to all efforts of the settlers to create their own 
land. A lake in the middle of the country was substantially enlarged to a 
sea, called the “South Sea”, or “Zuiderzee”. Around 1170 the Low 
Countries were hit by terrible storms and floods. Storms drove the sea 
right up to the city walls of Utrecht. The settlers responded by starting to 
build dikes. Each farmer who had frontage on the main drainage 
waterway would build and maintain a dike along the 100-meter side of 
his land. A farmer behind him could take advantage of the safety of the 
dike. Neighbours would consult as free men to split the costs. On a larger 
scale there were meetings and deliberations of local inhabitants 
(vergadering van ingelanden and waterschappen). These meetings would 
be attended by a dijkgraaf (chairman of the water board) who represented 
the Count of Holland. Around 1200 the ingelanden (local land owners 
and farmers) decided in such a meeting to build dikes in the area where 
Amsterdam
760
 would rise soon afterwards, as “the Venice of the North”. 
 
 In 1230 the Count of Holland took up his residence in what is now The 
Hague, the official capital of the Netherlands. The first windmill capable 
of lifting water from low-lying land to a higher river or lake was built in 
Alkmaar in 1408.
761
 A great many farms, sometimes more than a 
hundred, surrounded by dikes and windmills constituted a “polder”, 
which was governed by a waterschap (water board). Polders were 
organised in the same way as the settlements of peat farmers. The 
overlord gave an octrooi (charter) to a developer who, together with the 
farmers of the area concerned, would create a polder and arrange for 
public governance and infrastructure such as a churches and roads. The 
members of these “waterschappen” deliberated with one another on an 
equal footing, all “ingelanden” having freedom of speech. The farmers 
had been free men for 300 years. This system of free farmers deliberating 
about the common good of their communities was a unique feature of the 
Low Countries. 
 
                                                     
759 Prof. Jan Luiten van Zanden and Arthur van Riel, Nederland 1780-1914: Staat, Instituties en Economische 
Ontwikkeling (2000), p. 76 (“Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000)”). 
760 These dikes included a dike along the IJ, protecting the North side of Amsterdam, up to above Haarlem and a 
dike of 125 kilometers around West Friesland, i.e. Hoorn, Enkhuizen, Medemblik, Schagen, see Lendering 
(2005), pp. 33 and 36. 
761 Lendering (2005), p. 43. 
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 From 1581, when the seven provinces declared their independence from 
Spain and its Habsburg dynasty, the States of Holland and West 
Friesland, as the sovereign power of the most important province, 
continued to grant licences or charters – known as an “octrooi” – to 
private entrepreneurs.
 762
 Normally, an octrooi for land to be reclaimed 
would be issued to one or two entrepreneurs, who collected a group of 
investors and influential persons around them. These acted as a sounding 
board for the entrepreneurs with respect to external interests such as 
neighbours, and they might also have a role in supporting the 
entrepreneur in the event of a dispute with a neighbour. The outside 
investors were obliged only to pay up their promised share in the 
proposed capital of the venture, an early form of limited liability.
763
 They 
usually got a handsome return on their investment. Before the start of the 
project, compromises were made with surrounding municipalities and 
land owners who might lose access to water and transport as a result of 
the project. This process of finding compromises and taking all interests 
into account usually took place by deliberation aimed at achieving 
consensus. However, sometimes a committee of supervisors had to be 
appointed.
764
  
 
 The “octrooi” issued to the entrepreneur would name the first board 
members, who would run the business. The board would have a small 
group of managers, meeting once a week, and a larger group of 
influential and well-connected members who would meet once every two 
months. These were comparable to 20
th
 century supervisory directors.
765
 
The board had the freedom to deal with the project of reclaiming the land 
and managing the village and the church to be built there. The board 
included a “dijkgraaf” who represented the government. Under the terms 
                                                     
762 Han van Zwet, Lofwaerdighe dijckages en miserabele polders. Een financiële analyse van 
landaanwinningsprojecten in Nollands Noorderkwartier, 1597-1643 (2009), p. 40 (“Van Zwet (2009)”). 
763 Van Zwet (2009), pp. 28-29 and 54; see also note 768 on the next page; Oscar Gelderblom, Abe de Jong and 
Joost Jonker, „An Admiralty for Asia: Isaac le Maire and Conflicting Conceptions about Corporate 
Governance of the VOC‟, Origins of Shareholder Advocacy, Papers presented at Yale, Millstein Center for 
Corporate Governance, 6 November 2009 (January 2011), pp. 35-36 (“Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker 
(2011)”) and note 835 on page 256; H.M. Punt, Het Vennootschapsrecht van Holland, thesis (2010), p. 75; 
W.C.L. van der Grinten, Handbook for the NV and the BV (1989), p. 3 (“Van der Grinten (1989)”); and Van 
Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), p. 1. 
764 Van Zwet (2009), p. 52. 
765 See Van Zwet (2009), p. 55, the influential board members sometimes included members of the States 
General and the Supreme Court to ensure support in the event of disputes. 
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of the octrooi the board was obliged to forward its accounts to the 
Rekenkamer (accounts office) of the States of Holland and Friesland. The 
board had full autonomy and was free to operate as it saw fit. Board 
members appointed their own successors.
766
  
 
 These polders were interesting examples of public-private cooperation: 
i.e. private finance and the execution of public functions by private 
boards with the backing and subject to the light supervision of the 
provincial or city government. In fact, they were an example of a 
stakeholder model.  
 
 From 1400: active shipping 
 After 1400 the landscape of the maritime provinces of the Netherlands 
started to change. A network of harbours sprang up and navigable rivers 
and waterways were crowded with vessels of all kinds. Seagoing ships 
too used the canals and rivers to reach the warehouses in the many inland 
ports to discharge their valuable cargos. These cities became the hub of 
the import and export trade in almost all commodities used in Europe at 
that time. In 1560 the province of Holland alone had 1,800 sea-going 
vessels, six times larger than the Venetian fleet of 100 years earlier.
767
 In 
the 17
th
 century, 40% of the Dutch were dependent on activities directly 
or indirectly in shipping.  
 
 In the period between 1400 and 1600 shipping was organised by 
partnerships for single voyages only. All partners were fully liable, 
jointly and severally. By contrast, partners in polders, as described above, 
were not liable for amounts in excess of their share of capital.
768
 This was 
a form of limited liability. 
 
 Shortly before 1600 the States of Holland and of Zeeland issued 
octrooien (charters) exclusively for voyages to distant destinations to 
some private companies formed by citizens of various cities in these 
provinces. One of them, the famous expedition under the command of 
Willem Barentsz to discover the Northeast Passage to the East Indies, 
ended in a long winter of suffering by Barentsz and his crew in 1596-
1597 on "Nova Zembla". However, most other trips to Africa and the Far 
                                                     
766 Van Zwet (2009), pp. 40, 55 and 57. 
767 Landis (1998), p. 154. 
768 Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker (2011), pp. 35-36. 
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East were successful and profitable. Indeed, some expeditions made an 
average annual profit of 27%
769
  
 
 VOC 
 As early as 1598 the States General, led by Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, 
expressed its concern that so many mutually competing private 
expeditions and companies would undermine “the common wealth” and 
become an easy prey for the Dutch public enemy, i.e. the Spanish and 
Portuguese governments that treated the Indies trade as a state monopoly 
and defended their claims against rivals. Thanks to the foresight and 
diplomatic efforts of Van Oldenbarnevelt, the city companies of 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Middelburg, Delft, Hoorn and Enkhuizen finally 
merged into one big Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC/Dutch 
East India Company). To encourage the board members of the separate, 
profitable city companies to cooperate, they were given far-reaching 
powers. These cities appointed seventeen directors (de Heeren 
Zeventien). For the first time, they were appointed for life and were not 
liable for the VOC‟s debts.770 
 
 Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, one of the strongest statesmen the Dutch have 
ever had, used the existing system of polders and the voor compagnieën 
(pre-companies). He convinced the States General to grant the VOC an 
octrooi giving the company the exclusive right to trade and deal with the 
East Indies and the whole area of the Indian Ocean, including the power 
to represent the Republic there in dealings with foreign heads of state, 
and the right to take military action and set up and administer new 
colonies. Unlike the polder boards, there was no government 
representation on the board of the VOC.
771
 However, under the “octrooi” 
the States General did reserve the right to instruct the board on specific 
matters of public policy in the colonies. As a result, the Heeren Zeventien 
were also responsible for running Dutch foreign policy in the East Indies 
and performing all the tasks of a government, including matters of war 
and peace.
772
 
 
                                                     
769 Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker (2011), p. 36 
770 See Article 42 of the 1602 Octrooi, Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), p. 65, Dr. J.G. van 
Dillen, Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister van de Kamer van Amsterdam der Oost-Indische Compagnie 
(1958), p. 27 (“Van Dillen (1958)”); and Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker (2011), p. 25. 
771 Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker (2011), p. 40 
772 Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker (2011), p. 47 
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 VOC in the 18
th
 century 
 The VOC stagnated in the 18
th
 century. The investors were paid 
dividends, but no new capital was raised. At the end of the 18
th
 century 
the political and economic life of the once so vigorous Dutch Republic 
was beset by internal troubles and neighbouring predators. Whereas the 
Netherlands had accounted for 40% of world shipping in the 17
th
 century, 
this fell to 12% in the 18
th
 century.
773
 The VOC sank into bankruptcy and 
was taken over by the State in 1798 and then dissolved. 
 
 19
th
 century: shipping from zero back to leader again 
 During the Napoleonic period from 1795 to 1813 the British navy 
blockaded the whole European continent and no overseas voyages were 
possible.
774
 Shipbuilding started up again in Rotterdam and Amsterdam in 
the 1820s. At this time shipyards that would later become household 
names, for example Roentgen, Ruys, Van Ommeren, Van Vlissingen and 
Smit, were still building only sailing ships.
775
 In the aftermath of the 
Napoleonic upheavals the Republic of the Seven United Provinces had 
become the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Its first king, Willem I, 
descendant of the “stadhouders” from the House of Orange, known as the 
merchant king, took the initiative in establishing a general trading and 
manufacturing company known as the Nederlandsche Handel-
Maatschappij. One of its tasks was to promote shipbuilding.
776
 When the 
Suez Canal opened in 1869 it became more attractive to operate 
steamships on the East Indies route as the distance had been cut.
777
 True 
to the saying “navigare necesse est”,778 the Dutch quickly recovered their 
predominant position in shipping. By 1910 the tonnage of steam-powered 
vessels sailing under the Dutch flag exceeded even that of the UK, and 
was well ahead of each of the US, France and Germany. Coal mines in 
the area of South-Limburg from 1900 onwards became a source of wealth 
and a driver of industrial development.
779
 The old entrepreneurial spirit 
                                                     
773 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 37 and Dr. I.J. Brugmans, Paardenkracht en Mensenmacht, Sociaal-
Economische Geschiedenis van Nederland 1795-1940 (1969), p. 23 (“Brugmans (1969)”). 
774 Brugmans (1969), p. 41. 
775 Brugmans (1969), pp. 73 and 95 and Michael Wintle, An Economic and Social History of the Netherlands: 
Demographic, Economic and Social Transition 1800-1920 (2000), pp. 132-133 (“Wintle (2000)”). 
776 Wim Wennekes, De Aartsvaders, Grondleggers van het Nederlandse Bedrijfsleven (2000), pp. 33-34 
(“Wennekes (2000)”). 
777 Brugmans (1969), p. 355. 
778 Brugmans (1969), p. 369 and Wintle (2000), p. 345. 
779 Production at the coal mines of South-Limburg only started in 1901, Brugmans (1969), p. 353. 
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flowered again. In shipping, for example, companies joined forces to 
avoid being taken over.
780
 Shipping and the cargo business preceded the 
development of Dutch industry in the 20
th
 century. In the wake of 
shipping followed new companies such as Royal Dutch Petroleum, Dutch 
breweries and tobacco manufacturers, Unilever, Philips and KLM, all of 
which became major international companies and were often dependent 
on the links with the Dutch colonies.
 781
 
 
 Canals and further land reclamation 
 In the 19
th
 century wider and deeper canals and waterways were dug to 
develop the Netherlands as a distribution hub of northern Europe. Other 
projects included the creation of new polders such as the 
Wilhelminapolder,
782
 where a group of investors established a model 
farm for some farmers, and the Haarlemmermeerpolder,
783
 where 
Schiphol Airport is now located. The construction of the Afsluitdijk 
(barrier dam) and the creation of huge polders in the resulting inland lake 
were planned by Lely in 1880 and the project was completed in 1950.
784
 
 
 Water, an important foe and friend 
 Water has always been an important factor in the Dutch way of life. The 
seas gave them freedom. Water had to be “domesticated”. It helped the 
Dutch to defend themselves when their freedom was threatened. Their 
fight for independence from the Spanish who tried to suppress the rise of 
reformative religious movements in the Eighty Years‟ War from 1568 to 
1648 started with an invasion mounted by irregular Dutch seamen who 
had fled to friendly English ports and returned suddenly to capture the 
little town of Den Briel on 1 April 1572. This was the first victory in the 
Eighty Years‟ War, and the Watergeuzen (Sea Beggars) as they were 
dubbed passed into legend. 1 April is still celebrated as April Fools‟ Day, 
i.e. the day on which the Watergeuzen fooled their oppressors, the 
Spanish. In 1574 the city of Leiden breached its dikes in order to inundate 
the surrounding area and create a barrier against the Spanish army. In the 
17
th
 century the Dutch fought many battles, nearly all of them at sea. 
When the French armies invaded the Republic in 1672, the provinces of 
Holland and Zeeland opened the dikes along their eastern borders and 
                                                     
780 Brugmans (1969), pp. 358 and 361. 
781 Zahn (2005), pp. 301-302. 
782 Brugmans (1969), p. 163. 
783 Brugmans (1969), p. 499 and Wintle (2000), p. 131. 
784 Brugmans (1969), p. 499. 
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withdrew their forces behind a barrier of water. The French never 
occupied these provinces. However, water could just as easily be a foe as 
a friend and continued to pose a threat to the polders and riverside towns. 
After the disastrous floods of 1953 the Dutch had to raise the height of 
their dikes yet again.  
 
4.1.4 History of trade and business 
 Traders, free from feudal shackles 
 As the Netherlands borders the North Sea, is criss-crossed by rivers and 
inland waterways and is centrally located in Europe, it is perhaps hardly 
surprising that its inhabitants became cargo shippers, merchants and 
international traders. By the 13
th
 century feudalism was on the wane, 
central government was weak and city merchants were assuming the role 
of leaders. Free trade with surrounding countries was the basis of their 
wealth and power.  
 
 In the 15
th
 and 16
th
 centuries the grain trade with the Baltic countries 
(particularly the Hansa cities) and the Mediterranean flourished. 
Amsterdam was the staple market for grain, herring, salt, hides, timber, 
wool, silk and French wine. The Dutch even managed to buy grain from 
France and sell it back to other French merchants. Around 1500 the cities 
of the province of Holland were leaders in European shipping.
785
 Trade 
was able to grow disproportionately fast because the Netherlands did not 
have a feudal nobility dependent on agriculture. In the rest of Europe the 
problems of feudalism and mercantilism combined to impede economic 
development.
786
 
 
 Traders are pragmatic and take quick decisions. They deal with foreigners 
and learn to be adaptable, but are less interested in long-term broad 
strategies. They swallow their pride if this enables them to conclude an 
advantageous deal. 
 
 17th century: Dutch Golden Age 
 The Dutch are proud of their “finest hour”, the Golden Age in the 17th 
century. The foundations for their political and military success, for their 
wealthy cities, their excellent shipping, innovative banking and insurance, 
                                                     
785 Herman Pley, „Moet Kunnen‟: Een kleine mentaliteitsgeschiedenis van de Nederlander (2010), p. 20 (“Pley 
(2010)”). 
786 Johan Huizinga, Nederlandse beschaving in de zeventiende eeuw (1941), pp. 32-35.  
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their universities and their culture, including the exceptional prominence 
of Dutch painters, were laid in the 15
th
 and 16
th
 centuries  
 
 Religious peace was achieved in the early 17
th
 century without civil war, 
after the country had won independence from Spain in the Eighty Years‟ 
War. Their feudal neighbours – the German states, the Spanish and the 
French – protected their trade and industry with mercantile measures. The 
Dutch flourished by free trade, like their English neighbours across the 
North Sea, their only real competitors. Trade wars, restricted to 
encounters at sea with the English, did not seriously interrupt Dutch 
progress and prosperity. An enlightened oligarchy of homines novi, city 
merchants versed in matters of state as well as in trade and shipping, 
made this progress possible. They encouraged a degree of free speech and 
tolerated foreigners settling in the maritime provinces, mainly foreigners 
with drive, know-how and money. Although the family names of these 
ruling merchant clans, called “regenten” (regents) are now only rarely 
found among today‟s elite, their spirit lives on and many homines novi of 
the last 50 years – successful bankers, government ministers, mayors, 
university leaders and directors of large enterprises – have adopted the 
traditions of their “regent” predecessors. 787 
 
 The Netherlands, a small country surrounded by great powers 
 In the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries Dutch foreign policy steered a course 
designed to ensure that the Republic had at least two good friends among 
England, France and the eastern neighbours at any time. The German 
states did not pose a real threat, but both England and France were 
watching the rise of the Dutch Republic with envy. Initially, they had 
both helped the Dutch in their struggle for independence from Spain. In 
the wake of the rise of the Dutch Republic came commercial rivalry with 
England, culminating in three sea wars between their navies in the 17
th
 
century. Then in 1672, het Rampjaar (Year of Disaster), the Dutch 
Republic was invaded by the armies of Louis XIV, in connivance with his 
cousin, King Charles II of England. The sea saved the Low Countries. 
The Dutch fleet, led by Admiral De Ruyter, was victorious.
788
 The city 
fathers of the western provinces decided to inundate the border area of 
Holland, and a few feet of water formed an impregnable barrier for the 
French armies. 
                                                     
787 Zahn (2005), p. 54 and Meindert Fennema and Eelke Heemskerk, Nieuwe Netwerken: De elite en de 
ondergang van de N.V. Nederland (2008), p. 124 (“Fennema and Heemskerk (2008)”). 
788 Lendering (2005), p. 97. 
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 The necessity to manoeuvre between such powerful kingdoms confined 
the Dutch the virtue of flexibility, which the Dutch had already acquired 
from their experiences in trade. The presence of so many foreigners and 
refugees on Dutch territory also made the Dutch tolerant and open-
minded. “Polderen” was the state of mind. 789 
 
 Economic stagnation between 1670 and 1780 
 Between 1672 and 1720 government debt increased from 130 to over 300 
million florins.
790
 The Netherlands could not afford any wars and had no 
urge to fight. Until 1672 the rich merchant families had invested in ships 
and commerce. Now, these investments slowed down. Trade stagnated as 
England made every effort to replace the Dutch as cargo shippers and 
colonisers and gradually overtook Amsterdam as the main staple market 
for foreign goods. The French protected themselves through their 
mercantilism. The volume of trade passing through Dutch ports from 
1670 to 1780 remained nominally the same, but the Dutch market share 
declined from 40% to 12%.
791
 Wages of city workers increased and 
caused a drastic decrease in manufacturing.
792
 The Netherlands no longer 
developed new technologies
793
 and played little if any role in the first 
wave of the Industrial Revolution in the 1770s. Nonetheless, up to the 
1780s Amsterdam was still the world‟s largest financial centre.794 Henri 
Hope, who came from England to the Netherlands in 1762 with his three 
brothers, founded Hope & Co. They and other Amsterdam bankers 
financed Sweden, Poland and Spain. The first loans to the newly 
independent United States of America came from Amsterdam bankers.
 795
 
The English considered the aid the Dutch gave to the rebels in America a 
casus belli and declared war on the Dutch Republic. This time the 
English managed to cut the sea lanes to the Dutch East and West Indies, 
thereby dealing a disastrous blow to the Dutch economy. The resulting 
decline in trade and shipbuilding was aggravated by the events of 1780-
1787: the era of “revolutionary” movements within the Dutch Republic. 
                                                     
789 Lendering (2005), p. 129.  
790 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 34. 
791 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 37 and Brugmans (1969), p. 23. 
792 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 38. 
793 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), pp. 43-44. 
794 Wintle (2000), pp. 96 and 207. 
795 Hendrik G.A. Hooft, Patriot and Patrician to Holland and Ceylon in the Steps of Henrik Hooft and Pieter 
Ondaatje, Champions of Dutch Democracy (1999), p. 50. 
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The adherents of the House of Orange, from which the hereditary 
stadtholders (equivalent to presidents of the Republic) were drawn, 
championed sharp and sometimes armed conflict with the “Patriots”, who 
believed in the French ideal of a stronger political say for the middle 
classes.
796
 These French ideals at first seemed to match the tolerant and 
conciliatory traditions of the Dutch, but this time they did not lead to 
typical Dutch compromises and conciliation, but to polarisation and an 
invasion by the army of the King of Prussia, at the invitation of his 
brother-in-law, the last Dutch stadtholder Willem V, to restore order in 
the Dutch Republic.  
 
 The Netherlands was ripe for an even more disastrous invasion and 
occupation. Ten years later, the revolutionary armies of the French 
Republic occupied the whole of the Netherlands. This time the Dutch 
relied in vain on their natural bulwark, water. The rivers and waterways, 
guarding the access to the western provinces were frozen solid. The 
French army was able to walk over the ice. The invasion swept away the 
old order. In 1800 the VOC went bankrupt and was dissolved.
797
  
 
 King Willem I: Dutch East Indies and the Netherlands Trading Company 
 After the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1813, the conference held by the 
victorious powers in Vienna agreed that the Austrian Netherlands 
(present-day Belgium) should be apportioned to the Netherlands in order 
to create a strong country to the north of France. These united 
Netherlands were to be a buffer state.
798
 The Dutch East Indies, which 
had been occupied by the English in 1811, were restored to the 
Netherlands in 1816.
799
 That colony was to play a vital role in the 
recovery of the Dutch economy.
800
 It was in Vienna too that the English 
achieved their wish to see a strong government established in the country 
of their neighbours across the North Sea. As they reasoned, a king vested 
with “un-Dutch” powers was what those headstrong, independently-
                                                     
796 Jaap van Rijn, De eeuw van het debat: De ontwikkeling van het publieke debat in Nederland en Engeland 
1800-1926 (2010), p. 57 (“Van Rijn (2010)”). 
797 Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), pp. 85-105. 
798 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 110 explains the reason for the later separation in 1839. The Union 
lasted only until 1839, when Belgium became an independent kingdom. See also Wennekes (2000), p. 32. 
799 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 138 and Brugmans (1969), p. 105. 
800 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), pp. 143-144. The “cultuurstelsel” in the East Indies led to dependable 
agricultural production of tea, coffee and tobacco, a substantial flow of goods to the Netherlands and 
considerable revenues for the Dutch exchequer. 
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minded Dutch needed. The ideal candidate was at hand, right there in 
London and an Anglophile to boot, namely the son of the last stadtholder, 
Willem V, who had fled to London when the French occupied the 
Netherlands. 
 
 This Prince of Orange, confirmed as King Willem I, had witnessed at first 
hand the English success in manufacturing, trade and banking during the 
First Industrial Revolution since the 1770s. When he returned home he 
found a country that was run down
801
 and burdened with huge debts
802
 
and countrymen who had lost their traditional spirit of enterprise and 
adopted the habits of rentiers, retired to their country estates and became 
gentlemen of leisure.
803
 Willem I wanted to be a “merchant king” and 
dreamt of a new VOC. He promoted the creation of a new company, in 
1824, called the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (Netherlands 
Trading Company).
804
 The shares were to be underwritten by public 
subscription. The public subscribed for 70 million guilders, while only 20 
million had been expected. The king decided that a subscription of 
37 million guilders would be sufficient and took four million for his own 
account. He appointed the president, the secretary and three executive 
board members. Five supervisory directors, who were to represent the 
shareholders, were appointed to supervise the executives. In their future 
role they would also nominate the five executive board members. It is 
worthwhile noting that the practice of a supervisory board was continued. 
The five executives and the supervisory directors usually met together, 
rather in the manner of today‟s combined meetings of management and 
supervisory directors.
805
 This company was, at the time, the only publicly 
owned Dutch corporation. The Netherlands continued to be orientated 
towards agriculture, brewing, domestic manufacturing, small-scale trade 
and home crafts.
806
 
 
 19
th
 century: small-scale enterprise followed by industrial revolution 
 Since the early 1600s there had been a “Beurs” or Exchange in 
Amsterdam, opposite the Town Hall, around which the lives of 
                                                     
801 Strikingly expressed in the story of E.J. Potgieter, Jan Jannetje en hun jongste kind (1841). 
802 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 130. The government debt was 575 million florins in 1814, 900 million 
in 1830 and 1,200 million in 1840. See also Brugmans (1969), pp. 111-115. 
803 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 152 and Wennekes (2000), p. 32. 
804 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 139; Brugmans (1969), p. 69; and Wennekes (2000), p. 33. 
805 Frentrop (2002), p. 155 and Brugmans (1969), p. 109. 
806 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 152. 
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Amsterdam “regents” revolved. Commodities, shares and bonds and 
every form of negotiable paper had been traded there. Now, in 1876, an 
official Securities Exchange was founded in Amsterdam, trading mainly 
in foreign paper.
807
 At that time the Netherlands was a capital-exporting 
country. Marten Mees was an exception.
808
  
 
 King Willem I abdicated in 1840. His son Willem II reigned only until 
1849 and was succeeded by Willem III. By then the position of prime 
minister had gained in importance. Johan Rudolf Thorbecke, a liberal and 
prime minister in various instances from 1849 to 1872,
809
 was one of the 
most important statesman the Netherlands produced. He came from a 
business family, had been to universities in other countries and was a 
follower of Adam Smith. As such he believed in promoting free 
enterprise, i.e. enterprise free from government interference.
810
 
 
 The Technical University of Delft was founded in 1843.
811
 In 1858 
Charles Stork was producing steam engines. He was financially assisted 
by Marten Mees. Capital was available. There was a lot of old money in 
the Netherlands. In the first half of the 19
th
 century rich Dutchmen tended 
to invest in landed estates or foreign government bonds. There were 
others, however, who believed in promoting local industry. Samuel 
Sarphati founded the Association for Pharmaceutical Development, the 
Amsterdam Garbage Collection Service, the Amstel Hotel and an 
industrial bank in Amsterdam. The textile manufacturers of Twente, in 
the north-east of the country, established the Twentsche Bank. Marten 
Mees was involved in founding the Rotterdam Bank and the Amsterdam 
Bank, forerunners of AMRO, and later the National Postbank, a savings 
bank. He was a member of the supervisory board of each of those new 
institutions, which grew quickly and formed the basis for the large Dutch 
banks of the 20
th
 century.
812
 
                                                     
807 Frentrop (2002), pp. 191 and 193 and Brugmans (1969), p. 134. 
808 Wennekes (2000), p. 40. Another exception was the Van Eeghen family who invested in the Dutch East 
Indies. Van der Zanden (2000), p. 397 and Brugmans (1969), p. 268. 
809 Thorbecke was minister of internal affairs in a few intermittent years. 
810 Zahn (2005), p. 136. 
811 Wennekes (2000), p. 34. According to Brugmans (1969), pp. 197 and 287, and Wintle (2000), p. 130 the date 
was 1863. Delft‟s engineers tell me it was 1843! 
812 Wennekes (2000), p. 35. As regards Sarphati, Twentsche Bank and Marten Mees, see Wennekes (2000), 
pp. 109-139. For the purposes of this study it is of interest to note that large companies had influential 
supervisory directors and that Marten Mees held many of these positions. Mees & Zonen later merged with 
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 Although most people both here and abroad think of the Golden Age of 
the 17
th
 century as the start of Holland‟s prosperity and industry,813 it 
should be noted that the present-day economy is in fact based on the spirit 
of enterprise that started in the 1870s, although the elements of trade and 
water have always remained influential.
814
 By 1880 Dutch industry had 
made huge leaps forward.
815
  
 
 Growth of Dutch Society from its 1870 basis 
 The period from 1870 to 1900 produced strong industrial growth based 
on innovations in chemistry, power generation and machine building. 
Generally, this period has been called the Second Industrial Revolution, 
although in fact it was the first for the Netherlands. It set the stage for 
what the Netherlands would become in the 20
th
 century.
816
 There was 
substantial investment in larger companies that combined production, 
distribution and transport management.
817
 For instance, the families of 
Van den Bergh and Jurgens initially manufactured margarine
818
 and later 
merged with the British company Lever Brothers to form Unilever. As 
noted above, Royal Dutch Petroleum was founded in 1890. It grew 
                                                                                                                                    
Hope & Co. (in 1966). See also Wintle (2000), p. 208. 
813 Landis (1998), pp. 154-184. 
814 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 387. Wennekes (2000), p. 40, mentions, besides socially-minded Marten 
Mees, Jacques van Marken (founder of Gist Brocades, the present DSM) and Charles Stork. Other prominent 
men who founded major companies were Van Vollenhoven, Dutilh, Roentgen, Ruys and Van Vlissingen 
(shipping and shipbuilding), Van den Bergh and Jurgens (margarine), Misset (printing), Palthe (chemical 
washing), Begeman (machines), Lips (locks) and Heineken (brewing), as well as De Pesters and Van Marwijk 
Kooij, who started the Amstel brewery, which was at that time larger than Heineken. Most of these businesses 
were founded around 1870. Only the shipbuilders started earlier, Wennekes (2000), pp. 81-105 and Brugmans 
(1969), pp. 95-98. 
815 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 397 and Zahn (2005), pp. 127-128. 
816 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), pp. 416-417 and Wintle (2000), p. 343. 
817 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 380. 
818 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 381; Brugmans (1969), pp. 332-333; and Wennekes (2000), pp. 221-
283. Margarine was a French invention that was copied by Dutch butter producers Van den Bergh and Jurgens. 
Because of mercantile trade barriers put up by certain countries they chose to build factories there. They also 
copied Lever‟s soap patent. The Van den Bergh conglomerate remained a partnership until 1906, when it 
became a public company (NV). Van den Bergh and Jurgens made a secret pooling agreement with the British 
company Lever in 1908 and merged with it in 1927 and 1929, thus creating Unilever. Jurgens introduced the 
idea that top managers should be recruited only from within the company‟s own ranks. Paul Rijkens was the 
first strong leader who was not a member of the founding families and was an example of a new professional. 
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because of high demand for its products in the European market and 
became an integrated company, with oil fields, refineries and tankers as 
well as its own distribution network. Although small in comparison with 
Standard Oil, it protected itself by means of defence mechanisms and by 
its own mergers and acquisitions.
819
 Like Van den Bergh and Jurgens, 
Philips
820
 too benefited from the abolition of the Patent Act in 1869. By 
the time a new patent law was introduced in 1912, these companies had 
taken full advantage of the free-for-all.
821
 
 
 Farmers established cooperatives for milk and butter factories and 
cooperative banks for farming loans, the forerunners of Rabo Bank.
822
 
Networks of cross-supervisory directorships developed.
823
 Debating 
societies flourished. However, these societies started later and finished 
earlier than their British counterparts. Membership of Dutch debating 
societies was limited to the elite, whereas British societies had much 
broader membership.
824
 
 
 In the 1920s the chemical industry evolved still further, helped by the 
opening of new coal
825
 and salt mines. Salt and chemical products were 
largely developed by Koninklijke Zout and AKU (Algemene Kunstzijde 
Unie), which later merged to form AKZO. Unilever, Gist Brocades and 
DSM expanded. Long-distance communication with ships and aircraft 
had become important. Fokker built some of the world‟s first aircraft, 
which helped the Dutch to create one of the first international airlines, 
KLM.
826
 
 
                                                     
819 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 382; Brugmans (1969), pp. 339-243; and Wennekes (2000), pp. 341-
391. Oil had previously been used in the East Indies as balm. Heilco Zijlker, a young tobacco planter, realized 
that oil offered more possibilities. While travelling by boat to the Netherlands he met some financiers whom he 
managed to interest in oil. Together they founded a company for the production and sale of petroleum in the 
Dutch East Indies. In due course this became Royal Dutch Petroleum and, later, Royal Dutch Shell, after 
merging with the British Shell Transport and Trading Company. This is described in more detail below in the 
section entitled “1898 defence mechanism of Royal Dutch Petroleum”.  
820 Brugmans (1969), p. 336; Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 383; and Wennekes (2000), pp. 285-338. 
821 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 383; Wintle (2000), p. 129; and Wennekes (2000), p. 38. 
822 Brugmans (1969), pp. 229-303. 
823 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), pp. 297 and 385 and Brugmans (1969), p. 503. 
824 Van Rijn (2010), p. 272. 
825 Brugmans (1969), pp. 353 and 479. 
826 Brugmans (1969), pp. 486-487 and Zahn (2005), p. 262. 
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 The division of Dutch society along ideological and denominational lines 
and the sudden process of modernisation in the period 1965-1985 
 A typical feature of Dutch society has always been soevereiniteit in eigen 
kring (sovereignty of one‟s own group or milieu), which is itself closely 
related to the division of society along ideological and denominational 
lines. Over the centuries many different national groups (e.g. French 
Hugenots, Germans and Portuguese Jews) and Christian denominations 
lived almost parallel lives, with their own schools, churches, clubs, 
political parties and customs. Traditionally these milieux are described as 
zuilen (pillars). Hence the concept of verzuiling (literally, pillarisation). 
All were left by the authorities to run their own affairs. This tendency 
grew stronger in the 19
th
 century and continued until after the Second 
World War. Over time society divided into different pillars along 
denominational and ideological lines, for example Protestant, Catholic, 
socialist and liberal.
827
 Together they engaged in consultation with the 
aim of reaching consensus.
828
 In typical Dutch fashion, pillarisation did 
not lead to factionalism. As a matter of necessity in such a tightly knit 
society, the different pillars continued to cooperate with each other in 
order to achieve consensus on practical matters at regular intervals. Dutch 
governments since 1848 have usually been coalitions between parties 
representing the various pillars.  
 
 The 1960s brought sweeping social change internationally, but especially 
in the Netherlands. Dutch society secularised rapidly as Dutch Catholics 
distanced themselves from Rome
829
 and many Protestants simply forgot 
about the church altogether.
830
 The Netherlands led the way in such fields 
as overseas aid, euthanasia, abortion, drugs, peace, equal income, 
architecture and art.
831
 With the decline of the denominational parties 
ideology lost its dominant influence.
832
 
 
                                                     
827 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), pp. 408 and 415; Wintle (2000), pp. 258-263 and 346; Zahn (2005), p. 
173; and Gert van Klinken, Actieve Burgers, Nederlanders en hun politieke partijen 1870-1918 (2003), p. 449 
(“Van Klinken (2003)”). 
828 Pley (2010), p. 92; Zahn (2005), p. 173; and Van Klinken (2003), p. 449. 
829 James C. Kennedy, Bezielende Verbonden, Gedachten over Religie, Politiek en Maatschappij in het Moderne 
Nederland (2009), p. 111 (“Kennedy (2009)”). 
830 Kennedy (2009), pp. 42-98 and Zahn (2005), p. 252. 
831 Kennedy (2009), pp. 16-18 and 124-151. 
832 Van Rijn (2010), p. 273. 
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 Pillarisation and the existence of a large number of political parties are 
typical of the Netherlands. They are the product of the country‟s history 
and of the attitudes of the inhabitants of its polders and small semi-
independent cities
833
 who managed to work together on practical issues. 
Pillarisation itself is not noticeable in the composition of Dutch 
boardrooms whose members tend to be drawn from a commercial elite. 
For foreigners the existence of all these different divisions in society is 
sometimes confusing, but in the comparatively small world of the 
Netherlands everyone seems to know everyone else, where they come 
from and to what pillar or milieu they belong. This is usually not 
discussed openly, but simply taken as read. The tendency to focus on 
practical issues has remained a typical feature of Dutch corporate culture. 
 
 Mergers in the 1960s and 1990s 
 Until the 1960s most companies and their managers and board members 
tended to have strong local roots in cities such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam, 
Eindhoven and Maastricht. Another example is the textile industry of 
Twente and its technical university. In 1964, the Rotterdam Bank and the 
Amsterdam Bank merged to form AMRO Bank. In the same year the 
Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij and the Twentsche Bank merged to 
form Algemene Bank Nederland (ABN). Gradually, the city elites lost 
their local base. Although corporate boards had always included homines 
novi, a new national elite now started to evolve and the distinctions 
between the corporate world and the civil service began to blur.
834
 Many 
mergers were a consequence of the formation of the European Union and 
led to the creation of large national champions. Around 1990, there was a 
new wave of large mergers. ABN and AMRO amalgamated to form ABN 
AMRO, and the Postbank, Nederlandse Middenstands Bank and 
Nationale Nederlanden merged to form ING. Although these large banks 
achieved improved bank ratings, they had already run into problems 
before the 2008 credit crisis. 
 
 Modern polder model 
 In the same period the Netherlands benefited from the institutionalised 
“polder model” applied in the Social and Economic Council (Sociaal 
Economische Raad/SER), which is the forum in which representatives of 
the employers and employees and government and independent members 
meet to discuss and usually resolve sensitive issues such as salary levels. 
                                                     
833 Pley (2010), p. 106. 
834 Fennema and Heemskerk (2008), p. 33. 
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The SER is an important institution that represents the spirit of 
compromise and consensus in economic matters that constitutes the 
modern-day polder model. 
 
 Trade continues 
 Even today the Dutch are primarily a trading nation. The Netherlands is 
still a major distributor and is the world‟s fourth largest exporter after 
China, the US and Japan. It is also the largest European importer of 
Chinese products. The transit trade accounts for a substantial part of its 
imports and exports.  
 
4.1.5 Evolution of corporate governance 
 Early management boards, the VOC and similar companies 
 The small groups of peat farmers who worked the land beside the streams 
and rivers around AD 1000 started a tradition of cooperation and free 
consultation between equals that was designed to achieve consensus. The 
licences, “octrooien”, they received from the Count of Holland were 
unique arrangements. The tradition of consultation was continued by the 
dike builders of around AD 1300 who formed waterschappen (water 
boards) to manage the polders and control the water. The water boards 
had members, who were fully liable, and supporters, gentlemen of 
influence who contributed as limited partners. 
 
 The partnerships formed for a single sea voyage, the voor compagnieën 
(pre-companies), of the last decade of the 16
th
 century had managers with 
full liability as well as limited partners, who have been compared to the 
commendators (sleeping partners) known from societas of Northern Italy 
in Renaissance times. It is a matter of debate whether these limited 
partners (i.e. partners whose liability was limited to their contribution) 
were based on the earlier Italian examples of traders or on the Dutch 
water boards.
835
 
 
 These companies for a single voyage were already popular before the sea 
route to the East Indies was discovered. In the years immediately 
                                                     
835 Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), p. 1, where the authors state that in his thesis Van der Heijden 
defended the notion that the Dutch concept of limited partnership and limited liability for shareholders was of 
Dutch origin and originated from the water boards; see also Punt (2010), p. 75 et seq.; see also Mr E.J.J. van 
der Heyden, rewritten by Mr W.C.L. van der Grinten, Handboek van de Naamloze Vennootschap (1955), p. 3 
(“Van der Grinten (1955)”), and Van der Grinten (1989), p. 3; see also Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker 
(2011), pp. 35-36. 
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preceding the formation of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) the 
provincial states of Holland and Zeeland had issued ordinances 
prohibiting unlicensed voyages.  
 
 Dutch East India Company (VOC) 
 When the States General, inspired by Van Oldenbarnevelt, persuaded all 
these voor compagnieën (pre-companies) to merge, the VOC received an 
octrooi for 21 years. It was provided that the contributed capital would be 
returned to shareholders with accrued profits in the tenth and twentieth 
years.
836
 When the VOC was founded it managed to raise just under 6.5 
million guilders from a wide range of investors on the strength of the 
success and profits of the earlier companies.
837
 The VOC was less 
profitable initially because of the costs of the military tasks it was 
required to perform. Indeed, no dividends were paid in the first few years. 
Just before the end of its first decade, however, the board paid all 
investors a dividend of 162.5%, i.e. 6.25% interest per year 
compounded.
838
 This was paid partly in cash and partly in kind, which led 
to arguments about the valuation of the distributed assets. Dividends were 
paid in 1612, 1613, 1618 and 1620. Then dividend payments stopped, 
decreasing the value of the shares from 250% to 165%.
839
 In 1622 and 
1623 shareholders and shareholder activists (doleanten) had asked for 
more rights. By publishing pamphlets they tried to influence public 
opinion and put pressure on the negotiations between the States General 
and the Heeren Zeventien for a renewal of the octrooi.
840
 Nevertheless, 
the States General did not consent to giving the shareholders more rights 
when they issued a new octrooi.
841
 
                                                     
836 Johan Matthijs de Jongh, „Shareholder Activists Avant la Lettre: The “Compaining Participants” in the Dutch 
East India Company, 1622-1625‟, Origins of Shareholder Advocacy, Papers presented at Yale, Millstein 
Center for Corporate Governance, 6 November 2009 (January 2011), p. 11 (“De Jongh (2011/A)”). For the text 
of the licence and its translation into English, see Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), pp. 33 
and 44, and Van Dillen (1958), p. 26. 
837 Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), pp. 44 and 58 and Frentrop (2002), p. 57. 
838 Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker (2011), p. 48.  
839 De Jongh (2009/B), p. 6. 
840 Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), p. 44 and Johan Matthijs de Jongh, „Oligarchie en thema 
en variaties. Zeggenschap van aandeelhouders vóór 1900‟, in R. Abma, P.J. van der Korst and G.T.M.J. 
Raaijmakers (eds.), Handboek Onderneming en Aandeelhouder, OO&R-uitgave (2011), p. 7 (“De Jongh 
(2011/B)”), where he also refers to his 2009 publication in which he describes the pamphlets of 1622 and 1623 
and the actions of Isaac Lemaire and Willem Usselinks of 1609. 
841 Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker (2011), pp.50-51. 
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 Dutch corporate historians tend to cite the VOC of 1602 as the first public 
limited liability company with fixed paid-up capital. The VOC was a 
large public company, which indeed had limited liability in the modern 
sense, a separation of ownership and management and tradable shares.
842
 
The VOC was a merger of some of the East India companies established 
in various cities in the provinces of Holland and Zeeland and 
consolidated into Chambers (those of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, 
Middelburg, Delft, Hoorn and Enkhuizen). The VOC‟s executive board 
(the Heeren Zeventien) had authority over the six Chambers.
843
  
 
 Shortly afterwards the Wisselbank of Amsterdam was founded. This bank 
arranged an efficient system for the exchange of currencies and 
established a system of current accounts and cheques. In 1611, the 
Amsterdam Exchange (the Beurs) moved to splendid new buildings 
opposite the City Hall. As a result, the two symbols of Amsterdam‟s 
power stood facing each other.
844
  
 
 Differences between the VOC and the English East India Company 
 For this study it is interesting to note that the most obvious difference 
between the VOC and the English East India Company (EIC) was the 
different approach to the power of shareholders. The corporate structure 
of the VOC reflected the oligarchic nature of the semi-independent city 
states of the Dutch Republic, with control concentrated in the hands of a 
small group of directors (the Board of Seventeen or Heeren Zeventien).
845
 
Even after protests of shareholders and the creation of the Committee of 
Nine, a sort of supervisory board, in 1623, the shareholders still had no 
                                                     
842 Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), p. 58; Ferguson (2009), p. 134; and Cadbury (2002), p. 
5. Although the Heeren Zeventien had limited liability pursuant to article 42 of the 1602 Octrooi (see Gepken-
Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), p. 65; Van Dillen (1985), p. 27; Gelderblom, De Jong and Jonker 
(2011), p. 39; and Punt (2010), pp. 104 and 109), plaintiffs did occasionally sue the Heeren Zeventien, Punt 
(2010), pp. 106-107. For example, in a case about dividends for the heirs of stadtholder William III plaintiffs 
filed their claim against the Heeren Zeventien; see also Punt (2010), pp. 201-202. Hugo Grotius (Hugo de 
Groot), the world famous international jurist, also argued that shareholders were not liable, Punt (2010), p. 81, 
Hugo de Groot in De Iure Belli ac Pacis (1625). 
843 Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), pp. 43 and 47 and Van der Grinten (1989), pp. 2-3. 
844 Frentrop (2002), p. 85; Ferguson (2008), p. 49; and Van Dillen (1958), p. 32. 
845 Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), p. 15 and De Jongh (2011/A), p. 36. The Heeren 
Zeventien were appointed for life and new replacements were chosen by their friends, the city governors, 
Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), pp. 54-55. 
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influence. The Committee of Nine consisted of major shareholders, but 
they did not have voting rights at meetings with the Heeren Zeventien. 
The English EIC was much less oligarchic. In the EIC shareholders, 
called members, could dismiss directors, and had extensive information 
and approval rights,
846
 where each shareholder had a vote in the General 
Court or Court of Proprietors, comparable to the present-day meeting of 
shareholders.
847
 In the VOC, the Heeren Zeventien were appointed by the 
governing six city “Chambers” out of the members of these city 
oligarchies, therefore de facto by co-optation.
848
 In the first phase the 
VOC directors were even appointed for life.
849
 EIC directors were 
appointed for one year and could be dismissed. In the EIC shareholders 
had considerable power.
850
 It is interesting to note that the same 
difference of attitude to the power of shareholders vis-à-vis the board 
between the Netherlands and the UK can still be observed in the 
beginning of the 21
st
 century. 
 
 The VOC licence was dated 20 March 1602. The EIC‟s charter was two 
years older.
851
 However, the VOC was larger, having an initial paid-up 
capital of 6,449,688 guilders and 20 cents as compared with the EIC‟s 
start-up capital of £68,000.
852
 At the conversion rates at that time (9 
pounds to 100 guilders)
 853
 this meant the initial capital of the VOC was 
10 times higher than that of the EIC. Throughout the 17
th
 century the 
VOC remained larger than the EIC. The Dutch VOC served as an 
example not only for the Dutch West India Company of 1621, but also 
for other European shipping and trading companies in the 17
th
 century.
854
  
 
                                                     
846 De Jongh (2011/A), p. 74. 
847 Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), p. XI; Cadbury (2002), pp. 2-3; and De Jongh (2011/A), 
p. 74. 
848 Van Dillen (1958), p. 28 and Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), p. XI. 
849 Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), p. 54. 
850 Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), p. XI and Cadbury (2002), p. 3. 
851 Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), pp. X and 1 and Cadbury (2002), p. 3. 
852 Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), pp. 58 and 225; Lendering (2005), p. 85; and Van der 
Grinten (1989), p. 4.  
853 Jardine (2008), p. xxiii. 
854 Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), p. 109 for Denmark, p. 133 for France, p. 196 for Italy, 
and p. 234 for the UK, “EIC throughout the 17th century the largest in the UK and second in Europe after the 
VOC”. 
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 The VOC‟s octrooien of 1602 and 1623: a two-tier board 
 The Heeren Zeventien formed the executive board of the VOC but were 
entitled to trade for their private account in the VOC‟s products. This led 
to widely criticised conflicts of interest. It should be noted, by the way, 
that a similar situation developed at the EIC. In 1623 these malpractices 
were corrected in the VOC by the new octrooi.
855
 
 
 In the first years of its charter from 1602 to 1623, the Heeren Zeventien 
had features of both a one-tier and a two-tier board. The change in 1623 
resulted in a distinction between a management body and a body of 
supervisors (the Committee of Nine), which was the first instance of a 
two-tier board.  
 
 The right to appoint the Heeren Zeventien was reserved to the constituent 
founders, i.e. the six Chambers. Amsterdam chose eight directors, 
Middelburg four and Rotterdam, Delft, Hoorn and Enkhuizen one each. 
The seventeenth, who was the chairman, was chosen by the last five cities 
together.
856
 In the first years the board members were appointed for life. 
From 1623 directors were appointed for 3-year periods, but could be 
reappointed, which usually happened because they were appointed by the 
Chambers from which they came.
857
 Directors were major shareholders 
themselves. Each had to invest at least 6,000 guilders. Later this 
requirement was dropped. The Heeren Zeventien made all the decisions 
about voyages, ships, budgets, fitting out, crews, cash, provisions, the 
division of goods brought back from abroad, dates for auctions, the 
building of new ships and the declaration of dividends. Although some 
decisions were delegated to bewindhebbers (administrators) of the city 
Chambers, the Heeren Zeventien clearly exercised all the executive 
powers of the VOC. 
 
 As noted before, shareholders had no say at all in the management of the 
VOC during the first 21 years. In 1623 the octrooi was up for renewal 
and the States General had taken into account the complaints of 
shareholders about malpractices at the top of the VOC. The main 
innovation was the Committee of Nine. This consisted of nine major 
shareholders from the various Chambers. The Committee had the task of 
auditing the VOC‟s accounts each year. It also had advisory powers in the 
                                                     
855 De Jongh (2011/A), p. 80 and Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), p. 66. 
856 According to article 2 of the Octrooi, Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), p. 30. 
857 Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), pp. 55 and 58. 
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event that the Heeren Zeventien wished to sell goods and “other 
important items”. The Committee of Nine was given the right to attend 
meetings and make recommendations and also to inspect warehouses. 
This Committee may be regarded as the precursor of the present-day 
supervisory board.
858
 By 1720 the name of the Committee of Nine had 
changed to Raad van Commissarissen, the same name as carried by the 
present-day supervisory board under Dutch corporate law.
859
 
 
 Some shareholders wanted the Committee of Nine to have not only 
advisory rights, but also real voting rights on the board. If this had 
happened they would have made decisions together with the Heeren 
Zeventien. In such a case, there would have been a one-tier board of 17 
executive directors and 9 non-executive directors. However, this demand 
by the shareholders was not accepted by the States General. The lobbying 
of the merchant-regents (i.e. the regenten of the big cities) prevailed,
860
 
and the Committee of Nine remained supervisory directors only.
861
 There 
was now a two-tier board. This development came to a business world 
that was accustomed to the role of outside influentials as sounding board 
and supporter in the “polder” tradition. Nowadays, many Dutch 
commentators argue that the country has been used to a board of 
supervisory directors for about 400 years and that two-tier boards should 
therefore remain. They have become a feature of Dutch corporate culture. 
 
 The so-called Accounting Committee, also established in 1623, was 
appointed to receive the accounts for the past 21 years from the Heeren 
Zeventien. The latter more or less boycotted this committee, but could not 
stonewall the Committee of Nine as it consisted entirely of major 
shareholders. However, the Heeren Zeventien knew how to deal with 
                                                     
858 Gepken-Jager, Van Solinge and Timmerman (2005), p. 57; P. van Schilfgaarde and J.W. Winter, Van de BV 
en de NV (2009), pp. 31 and 235 (“Van Schilfgaarde and Winter (2009)”); M.J.G.C. Raaijmakers and W.J. de 
Ridder, Corporate Governance in Nederland (“Raaijmakers and De Ridder (2008)”); Prof. P.J. Dortmond, „De 
one-tier board in een Nederlandse Vennootschap‟, Nederlands ondernemingsrecht in grensoverschrijdend 
perspectief, Serie Instituut voor Ondernemingsrecht, deel 40 (2003), p. 111 et seq. (“Dortmond (2003)”); Van 
der Grinten (1989), pp. 2 and 512; and G.J. Boelens, Oligarchische Clausules in Statuten van N.V.‟s 
[Oligarchic Clauses in Articles of Association of NVs], thesis (1949), p. 90 (“Boelens (1949)”). 
859 Van der Grinten (1989), pp. 5 and 512, where it is stated that from then on supervisory directors became an 
important power, and Dortmond (2003), p. 111 et seq. who confirms this. 
860 Frentrop (2002), p. 104. 
861 De Jongh (2011/A), p. 79 and Mr J.M. de Jongh in an article, „Aandeelhoudersactiviteiten avant la lettre‟ in a 
book, Welberaden (2009), p. 270 (“De Jongh (2009)”). 
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these supervisory bodies. They saw to it that their friends were appointed, 
and they pacified shareholders by paying out substantial dividends. When  
profits declined in the 18
th
 century, the VOC still managed to regularly 
pay out smaller, equalised dividends, thereby satisfying the shareholders 
who were by this time no longer entrepreneurs but rentiers.
862
 In the 17
th
 
century one or two other companies resembling the VOC were 
established in the Netherlands, such as the West India Company (WIC) in 
1621. All of them had a multi-purpose function, i.e. a mixture of trading 
and the governance of overseas territories.
863
 
 
 As mentioned previously, the total number of participations entered in the 
share registers in 1602 was worth nearly six and a half million guilders, 
to be precise 6,449,688 guilders and 20 cents. This total did not change. 
Although there were no shares with a fixed nominal amount, registered 
shareholders were free to sell and transfer their total shareholding or part 
of it by new registration at the offices of Chambers in the presence of one 
or two members of the Heeren Zeventien. In practice, it became common 
to trade participations of 500 guilders, which was a fairly large amount in 
those days. The entries in 1602 even showed shares of 50 guilders in the 
name of clerks and chambermaids, subscribed by their benevolent bosses. 
 
 Changes to NV law in 1720 
 In 1720 the Dutch followed the British example, the new charter  stated 
the total outstanding capital, with each share having an equal value. The 
charter now envisaged regular shareholder meetings. However, the Dutch 
did not follow the British example of creating a large number of 
shareholder companies and as a result did not suffer a share bubble and 
bust, as happened in both France and England. They did create several 
insurance companies with limited liability, of which the oldest still in 
existence is the Assurantiesociëteit Stad Rotterdam Anno 1720. In the 
articles of association of these companies the name commissarissen 
(supervisory directors) appeared for the first time.
864
 The responsibility of 
the supervisory directors varied from simply checking the accounts to a 
right to veto certain decisions, and even to management tasks. Other 
insurance companies were founded in 1776, 1807 and 1809. All of them 
                                                     
862 Frentrop (2002), p. 111 and De Jongh (2011/A), p. 82. 
863 Van der Grinten (1955), p. 5. 
864 Van der Grinten (1989), pp. 5-6 and 512 and Dortmond (2003), p. 111 et seq. 
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had supervisory boards that verified the accounts on behalf of the main 
shareholders.
865
 
 
 Dutch corporate law before and after the Code Napoleon 
 Old company law remained applicable to existing companies. This had 
already been determined in draft codes prepared by Dutch jurists, 
including M.S. Asser in 1809. These drafts never became effective. After 
the Netherlands was incorporated into the French Empire in 1810 the 
French Code de Commerce became applicable. The old corporate practice 
and the clauses in articles of association remained applicable for existing 
companies, because the Code de Commerce saw a corporation as an 
agreement between shareholders. It followed that shareholders had 
freedom of organisation once they decided the regime of the company, 
even when that had been established many years previously. The part of 
the Code de Commerce pertaining to corporate law was short. After the 
liberation of the Netherlands in 1813, a committee of Dutch jurists was 
formed to draft a new Commercial Code. This took a long time because 
of the main discussion point: whether the government would have the 
power to permit or veto the formation of limited liability companies and 
dissolve them at its discretion or, at the other extreme, could only check 
compliance with specific legal requirements. The Commercial Code that 
was finally enacted in 1838, contained only very brief provisions on 
company law. It had 21 articles applicable to companies with limited 
liability, called “NVs” (Naamloze Vennootschappen).866 The language it 
employed was sweeping and vigorous, as was that of the French Code de 
Commerce. As the company was seen as an agreement between 
shareholders, existing companies continued to function under their 
existing regime, but, according to French “revolutionary” ideas for new 
companies, the meeting of shareholders would be the highest organ for 
new companies. The implications of this last point were less than might 
have been expected because most companies were old family enterprises 
in which shareholders and directors were the same persons and the old 
system of supervisory directors who represented the main shareholders 
for the purpose of checking the accounts remained in force.
867
 In practice, 
                                                     
865 Van der Grinten (1989), pp. 5-6 and 512; De Jongh (2011/B), p. 17; and Punt (2010), p. 112. Punt describes 
several 18th century cases of litigation including the case of VOC dividends for the heirs of stadtholder 
William III and several other cases involving smaller companies, also with supervisory directors. 
866 Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), p. 5. NV is the abbreviation of “Naamloze Vennootschap”, which 
comes from “Société Anonyme”. 
867 Van der Grinten (1989), p. 512. 
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supervisory directors did often check the accounts for the shareholders, as 
there were no external auditors.
868
 The 1838 Code allowed substantial 
flexibility and, besides permitting the old system (where the duties of the 
supervisory directors could be limited to “bare” supervision), provided 
that the supervisory board could even engage in management.
869
 The 
Code of 1838 had the following characteristics: 
 (i) a notarial deed and government consent were necessary for the 
articles of association; 
 (ii) registration of companies and directors in trade registers; 
 (iii) personal liability of directors in the case of non-registration and 
also in the case of non-compliance with the articles of 
association; 
 (iv) choice between bearer and registered shares; 
 (v) if a director infringed the articles of association all the directors 
were jointly and severally liable to third parties (a consequence of 
fraternal boards); 
 (vi) flexibility of the role of the supervisory board as described above; 
 (vii) managing directors appointed by the meeting of shareholders; 
 (viii) possibility of limiting the voting rights of each shareholder to six 
votes by a clause in the articles of association;
870
 the aim of this 
clause was to make it possible to limit the power of large 
shareholders and give other shareholders more influence, but the 
result could be to strengthen the position of the board vis-à-vis 
the shareholders. 
 
 Apart from the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, which had a 
supervisory board that nominated the executive directors,
871
 only a few 
other NVs were incorporated between 1838 and 1850. 137 NVs 
registered by 1850.
872
 In the following decades several attempts were 
made to introduce a more detailed code. In the 1880s, the era of many 
cooperatives and cross-networking, several informal companies 
(“maatschappijen”) actually mentioned in their articles of association that 
                                                     
868 J.R. Glasz, Enige beschouwingen over zinvol commissariaat, thesis, Serie Recht en Praktijk, no. 84 (1995), 
p.160 (“Glasz (1995)”), referring to an advice given by Crookewit of 1880. 
869 Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), p. 4 and De Jongh (2011/B), p. 20. 
870 Articles 36-56 of the Commercial Code of 1838. The points mentioned here can be found: (i) and (ii) in 
article 38, (iii) in article 39, (iv) in article 40, (v) in article 45, (vi) in article 52, (vii) in article 44 and (viii) in 
article 54. 
871 Frentrop (2002), p. 155 and Brugmans (1969), p. 109. 
872 Brugmans (1969), p. 88. 
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the supervisory board appointed the executive directors.
873
 This was an 
oligarchic clause that marked the start of a tradition of defence 
mechanisms enshrined in the articles of association. 
 
 1898 defence mechanism of Royal Dutch Petroleum 
 Royal Dutch Petroleum, later called Royal Dutch Shell, was formed in 1890.874 Heilco 
Zijlker had discovered oil in the East Indies and found financiers to back him. The 
company grew quickly and was listed. The founders and several knowledgeable 
politicians formed the supervisory board and employed August Kessler and Hugo Loudon 
as managers. Their sons were later directors of the group. When Henri Deterding joined 6 
years later, he proved to be a strong CEO, a rather un-Dutch “imperial” CEO. At first oil 
was used for lamps and sold thoughout eastern Asia. Deterding cut out the distributors 
and transport shippers and included these services in the activities of Royal Dutch 
Petroleum. This was a period of big mergers in the US. John D. Rockefeller was shaping 
American Standard Oil into a huge conglomerate. From 1898 Dutch corporate culture 
allowed boards to co-opt their successors. In 1898 Rockefeller approached Royal Dutch 
Petroleum with a proposal for a merger by public offer. He said that he could provide the 
company with the capital needed for expansion. The proposal was refused, because 
Kessler, the CEO, was able to convince his supervisory directors that Royal Dutch had 
“concessions for everlasting oil fields” and could raise all the necessary capital on the 
stock exchange. Rockefeller did not give up. He started a “baisse operation” and the share 
price of Royal Dutch Petroleum shares fell drastically. Deterding realized that 
Rockefeller‟s strategy was to buy enough shares to dominate the general meeting of 
shareholders and then arrange for that meeting to appoint new supervisory and 
management directors consisting of Rockefeller‟s men. This strategy would work because 
the articles of association of Royal Dutch Petroleum, in keeping with the Commercial 
Code of that era, gave the general meeting of shareholders the right to appoint members of 
the boards. Deterding, with the approval of the supervisory directors, asked the Minister 
of Justice to approve a change to the articles of association in order to create a special 
class of shares (then known as preference shares and later as priority shares875) to be held 
by the supervisory directors. Henceforth the supervisory and management directors would 
be appointed by the meeting of holders of these new shares. This meeting could also block 
                                                     
873 De Jongh (2011/B), p. 23. 
874 Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), p. 382, Brugmans (1969), pp. 239-243 and Wennekes (2000), pp. 341-391, 
also mentioned above. 
875 R.P. Voogd, Statutaire beschermingsmiddelen bij beursvennootschappen, thesis, Serie Vennootschaps- en 
Rechtspersonen, deel 32 (1989), pp. 4, 40, 55 and 60 (“Voogd (1989)”), and Van Zanden and Van Riel (2000), 
p. 386 and R. Polak, Wering van Vreemden Invloed uit Nationale Ondernemingen [Protection against foreign 
influence over national enterprises], thesis (1918), p. 59 (“Polak (1918)”); Staatscourant of 23 June 1989; and 
Boelens (1949), p. 10. 
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any change in the articles of association. Initially, the Minister of Justice objected because 
the requested changes were contrary to the general principles of law, but the Colonial 
Ministry convinced the Dutch government that it was in the national interest to help Royal 
Dutch Petroleum defend itself against a takeover by Standard Oil. The articles of 
association were changed accordingly. Thus in 1898, the Dutch corporate community 
received official sanction for the appointment of boards by co-optation. The times of the 
VOC with its oligarchic arrangements and government help had returned. This had been 
the trend from 1600 onwards right down to the 19th century.876 Standard Oil gave up 
trying to take over Royal Dutch when it realized it could never get control even if it 
acquired a majority of the shares. 
 
 Standard Oil then made a tender offer for Moeara Enim (“Enim”), another Dutch oil 
company extracting oil in Sumatra. This offer was supported by the Enim board. The 
listed price of Enim doubled and Royal Dutch Petroleum shares fell by 20%. The Enim 
board called a meeting of shareholders and recommended the offer, arguing that Standard 
Oil would provide capital for tanker ships. Deterding replied that Royal Dutch Petroleum 
would be a better partner as it could provide capital on more favourable terms and would 
respect Enim‟s independence. Deterding again visited the Minister of Colonies, who said 
that he might refuse a licence for a merger of Enim and Standard Oil. Standard Oil 
withdrew. Kessler and Deterding had won the takeover war only to discover the promised 
“everlasting oilfields” were being rapidly depleted. The board and the supervisory 
directors were late in informing shareholders and the listed price of Royal Dutch 
Petroleum dropped by 90%. Enraged shareholders threw stones through the windows of 
Deterding‟s house in The Hague.877  
 
 Royal Dutch later acquired all the shares of Enim and of Billiton NV, a mining company. 
In 1901 it entered into a cooperative arrangement with the British Shell Trading and 
Transport Company. Together they became one of the world‟s largest oil companies. 
When they merged in 1906 the company included the oil operations of the Rothschilds 
and Gulbenkian. By this time the main product had become petrol, for which Royal Dutch 
Shell built a large refinery in Rotterdam. It competed intensely with Standard Oil, but 
concluded a standstill agreement with the Americans in 1928.  
 
 Change in company law in 1928 
 From the 1880s onwards Dutch businesses flourished. The Netherlands 
played a role in international peace treaties. The Peace Palace in the 
Hague, sponsored by Andrew Carnegie, was built. Statesmen from all 
over the world gathered there in 1907 and 1913 to promote world peace. 
                                                     
876 De Jongh (2011/B), p. 25. 
877 Fentrop (2002), pp. 216-220. 
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Notwithstanding their efforts, the First World War broke out in 1914. 
However, the Netherlands stayed neutral, to the benefit of its commerce 
and industry.  
 
 Abraham Kuyper, the founder of the Dutch Reformed Anti-Revolutionary 
Party, defended the interests of the “kleine luyden” (“little people”). 
These petty bourgeoisie found a voice in this party, which dominated the 
centre of Dutch politics at a time when revolutions were spreading over 
Europe. Efforts were made to reform company law and make it more 
“democratic”. The public started to develop an interest in the shares of 
listed companies and thought had to be given to company law. On this 
occasion consensus was once again the basis for a new draft of company 
law. The new provisions would have created more transparency for 
shareholders and greater protection of corporate capital and minority 
rights and introduced director liability. The Minister of Justice introduced 
the bill in 1910.
878
  However, the time was not yet ripe and the law was 
not enacted until 1928
879
 under Justice Minister Donner and only then 
after lengthy debate. During the First World War the Germans started to 
buy Dutch shares. There was a fear of Ueberfremdung (dominance by 
foreigners), but this was not confined to the Netherlands. Dutch 
companies introduced oligarchic clauses in their articles of association. 
Other countries created different classes of shares with multiple voting 
rights.
880
 Dutch company law allowed other oligarchic clauses in the 
articles of association, e.g. transfer of shares exclusively to Dutch 
shareholders, board membership restricted to Dutch nationals, and 
transfer of shares only to Dutch holding companies.
881
 In 1920 Philips 
established such a holding company, which was called NV 
Gemeenschappelijk Bezit. This company was controlled by the Philips 
family and owned the majority of the listed shares. Heineken has 
employed the same system right down to the present day.
882
 The family 
owns 51% of the shares in a listed holding company, which owns 51% of 
the operating company, which is also listed. Hence the family is able to 
control the business by holding 51% of 51%, i.e. 26.01%.  
 
                                                     
878 Fentrop (2002), p. 223. 
879 Fentrop (2002), p. 263. 
880 Frentrop (2002), p. 240 and Boelens (1949), pp. 26-80. 
881 W.L.P. Molengraaff, Handelsrecht (1923), p. 244 (“Molengraaff (1923)”). 
882 Frentrop (2002), p. 243. 
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 Between 1910 and 1928 protection measures were extensively discussed 
in legal and corporate circles. In 1910 the draft of a new Companies Bill 
would have banned oligarchic clauses. However, the threat of 
Ueberfremdung during the First World War and the subsequent volatility 
of currencies led most continental European countries to permit defence 
techniques. France, Belgium, Switzerland and Germany once again 
abolished these possibilities in the 1930s.
883
 The Netherlands kept its 
oligarchic clauses. By 1928 Justice Minister Donner wished to abolish all 
oligarchic clauses, but Dutch business strongly objected. As a result, 
companies could still include a clause in their articles of association 
allowing for binding nominations of managing and supervisory 
directors.
884
 
 
 The Commericial Code of 1928 had 122 articles dealing with NVs, as 
compared with the 21 articles of the 1838 Code. The main elements of 
the new code were as follows:  
 (i) the meeting of shareholders could appoint managing and 
supervisory directors, but provisions allowing for binding 
nominations by the holders of a special class of shares – a 
defence mechanism – remained a legal possibility; 
 (ii) the role of supervisory directors remained flexible;
885
 
 (iii) publication of financial statements; 
 (iv) the paid up and maximum capital had to be stated in the articles 
of association; 
 (v) liability of founders and managing and supervisory directors was 
increased; 
 (vi) each board member had an obligation to perform his duties 
properly; all directors were jointly and severally liable for matters 
that came within their remit unless they could prove that they 
were not to blame and had not failed to take measures;
886
 
                                                     
883 Boelens (1949), pp. 26-80. 
884 Boelens (1949), pp. 93 and 107; and G.H.A. Grosheide, Machtsverhoudingen in NVs [Power division in 
NVs], advisory report presented to the Royal Netherlands Notarial Organisation (1959), p. 45 (“Grosheide 
(1959)”). 
885 Van der Grinten (1989), p. 512. 
886 Joint and several liability is a consequence of fraternal board membership. See W.L.P.A. Molengraaff, 
Leidraad van het Nederlandse Handelsrecht (1940), p. 255 (“Molengraaff (1940)”). Joint and several liability, 
with the possibility of exculpation, was introduced into the regulations governing NVs in 1928 as a copy of a 
similar provision in the Code on Cooperative Associations, articles 29, 31-32, Molengraaff (1940), p. 307 and 
H.F.A. Völlmar, Het Nederlands Handelsrecht (1931), p. 151 (“Völlmar (1931)”). 
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 (vii) shareholders could ask for an investigation by court-appointed 
investigators.
887
 
 
 Mergers of Royal Dutch Shell and Unilever  
 Royal Dutch Petroleum merged with the English Shell Transport and Trading Company 
(Shell Transport) in 1907 and formed a group with two holding companies, one listed in 
London and the other in Amsterdam. Each of them owned shares in intermediate holding 
companies in a ratio of Royal Dutch 60% and English Shell 40% and each was entitled to 
the dividends from these intermediate holding companies and paid dividend taxes in a 
ratio of 60:40, as arranged under the terms of an equalisation agreement. In 1929 the UK 
Lever Brothers merged with Van den Bergh & Jurgens to form Unilever N.V. and 
Unilever Plc. They too operated as dual-headed companies and were listed in both cities. 
Each owned 50% of the shares in intermediate holding companies, and under an 
equalisation agreement each of the top holdings would pay out equal dividends. Both 
Royal Dutch Shell and Unilever were and still are very successful. The British and the 
Dutch have played complementary roles in their cooperation. For example, Morris 
Tabaksblat, retired CEO of Unilever, has stated that Unilever‟s corporate culture is a good 
mix of the informal discussion of the British and the informal decision making of the 
Dutch.888  
 
 Further legal defence mechanisms 
 The UK never allowed legal defence mechanisms. The UK maintains the 
“passivity rule”, implying that boards should not take any action in 
shareholder matters. In the US the Ford Company Foundation issued new 
shares to the public in 1955. The family Ford retained B shares, a small 
percentage of the newly issued shares, but these shares carried 40% of the 
votes. At the time this was exceptional for the US. 
 
 In the Netherlands, however, it was quite usual to include some sort of 
defence in the company‟s articles of association. Polak, already in 1918, 
had given as the main reason for defence mechanisms the fear of 
takeovers by foreigners.
889
 In 1949 Boelens added some more reasons, 
including (i) dangers resulting from fragmented ownership, 
                                                     
887 These items can be found in the Commercial Code of 1928 as follows: (i) in article 48a, (ii) in article 51b, 
(iii) in articles 49b and 52, (iv) in article 36d, (v) in articles 36g, 47b, 47c, 591, 59b and 52, (vi) in article 47c 
and (vii) in articles 53 and 53a-d (the court-appointed investigators were possibly the predecessor of the 
Enterprise Chamber, which was introduced in 1970). 
888 Couwenbergh and Haenen, Tabaksblat (2008), p. 77. 
889 Voogd (1989), p. 8 and Polak (1918), pp. 25-57, where Polak describes the danger of infiltration by 
foreigners taking over Dutch companies. Polak himself was not in favour of defence mechanisms. 
  
 319 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
(ii) speculators and (iii) the advantage of having a supervisory board, 
(iv) continuity of the board, (v) freedom of the board to focus on 
company business without having to worry about shareholders‟ wishes 
and actions and (vi) independent shareholders. He concluded “it is 
awkward to let shareholders decide on important matters”.890 This was a 
clear expression of the idea, then prevalent in Dutch corporate culture, 
that weak shareholders needed a guardian. Shareholders cannot instruct. 
 
 The Supreme Court decision in Forumbank of 1955891 made clear that the general 
meeting of shareholders cannot give instructions to the board. A 60% shareholder had 
borrowed money from Forumbank and had pledged his shares as security. He then called 
a shareholders meeting at which the purchase by the company of his and the 40% 
minority shareholder‟s share was on the agenda. The managing and supervisory boards 
objected as did the minority shareholders. The general meeting voted, of course, with the 
60% majority shareholder prevailing, in favour of the resolution. The minority 
shareholder asked the court to declare the resolution null and void. The District Court, 
Appellate Court and Supreme Court did indeed declare the resolution null and void, 
confirming that the shareholders meeting could not instruct the managing board. 
 
 As stated before, the articles of association of many Dutch companies 
contain a variety of defences, such as giving the holders of a special class 
of shares (“prioriteitsaandelen”) the right to appoint directors and to take 
other important decisions in the manner Royal Dutch Petroleum had done 
in 1898. The Companies Act of 1928 established clearly that companies 
could enshrine in their articles of association the right of the board of 
supervisory directors to appoint its members. Co-optation of the members 
of that board became common practice. By and after the Second World 
War other oligarchic clauses and clauses limiting the voting rights of 
shareholders found their way into the articles of association.
892
 
 
 After the Second World War NVs added a new weapon to their arsenal of 
defence against predators, the right to issue shares to a foundation 
especially established for that purpose and controlled by management. 
                                                     
890 Voogd (1989), pp. 8-10 and Fentrop (2002), p. 281 and Boelens (1949), pp. 9-25, which arguments were still 
valid in 1971, see the brochure of that year of the Foundation Maatschappij en Onderneming, Profs. Kuin, 
Bosman, Van Doorn and Uniken Venema, pp. 16-20. 
891 Forumbank, HR 21/1/1955, NJ 1959, 43. 
892 Voogd (1989), pp. 20 and p. 29-191 and Boelens (1949), pp. 107-140. 
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Usually such shares were preferred shares and the number which the 
board could issue at low cost was large enough to outvote any predator.
893
  
 
 A defence, already used in 1918, was to issue share certificates to bearer, 
“certificaten”. The idea came from the US voting trusts. A company 
would transfer shares with voting rights to a trust, controlled by the board 
of the company, in exchange for “Depository Receipts”. In the 
Netherlands the original shares were transferred to an administration 
vehicle, “administratiekantoor”, sometimes an association or company, 
but usually a foundation, the board of which had the voting rights of the 
shares. For each share this administration vehicle issued a bearer 
certificate, listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. The dividends and 
other economic rights attached to the shares were passed back to the 
certificate holders. The board of such a vehicle would be friendly to 
management, so that management could control the voting rights.
894
  
 
 The system of certificaten was used again in the Second World War. The Amsterdam 
municipality had to pay a penalty of 30 million guilders to the occupying Germans, 
because the city had gone on strike. The municipality paid in certificates of Hoogovens, 
the only Dutch steel company. These certificates had been issued for this purpose by the 
company and represented an economic or beneficial ownership. The voting rights 
remained with the administration vehicle, administered by the municipality.895 The 
Germans accepted this.  
 
 In 1954 the committee Hellema found that of the 70 largest companies, 
listed in Amsterdam, only 4 did not have any form of defence 
mechanism.
896
 
 
 It is important to note that defence mechanisms can only work, if the law, 
i.c. the company law codes and jurisprudence, allow them, but it is also 
essential that the body responsible for permitting of a listing accepts the 
practice. At the time the responsible body was the “Vereniging voor de 
Effectenhandel”. It could refuse to list the shares of a company, whose 
articles of association were not to its liking. The board of the “Vereniging 
voor de Effectenhandel” consisted of brokers and bankers who usually 
                                                     
893 Voogd (1989), pp. 195-260. 
894 Voogd (1989), pp. 21-27 and F.J.M.A.H. Houben, Het Certificaat, thesis (1942), pp. 33-34 (“Houben 
(1942)”) and Polak (1918), pp. 66-67. 
895 Frentrop (2002), pp. 281-282. 
896 Voogd (1989), p. 25 and Houben (1942), p. 34. 
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were sympathetic to the wishes of a company‟s board and were less 
supportive of activist shareholders. 
 
 New Company Laws of 1971 
 In continental Europe the discussion in the 1950s and 1960s was whether 
the company‟s aim should be the maximisation of shareholders value or 
whether there are other decisive stakeholders‟ interests. 
 
 There was a strong employee interest lobby. There were suggestions to 
appoint employee representatives on the supervisory board as in 
Germany.  
 
 In 1964 the Committee Verdam on enterprise law laid the basis for later 
developments.
 897
 The following laws were enacted in the 1970s: 
 
 1 the Works Council Act of 1971 obliging larger enterprises to 
establish a Works Council, which has rights of advice, 
consultation on certain board decisions, such as mass dismissals 
and acquisition or disposal of companies, and consent on 
employee regulations; 
 2 the Law laying down the requirements of a company‟s annual 
statements, of profits and loss statements and balance sheet with 
explanations and the statement of the auditor; 
 3 the changes in the Law on Investigation of Enterprises, 
“Enquêterecht”, that could be initiated by shareholders, the 
public prosecutor and/or trade unions and the establishment of the 
specialized Enterprise Chamber to deal with these cases, which 
form the 1990s led to a body of corporate case law; and 
 4 the Law on Structure Regime Companies, which provided the 
Dutch solution for employee influence on the boards of large 
companies. 
 
 All these laws, as well as some additions to the company law in the new 
Book 2 of the DCC of 1976, described on the next page, referring to the 
“interest of the company and its enterprises”, breathe an atmosphere of 
pluralism and equal rights for all stakeholder interests, especially 
including the interest of employees. Another regulation in the atmosphere 
of that period were the Rules on Mergers of the Social Economic 
                                                     
897 Van Schilfgaarde and Winter (2009), p. 414, nr. 137 (structuur); Van der Grinten (1989), pp. 19-20 and P.J. 
Verdam, Herziening van het Ondernemingsrecht (1971) (“Verdam (1971)”). 
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Council, the “SER Fusie Gedragsregels”, the first chapter giving 
consultative rights to trade unions in cases of acquiring or disposing of 
companies. The SER has been mentioned before as the institution 
embodying the modern “polder model”, as a meeting place for 
consultation between employers and employees. 
 
 The Enterprise Chamber for Enquiry of companies created a body of 
jurisprudence, from the 1990s concerning the rights and obligations of 
boards. 
 
 The law on structure regime companies is of interest, because the 
Netherlands chose its own unusual two-tier model called the “Structure 
Regime”, which is relevant to board practices. Although this model was 
set up to create employee participation in the governance of the company, 
the consequence was that it elevated the supervisory and management 
boards to a legal position that made them immune to shareholder 
criticism, because the supervisory board of large companies were given 
extra powers of co-opting themselves, appointing the management board 
and vetoing important decisions.
898
 This came in addition to the defence 
mechanisms described above. In 1970 the general view in the 
Netherlands was that with the widespread shareholder-ownership these 
fragmented shareholders were only interested in their own profits and 
therefore companies had to be protected by giving their boards and works 
councils more power. Most of the power was concentrated in 
management and supervisory boards. It led to managerial capitalism. The 
strengthening of the voice of employees was a confirmation of the 
already existing stakeholder or pluralistic model. 
 
 Introduction of Book 2 Dutch Civil Code (DCC), 1976 
 The new civil code was a project developed some decennia earlier. 
Professor Meijers wrote many parts of it in the 1930s. Company law was 
to be dealt with in Book 2 of the new Civil Code, hereinafter to be called 
Book 2 DCC), the book on legal entities. The text of Book 2 DCC was 
finalized in 1960 and enacted on 8 April 1976. With respect to the NV 
(limited liability company, with many shareholders, comparable with the 
UK Plc, German AG and French SA) and the BV (limited liability 
company, with a closed number of shareholders, comparable with the UK 
Ltd., German GmbH and French SarL) Book 2 DCC replaced all the 
articles 36-58g of the Commercial Code. There were no important 
                                                     
898 Zahn (2005), pp. 264-265. 
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changes. The BV had been introduced in 1971. The first articles 1 
through 25 of Book 2 DCC are applicable to both the NV and the BV. 
Articles 64 through 174 deal with the NV and articles 175 through 284 
deal with the BV. They are very much alike and most of the articles for 
the BV are 110 numbers higher than those for the NV. For example, the 
main article describing the duty of supervisory directors is 2.140 DCC for 
the NV and 2.250 DCC for the BV. Hereinafter, this study will often refer 
to 2.140/250 DCC to make clear that a certain point is applicable to both 
NVs and BVs. Other legal entities, such as the state, provinces, 
municipalities, church associations, associations, co-operatives and 
foundations are also dealt with in Book 2 DCC. Then there are chapters 
on mergers and splitting of legal entities, disputes and enterprise 
investigation and finally the annual report and accounts, which were 
changed several times. Annex Book 2 DCC to this book gives a summary 
of Book 2 DCC. The summary includes the articles of the pending draft 
articles on one-tier boards, such as 2.129a/239a DCC (Act). One-tier 
boards are the centrepiece of this book. The alternative option to have a 
one-tier board instead of the usual two-tier board system was first 
proposed as a possibility in the Tabaksblat Code. This concept was 
introduced by the government in a bill, which was accepted by the 
Second Chamber of Parliament on 9 December 2009 and by the First 
Chamber of Parliament on 6 June 2011 and is expected to be enacted on 
1 January 2012. 
 
 Three “Anti-Misuse” of Bankruptcy Acts 1987 
 In the beginning of the 1980s there were many bankruptcies, many of 
them the consequence of fraud or fraudulent bookkeeping. First, an Act 
which made constructors liable for debts of their bankrupt subcontractors, 
second, an Act holding directors liable for failing to inform the tax and 
social security premium collector in case of near bankruptcy and third 
and most important for this study the articles 2:139/248 DCC creating 
joint and several director liability for sloppy bookkeeping, failing to file 
accounts and other causes of bankruptcy. 
 
 Defence mechanisms maintained, 1987 
 In 1987 the Committee Van der Grinten
899
  came to the conclusion that 
defence mechanisms could be left as they were, but that the courts should 
intervene in extreme cases. In the same period Professor Maeijer spoke in 
                                                     
899 Van der Grinten was the most influential corporate law professor of that period; the Handbook for the NV and 
the BV, Van der Grinten (1989) became the corporate law bible. 
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favour of defence mechanisms, in his Silver Jubilee speech in 1987, as a 
way for the board to act in the “interest of the company.900 This attracted 
attention at the time, because of the takeover battle between the 
publishing companies Kluwer and Elsevier. Elsevier wished to take over 
Kluwer, but Kluwer had defence mechanisms and successfully protected 
itself. 
 
 Discussions about defence mechanisms from 1989 
 From 1989 the “Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel”, the body running 
the “Beurs”, the Association of Stocktraders, supported by the Minister of 
Finance, Mr Onno Ruding, argued and negotiated for less defence 
mechanisms or at least less far reaching defence mechanisms. The old 
boys network of brokers and investment bankers at the top of the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange had become less tight. The former, by now, 
thought that there would be higher volume of trade in a free market 
without boards that can impede takeovers of “their” companies. In these 
discussions the Association of Large Listed Companies (VEUO) opposed 
the Minister of Finance Ruding and his successors Kok and Zalm and the 
“Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel”. The discussion was settled by a 
compromise: the establishment of the Netherlands first corporate 
governance committee, the Committee Peters in 1997, which would give 
more rights to shareholders and lay down a number of obligations for 
supervisory directors. 
 
 Enterprise Chamber injunctions from 1994 
 In the same period shareholders and other stakeholders got the right to 
start Enterprise Chamber cases with immediate impact, because they 
could ask for preliminary injunctions. Asking for an investigation had 
been theoretically possible since the Companies Act of 1928. At the time 
Professor Mr E.J.J. van der Heyden was strongly opposed to this idea. He 
argued that it was against the interests of companies.
901
 In 1971, as 
mentioned above, the new Investigation Court, the Enterprise Chamber, 
was founded, giving shareholders, the prosecutor and unions the right to 
ask for an investigation. The first big case was OGEM, a huge 
bankruptcy, where directors were found to have been guilty of serious 
mismanagement. The receiver in the bankruptcy was the plaintiff and the 
                                                     
900 Naamloze Vennootschap 76/1, January 1989. 
901 E.J.J. van der Heyden, Het Wetsontwerp op de Naamloze Vennootschappen 1925 (1926), p. 69 (“Van der 
Heyden (1926)”), where he writes “Risum tenamus, don‟t let us laugh”. 
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case made the public aware, to much surprise, that respected directors of 
such a large public company could mismanage so badly.
902
  
 
 In 1994 an important change was made in the Law of Investigation of 
Enterprises, “het Enquêterecht”, introduced already in 1928 and amended 
in 1971. The new point was that plaintiffs could ask for immediate 
injunctions such as blocking decisions or agreements, appointment and 
dismissal of directors, etc. This led to a large volume of cases concerning 
smaller unlisted companies and some well published cases involving 
large listed ones. These large cases are explained in further detail in the 
section on duties of directors (in sub-section 4.6.4), but are described in 
summary here to show how effective this 1994 extension of the law was. 
 
 The first large case involving injunctive relief requests was the Gucci 
case of 1999, the handbag war where LVMH, Louis Vuitton Moët 
Hennessy, threatened Gucci NV by silently buying a large percentage of 
shares and Gucci defended itself by issuing shares to an employee benefit 
fund, giving it extra votes, in order to outvote LVMH. LVMH asked the 
court to order that Gucci could not use these extra votes and Gucci asked 
the court to order that LVMH would not be allowed to vote its recently 
acquired shares. First, the Enterprise Chamber ordered that none of the 
parties could vote with the extra shares. However, Gucci‟s issue of shares 
to employees had been paid thanks to a huge loan from Gucci, which 
transaction was in the end, upon appeal, in 2000, declared as against the 
rules of financial assistance by the Supreme Court.
903
  
 RNA, Rodamco North America N.V., case was the target in the next 
takeover defence case of 2003, where the target took temporary defence 
measures. The Enterprise Chamber ordered that these mechanisms could 
not be used, but in the end they were validated by the Supreme Court.
904
 
 HBG, Hollandsche Beton Groep N.V., was the object of the first large 
shareholder rights case in 2001, where shareholders demanded the right 
of consultation with the management board on major strategic moves.
905
 
The shareholders got the Enterprise Chamber to order HBG not to enter 
into a large transaction, but the Supreme Court overturned this decision in 
2003. 
 
                                                     
902 OGEM, HR 10/1/1990, NJ 1990. 
903 Gucci, HR 27/9/2000, NJ 2000, 653. 
904 RNA, HR 18/4/2003, JOR 2003, 1001. 
905 HBG, HR 21/2/2003, NJ 2003, 182. 
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 The subsequent shareholder rights case involved Stork N.V. in 2007, 
where shareholders wanted a say in strategy (in order to split the group). 
Shareholders asked for an order that an issue of shares by Stork to a 
friendly foundation could not be used and Stork asked for an order, that 
shareholders could not vote out the supervisory board. The Enterprise 
Chamber found a middle way by deciding that parties had to negotiate 
and chose the solution of forcing parties to negotiate under the guidance 
of 3 super-supervisory board members.
906
  
 In the ABN AMRO in Sale LaSalle Bank case of 2007 shareholders asked 
for the right of veto for the sale of LaSalle Bank by ABN AMRO – and 
the Enterprise Chamber, indeed, ordered a stay of the transaction, which 
decision was overturned by the Supreme Court.
907
  
 In the ASMI – a large semi conductor producer – case of 2009 in the 
Enterprise Chamber and the decision of the Supreme Court in 2010 
shareholders wanted a say in strategy (wishing to split the group) and got 
half a victory in the Enterprise Chamber, which stayed all voting and 
again ordered parties to negotiate to find a solution. This decision, 
however, was overturned by the Supreme Court.
908
  
 In the DSM N.V. case of 2007 US shareholders asked the Enterprise 
Chamber to block a special clause in the articles of association of DSM in 
                                                     
906 Stork, Enterprise Chamber, OK 17/1/2007, JOR 2007/42, the US investors Centaurus and Paulson, who 
acquired 31.4% in Stork, demanded that Stork split itself into 3 divisions: aerospace, food systems and 
technical services and sell off the last two. The Stork board reacted stiffly. The communication was not good. 
Centaurus asked for a meeting with the chairman, who reacted that he did not deal with strategy and referred 
Centaurus to the CEO. Both Centaurus and Stork approached the Enterprise Chamber, which concluded that 
the communication between the boards and these two large shareholders was not good and that they were both 
at fault. The Enterprise Chamber ruled that the board could not use its defence mechanism outside a hostile 
takeover, merely to protect itself, and certainly not indefinitely, and that the supervisory board could not be 
dismissed by shareholders and it appointed three super-supervisory directors to be in charge of the negotiations 
of strategy. 
907 ABN AMRO in Sale LaSalle Bank, HR 13/7/2007, NJ 2007, 434, see note 928 below. 
908 ASMI, HR 9/7/2010, NJ 2010, 544. The ASMI case is a long winded case that went in and out of the 
Enterprise Chamber three times. The shareholder activists were unhappy with the founder, CEO, 21% 
shareholder Del Prado, who as they said ran the company as a family company, appointing his son as his 
successor and having the supervisory board appoint himself as advisor to that board. The Supreme Court 
confirmed again that the management board determines the strategy and that the supervisory board supervises 
strategy. They should be free to do so and decided importantly that the supervisory board does not have the 
obligation to mediate between shareholders and the managing board but can act as deems fit, which was a 
point that the Enterprise Chamber had left rather vague in its Stork and ASMI decisions. The Supreme Court 
referred the case back to the Enterprise Chamber, which decided that the investigation would be stopped. 
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2007 the purpose of which was to give higher dividends to shareholders 
who owned the shares for more than three years. The Enterprise Chamber 
blocked the arrangement that would have favoured long-term 
shareholders, but the Supreme Court overturned the decision.
909
 
 
 Since 1994 the volume of Enterprise Chamber cases has grown to about 
45 per annum. Most are joint venture cases and cases concerning unlisted 
closed companies, the Dutch “BVs”, comparable to British Ltd‟s. In those 
smaller cases the Enterprise Chamber functions well in providing an 
orderly, third party forum for what would otherwise remain shareholder 
quarrels. There are about two large cases per annum concerning listed 
companies. There is some discussion about the way these cases are being 
handled, mainly because of the danger that the Enterprise Chamber might 
fall for the temptation to second-guess directors. Both the SER and a 
group of professors of the Groningen and Rotterdam Universities have 
published studies on this subject.
910
 The SER has offered several points of 
advice. It discussed the suggestion that the Enterprise Chamber follow the 
concept of the US Business Judgment Rule. It did not go so far, but 
generally agreed that the US practice of judges giving better motivated 
judgments with clear tests is a worthwhile example to follow. Mention is 
made by the SER of Assink‟s (2007) (thesis), who argues for a Dutch 
Business Judgment Rule.
911
 
 
 The Peters Code of 1997 
 The idea of a code of best practices of corporate governance came from 
the UK, i.e. the Cadbury Code of 1992. The first Dutch code was the 
Peters Code of 1997. The committee, chaired by Jaap Peters, retired CEO 
of the large insurance company Aegon, made 40 recommendations. A 
summary is attached as Annex “Peters”. Many of the relevant points – 21 
on the supervisory board, 4 on the management board, 8 on shareholders 
and 7 on compliance – were addressed as recommendations.912 
Compliance was not swift but the report did result in lively discussions 
which formed the base for the Tabaksblat Code of 2004. 
 
                                                     
909 DSM, HR 14/12/2007, NJ 2008, 105. 
910 SER advices Evenwichtig Ondernemingsbestuur of 14 February 2008 (“SER (2008)”) and Prof. Dr. K. Cools, 
Mr P.F.A. Geerts, Prof. Mr M.J. Kroeze and Mr Drs A.C.M. Pijls, Het recht van Enquete (2009) (“Cools, 
Geerts, Kroeze and Pijls (2009)”). 
911 SER (2008), pp. 53-54. 
912 See Annex Peters Code. 
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 Changes in favour of shareholders, 2004 
 When the Euro was introduced in 1999 shareholder-ownership of Dutch 
companies rapidly became more international at the same time. Dutch 
shareholders started to spread their investments to other European 
companies. Pension funds have since 1996 been free to invest elsewhere. 
Dutch investors went through the Ahold and the World Online dramas, 
where boards were alleged to have grossly misinformed the public. In the 
aftermath Dutch shares were relatively cheap. US and UK investors 
raised their holdings of Dutch listed shares. While in 1995 37% of Dutch 
listed shares were owned by foreigners, this jumped to 75% in 2005 and 
also to 72% in 2009. About half were held by North American and UK 
investors.
913
 Suddenly Dutch directors had a different shareholder base to 
deal with. The foreigners, often with strategic stakes, made it clear that 
they wanted more influence. In the same period the number of foreign 
board members of the largest Dutch companies grew to more than a third 
of all board members. 
 
 In 2004 important rules for corporate governance were introduced, the so-
called Tabaksblat Code, which apart from describing duties of 
management and supervisory boards, gave shareholders more rights and 
supported the elimination or reduction of defence mechanisms. 
 
 Furthermore, in that year the Act on the change of the Structure Regime 
gave shareholders more rights as follows. 
 Shareholders could now appoint and dismiss the board of supervisory 
directors. A 1% shareholder or a shareholder holding EUR 50 million 
could submit an item for the agenda of a shareholders‟ meeting. 
Shareholders received the right to veto major transactions that would 
change the enterprise; they were given say on pay and received the voting 
right on the share even if they only had a depository receipt 
(“certificaat”), and the right to start an inquiry procedure and ask for 
preliminary injunctions in the Enterprise Chamber were to be used more 
easily. 
 
                                                     
913 Riens Abma, „De veranderde positie van de aandeelhouder in goed bestuur‟, Tijdschrift over Governance, no. 
2, pp. 11-12 (“Abma (2006/B)”), see also Assink in Assink and Strik (2009), p. 34, Monitoring Committee 
Corporate Governance Code of 3 August 2006, p 10 and SER (2008), p. 33. See also Rapport Nijenrode, 
Aandeelhoudersbetrokkenheid in Nederland (2010), p. 50  (“Aandeelhouders Rapport Nijenrode (2010)”) and 
Xander van Uffelen, „Angelsaksische investeerder rukt op‟, Volkskrant, 3 April 2010. 
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 Since 1999 shareholder activists have been approaching boards of 
important companies, in some cases causing minor culture shocks. 
Boards were not used to communicate with critical shareholders, shielded 
as boards had been by defence mechanisms and by their protected 
position in structure regime companies, where supervisory boards co-
opted themselves and appointed management and could afford to 
disregard the opinions of shareholders.
914
 
 
 Recent repercussions, 2008 
 Aggressive actions by shareholder activists and hedge funds, and 
takeovers of Dutch icons by private equity houses quite rapidly created a 
backlash and led to second thoughts about such unfettered power for 
shareholders. Since 2008, the government has proposed bills to increase 
the transparency concerning the identity of activist shareholders. These 
proposals include a reduction of the threshold for mandatory notification 
of ownership from 5% to 3% and a requirement for shareholders to notify 
the board if they want to object to the strategy set out by the board. The 
threshold for adding an item to the agenda of a general meeting is to be 
raised from 1% to 3%.
915
 The waiting period for a demand for an agenda 
point is extended from 60 to 180 days.
916
 Defence mechanisms will still 
be allowed. Draft laws limiting the maximum period during which a 
defence mechanism can be operative to 6 months were shelved and a law 
restricting the use of certificates was mitigated.
917
 In the implementation 
of the EU takeover directive (the 13
th
 European Directive) the 
Netherlands opted out of many stipulations that would have limited 
protection devices.
918
 
 
 Monitoring of Code, New Frijns Code 2008  
 The Tabaksblat Code was followed by monitoring reports, at least each 
year and the Frijns Code of 2008, which did not deviate from the 
                                                     
914 Couwenbergh and Haenen, Tabaksblat (2008), pp. 91-93. 
915 Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 31763, Memorandum of Reply, 2 May 2011, p. 4. 
916 Assink in Assink and Strik (2009), pp. 41-43. 
917 Couwenbergh and Haenen, Tabaksblat (2008), p. 104. 
918 Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), pp. 746-774. See also SER (2008), p. 40, which mentions that 75% 
of European countries did not opt out of the limits on defence mechanisms. One of the arguments used in the 
Netherlands to maintain defence mechanisms is to keep a level playing-field with the US, where defence 
mechanisms are allowed in reciprocity vis-à-vis the US (see Van Ginneken (2010), p.86). Another argument is 
the exceptionally vulnerable position of Dutch boards, see SER (2008), p. 37, because of the low threshold for 
agenda additions and the easy access to preliminary injunctions in the Enterprise Chamber. 
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Tabaksblat Code but did add a few points.
919
 Generally there is a high 
degree of compliance with these codes. Annex Frijns gives a summary of 
the Frijns Code. 
 
 Complexity of powers in companies at present: outside influences 
 The most recent development can be described as follows: the CEO has 
become stronger. He stands above his executive colleagues and is not 
inclined to accept the increasing influence of the supervisory board; the 
chairman of the supervisory board on the other hand has not become 
much stronger so there is insufficient balance vis-à-vis this strengthened 
CEO. This tends to weaken the power of the supervisory board as a 
whole. This weaker position instead of contributing to the development of 
strategy might result in supervisory directors limiting their task to 
monitoring and to work less on strategy development. On the other hand 
the outside world in the shape of shareholder activists, share-vote 
advisers, politicians, civil servants and the media are interfering more and 
more in company matters, which should be a reason for more board 
discussion about strategy and more proactive participation of supervisory 
boards in strategy development. Corporate governance has become more 
complicated.
920
 
 
4.1.6 Features of Dutch Corporate Culture: consultation, plurality of interests, 
two-tier system, defence mechanisms 
 
 Although British, US and Dutch culture have much in common, such as a 
crave for the same Christian religions, rationality and independence, I 
would like to mention four special aspects of Dutch corporate 
governance.  
 
 First the habit to hold discussions in an atmosphere of consultation 
always with the aim of reaching consensus, second, that all stakeholder 
interests are considered, third, the role of separate supervisory boards, 
and fourth, oligarchic features, which even into the 21
st
 century give 
directors a feeling of being protected.  
 
                                                     
919 See annex Frijns Code available at 
http://www.commissiecorporategovernance.nl/page/downloads/DEC_2008_UK_Code_DEF_UK_pdf. 
920 Prof. S. Schuit, The Chairman Makes or Breaks the Board (2010), p. 33 (“Schuit (2010)”). 
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 A Consultation and consensus 
 
  Consultation with the aim of reaching consensus 
  Dutch boards consult with the aim of reaching consensus. All 
those present are free to speak on an equal basis. This is the 
polder model.
921
 An important consequence is a “collegial” or 
“fraternal” board model as is described in 4.1.3 above.922 Boards 
find practical solutions and try to avoid having to discuss 
underlying principles. Hard basic questions are seldom asked. 
Criticism of a consensus through compromises is not appreciated. 
Board members deal with each other with less hierarchy
923
 and 
more informality in decision making than their colleagues in the 
UK and the US. In the Netherlands it is unusual to vote in board 
meetings. That fact that Dutch consultation can take a long time 
and that there is no hierarchy to speed up decision making, can be 
confusing for foreigners. 
 
  Education is technical and practical 
  Dutch engineers, economists and lawyers have a thorough rather 
technical, education.
924
 Graduates of liberal arts, such as history 
or sociology, which give broader general views of society, are 
seldom found among members of Dutch boards.
 925
 This leads to 
practical thinking and a tendency for practical discussions. 
 
  Direct and frank 
  Members of Dutch boards, not only of companies but also of 
churches and societies, are used to speaking their mind. They 
expect their colleagues do the same and respect them for it. Often 
they come up with unexpected things to test the waters. This 
direct, open, frank and cost conscious Dutch attitude makes it 
natural for a Dutchman to ask challenging questions about 
practical matters. But once a compromise is reached everybody 
                                                     
921 Bos, Ebben and Te Velde (2007), p. 45; Zahn (2005), p. 262; and Kennedy (2009), p. 145. 
922 Molengraaff (1940), p. 255; and Van der Grinten (1955), p. 420, nr. 242, Van der Grinten (1989), p. 385, no. 
385, Van Schilfgaarde and Winter (2009), no. 42, Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), no. 417, H. 
Beckman, „Bestuurder, taak en aansprakelijkheid‟, in J.R. Glasz, H. Beckman and J.A.M. Bos, Bestuur en 
toezicht, Serie Recht en Praktijk, no. 71 (1994), p. 55 (“Beckman (1994)”), and Timmerman (2009), last point. 
923 Zahn (2005), p. 262. 
924 G.G. Bekenkamp, President-directeuren, posities en patronen (2002), p. 89 (“Bekenkamp (2002)”). 
925 Trompenaars and Hampden (2006), pp. 20-25. 
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agrees to act accordingly, confident that even if they have been 
straight forward, the others will not be upset. Dutch directness 
and uprightness is often experienced in other countries as 
aggressive, blunt and pushy.
926
 
 
  Many factors contribute to the mentality of consultation leading 
to consensus mentality 
  The threat of water and of surrounding superpowers, a ruling 
merchant oligarchy, a small country, social control within such an 
oligarchy backed by a critical Calvinist church, different 
religions, many political parties and more recently the interests of 
employees and environmental concerns have contributed to this 
spirit of and respect for compromise and consultation. 
 
 B Plurality of interests 
 
  Interests of others than shareholders 
  There is a tradition of taking more than just shareholder interests 
into consideration. Since the 1960s employee and environmental 
concerns play a larger role. In the 1960s employee rights even 
became a centrepiece of Dutch enterprise law with the Works 
Council Act and the Structure Regime Act. The Supreme Court 
has recently reconfirmed
927
 this concept of plurality of interests in 
the ABN AMRO
928
 case. That the interests of employees count is 
                                                     
926 Reinildis van Ditzhuizen, updating Amy Groskamp ten Have's, Hoe hoort het eigenlijk? (1939), p. 350 (book 
on manners); Pley (2010), p. 67; Kennedy (2009), p. 18. 
927 The concept of plurality of interests had already been decided in Doetinchemse IJzergieterij, HR 1/4/1949, 
NJ 1949, 405, when the supervisory board used the term “interest of the company” in their defence against a 
threat of a takeover. 
928 ABN AMRO in Sale LaSalle Bank, HR 13/7/2007, NJ 2007, 434. ABN AMRO was negotiating with Barclays 
Bank to merge. A consortium of Royal Bank of Scotland, Bank Santander and Fortis Bank announced that 
they would propose a higher tender offer. ABN AMRO went public with the decision to sell LaSalle Bank and 
to merge as equals with Barclays. The Dutch Association of Investors (VEB) objected to the sale of LaSalle 
arguing that this was a major transaction and needed shareholder consent. The VEB asked the Enterprise 
Chamber to block the sale. The Enterprise Chamber did so with arguments such as reasonability. The Supreme 
Court reversed that decision confirming that article 2:107a DCC defines major transactions as at least one third 
of the balance sheet total, which LaSalle was not. The Supreme Court stated clearly that this article should be 
interpreted restrictively, because of the need for legal clarity for the practice of boards and companies. In his 
conclusion, Advocate General Timmerman, discussed the Revlon argument, but counters with Unocal and 
QVC arguments as well as Delaware GCL § 271. He also referred to English law, which requires shareholders‟ 
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confirmed by article 2:347 DCC that gives trade unions the right 
to initiate a case in the Enterprise Chamber as was in the recent 
case of 2010, where the Enterprise Chamber gave a judgment 
against management of the publishing house PCM and a private 
equity buyer at the request of unions.
 929
 
 
  Dutch law mentions in many places that all interests should be 
considered. A centrepiece of company law is article 2.8 DCC, 
which determines that the managing and supervisory directors 
and the shareholders are obliged to act in a reasonable manner 
towards each other. The requirement of reasonability is again a 
cornerstone of contract law. Although this is not directly relevant 
to corporate governance, Dutch literature
930
 on corporate law 
stresses the importance of the general principle of Dutch law for 
all parties are to take the interests of other parties into account. 
 
  A key decision of the Supreme Court in contract law is Baris-Riezenkamp of 
1957.931 Baris sold a business, producing auxiliary engines for bicycles, to 
Riezenkamp, the buyer, who said it was essential that the production cost price 
would be Guilders 135 at maximum per engine. Baris, the seller, said that he 
had really investigated and according to him a cost price of Guilders 135 was 
possible. Then Riezenkamp raised his offer by 10%. The sale took place. Later, 
after the acquisition, Riezenkamp had a calculation made by experts, who 
concluded the cost price was Guilders 250. The Supreme Court concluded: 
buyer and seller have the obligation to seriously consider the interests of the 
other side when giving information. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
consent for important disposals. The UK had wished to put shareholders‟ consent for large disposals in the 13th 
European directive, but found the Netherlands explicitly against such requirement. The Supreme Court stated 
clearly that the management board determines strategy and the supervisory board supervises strategy and that 
boards must act in the interest of all stakeholders. 
929 PCM, OK 27/05/2010, LJN:BM 5928. The unions started the case. The Enterprise Chamber found that a 
major shareholder forced a sale of the shares in PCM, a publishing house of important newspapers, to a private 
equity group APAX, which highly leveraged this acquisition and caused a too heavy financial burden on PCM. 
The Enterprise Chamber found that management and supervisory boards of PCM and APAX had mismanaged, 
because they had not considered the totality of the enterprise, including the interests of the employees. There 
was no appeal in this case. 
930 Maeijer (1989) and L. Timmerman, „Over de toekomst van het vennootschapsrecht‟, RM Themis 1999/2, pp. 
43-51 (“Timmerman (1999)”). 
931 Baris-Riezenkamp, HR 15/11/1957, NJ 1958, 67. 
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  Boards of companies must act in the interest of the company and 
its enterprise. This important rule, laid down in article 2:140 
DCC, describing the obligations of board members, is to be 
interpreted that board members should take into account the 
interests of all concerned.
932
 This is further discussed in detail in 
4.2.5 below. 
 
 C Supervisory boards, two-tier system 
 
  All through the centuries an important role has been reserved for 
outsiders, independent from day-to-day management. In the 
“polder” boards the “dijkgraaf” was an outside advisor as were 
the “influential” outside investors, who were attracted as 
sounding board and potential supporters. The “polders” had a 
commercial object as well as a communal aim. The same applies 
for the VOC, which had a commercial object and a communal 
aim of colonisation and defence at sea.
933
 The Heeren Zeventien 
did not have any central government representative as “outsider” 
looking into governance, but they did consult with city 
representatives as outside sounding boards and supporters for 
their co-optation. The first formal committee, that was meant to 
advise and monitor management, was introduced in 1623 in the 
VOC. It represented the shareholders, but did not report back to 
shareholders and, in fact, kept shareholders at a distance. With 
the focus of enterprises purely on commercial aims, 
“commissarissen” were deemed to look after the interest of 
shareholders. In the 18
th
 century, this sort of outside committees 
became known as “Raden van Commissarissen”, supervisory 
boards. Supervisory boards were part of Dutch culture and were 
continued after the French Code de Commerce of 1813 and also 
contained this system, were reconfirmed in the acts of 1838, 1928 
and 1971. These directors always had a certain supervisory role, 
which implied a role in the nomination of the directors, “seeing to 
it that there is good management”. In 1971 the legislator added 
that supervisory boards should “monitor in the interest of the 
company and its enterprise” and “assist”, “staat ter zijde”, 
management with advice.
934
 In the same year the Structure 
                                                     
932 Articles New (in the Act) 2.129/239, 4, 2.150/250, 2 DCC. 
933 Van der Grinten (1955), pp. 4-5. 
934 Article 2.150/250 DCC. 
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Regime was introduced, which emphasized the role of the 
supervisory board as taking an independent stance and 
considering the interests of all involved and not only of 
shareholders. Most experienced Dutch directors, management 
and supervisory directors as well, give great value to this 
“independent stance” of supervisory directors. In the 
consideration of whether or not to change from a two-tier system 
with supervisory directors and to change to a one-tier board with 
non-executive directors and no supervisory directors, it is 
important to be cautious and develop a sensitive view. 
Supervisory boards are part of the Dutch software of the 
corporate governance mind. 
 
 D Oligarchic clauses, defence mechanisms 
 
  Oligarchic clauses and defence mechanisms in general 
  As we have seen, the Dutch developed the combination of private 
investors‟ capital with professional management of commercial 
enterprises, often mixed with public tasks, in a way which 
reflects a non-hierarchical spirit of governance characterized by 
frequent consultation, discussions and compromises. Part of this 
arrangement was that the participants, the boards and supervisors 
supported each other in their co-optation and in maintaining their 
positions, as “collegial” or “fraternal” board. For some centuries 
this had worked well, leading the country into its Golden Age. 
Peer pressure among the oligarchs within cities and public 
criticism of excesses from pulpits and in pamphlets prevented this 
set-up for a long time from degenerating into a corrupt and self-
seeking regime.
935
 The disastrous years around 1800 destroyed 
much of the fabric of this system, but the spirit revived in the 19
th
 
century together with the revival of commerce and industry. Only 
recently have challenges been mounted against this spirit of 
oligarchy bred into most supervisory board members and 
managers. At the same time the walls of protection against 
outside influences on the leaders of Dutch public companies are 
being undermined. 
 
                                                     
935 Zahn (2005), p. 262. 
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  Boards not used to outside pressure 
  This cosy atmosphere was disturbed by the increase of foreign 
shareholders, many Enterprise Chamber cases, by new laws and 
the Code of 2004.
936
 
 
  Changes 2004 a culture shock 
  One could call these changes of 2004 a culture shock for many 
Dutch board members.
937
 Those who were internationally trained 
had less problems.
938
 It can be expected that Dutch boards have 
now become more attentive to foreign corporate governance 
practices, behaviour of directors and expectations of foreign 
shareholders. Discussions among directors and top managers of 
corporations now have to deal with the question of how to adapt 
to the new rules and the new circumstances that bring demands 
from foreign shareholders, the media and government 
supervisors. This study aims to contribute to this discussion. 
 
4.2 Who are the shareholders of public companies? 
 
 Traditionally shareholders in the Netherlands have less power than in the 
UK. It is often said that shareholders in the Netherlands also have less say 
than in the US. This is not true from a legal point of view. On paper US 
shareholders have fewer specific rights, such as calling meetings or 
taking resolutions that the company must issue shares or suspend or 
dismiss directors. However, through shareholder activism and class 
actions in securities cases the rights of shareholders in the US have 
become stronger in the last 20 years. US shareholders, indeed, regard the 
boards as their representatives.
939
 The importance of shareholder 
influence in the Netherlands is increasing, now there are many active US 
and UK shareholders of Dutch companies. 
 
4.2.1 Sources of finance 
 
 There are many smaller family companies which make up a large equity 
percentage of the national economy. Family companies have their own 
                                                     
936 SER (2008), pp. 35-40. 
937 Couwenbergh and Haenen, Tabaksblat (2008), p. 105. 
938 Bekenkamp (2002), p. 101. 
939 Financial Times, Wednesday, 23 February 2011, in article about Apple and the fight of shareholders for 
majority voting, the proxy issue of the season of 2011. 
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equity and have credit arrangements with banks. Larger companies raise 
money from banks in loans and from the capital markets. 
 
4.2.2 Dutch banks do not use influence 
 
 In the Netherlands, as in the UK, banks do not have a large influence in 
the companies they finance. In the 1990s the Dutch government, 
including the then Minister of Finance, Mr W. Kok, promoted more 
correcting influence by financial institutions, but this never became a 
fact.
940
 Although Dutch banks and pension funds held considerable 
shareholdings, they did not use their voting power to wield influence. 
With the recent credit crisis and the resulting reduction of bank lending, 
there is no reason to expect a growing influence of banks on Dutch 
companies. 
 
4.2.3 Stock exchange not so important for peer control 
 
As we are focussing on publicly listed companies, a word about the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange is necessary. Its roots go back to the 
informal but regular meetings of merchants and traders in or around 
buildings and bridges in the 16
th
 century. In 1602 a splendid building was 
inaugurated, specially designed for market activities. Besides 
commodities, insurance policies and letters of exchange, participations 
(shares) in the VOC and the WIC were traded. They were registered, but 
many creative manners were developed to transfer the shares or merely 
the economic rights. In the 17
th
 and 18
th
 century Amsterdam was the most 
important securities and money market in the world. In the 19
th
 century a 
formal stock exchange was established with listings of Dutch and foreign 
shares, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. It has rarely tried to play an 
important role in corporate governance, although it is, of course, in the 
position to accept or veto listings. It is now part of Euronext (Paris, 
Brussels, Amsterdam), which is in turn part of NYSE Euronext and is 
now merging with the Franfurter Börse.  
 
 For a short active period in the late 1980s the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange insisted that companies, wanting to list their shares, adopt rules 
of good governance with the aim of reducing defence mechanisms. The 
“Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel” wanted freer trade in listed shares 
and initiated discussions with the association of listed companies. This 
                                                     
940 Frentrop (2002), p. 385. 
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led to the setting up of the Peters Committee and resulted in the Peters 
Code.
941
 
 
4.2.4 Who are shareholders? 
 
Share-ownership typically remained fragmented from the 1900s up to the 
1980s, longer than in Britain. Then Dutch pension funds and financial 
institutions started to buy shares of Dutch listed companies on a greater 
scale. Some of the big banks had 5% shareholdings in each other, but did 
not try to influence the corporate governance or strategy of their 
investments. 
 
 In 1995, listed shares in the 25 largest Netherlands‟ companies were held 
as follows: 
 – 19% by Netherlands private individual shareholders 
 – 19% by Netherlands companies (cross participations) 
 – 24% by Netherlands institutional investors 
 – 37% by foreign investors 
 – 1% by the Dutch government. 
 
 In 2005, the picture had changed. The percentage of shares held in the top 
25 listed companies by foreigners had doubled from 37% to 75%. The 
percentage of Dutch private investors had been reduced to a mere 5%, 
cross participations by Dutch companies to 9%, institutional investors 
(10%) and the government (1%), bringing the total shares in Dutch hands 
to 25% only.
942
 
 
 In 2006, the percentages held in different countries of the total of listed 
AEX companies were: 
 – 21% in the Netherlands (total individual, companies and pension 
funds) 
 – 25% in the US/Canada 
 – 21% in the UK and Ireland 
 – 26% in the continent of Europe 
 – 7% in other places.943 
 
                                                     
941 Willem J.L. Calkoen, „De Commissie Corprorate Governance “Peters” zwengelt discussie aan‟, TVVS 
(1996), no. 96/12, pp. 333-338 (“Calkoen (1996)”). 
942 Abma (2006/B), pp. 11-12. 
943 Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance Code of 3 August 2006, p. 10. 
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 Foreigners held 79% of all listed Dutch companies. Only two years later, 
in 2008, the percentage of foreign held shares in all companies listed on 
the Amsterdam Stock Exchange had risen to 85%.
944
  
 
 Such big shifts had several causes. In 1999 the Euro giro system was 
introduced, which meant that Dutch investors were advised and 
facilitated to invest all over Europe. Dutch pension funds were only 
allowed to invest in foreign shares after 1996. In 2001 the Netherlands 
suffered from the Ahold and World Online scandals with a depressing 
effect on the Dutch stock market. Foreigners started buying when they 
perceived that Dutch shares were undervalued. No other European stock 
market has such a high percentage of foreign held shares as the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange. 
 
 Among these foreigners US and UK activists in particular elicited 
discussions with Dutch boards, initiatives to which Dutch directors had 
not been accustomed. The Dutch Association of Investors (“VEB”) plays 
an important role in these discussions. The VEB has started litigation on 
corporate governance matters, such as in the ABN AMRO case.
945
 
Foreigners did not restrict themselves to initiatory discussions with 
boards of Dutch companies. Dutch pension funds, organized in an 
association, called Eumedion, usually combine their comments at 
shareholders meetings.
 946
 US shareholder activists started action against 
both ABN AMRO in 2007 and Stork in 2006,
947
 which ended up in 
litigation in the Enterprise Chamber. Hedge funds and the UK pension 
fund Hermes have started Enterprise Chamber proceedings against ASMI 
in 2010.
948
  
 
 In the same period many boards of Dutch listed companies attracted 
foreign board members. As mentioned before, by 2006 more than a third 
of the total of management and supervisory board members of Dutch 
                                                     
944 Abma Report for 1995 and 2005 and SER (2008), p. 33 for 2002 and 2007. 
945 See for description of the ABN AMRO case, note 928. 
946 When Eumedion – the Dutch Association of Pension Fund Investors – writes to give its views it sometimes 
also writes in the name of CalPERS, which in June 2008 had EUR 1.2 billion invested in the Netherlands, e.g. 
the letter of 28-09-2009 of Eumedion. 
947 See for description of the ABN AMRO case, note 928, the whole merger development and necessity for ABN 
AMRO to make strategic moves had been triggered by a “dear chairman letter” of the US investor TCI. The 
Stork case is described in 4.4.2.2 where structure regime companies are described. 
948 ASMI, HR 9/7/2010, NJ 2010, 544, see note 908 in 4.1.5. 
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listed companies were foreigners.
949
 This has changed the atmosphere of 
the Dutch board dynamics substantially.
950
 
 
4.2.5 Convergence: adaptation of Dutch legal concepts to foreign ones 
 
In this section – “who are the shareholders?” – this sub-section 4.2.5 on 
adaptation of Dutch legal concepts to foreign concepts is a side step. As 
will be seen it is an important point of the Dutch legal culture. The reason 
for the adaptation is amongst others to favour the wishes of the foreign 
investors, who represent more than 70% of the shareholders in Dutch 
listed companies. Dutch company law in many ways meets special 
wishes of foreign investors. First, exemptions were introduced in 
company law in the 1970s and 1980s, for certain holding companies from 
a variety of legal requirements for Structure Regime companies as well as 
exceptions from obligations regarding the consolidation and publication 
of accounts. Many of the changes introduced by the Tabaksblat Code and 
the subsequent changes in company law of 2004 can be seen as an 
adaptation to UK practices. Second, in December 2009 the Act on the 
alternative of a one-tier board system and the draft act on a more flexible 
BV law was accepted by the second house of representatives, “de Tweede 
Kamer”, and the Act has been approved by the Senate, the “Eerste 
Kamer” on 6 June 2011. Third, several legal concepts, such as the 
interpretation of agreements, good faith in negotiations and the interest of 
the company, connected with the stakeholder model, are in some cases 
being interpreted by the Dutch courts in the light of English-American 
jurisprudence and international trade practices.  
 
 First, exceptions for foreign holding companies 
 The Act on Structure Regime Companies, introduced in 1971, required 
large companies with more than 100 employees and an equity of € 16 
million or more, to have a supervisory board. Such a board was given the 
                                                     
949 Fennema and Heemskerk (2008), p. 186. This is still the case in 2010. On all AEX companies there are 101 
Dutch supervisory directors and 64 foreign supervisory directors, see the Monitoring Committee Report of 
2010, p. 44. 
950 Prof. J.A. van Manen, in his thesis of 1999, Monitor in het belang van de vennootschap. Een analyse van de 
functie van commissarissen (“Van Manen (1999)”), has quoted various opinions of Dutch supervisory 
directors among which we find the view that foreign board members help to change the tendency amongst 
Dutch directors to protect each other, p. 292. I have also been informed by a supervisory board member of a 
major Dutch listed company that the foreign members of that supervisory board asked the board to consider a 
change to a one-tier board system. 
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right to co-opt itself, to veto important transactions and to appoint the 
managing directors.
951
 Such a structure regime is unattractive to foreign 
investors; it reduces shareholder influence to the extent that even a 
majority shareholder does not have control over the company. At the 
request of the Dutch Association of Entrepreneurs exemptions were 
added in the 1971 Act on Structure Regime Companies to mitigate this 
regime for Dutch companies with more employees outside the 
Netherlands than in the country. In such cases shareholders appoint and 
dismiss the managing directors.
952
 Furthermore holding companies that 
only have the function of financing a group of companies and again have 
more employees outside the Netherlands than in the country, are exempt 
from all the legal requirements of the structure regime.
953
 The reasoning 
is that the Netherlands has employee participation rules, but that these 
rules only apply to the territory of the Netherlands. One of the reasons for 
these exemptions was to facilitate foreign investors. This still applies, as 
was reconfirmed by an advice of 2008 of the Social Economic Council, 
Sociaal Economische Raad (SER), the forum for consensus discussions 
between government, employees and entrepreneurs.
954
 
 
 Other facilities for foreign and Dutch international concerns that have 
intermediate holding companies in the Netherlands are: first, that the 
intermediate holding company does not have to consolidate its accounts 
with its subsidiaries,
955
 second, that it does not have to have its accounts 
publicly registered
956
 if its European top parent company has 
consolidated this intermediate holding into its accounts and has filed a 
statement that it guarantees all obligations of the intermediate holding 
company. These are special Dutch facilities for intermediate holding 
                                                     
951 See for a further explanation 4.4.2 below. 
952 Article 2:155/265 DCC; Van der Grinten (1989), pp. 68-71. Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), p. 673; 
Winter (2006), p. 403; P. Sanders and W. Westbroek, The BV and NV, adapted by Paul Storm and F.W. Buyn, 
9e druk, Serie Recht en Praktijk, no. 23 (2005), p. 244 (“Sanders, Westbroek, Storm and Buyn (2005)”). 
953 Article 2:153/263, 3 DCC; Van der Grinten (1989), pp. 71-74; Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), pp. 
674-676; Winter (2006), p. 407; Sanders, Westbroek, Storm and Buyn (2005), p. 242. 
954 SER (2008), pp. 24, 28 and 41. 
955 Article 2:408 DCC; Van der Grinten (1989), p. 599; Winter (2009), p. 3278; Sanders, Westbroek, Storm and 
Buyn (2005), p. 448. 
956 Article 2:403 DCC; Van der Grinten (1989), p 615; Winter (2009), pp. 328-329; Sanders, Westbroek, Storm 
and Buyn (2005), pp. 441-442; Maeijer (1994), pp. 606-611; Prof. H. Beckman, De jaarrekeningvrijstelling 
voor afhankelijke groepsmaatschappijen, thesis (1995), pp. 367-434 and especially the English summary on 
pp. 797-805. 
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companies that the Netherlands wishes to attract. There are many 
intermediate holding companies in the Netherlands, because of the many 
double tax treaties and the tax exemption for income and capital gains 
from a subsidiary, called the participation exemption and a dependable 
ruling system to go with it. This participation exemption differs from the 
tax credit system known in most other countries and can be considered as 
further evidence of the Dutch international trading tradition. 
 
 Many aspects of the Tabaksblat Code of 2004, such as the mentioning of 
the possibility of a one-tier board system are to be seen in the light of 
adapting to foreign business practices. The same applies to the Act on 
changes to the Structure Regime of 2004, including changes such as 
appointment of the supervisory board by shareholders and a say for 
shareholders on important transactions.
957
 
 
 Second, draft laws on the One-Tier Board and on the Flexible BV 
 Since the introduction of the BV (limited company) in 1971, comparable 
with the UK Ltd., the German GmbH and the French Sarl, the Dutch BV 
law was nearly the same as the NV law and rather rigid. In December 
2009, the second House of Parliament, “de Tweede Kamer”, accepted a 
draft for a law on the BV very different from the NV law. The draft 
contains many provisions facilitating foreign investors. The law is called 
the Act on the Flexible BV with pliable rules for calling general 
meetings, the possibility to hold general meetings outside the 
Netherlands, and to adopt shareholders‟ resolutions in writing outside a 
meeting, the creation of shares of various classes with different votes and 
profit rights, with flexibility for the appointment of directors, feasible 
qualitative requirements for directors, the possibility for shareholders to 
give binding instructions to directors, the exclusion of transferability of 
shares and the deletion of capital protection requirements, such as the 
elimination of financial assistance rules for BVs. In the same month of 
December 2009, the draft law on the possibility of a one-tier board as an 
alternative to the existing two-tier board system for NVs and BVs was 
accepted by the “Tweede Kamer” and has been confirmed by the "Eerste 
Kamer" on 6 June 2011. These initiatives indicate the willingness of the 
Dutch government and even the trade unions, who supported these bills, 
to further adapt Dutch corporate laws to Anglo-American practices.
958
 
The fact that there has been an increase of foreign shareholding in Dutch 
                                                     
957 See sub-section 4.1.5. 
958 Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 31763, no. 5, p. 1. 
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listed companies from 37% in 1995 to 85% in 2008 shows that the 
Netherlands has been an attractive centre for foreign investors and for 
internationally operating foreign conglomerates. 
 
 Third, adaptation of legal concepts 
 The judiciary too has contributed to this internationalisation of Dutch 
company law, in two areas: interpretation of agreements and negotiating 
parties not bound.. 
 
 Interpretation of agreements: intent or text.  
 In the 1980s and 1990s the Supreme Court seemed to let the supposed 
intent of the parties and the principle of reasonability prevail over the 
literal text of written agreements. The cases Haviltex959 of 1981 and Hoog 
Catherijne960 of 1995 are examples of this type of interpretations. 
 
 This created confusion among English and American parties who are 
used to extensive and exhaustive documents. Recent decisions of the 
Supreme Court indicate that an unambiguous and clear contractual clause 
has to be interpreted according to its obvious literal meaning, especially if 
both parties are experienced and have been advised by legal and financial 
                                                     
959 Haviltex, HR 13/03/1981, NJ 1981, 635.  
 Haviltex of 1981was an important case of interpretation of contracts. Haviltex had bought a foam cutting 
machine. There was a short clause in the agreement, giving Haviltex the right to return the machine before the 
end of that year. Further details of this clause were worked out in later letters, which could be said to deviate 
slightly from the literal text of the clause. Haviltex, arguing that the further details in the letters should be used 
for the interpretation of the intent of the parties, won in all courts and the Supreme Court said that the text of 
an agreement should not only be interpreted according to the literal text, but also in accordance with the intent 
of the parties. 
960 Hoog Catherijne, HR 22/12/1995, NJ 1996, 300. 
 Hoog Catherijne of 1995. ABP (Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds), the largest Dutch pension fund for 
public officials bought a real estate project in Utrecht from HC BV, a joint venture of two large Dutch real 
estate investors. In the acquisition agreement HC BV had warranted that its balance sheet was correct. ABP 
did a thorough due diligence with expert advisers. ABP, referring to the warranty of HC BV of its balance 
sheet, which did not show two debts of a total of Hfl 7.5 million, claimed damages, i.e. these higher debts from 
HC BV. ABP won in the district court, but lost in the Appellate Court and the Supreme Court. The highest 
courts argued that ABP, notwithstanding the clear warranty, should have asked more questions and should 
have had a closer look at documents it received at the last moment. The higher courts use the argument of 
“reasonability”. The judgment made parties in M&A transactions insecure about obligations of the seller and 
the buyer, when a due diligence exercise takes place. 
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experts and certainly if the agreement contained an “entire agreement 
clause”. Meijer/Pontmeijer of 2007961 is an example. 
 
 Negotiating parties bound by their intent, unless they explicitly confirmed 
an opt out 
 In the 1980s there were several judgments, e.g. Plas/Valburg of 1982,
962
 
which made clear that if parties negotiated and showed an intent to 
continue the negotiation, one party could not suddenly terminate the 
negotiations without incurring liability. There was a so called pre-
contractual good faith obligation to continue the negotiations or conclude 
them in an orderly fashion. This caused problems for UK and US parties, 
in mergers and acquisitions negotiations. They were used to having an 
easy way out, by stipulating in their letter of intent that all offers are 
“subject to contract”. Judgments of the 1990s made it clear that if a letter 
of intent contained a “subject to contract” clause, parties could make use 
of this literal text: Van Engen/Mirror of 1995 and De Ruyter/MBO of 
1997.
 963
 This is another example of Dutch jurisprudence adapting to 
international business practices. 
 
 The interest of the company, stakeholder or pluralist model; is there a 
tendency to pay more heed to the long term shareholders‟ interest? 
 One of the principles of Dutch company law is that directors act in “the 
interest of the company and its enterprise”, in Dutch “belang van de 
vennootschap en de met haar verbonden onderneming”. This is the 
“pluralist” or “stakeholder” approach. The question is: is the tendency of 
convergence and adaptation to international trends as described above in 
this sub-paragraph a reason for demanding more attention to long term 
shareholder interests? 
 
                                                     
961 Meijer/Pontmeijer, HR 19/1/2007, NJ 2007, 575. 
 In a typical M&A negotiation about a Share Purchase Agreement, SPA, there was a tax indemnity in which the 
seller indemnified the purchaser and the target for all tax consequences. The clause mentions an exception for 
the period “as of the date of the running financial year”. The buyer argued that the literal final text should 
apply, especially because there was an “entire agreement clause”, unless the seller can prove that parties 
“meant something else”. The Appellate Court and the Supreme Court followed the buyer‟s argumentation: the 
literal text should apply but a party may prove that “parties meant differently”. 
962 Plas/Valburg, HR 18/6/1982, NJ 1983, 723.  
963 Van Engen/Mirror, HR 24/11/1995, NJ 1995, 162 and De Ruyter/MBO, HR 14/6/1996, NJ 1997, 481. 
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 The term the “interest of the company” was already used as an argument by the 
supervisory board in their defence against a threat of a takeover in the case of the 
Doetinchemse IJzergieterij, as early 1949.964 
 
 In 1971 the DCC introduced the obligation for supervisory directors that 
they should execute their duties in the interest of the company and its 
enterprise (article 2:140/250 DCC). The addition of the words “and its 
enterprise” was meant to stress the point that all factors should be taken 
into account, including the interest of subsidiary companies.
965
 
 
 In the Netherlands some authors, including Maeijer, argue that the 
“interest of the company” is one single concept of the continuity of the 
enterprise while others, including Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme, Van 
der Grinten and Van Schilfgaarde and Winter see it as a mix of various 
interests. Those who see it as a mix of various interests go on to say that 
the directors should weigh the interests and decide according to the 
“upshot”, in Dutch “resultante”. 
 
 In my view directors must consider all the interests and may then decide 
as they deem fit. I do not think the words “weigh”, “upshot” or 
“resultant” are realistic. Entrepreneurial directors‟ decisions are not based 
on arithmetical weighing of interests with one answer. In many situations 
more than one decision can be a reasonable decision. Then there is not 
one and only one correct decision. I would like to add that in the last 
decade communication has become more important in recent years. 
Directors must inform all interested parties in time. I would summarize 
my view as: consider all interests, freedom of entrepreneurial decision, 
proper and timely information to interested parties; in other words a 
business judgment rule with proper information to all parties as an 
additional element. 
 
 Strangely enough, the concept of “the interest of the company” was not 
mentioned in the articles of the 1971 DCC, dealing with the specific task 
of the management directors. Most authors, however, agreed that 
managing directors too have to be guided by “the interest of the 
company”. These words have been included in the task description for all 
                                                     
964 Doetinchemse IJzergieterij, HR 1/4/1949, NJ 1949, 405. 
965 Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), pp. 479-480 and Assink (2010), p. 38, describe the discussion 
between Maeijer, and others about the “interest of the company”. 
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directors, both management and supervisory, in article 2:129/239, 
paragraph 5 DCC of the Act. 
 
 It is important to discuss this principle, because first, it is seen by many 
as the beacon or the compass for all directors (supervisory, managing, 
non-executive and executive directors), second, it is broad enough to 
apply in different situations, third, it is sufficiently vague to allow for the 
development of an interpretation based on case law, and fourth, it is 
comparable with the UK Common Law principle of the “interest of the 
company”, updated in section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 to the 
“success of the company” or “enlightened shareholder value”. It also 
tallies with the US concept that the directors have fiduciary duties of 
loyalty to the company in combination with the business judgment rule to 
act in the interest of the company. 
 
 What does the duty to act in “the interest of the company and its 
enterprise” mean? Under Dutch law, as in UK and US law, the trend 
seems to be that directors, when making a decision, should consider all 
factors and interests, i.e. the interest of shareholders (long-term, short-
term, large, small, minority, etc.), managers, employees, creditors, the 
community, e.g. the environment, associated companies and other 
constituencies. As long as all those interests are running in tandem, there 
is no problem, but what if there is a conflict? 
 
 Professor L. Timmerman wonders whether all these interests should carry 
equal weight or whether there should be a hierarchy, and if so, should the 
long-term shareholders carry the heaviest weight?
966
  
 
 Timmerman refers to the Tabaksblat (2004) and Frijns (2008) odes, 
especially to preamble no. 7 to the Frijns Code: “The code is based on the 
principle accepted in the Netherlands that a company is a long-term alliance between the 
various parties involved in a company. The stakeholders are the groups and individuals 
who, directly or indirectly, influence – or are influenced by – the attainment of the 
company‟s objects, i.e. employees, shareholders and other lenders, suppliers, customers, 
the public sector and civil society. The management board and supervisory board have 
overall responsibility for weighing up all these interests, generally with a view to ensuring 
the continuity of the enterprise, while the company endeavours to create long term 
shareholder value”. Furthermore he refers to section 172 of the UK 
                                                     
966 Timmerman, Speech (2009), which journal contains the text of his “oratie”, his formal speech accepting the 
appointment of professor of the principles of company law at the Erasmus University on 19 December 2008. 
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Companies Act 2006 with its concept of the “success of the company” 
and “the enlightened shareholder value”. 
 
 The “interest of the company” has been a subject for many corporate law 
authors in the last few years.
967
 
 
 Professor Alexander Rinnoy Kan, Chairman of the SER,
 
has said “the supervisory board 
should be accountable to stakeholders once per year, at least to the prime shareholders and 
employees”.
 968
 
 
 What can the Dutch learn from the English and American concept of 
“interest of the company”? 
 The “interest of the company” is an old, well-known term in UK 
Common Law. Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 – and especially 
the relevant debate about it – builds on the vague text “interest of the 
company”the modern term “the success of the company”, which appears 
in the text of this section 172. The accepted interpretation rejects a 
“pluralist” approach (in the UK the term “pluralism” means equal 
treatment of all factors making up the “interest” or the “success” of the 
                                                     
967 H.J. de Kluiver, „Vennootschappelijke repliek op Timmerman‟s grondslagen‟, Ondernemingsrecht 2009/4, 
pp. 17-20; J.M.M. Maeijer, Het belangenconflict in de naamloze vennootschap, oratie (1964) (“Maeijer 
(1964)”) and 25 years later, „25 jaren belangenconflict in de Naamloze Vennootschap‟, NV 67/1, January 1989 
(“Maeijer (1989)”); Van der Grinten (1989), p. 445; H.J.M.N. Honee, „Commissarissen, gezanten uit 
Niemandsland?‟,  NV 1996, no. 11, p. 276; P.C. van den Hoek, „Vrijheid alleen is niet genoeg, een reactie‟, 
Ondernemingsrecht 2006/9, pp. 24-27; Timmerman (1999), pp. 43-51, specifically p. 44, in which article 
Timmerman already foresees a One-Tier Board Act, see p. 49; M.W. den Boogert, „De vergeten band tussen 
raad an commissarissen en algemene vergadering: De Januskop van de commissaris‟, Ondernemingsrecht 
2005/87 (“Den Boogert (2005)”); Van Schilfgaarde and Winter (2009), pp. 11 and 212 and Jaap Winter, 
„Level Playing Fields Forever‟, in H. Beckman, H.L. Kaemingk and C. Honée (eds.), De nieuwe macht van de 
kapitaalverschaffer (2007), pp. 7-8 (“Winter (2007)”); Assink in Assink and Strik (2009), pp. 67-71. In short, 
Van den Hoek, Den Boogert and Winter give the view that the supervisory board should pay more attention to 
the interests of the shareholders, at least more than before 2004. In this view Den Boogert goes furthest in 
favour of shareholders generally, while Van den Hoek makes the nuance of long-term shareholders interest. 
There is criticism on this extreme favouring of shareholder interest of Den Boogert by Assink, who asks what 
shareholder interest is, because there are so many varied shareholder views. There is also criticism of 
favouring long-term shareholders by De Kluiver, who asks what long-term shareholder interest is, because 
there may be many views on the subject. I believe the UK and US experiences can help here. 
968 Chairman of the Social Economic Council, “SER”, the forum of discussions between government, employers 
and employees in his speech to company lawyers on 14 November 2008; Bestuur en Toezicht, uitgave 
vanwege het Instituut voor Ondernemingsrecht, RUG, no. 67. 
  
 348 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
company) and imposes on a director the obligation “to have regard” to all 
factors, many of which are defined, including the meaning of “long-
term”. His basic duty is to promote the purposes of the company “for the 
benefit of its members as a whole”. This may go contrary to the aims of 
short-term shareholders.
969
 It is up to the directors, in good faith to 
determine what policies the success of the company demands.
970
 
Directors are, in the UK, expected to make business judgments and 
decisions in good faith, and courts are generally reluctant to second guess 
those judgments and decisions.
971
 
 
 The Attorney General, Lord Peter Goldsmith, said in Parliament in 
2006
972: “under the duty to promote the „success of the company‟ the 
weight to be given to any factor is a matter for good faith judgment of the 
directors. Importantly, his decision is not subject to a reasonableness test, 
and, as now, the courts will not apply a reasonableness test to directors‟ 
business decisions.” I call this: “the director is free to decide” and I add: 
“as entrepreneur”. With respect to “entrepreneurship” I refer to the words 
“entrepreneurial leadership” in A1 supporting principal of the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, discussed in 2.5.3 above. 
 
 Communication is also important. In the Netherlands information to 
shareholders should be developed further than up to now. 
 
 A recent UK study
973
 discusses categories of shareholders: founders, 
families, foundations, employees, engaged shareholders, unengaged 
shareholders, such as some investment institutions and sovereign wealth 
funds, traders and speculators, such as hedge funds, and says that without 
saying that any particular category is good or bad the first are logically 
interested in long-term strategy or “stewardship”, while others play in a 
“casino economy” and are useful for liquidity of the market. The study 
finds indicators that shareholders who are not interested in stewardship 
may be on the increase and globalization of capital markets could make 
communication between boards and shareholders more difficult. It 
concludes with the opinion that directors should focus their dialogue on 
                                                     
969 Davies (2008), pp. 507-519. 
970 Smerdon (2007), p. 89. 
971 Smerdon (2007), p. 94. 
972 Mayo in Rushton (2008), pp. 127-128. 
973 Goyder (2008/A) and (2008/B). 
  
 349 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
the stewardship shareholders which would require them to obtain a 
clearer picture of whom and where such shareholders are. 
 
 In the US boards do not have to follow shareholder instructions. 
Shareholders have the right to elect directors, but not to give them 
binding instructions. The directors must take their own decisions, but 
with requirements of due process. US judges apply the business judgment 
rule. There is no reasonableness test, but alternatives and the interests of 
the company and all concerned must have been considered. A decision 
may in no way be disloyal to the company, i.e. no self-interest: loyalty to 
the long-term shareholder interests, not plurality, is the US bright-line.  
 
 US practice makes a distinction between shareholders, from “traders” to 
“strategic investors (like Buffet and Monk)”. It is also held advisable to 
communicate directly with these long-term shareholders.
974
 
 
 On the other hand, Netherlands‟ jurisprudence, for example ABN AMRO 
of 2007 and ASMI
975
 of 2010, supports pluralism in the Dutch sense. 
Boards should consider all interests involved. This could lead to several 
alternatives, resulting in several acceptable business judgments.  
 
 Now we come back to the question of hierarchy when considering the 
interests and the influence of shareholders. Dutch, like their US and UK 
colleagues, do not have to follow instructions from shareholders.
976
 
Traditionally, Dutch boards could even behave remotely towards 
shareholders. As we have seen (vide preamble 7 of the Frijns Code above 
and the laws of 2004 in favour of shareholders), a growing influence of 
shareholders has been acknowledged in Dutch corporate culture. There is 
a strong current in UK and US literature that recommends boards to 
communicate with those shareholders who are interested in long-term 
stewardship.
977
  
 
 For the Netherlands I would like to refer to the Verenigde Bootlieden case 
of 1994, where the Supreme Court said that there can be reasons to deal 
with different shareholders in different ways and to the DSM case of 2007 
                                                     
974 Brancato (1997), pp. 11-33. 
975 See notes 928and 908 above. 
976 Forumbank, HR 21/1/1955, NJ 1959, 43. 
977 Goyder (2008/A) and (2008/B) and Brancato (1997). 
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and especially in the conclusion to that case of the advocate general.
978
 In 
the Netherlands the literature on one-on-one meetings of directors with 
shareholders started with Eisma,
979
 who realized in 1998 that the Dutch 
should adapt to the UK and US practice, but concluded that he was 
basically against one-on-ones, because he found two dangers: such 
contacts could be in contravention of the principle of the equality of 
shareholders expressed article 2:92, paragraphs 1 and 2 DCC and could 
lead to insider trading prohibited by the then Fondsenreglement 28h. 
Professor Vletter-Van Dort
980
 in her thesis deals with these aspects in 
detail and basically agrees with Eisma, but does find examples of 
exceptions for the equality of shareholders and concludes, along the lines 
of the Verenigde Bootlieden judgment, that if it is in the interest of the 
company to make an exception to this principle, the court should allow it. 
I would argue that it can be in the interest of the company to have one-to-
ones with shareholders, who have a long-term interest and with any 
shareholder who expresses the wish to have a one-on-one with the board. 
I do realize the danger of spreading insider knowledge which article 28h 
of the former Fondsenreglement intended to avoid and which prohibition 
is now laid down in articles 5.25i and 5.27 of the Act on Financial 
Supervision (Wet Financieel Toezicht). 
 
 Generally institutional investors in the UK have larger percentages of 
shares than Dutch investors have. This would seem to decrease the Dutch 
interest in one-on-ones. However, 56% of the Dutch listed companies 
report to have more than 12 one-on-ones per year and 34% report to have 
more than 50 one-on-ones per year.
981
 
 
 Boards should sound out long-term shareholders and listen. A good base 
of long-term shareholders is important and worth cultivating. Because 
shareholders fall in different categories, boards should be free to choose 
with which sort of shareholders they communicate. They must make their 
                                                     
978 Verenigde Bootlieden, HR 31/12/1993, NJ 1994, 436 and DSM, HR 14/12/2007, NJ 2008, 105 with 
conclusion Advocate General L. Timmerman. 
979 Prof. Mr S.E. Eisma, „Investor Relations‟, inaugural speech (The Hague 1998) (“Eisma (1998)”) 
980 Prof. Mr H.M. Vletter-Van Dort, Gelijke Behandeling van Beleggers bij Informatieverstrekking, thesis (2001) 
and Prof. Mr H.M. Vletter-Van Dort, „Nogmaals gelijke behandeling van aandeelhouders‟, in J.B. Huizink, 
J.B. Wezeman and J. Winter (eds.), A-T-D Opstellen Aangeboden aan Prof. mr P. van Schilfgaarde (2000), p. 
429, who was not in favour of any exceptions. 
981Aandeelhouders Rapport Nijenrode (2010), p. 80. One-on-ones also called one-to-ones. 
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communication policy public on their website.
982
 Thoughtful 
communication should be established with all “stakeholders” as this is 
usually directly or indirectly in the interest of long-term shareholders. 
Boards should communicate with relevant stakeholders in specific cases, 
but in all cases with shareholders. The UK practice is in favour of one-
on-ones, also called one-to-ones. The UK FSA has issued a guideline for 
this. In the US the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and in 
the Netherlands the Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM), have set up 
websites with question and answer programmes on the subject of one-on-
one meetings between representatives of a board and individual 
shareholders. Both authorities confirm that one-on-ones are permitted. 
They emphasize that boards in such one-on-ones must not give sensitive 
information, that is not available to others.
983
 In the Netherlands, the 
AFM has, after one of its directors said he was against one-to-ones, 
issued a Q&A – comparable with the SEC‟s Q&A – confirming that one-
to-ones are permissible with caveats for sensitive information. Sometimes 
lock-up and secrecy agreements will be necessary.
984
 The UK 
Stewardship Code of 2010 also emphasizes that representatives of 
institutional investors should meet with board members. This Code 
advises at the same time that institutional investors should avoid 
becoming insiders.
985
 One-on-ones with selected shareholders are usually 
held by the CEO and CFO, sometimes in the presence of the chairman of 
the supervisory board or of the one-tier board. In some cases of one-on-
ones it may be necessary to agree to lock-ups restricting trade in shares of 
the company for a specific period.
986
 The Frijns Code, too, deals with this 
                                                     
982 Frijns Code requires to do this, IV.3.13, but hardly any listed company in the Netherlands has followed up on 
this, yet. Philips N.V., which in my view does communicate excellently, does mention its policy in its annual 
accounts and refers to its website, but the website does not yet contain such policy. The Monitoring Report of 
the Committee Streppel of 2010 complains about the lack of this follow-up. 
983 SEC letter of 4 June 2010, Regulation FD Question and Answer 101.11, see chapter on US section 3.2.3; 
Dutch AFM website http:/www.afm.nl/nl/professionals/diensten/veelgestelde-vragen/marktmisbruik/one-on-
ones-aspx?perpage=10. The UK FSA has issued a guideline for this purpose, DR 2.2.10 
http/fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/DTR. 
984 Q&A to be found on website: 
http:/www.afm.nl/nl/professionals/diensten/veelgestelde-vragen/marktmisbruik/one-on-ones.aspx?perpage=10. 
985 The UK Stewardship Code of July 2010 made by the Financial Reporting Council describes visits with board 
members in principles 1, 2 and 3. 
986 See also Prof. Dr. A.W.A. Boot and Prof. Dr. K. Cools R.A. in their advice to the Royal Association for 
Country Policy, „Private Equity and aandeelhouders activisme‟ (2007). They promote (a) more transparency 
with and among shareholders, market manipulation, (b) lock-ups for shareholders that have one-on-ones, (c) 
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subject, vide preambles 9 and 10: “the greater the interest, which the shareholder 
has in a company, the greater is his responsibility to the company …” (see 9) and “good 
relations between the various stakeholders are of great importance in this connection, 
particularly through a continuous and constructive dialogue” (see 10). Dutch boards 
could and should have one-on-ones with stewardship shareholders, follow 
the UK example of listening, and publish their policy in this matter on 
their website. 
 
 The UK and US examples teach us that classifying shareholders in 
different categories and ranging these groups into an order of priority is a 
worthwhile effort.  
 
 “Hierarchy”, according to UK and US ideas, does mean that in all 
decisions the boards must think of the long-term shareholders. If there are 
no shareholders that express a view it would be the imaginary long-term 
shareholder and if there is a shareholder who expresses a long-term view, 
boards must consider these views. They must take time and energy to 
explain their thought process to shareholders. It is important for the board 
to manage its relationship with shareholders. The board must make clear 
what its strategy is, what growth it is aiming for and what acquisition 
strategy it has. If an opportunity comes about to buy a company, it should 
go ahead without asking shareholders and explain immeditely after the 
acquisition how it fitted in the strategy. If it does not give this 
information, it will have a problem.
987
  
 
 The same applies to closing a factory. Communication in advance with 
the works council and later with shareholders as well is vital. Boards 
should be free in their good faith business decisions and free from a 
reasonableness test, but they should take time to explain to shareholders. 
This implies that I am in favour of giving long-term shareholders a higher 
position on the ladder of information obligations, because they are always 
concerned.988 
                                                                                                                                    
use of transparency defence mechanisms and (d) quorums for dismissal of directors. 
987 Couwenbergh and Haenen, Tabaksblat (2008), pp. 110-113. 
988 In connection with “hierarchy” it is interesting to mention Van Manen (1999), pp. 256-261. He asked 45 
supervisory directors whether they would consent to a mass dismissal of employees, if this would (a) cause 
substantially more profitability, (b) cause the enterprise to at least make a minimal profitability instead of 
losses and (c) protect its continuity, i.e. avoid bankruptcy. In all cases, the majority and in the last case 100% 
of the supervisory directors responded that they would favour a decision for mass dismissal. Of course, the 
supervisory board would require proper communication with shareholders, the Works council and unions. 
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4.3 Formal acts and informal codes 
 
 Dutch corporate governance law is based on Book 2 DCC and the Frijns 
Code of 2008 on best practice, which succeeded the Tabaksblat Code of 
2004. The DCC is discussed at the end of sub-section 4.1.5 and in sub-
section 4.6.2. The Tabaksblat and Frijns Codes are discussed at the end of 
sub-section 4.1.5 and in sub-sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3. The Netherlands is 
a civil law country and has detailed legislation on NVs and BVs in Book 
2 DCC, which contains a large number of stipulations, many of which are 
mandatory law and some of which are optional. In addition, corporate 
governance is influenced to a large extent by the Frijns Code, which is 
regarded as soft law in the “comply or explain” tradition, taken over from 
the UK system of codes of best practices. In the same way in the UK 
listing rules, there is an obligation in the Netherlands to report about 
deviations from the Frijns Code in the annual report of the company.
989
 
 
4.4 Composition of Dutch boards, division of tasks 
 
4.4.1 Introduction  
 
 The UK and the US have only a one governance system, i.e. the one-tier 
board system. The compositions of UK and US average boards were 
alike up to the 1980s. They had a CEO, who was also chairman, about 3 
other executive directors and 4 or 5 outside directors. Since 1993 the UK 
made changes to separate the functions of CEO and chairman, 
maintaining the 3 other executive directors and the 4 or 5 outside or non-
executive directors in order to have a balanced board. In the US changes 
were different. There was a focus in the 1990s, and certainly from 2002, 
on a strong majority of independent directors. The typical board is 
composed of a CEO, who in most cases is also chairman and about 7 to 8 
independent directors, who are typically led by a lead director to create 
counterbalance. The other executives, officers apart from the CEO, are 
not on the board, but do attend meetings. Since 2002 many US 
companies have instituted executive sessions of independent directors 
meeting alone and are gradually going over to appointing a separate non-
CEO chairman. 
 
                                                     
989 Article 2.391,5 DCC. 
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 We see that the UK and the US have one and the same basic system with 
large flexibility and that the composition has changed in the last 20 years 
in different directions. 
 
 The law in the Netherlands specifies two possible systems: a simple 
management board or a two-tier board. The institution of a supervisory 
board is optional in the Netherlands, but for larger companies it is the 
norm. Most larger companies have a management board of about 3 or 4 
and a supervisory board of about 6 members. Furthermore there are 
special large companies, the Structure Regime companies, that must have 
a supervisory board with specific powers. Then the Act of 6 June 2011, 
which is expected to be effective on 1 January 2012, makes the one-tier 
board a possible alternative for all companies, next to the two-tier system, 
whether in a Structure Regime company or not. This means that from the 
date that the Act has become effective, there will be five alternative 
compositions of boards: first, the simple monistic management board 
system, used for many small companies and a few larger ones, second, 
the two-tier board system used in most large companies, third, the two-
tier board Structure Regime companies for even larger companies, fourth, 
the one-tier board companies and, fifth, the one-tier board Structure 
Regime companies. These compositions will be discussed hereafter in 
section 4.4. 
 
 As in the UK and the US, Dutch companies too should have (i) a purpose, (ii)  a strategy, 
(iii) policies, (iv) risk management, (v) succession, (vi) evaluation systems, and (vii) a 
policy for communication with shareholders and other interested parties, such as 
employees, customers, suppliers and society. All these elements must be developed, 
implemented and monitored. The members of two-tier boards or of one-tier boards have 
to work together to fulfil these tasks. The question is what best practice for the 
composition of the board can be developed in the Netherlands to fulfil all these elements 
and roles in the most efficient way and to avoid inefficiencies brought about by risks such 
as the “imperial CEO”, “group think”, loafing in acceptable sub-optimal work, lack of 
teamwork, continuing disputes and/or lack of communication. 
 
 This section (4.4) describes the various practices in the Netherlands for the composition of 
the board. First it describes the legal basis of the normal Dutch two-tier board system, the 
structure regime, examples of the use of the one-tier board system under present law and 
the description of the new Act on the alternative of a one-tier board (4.4.2); followed, 
second, by a description of the composition of what average boards look like in the usual 
two-tier boards, the present one-tier boards and expected future one-tier boards under the 
Act (4.4.3); and the changes in board composition brought about by the codes, and 
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creation of committees (4.4.4); as well as the element of non-executives being in the 
majority on the future one-tier board (4.4.5) and size (4.4.6). These aspects are followed 
by a summary concerning composition of boards in the Netherlands (4.4.7). This section 
4.4 on the composition of the board(s) will be followed by a section describing the role of 
each type of director in the different compositions (section 4.5), followed by sections on 
duties (section 4.6) and liabilities of directors (section 4.7). 
 
4.4.2 Dutch board composition, present and future 
 
4.4.2.1 Dutch board composition, usually two-tier board 
Dutch company law is described in Book 2 DCC. Every Dutch NV must 
have a management board. A supervisory board is optional. Most 
companies, that are listed or have more than one shareholder, have two 
boards. Having a two-tier board system, is part of Dutch corporate 
culture. As described before, throughout the centuries Dutch companies 
have had separate supervisory boards with functionaries, who were not 
part of the management board and had an independent role in looking 
after the interests of the shareholders and others involved with the 
enterprise and sometimes in providing support for management. The 
background of this culture is described in 4.1.6C and D above. The early 
“polder” enterprises were commercial project development enterprises, 
that also had as aim to create and run the villages and churches in the 
“polders”. The VOC had the aim of trading for profit and at the same 
time had a colonial and a naval defensive role. Most 17
th
 century 
enterprises had dual commercial and communal objects.
990
 This meant 
that it was logical to ask for outsiders in a supervisory role to check and 
support management in connection with these other interests. In this 
atmosphere the committees that had a monitoring role in the name of 
shareholders, such as in the VOC from 1623 did so independently 
without reporting to the shareholders. These committees, from 1720 
called supervisory boards, always functioned in a limited advisory and 
non-directive role. At the same time these independent functionaries were 
to advise management independently about other interests connected with 
the enterprise and these distant functionaries also often had a direct or 
indirect role in the nomination and appointment process of board 
members, from the city chambers in the VOC to the binding nominations 
in Royal Dutch Petroleum, to the structure regime. It is with this 
background that Dutch company law describes the role of the supervisory 
                                                     
990 Van der Grinten (1955) and (1989), pp. 4-5.  
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board as supervising and standing by the management board with advice, 
taking all interests into account.
991
 
 
4.4.2.2 Structure regime supervisory boards 
 In the 1970s worker participation became important. The Netherlands 
chose for a different two-tier board system from Germany. In Germany 
supervisory boards of large companies had to make nearly 50% of the 
seats available for representatives of trade unions. In the Netherlands this 
option was not chosen, because neither the unions nor the enterprises 
wanted union members or employees on the supervisory board. Most UK 
and US literature dealing with two-tier boards looks at the German 
system.
992
  
 
 The two-tier system of Germany has a history and culture of its own since 
the Allgemeine Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch of 1861, of the period 
following the unification of Germany. Since the Aktienrechtsnovelle of 
1870 larger companies had a mandatory supervisory board, 
“Aufsichtsrat”, of shareholder representatives. The Aktienrechtsnovelle of 
1884 made it possible for non-shareholders to be supervisory board 
members. They could supervise especially, because of their qualities. The 
law gave a further description of the supervision function. Further 
reforms were introduced with the employee participation rules of 1920, 
1931 and 1937. There were further changes in 1951, 1952 and 1976, 
which reform describes that AGs with more than 2,000 employees just 
below half of its supervisory board members had to be employee 
representatives.
993
 
 
 In the international arena the Dutch were able to develop a two-tier 
system that on the one hand gives some influence to works councils, at 
least for consultation and good communication and maybe even in some 
cases for sounding out the employee base for strategic decisions, and on 
the other hand does maintain the possibility for the management board to 
continue its management function with limited outside interference and in 
harmonious consultation with a supervisory board. This system was laid 
down in the 1971 Act on Structure Regime Companies, which 
perpetuated the time-honoured tradition of a supervisory board with 
                                                     
991 Article 2:140/250, 2 DCC. 
992 Charkham (2005), pp. 29-107; Cadbury (2002), p. 229. 
993 Marcus Lutter, „Der Aufsichtsrat im Wandel der Zeit‟, Aktienrecht im Wandel, Band II (2007), pp. 389-429, 
Chapter „Der Aufsichtsrat im Wandel der Zeit‟ (“Lutter (2007)”). 
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substantial powers and independent, not special interest, director.
994
 
Employees got their say in another way than through their own directors. 
 
 The Dutch did introduce works councils with the Works Council Act of 
1971. Every company with more than 50 employees must have a works 
council. The works council is a body of representatives of the employees 
of the company. It must be consulted by management to give advice on 
important decisions, such as acquisitions or disposal of shares or 
enterprises, large loans, mass dismissals or a change in management 
structure. For example, if a company would contemplate a change from a 
two-tier system to a one-tier system, the works council would have to be 
consulted.
995
 Its advice must, by law, be taken into account by 
management before it takes its decisions on these major matters. If the 
works council gives a negative advice on the proposed decision of 
management, management must wait for a month to give the works 
council the possibility to lodge an appeal with the Enterprise Chamber.
996
 
 
 The essential novel part of the Dutch worker participation system is the 
so-called “Structure Regime” arrangement for large companies laid down 
in the Structure Regime Act of 1971. Large companies, for the Structure 
Regime, are companies with more than € 16 million997 equity (paid-up 
capital plus reserves), with at least 100 employees and a works council 
that has been active in its group of companies for more than three 
years.
998
 These large companies must have a supervisory board, which is 
independent from shareholders and management and considers the 
interests of the company and its enterprise, i.e. all stakeholders. A 
supervisory board in a structure regime company is powerful, because it 
appoints, suspends and dismisses
999
 the management board and can veto 
all important decisions of management, such as the acquisition of 
disposal of shares, large loans and mass dismissals. To provide for this 
independence of the supervisory board the act initially stipulated that it 
co-opted itself, with some rights of shareholders and the works council to 
                                                     
994 Prof. Huub Willems, former chairman of the Enterprise Chamber, „It Needs Three Tiers to Tango‟, Ars Aequi 
(September 2010), p. 651, in which he also refers to an interview of Fritz Frölich, former CFO of AKZO, who 
is on many German and French boards and who is very complimentary of the Dutch system. 
995 Article 25(e) Works Council Act. 
996 Articles 24 and 25 Works Council Act. 
997 This number is adapted regularly with inflation by Royal Decree. 
998 Article 2.153/263, 2 DCC. 
999 Article 2.162/272 DCC, there are exceptions for subsidiaries of foreign groups. 
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propose candidates and to object against nominations. As mentioned in 
4.2.5 above this appointment procedure was changed in 2004.
1000
 
 
 Since the changes in the Law on Structure Regime Companies in 2004, 
the shareholders‟ meeting appoints and dismisses the supervisory 
directors. There must be at least 3 supervisory directors. The rule is still 
valid that supervisory directors nominate their successors with some 
influence from the works council in these nominations, but the 
shareholders have the right to refuse to follow the nomination. The 
influence of the works council rests on its right to pre-nominate one-third 
of the nominations of the supervisory board. The fact that shareholders 
may dismiss the complete supervisory board was shown to be an 
important power of shareholders in the Stork case.  
 
 The Stork case1001 of 2007 involved a shareholder activist dispute between US hedge 
funds, Centaurus and Paulson, who together owned 31.4% of the shares, and 
management. The activists typically demanded a split up of Stork, Netherlands‟ oldest 
industrial conglomerate of 1883. Management was opposed to a split. The hedge funds 
wished to discuss this with management, but the shareholders were not very open with 
their arguments. The activists asked to discuss strategy with the chairman of the 
supervisory board. He referred the shareholders to management, saying that the 
supervisory board does not deal with strategy. The shareholders put the dismissal of the 
whole supervisory board on the agenda for the shareholders' meeting. Management, 
supported by the supervisory board, issued shares to a friendly foundation to outvote the 
shareholders. The communication was so bad that the matter ended up in the Enterprise 
Chamber. 
 
 The Enterprise Chamber decided before the shareholders meeting with a compromise by 
blocking the dismissal of the supervisory board and blocking the vote with the issued 
shares, and at the same time appointing 3 “super” supervisory directors, who would have 
6 months to guide parties to a solution of the dispute on strategy. The court said that the 
supervisory directors should in such cases have a mediation role between shareholders 
and management or at least should not escalate the discussion. This point was later 
                                                     
1000 Change of Structure Regime Act, which gave more rights to shareholders, 1 October 2004. For a detailed 
description of the original Structure Regime, see Prof. S. Schuit, Corporate Law and Practice of the 
Netherlands: Legal, Works Councils and Taxation (2002), pp. 113-116 (“Schuit (2002)”), which will be 
updated in 2011. For the English text of the DCC see Hans Warendorff and Richard Thomas, Company and 
Business of the Netherlands, Complete DCC Translated (a loose leaf book). 
1001 Stork, Enterprise Chamber, OK 17/1/2007, 2007, NJ 15. 
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corrected by the Supreme Court in the ASMI decision of 2010. Since this decision the law 
is that supervisory directors do not necessarily have to mediate. 
 
 An example of the decision power and independence from shareholders 
of a supervisory board under the structure regime was the Corus case of 
2003, which was rather a surprise to the international business 
community.
1002
  
 In 1999 British Steel and Koninklijke Hoogovens merged and created Corus Group Plc, 
which owned 100% of the shares in Corus Netherlands, which in turn owned an 
aluminium producer. Corus Group Plc was in need of cash and wished to sell off the 
aluminium producer. Because this involved the sale of an important enterprise of Corus 
Netherlands, the works council and the supervisory board had their right of say 
concerning the sale. They said they resisted the sale, or would at least want some 
guarantees that the proceeds of the sale would be ring fenced for Corus Netherlands and 
not only be used for the financing problems of Corus UK. The works council gave a 
negative advice. The supervisory board gave consent under the condition of a ring fencing 
agreement, which Corus Group Plc did not want to accept. Corus Group Plc took the 
matter to the Enterprise Chamber, which said that the supervisory board had acted in the 
interest of the company and had acted reasonably. In the end the aluminium plant was 
sold, but only after a ring fencing agreement was signed. 
 
 A comparable case is the recent Organon case of 2010, where the US 
pharmaceutical group Merck Corporation, had some years before acquired 100% of the 
shares of Organon NV. Merck had decided on mass dismissals at Organon. The works 
council of Organon had not been asked to give advice and the supervisory board 
announced it would veto any proposal for mass dismissals.1003 The works council put the 
case to the Enterprise Chamber. The hearing was planned for 2 September 2010. On 
1 September 2010 parties settled the matter by Merck Corporation promising to postpone 
its plans for dismissals by 5 months. After 12 months parties settled. The result was that 
not 50% of the employees but only 25% were dismissed. 
 
 These cases show how independent supervisory boards in Structure 
Regime companies are and how little power shareholders have. The 
lesson for these and other shareholders would be to communicate well in 
advance in an open and informative way about their plans with the 
supervisory board and the works council in which case their chances of 
success would be better. This is a consequence of the consultation culture 
                                                     
1002 Corus, Enterprise Chamber, OK, 13/3/2003, NJ 2003, 248. 
1003 Financieele Dagblad, 3 September 2010, pp. 1 and 11. 
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of the Netherlands. The shareholder or director, who omits one of the 
consultation obligations usually runs into problems. 
 
 The fact that the supervisory board in a Structure Regime company 
appoints and dismisses management directors is very important for its 
power. In the majority of regular classical Dutch companies the 
supervisory board does not have this power. There the shareholders‟ 
meeting appoints and dismisses management and supervisory board 
members, which means that those supervisors have less power vis-à-vis 
the management board. In practice, however, they usually do nominate 
management directors or at least influence these nominations. 
 
4.4.2.3 One-tier boards under present law 
 As mentioned above, a Dutch company that is not a structure regime 
company does not have to have a supervisory board. These companies 
can have a single or “monistic” board. The basic idea is that there are 
only managing board members. This legal possibility has given creative 
enterprises and lawyers the possibility to have one-tier boards with day-
to-day, “inside”, directors and “outside” directors, who only have an 
advisory and monitoring role. Generally, the Dutch one-tier boards under 
present law have “inside” directors who have the right to represent and 
sign for the company – and are registered as such in the trade register – 
and “outside” directors who cannot represent the company and have more 
of a monitoring role. The articles of association (in Dutch “statuten”) 
describe this and can also give further colour to the roles of the different 
directors. A board regulation can give further detail. There are quite a 
number of private – not public – companies that operate in this creative 
one-tier board fashion. 
 
 The main concern of “outside” directors in one-tier boards under present 
and future law is that their liability is increased when they become non-
executive directors in a one-tier board instead of supervisory directors in 
a two-tier system.
1004
 The possibility of exoneration or disculpation, 
                                                     
1004 D. Strik, Grondslagen bestuurdersaansprakelijkheid, thesis (2010), p. 105 et seq. (“Strik (2010)”) and D. 
Strik, „Aansprakelijkheid van niet-uitvoerende bestuursleden: you cannot have your cake and eat it!‟, 
Ondernemingsrecht 2003/10, pp. 367-374 (“Strik (2003)”), and Prof. W.B. Wezeman, „De toezichthoudende 
rol van commissarissen en “audit-commissies”‟, Tijdschrift voor Jaarrekeningenrecht, No. 4, augustus 2009, 
p. 94 (“Wezeman (2009/A)”), and W.B. Wezeman, „Persoonlijke aansprakelijkheid van uitvoerende en niet 
uitvoerende bestuurders‟, Bestuur en toezicht, p. 100 (“Wezeman (2009/G)”). Both Strik and Wezeman argue 
for more disculpation possibilities for non-executives from the traditional joint and several liability to be added 
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because of their “outside role”, is deemed not to be sufficiently 
certain.
1005
 The answer of the Minister of Safety and Justice to the Senate 
repeats that while there is joint and several liability for all directors,
1006
 a 
director is only liable in case of serious blame depending on all facts as 
confirmed in the decision Staleman v. Van de Ven, HR 10/1/1997, NJ 
1997, 360.
1007
 Because there are not many one-tier boards, this aspect 
whether a non-executive director would be excused to a lesser extent than 
a supervisory director has not been tested in court and creates 
insecurity.
1008
  
 
 Examples of well known big companies with a one-tier board under present law are: 
(1) Unilever NV, which was not a Structure Regime company, because it benefitted from 
the holding company exception, had a board of “inside” directors, who could appoint 
“advisory” members to the board, who did meet with the “inside” directors in one board, 
but had no vote or veto and were not registered in the trade register as directors. In 2004 
Unilever NV, referring to the Code Tabaksblat, which mentioned the possibility of having 
a one-tier board, and to a European Directive on the European Company, which gives the 
alternatives of a one- and two-tier board, changed its board structure. Now the board has 2 
executive directors (CEO and CFO) and 12 non-executive directors. One of the non-
executives is chairman. This is very close to the UK model. In fact, the directors of 
Unilever NV are the same persons as the directors of Unilever Plc.1009 
(2) Reed Elsevier NV uses the “combined board” model. It is a structure regime company 
with a management and a supervisory board. This looks like a two-tier board system. 
However, it has been creative and has made use of the Dutch stipulation that the joint 
meeting of the management board and supervisory board is the “combined board” and is a 
legal organ, just like the legal organs the management board, the supervisory board and 
the shareholders meeting are.1010 The combined board meets often. All managing board 
members and supervisory board members are present. Actually this is not very different 
                                                                                                                                    
to article 2:9 DCC.  
1005 Strik (2010), p. 81 et seq.; Wezeman (2009/A), p. 93. 
1006 Parliamentary Papers 2011, 31763, Memorandum of Reply to the First Chamber, 2 May 2011, p. 6. 
1007 Parliamentary Papers 2011, 31763, Memorandum of Reply to the First Chamber, 2 May 2011, p. 16. 
1008 Prof. Mr L. Timmerman, „De Two-Tier Commissaris/One-Tier Niet-Uitvoerend Bestuurder‟, Bestuur en 
Toezicht (Conference in Groningen, 2009), p. 26 (“Timmerman, Two-Tier (2009)”) and Wezeman (2009/G), 
p. 96 and Strik (2010), p. 105 et seq. 
1009 Strik (2010), pp. 108-109 and Couwenbergh and Haenen, Tabaksblat (2008), p. 143 et seq. in which Morris 
Tabaksblat, as interviewed, very interestingly explains to his interviewers Couwenbergh and Haenen that 
peaceful changes in structures can take 10 years. 
1010 Article 2.78a DCC and formerly the Departementale Richtlijnen (rules for “statuten”). See Dortmond 
(2003), pp. 115-116 and Strik (2010), pp. 110-111. 
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from the usual practice in a Netherlands supervisory board where members usually meet 
in the presence of the management board members. But in most companies the 
supervisory directors discuss decisions that have been planned by the management board 
members. In most companies the supervisory board members have a monitoring role. In 
Reed Elsevier NV the arrangements are different. For a long list of important decisions a 
positive decision of the combined board is necessary. So in practice the combined board, 
as a whole, makes all the important decisions and is involved in the development of the 
decisions as well. This special aspect of Reed Elsevier NV is laid down in a “governing 
agreement” and special stipulations in the “statuten” that describe the powers of the 
“combined board”.1011 The members of these boards of Reed Elsevier NV are the same 
persons – plus one extra – as the ones on the one-tier board of Reed Elsevier Plc. It is 
probable that the one extra person of the Reed Elsevier NV supervisory board member is 
the member nominated by the works council. 
 
 One could conclude that the Netherlands needs no new Act for One-tier 
Boards, because practice creates enough possibilities to be flexible. 
Although there are examples as mentioned above, there are only a few 
listed companies with a one-tier board: in 2003 only 7 one-tier board 
companies were listed on Euronext, of which some are foreign and in 
2008 only 10 on Euronext, but the increase is due to 3 new listings of 
foreign companies.
1012
 
 
 One could also argue that the Act is unnecessary, because supervisory 
directors are becoming so active that the Dutch already have a one-and-a-
half-tier board in which the tasks of supervisory directors have increased, 
without any structural change. 
 
 Professor Sven Dumoulin, then inhouse counsel of Unilver NV and now 
of Akzo Nobel NV, made clear that there are some reasons why a simple 
short act would be useful. He does so by identifying 18 differences 
between supervisory directors and non-executive directors in companies, 
such as Unilever NV.
1013
 His article has been inspirational for our 
minister of justice, when preparing a Draft Act or Bill on One-tier 
Boards. 
 
                                                     
1011 Strik (2010), p. 110 and Couwenbergh and Haenen, Tabaksblat (2008) on many pages and Schuit (2010), 
p. 13. 
1012 Strik (2010), p. 105. 
1013 Dumoulin (2005), pp. 1-11. The 18 differences and the reasons for the Act are described below in 4.5.7. 
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4.4.2.4 Act on One-tier Boards 
 On 8 December 2009 the second house of parliament, “Tweede Kamer”, 
and subsequently the first house of parliament, “Eerste Kamer” on 6 June 
2011 accepted the One-tier Board Act, which is called “Wijziging van 
Boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met de aanpassing van 
regels over bestuur en toezicht in naamloze en besloten 
vennootschappen”, freely translated as “changes of Book 2 of DCC in 
connection with directing and supervising NVs and BVs”, hereafter 
referred to as the “Act” or “the One-tier Board Act”. 
 
 The reasons for the Dutch government to introduce this Act were the 
desire for more flexibility of Dutch company law, adaptability to foreign 
business practices and the European Law on the European Company.
1014
 
An important ground was the admission of the fact that the majority of 
shareholders of Dutch listed companies are from the US and the UK. An 
important reason of the Act is the improvement of the investment 
climate.
1015
 Here we see a continuation of the Dutch trader‟s tradition 
adapting to foreign commercial opportunities. 
 
 The English summarized translation of the Act and the text of the Act in 
Dutch are attached hereto as Annexes 6.4 and 6.5. 
 
 The Act proposes that as an alternative to the two-tier system a one-tier 
system can be laid down in the articles of association by describing the 
different functions of the members of the board of a one-tier company 
(executive and non-executive members). The tasks of monitoring and 
nominating board members, the remuneration of the executive members 
and the position of the chairman can be fulfilled only by the non-
executive directors. Under the Act, in companies with a one-tier structure 
the positions of CEO and chairman must be separate.
1016
 The special two-
                                                     
1014 Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 31763, no. 3, p. 1. 
1015 Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 31763, no. 5, p. 1. 
1016 The centre piece article is article 2.129/239(a) DCC. One-tier Board: 
1. The articles of association may provide that the duties of the board are to be divided between one or 
more non-executive directors and one or more executive directors. The task of supervising the 
performance of the duties of the directors cannot be withdrawn from the non-executive directors. Nor 
may responsibility for chairing the board, nominating persons for appointment to the board and 
determining the remuneration of executive directors be allocated to executive directors. Non-executive 
directors must always be natural persons. 
2. The executive directors may not take part in decisions on their own remuneration.  
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tier board rules which are mandatory in the Netherlands for large 
companies falling under the structure regime with substantial powers for 
supervisory board members and the way they are nominated and 
appointed are applicable mutatis mutandis to the non-executive directors 
of a one-tier board of a Structure Regime company. This last point has 
the support of the unions.
1017
  
 
 When the Tweede Kamer accepted the Bill on 8 December 2009 a few 
last minute amendments were added upon the proposal of members of 
parliament who wanted to “score” popular points. They are the non-
cumulation article (not more than 5 supervisory or non-executive 
directorships per person, where being chairman counts double) and the 
diversity article (at least 30% ladies in the board as a comply or explain 
basis). These two points are discussed below at the end of 4.4.3. Also an 
amendment was added to the effect that a managing director may not 
have an employment contract, thereby limiting their right to demand large 
amounts in indemnities if they are dismissed. At first this seemed to cause 
administrative problems because of extra social security formalities for 
non-employees who work fulltime. This problem is being solved by the 
Ministry of Social Affairs, which has determined that non-employee 
fulltime workers fall under the social premium and pension regulations as 
if they were employees.
1018
 
 
 The Act was pending in the Senate for one and a half year. The main 
point of discussion was the non-cumulative article. The Act was accepted 
on 6 June 2011 and will probably become effective on 1 January 2012. 
 
 No One-Tier Board for Banks 
 A point that is rarely discussed is that the Act on Financial Supervision 
(Wft) determines explicitly in article 3.19 that the banks and insurance 
companies must have a supervisory board of at least three members and 
that the Netherlands Bank may only give dispensation for cases of a 
missing supervisory director or so. Theoretically one could argue that the 
Netherlands Bank could give dispensation for a one-tier board with three 
monitoring non-executive directors, but because the Ministry of Finance 
                                                                                                                                    
3. The articles of association that one or more directors can validly decide on matters that come within 
their remit. Any such provision indirectly by way of  the articles must be in writing. 
1017 Commentaar FNV on the Act, Amsterdam 2008, 
http://home.fnv.nl/02werkgeld/arbo/wetgeving/medezeggenschap/bestuur_en_toezicht.htm 
1018 Parliamentary Papers 2011, 31763, replies to First Chamber, p. 13. 
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knowingly maintained article 3.19 Wft
1019
 I am of the view that the 
Netherlands Bank cannot do this in practice. The maintaining of 
article 3.19 Wft is remarkable, because on 5 December 2008 the then 
Minister of Finance publicly declared that he would prefer the financial 
institutions to have One-tier Boards.
1020
 There are a number of other 
relevant people who think that banks should have a One-tier Board, 
because of the requirement for banks to have knowledgeable and well 
involved outside directors. 
 
 Proposal: it should be possible for banks to have a one-tier board 
 For this reason I propose that this article 3.19 Wft should be changed to 
the effect that banks and insurance companies should at least have a 
supervisory board with 3 members or a One-tier Board with at least 3 
non-executive board members. 
 
4.4.3 Composition of the average boards 
 
 In general, the number of directors in Netherlands‟ boardrooms is not 
different from that of the US and the UK boards: on average in all these 
countries there are about 4 to 5 “inside” directors and 5 to 6 “outside” 
directors. The difference is that they have different “name tags” and by 
consequence have different tasks. 
 
 In the UK there are about 4 to 5 executive directors, a chairman and an 
average of 5 to 6 non-executive directors (NEDs). In the US the CEO is 
usually also the chairman. He is the only executive board member. The 
other officers, about 3 or 4 are not board members but do usually attend 
board meetings. These US boards are further filled with 6 to 7 
independent directors, including a lead director – who often meet 
                                                     
1019 The translation of article 3.19 Wft is: 
1. A clearing institution or credit institution vested in the Netherlands, which is an NV or BV, or an insurer 
vested in the Netherlands, which is an NV or BV, has at least a suprvisory board with three members, as meant 
in articles 140 and 250 of Book 2 DCC. 
2. A clearing institution or credit institution vested in the Netherlands which is not an NV or BV has a body 
comparable with a supervisory board of at least three members. 
3. The Netherlands Bank can upon request give dispensation in whole or in part and for limited or indefinite 
period of the above paragraphs 1 or 2 if the requiron shows that it cannot reasonably fulfil the stipulation and 
that the aims of this article can be fulfilled otherwise. 
1020 Financieele Dagblad, „Bos prefereert Angelsaksische bestuur banken‟, 5 December 2008, p. 11. 
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separately in executive sessions. In 30% of the listed companies there is a 
separate non-CEO chairman instead of a lead director. 
In the Netherlands there is a management board of about 4 to 5 and a 
supervisory board of about 5 to 6
1021
 and they usually meet together. 
Upon introduction in the Netherlands of a one-tier board in the Act there 
would most likely be 4 to 5 executives, including the CEO and 5 to 6 
non-executives, including the chairman.  
 
 Management board 
 Traditionally a Dutch management board was composed of a general 
managing director (“algemeen directeur”), a finance director and one or 
two other directors. They managed by consultation of equals leading to 
consensus and there were checks and balances within the management 
board, the co-pilot model.
1022
 
 
 CEO 
 From about 2000 the “algemeen directeur” changed into a CEO. Not only 
did the name change, but the function became more important. The stock 
exchange, foreign investors, foreign financial markets and media wanted 
a visible personal leader. It is also a consequence of centralisation of 
global conglomerates.
1023
  
 
 Supervisory directors 
 Dutch listed companies, whether in a structure regime or not, have by 
average 5 to 6 supervisory directors. Their tasks are increasing. They 
work harder and they are nominated independently. One of them is the 
chairman. The growth of the role of the chairman has not kept pace with 
the rising star of the CEO.
1024
 The company also has a vice-chairman who 
can replace the chairman and lead the evaluation of the chairman.
1025
 
                                                     
1021 Nationaal Commissarissen Onderzoek 2009, assembled by Prof. Dr. Auke de Bos and Dr. Mijntje 
Lückerath-Rovers (“De Bos and Lückerath (2009/O)”), p. 17. 
1022 For a further description of the co-pilot model, see 4.5.2 below. 
1023 Couwenbergh and Haenen, Tabaksblat (2008), pp. 130, 152-153. Schuit (2010), pp. 43 and 45. Jeroen van 
der Veer, retired CEO of Shell and supervisory director of Philips, Unilever and ING and Anthony Burgmans, 
retired CEO – later chairman – of Unilever, supervisory director of BP and ABN AMRO and now chairman of 
the monitoring committee of banks have orally mentioned this at conferences on respectively 29 January and 
25 May 2010. 
1024 Couwenbergh and Haenen, Tabaksblat (2008), p. 133. Schuit (2010), p. 44 and Jeroen van der Veer and 
Anthony Burgmans at the above mentioned conferences. 
1025 Frijns Code III.4.3. 
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 One-tier board under present law 
 In examples mentioned above
1026
 there are “insiders” and “outsiders”. 
 
 One-tier board under the Act 
 The Act leaves completely open how many executive directors and how 
many non-executive directors there should be. In the UK NEDs must 
have a majority, in the US the independent directors must form a vast 
majority. The Dutch are used to 4 to 5 executives and 5 to 6 supervisory 
directors/non-executives, it is likely that this will continue. The 
Tabaksblat and Frijns Codes stipulate that there should be more 
independent non-executives than executives.
1027
 This is important for the 
balance and stimulates to follow the UK model. 
 
 Theoretically a Netherlands‟ company in deciding for a one-tier board 
could opt for the US model of only a CEO and 5 or more non-executives 
on the board and the other officers in the room by invitation. An 
argument for such US type boards could be: they only discuss broad lines 
and strategy anyway and it is more efficient. The counter argument would 
be: if other officers are also on the board, there is more insight for the 
non-executives in the background arguments of the officers, more insight 
in the dilemmas, more insight as to whether the management team 
functions well and more insight in who would be suitable candidates for 
the top. 
 
 Company secretary 
 The supervisory directors or non-executives are, according to the Frijns 
Code, to be assisted by an independent company secretary who is 
appointed by the management board upon the proposal of the supervisory 
board and with its consent. On paper the arrangement seems good.
1028
 In 
practice, however, he works for and is instructed by the management 
board and the supervisory board at the same time.
1029
 The example of the 
UK company secretary is good, because in the UK it is absolutely clear 
that the company secretary works for the chairman and the NEDs. The 
                                                     
1026 See 4.4.2.3 above. 
1027 Frijns Code III 8.4. 
1028 Frijns Code III 4.3. 
1029 Schuit (2010), p. 62, quotes R. van Oordt and R. Zwartendijk. M.W. den Boogert, „De Raad van 
Commissarissen onder de nieuwe Corporate Governance Code‟, Ondernemingsrecht 2004/4, p. 118 (“Den 
Boogert (2004)”). 
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UK experience has been that if the functions of general counsel and 
company secretary are combined in one person, the secretary work is 
usually delegated to a more junior person and is then diluted. If there is a 
real separate company secretary, who is the conscience of the company 
and who supports the Chairman in corporate governance and strategy 
development, the company secretary can add substantial value. The UK 
example shows that it is advisable to have a senior and independent 
person as company secretary. See for the UK sub-section 2.4.4. 
 
 Committees 
 Dutch supervisory boards – since the Tabaksblat Code of 2004 – have 
audit, remuneration and nomination committees if there are more than 4 
supervisory board members. In the Netherlands the nomination 
committee is called “selection and approval committee”, “selectie- en 
benoemingscommissie”. The members of these committees are 
supervisory board members. The chairman of the supervisory board may 
not be chairman of the audit or remuneration committee,
1030
 although he 
is usually chairman of the nomination committee. In Dutch one-tier 
boards under the Act the committees will be the same and the members 
will be non-executives. Article 2:129/239(a) of the Act on one-tier boards 
restricts the monitoring and nomination roles to non-executives.
1031
  
 
 As in the UK and US one of the members of the audit committee must be 
a financial expert. This idea of the financial expert was developed by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
1032
 In the UK the names of the committees are the 
same as in the Netherlands although in the Netherlands the Nomination 
Committee is often called the selection and appointment committee. In 
the US there are audit, compensation (US word for remuneration) and 
nomination committees. 
 
 In the composition of the committees we see a substantial convergence in 
the US, UK and Dutch practice, except that in the US there is a strict rule 
banning executives from the meetings and US committees tend to deliver 
more finished and final work to the board than Dutch and UK committees 
do. Having more independent advisers in board committees and in board 
                                                     
1030 Frijns Code III.5.6 and III.5.11. 
1031 Also Frijns Code III.8.3 stipulates that the committees will only have non-executives as members. This is the 
same as the US. The UK is more flexible. 
1032 Wezeman (2009/A), p. 92 and H. Langman, „De audit-commissie‟, Ondernemingsrecht 2005/8, p. 259 
(“Langman (2005)”). 
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meetings is a general trend in the US. This trend is followed to a lesser 
extent in the UK and the Netherlands, but may grow further. “Over use” 
of advisers has draw backs. Caused indirectly by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
Dutch audit committees may now sometimes be more “directive” than 
Dutch supervisory directors were in the past.
1033
 
 
 Limitation of holding other positions (non-cumulation) 
 The Tabaksblat Code and Frijns Code already had a stipulation limiting 
supervisory directors to not more than 5 board memberships, where the 
chairman counts for two memberships.
1034
 The House of Representatives 
on 8 December 2009 amended the Act to have this stipulation added into 
the Act, to determine that executives can only serve on two boards as 
supervisory director and non-executives can only serve on five 
supervisory boards at one time.
1035
 It is interesting to note that such best 
practises are already quite normal and accepted in the UK and the US, not 
only because of any cumulation, but simply because of the time involved 
in these functions. The main point of the amendment is that it is 
mandatory instead of a "comply or explain" rule and can have draconian, 
i.e. voidness, effects as a consequence. 
 
 Diversity 
 The House of Representatives added a further amendment to the Act 
aiming for a diversity, on a comply or explain basis, that both 
management and supervisory boards should have at least 30% women 
and at least 30% men.
1036
 
 
4.4.4 Changes in board composition brought about by codes, committees 
 
 The Tabaksblat and Frijns Codes have not caused basic changes in the 
composition of supervisory boards and management boards. This is 
different from the US and the UK where new regulations and codes did 
introduce substantial changes in the functioning of boards. The changes 
in the UK and the US often go to the heart of the matter. In the 
Netherlands there is a tendency to make practical and less principally 
based corrections. The US went the way of a strong majority of 
                                                     
1033 M.J. van Ginneken, „Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Het Amerikaanse antwoord op Enron (II)‟, 
Ondernemingsrecht 2004/5, no. 54, p. 152 et seq. (“Van Ginneken (2004)”). 
1034 Frijns Code III.3.4. 
1035 Articles 2:132a/242a and 2:142z/252a DCC. 
1036 Articles 2:166/276 DCC. 
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independent directors and of executive sessions. The UK emerged with 
the separate non-CEO chairman and a majority of NEDs on the board. 
The Dutch Codes have caused discussion about more serious work of 
supervisory board members, formalized the criteria for independence of 
supervisory directors and emphasized already existing thoughts that 
supervisory directors should work harder. One could say that the most 
principally based changes of the Tabaksblat Code were the promotion of 
committees and the introduction of the proxy for Depository Receipt 
holders, “certificaathouders”, to vote the underlying shares.  
 
 Most supervisory boards now have audit, remuneration and nomination 
committees.
1037
 The Codes have had an impact on the degree of 
involvement of supervisory directors and on the debate about a more 
active chairman. The Codes have also given an impetus to the debate 
about one-tier boards in the Netherlands.
1038
 
 
4.4.5 Non-executives in the majority on the future one-tier board 
 
 Generally supervisory boards are larger than management boards. At 
present, the point is not very important, because supervisory boards have 
their veto right even if they are small. The Frijns Code does stipulate for 
one-tier boards that non-executives must have a majority.
1039
 The Act is 
silent on this item and this is regarded as remarkable by some. The fact 
that the Act has not made an explicit requirement of such majority can be 
seen against the background of Dutch culture, not to make a point about 
power and about majorities. In the VOC, the city of Amsterdam did not 
insist on having a majority, although Amsterdam had contributed most of 
the capital. The Dutch traditionally attempt to seek consensus; power is 
veiled. The fact that the Act does not explicitly stipulate that for a one-
tier board the non-executives must be in the majority, does not mean that 
boards can ignore this requirement, because as mentioned before, the 
Frijns Code does stipulate such a majority and the Frijns Code is 
applicable for listed companies. There could be a problem for Structure 
Regime subsidiaries of large groups, such as Corus BV and Organon BV. 
If they would for example have had a one-tier board with five executives 
and three non-executives and the executives would vote for the parent‟s 
                                                     
1037 The Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance Code of December 2009, p. 69, has confirmed the 
importance of the committees for the functioning of the supervisory board. 
1038 Frijns Code III.8. 
1039 Frijns Code III.8.4. 
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strategy, they would outvote the non-executives. Most likely the Works 
Council, when asked to advise
1040
 on a change from a two-tier to a one-
tier system, will advise positively under the condition that there will 
always be more non-executive directors than executive directors. For 
important resolutions in Structure Regime companies the consent of the 
majority of the non-executive directors is required by article 
2:164a/274a(4) DCC. In his answer to the senate, “Eerste Kamer”, the 
Minister of Safety and Justice, says that in practice it is unlikely that the 
non-executives will be smaller in number than the executives.
1041
 
 
4.4.6 Size 
 
 Sometimes Dutch boards have been very large. ABN AMRO, in 2007, 
had 5 management board members and 12 supervisory directors. That 
was – in hindsight – regarded as too large.1042 Basically the Dutch are 
well advised to pay attention to the recommendations given in the US and 
the UK that boards should not be too large. The Dutch generally are 
mindful of this point. They do consider size.
1043
 The report of the 
Committee Maas, giving advice for better banks, has suggested that 
supervisory boards should be larger with access to more knowledge: at 
least 10 for big banks and at least 6 for small banks.
1044
 The then Minister 
of Finance, Bos, advised against outsized supervisory boards. I would say 
that for larger companies 9 would be a maximum, i.e. 3 members for each 
of the 3 committees. In smaller companies the supervisory board can 
have a lower number to avoid unwieldy discussions or supervisory 
directors that stay silent. 
 
4.4.7 Summary of composition of boards 
 
 1. The Netherlands traditionally have a two-tier board system, even 
though having a supervisory board is not required by law, except 
in Structure Regime companies. Listed companies have about 3 
                                                     
1040 If a company would change from a one-tier board system to a two-tier board system, it would require the 
positive advice of the Works Council, according to article 25e of the Works Council Act. 
1041 Report of discussion in Senate of 24 May 2011, p. 22. 
1042 See Smit (2009), which describes the board dynamics at ABN AMRO. 
1043 De Bos and Lückerath (2009/O), p. 17, says that the average for a supervisory board of listed companies is 
6.2 in 2008. The number of supervisory directors of all companies decreased from 5.88 in 2006 to 5.33 in 2008 
according to the Monitoring Report of 2009, p. 41. 
1044 Cees Maas, Naar herstel van vertrouwen (2009), p. 13, advice 1.3 (“Maas (2009)”). 
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to 5 managing board members and an average of about 6 
supervisory board members. 
 2. Structure Regime companies have a mandatory supervisory board 
with substantial powers. 
 3. Although most other companies have a supervisory board, there 
are some examples of one-tier boards with executive and non-
executive directors. 
 4. The Act on the one-tier board as alternative option is made up of 
a short set of practical articles. Structure Regime companies can 
fall under the Act and can have a one-tier board as well, in which 
cases the rules for supervisory directors are mutatis mutandis 
applied to the non-executive directors. 
 5. I propose to change article 3.19 Wft so that banks and insurance 
companies are also permitted to have one-tier boards with at least 
three non-executive directors. 
 6. When considering a one-tier board one should realize that this 
system has developed in different directions in the UK and the 
US. UK boards typically have about 4 executive officers, a 
separate chairman and 5 or 6 NEDs, while US boards on average 
have a CEO/chairman and about 7 independent directors, who 
interestingly often meet separately before or after each board 
meeting. 
 
4.5 Role of board members 
 
4.5.1 Introduction 
 
 As described above, boards of companies in each country must develop, implement and 
monitor such varied elements as purpose, strategy, policy, risk management, succession, 
evaluation and communication. Since the composition of boards and the division of tasks 
have been dealt with in section 4.4, I shall now consider what roles are appropriate to each 
type of director and how these roles can best be promoted. 
 
 In this section (4.5) the role of the members of Dutch supervisory and management boards 
in the two-tier system and of executive and non-executive directors in a one-tier system 
will be discussed in relation to the following aspects: the evolution of the role of 
supervisory board members in a two-tier system over the last 30 years, culminating more 
or less in a one-and-a-half-tier board (4.5.2); the legal context of the division of powers 
between shareholders and board members (4.5.3); the roles of the different board 
members in two-tier and one-tier systems (4.5.4); the role of the management board 
members and supervisory board members in strategy development (4.5.5); the difference 
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between a two-tier and a one-tier board in relation to early and on-site information and 
access to junior management (4.5.6); the differences between supervisory board members 
and non-executive directors (4.5.7); the role of representing the company (4.5.8); the dual 
function of management board members: action and monitoring (4.5.9); independence in 
today‟s two-tier boards 4.5.10); the role of the chairman in the present and future (4.5.11); 
the role of the separate chairman and CEO in a two-tier and one-tier board in companies 
of varying size (4.5.12); evaluation (4.5.13); term of office, re-election, selection and 
dismissal (4.5.14); formal documentation of functions in two-tier and one-tier boards 
(4.5.15); getting the best out of directors (4.5.16); succession (4.5.17); enterprise risk 
management (4.5.18); corporate governance at banks (4.5.19); and, finally, a summary of 
the roles of directors (4.5.20). While discussing these matters, I shall also describe some 
of the differences between one-tier boards in the UK, US and the Netherlands and what 
elements of UK and US corporate governance could usefully be adopted Dutch two-tier 
and one-tier boards. 
 
4.5.2 How supervisory boards have evolved in the last 30 years into a one-and-
a-half-tier system 
 
 We have seen in the chapters on the UK and the US that the positions of 
NEDs and chairmen in the UK changed substantially from 1993 onwards 
and that the position of independent directors and chairmen or lead 
directors in the US has changed especially since 2002. In the Netherlands 
the changes to the positions of supervisory board members and chairmen 
have occurred mainly since 2004. 
 
 Before 2000 a typical Dutch management board under the two-tier 
system consisted of a managing director known as the algemeen 
directeur, a finance director and, possibly, another member. They 
operated by consensus. There was hardly any hierarchy and the managing 
director was a primus inter pares. This was characteristic of the Dutch 
style of consultation leading to consensus.
1045
 The managing director was 
creative and developed and “sold” new ideas. The typical finance director 
was careful and cautious and in practice personified the checks and 
balances that existed within the management board. This was a real 
strength of Dutch corporate governance. Very interestingly, this idea of 
the CFO providing balance within the board and monitoring the CEO has 
recently been identified as a new phenomenon in the UK and the 
evolution of the CFO‟s role has been aptly summarized as “Number 
                                                     
1045 Couwenbergh and Haenen, Tabaksblat (2008), p. 130; Kennedy (2009), p. 150; Lendering (2005), p. 25; 
Langman (2005), p. 262. 
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cruncher to co-pilot”.1046 Examples are Mark Loughridge of IBM and 
Simon Henry of Royal Dutch Shell, who are hailed as generalists capable 
of keeping their CEO under control. CEOs are described by Simon Henry 
as “marketeers” who have great ideas, but, as he adds, “somebody has to 
bring reality to the table.” 
 
 Many companies had anti-takeover defence mechanisms. The “structure 
regime” that conferred powers on the supervisory board and left few 
powers on shareholders was seen as an extra protection device. This 
encouraged managers to believe that they did not have to communicate 
with shareholders. Another factor was the high rate of absenteeism at 
shareholders‟ meetings, which were generally attended, in person by 
proxy, by no more than a third of shareholders.
1047
 Although, technically, 
shareholders had the right to appoint and dismiss directors,
1048
 alter the 
articles of association, vote on mergers and splitting,
1049
 discharge 
directors from liability,
1050
 declare dividends,
1051
 issue shares, determine 
pre-emptive rights, redeem shares
1052
 and call a general meeting of 
shareholders, they rarely made use of these rights. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that these rights are not part of management 
(bestuur).
1053
 
 
 Supervisory boards were often management friendly. Usually the 
management board would propose candidates for appointment to the 
supervisory board. This was even the case in “structure regime” 
companies, where the law said that supervisory directors were appointed 
by the supervisory board. The role of supervisory board members was to 
“assist” the management board by providing advice and meeting with it 
for the purposes of consultation.
1054
 They were often representatives of 
                                                     
1046 Financial Times, 9 September 2010, p. 10. 
1047 Abma (2006/B), p. 14, whereas the US is 85% and the UK 60%. 
1048 Articles 2:132, 1/242, 1 and 2:134, 1/234, 1 DCC for management board members and 2:142, 2/252, 2 and 
2:144, 1/2:144, 1 DCC for supervisory board members. 
1049 Articles 2:121, 1/231, 1 DCC and 2:117, 1/755 and 2:334m, 1 DCC. 
1050 Article 1:101, 3/211, 3 DCC. 
1051 Article 2:105/215 DCC. 
1052 Article 2:110/220 DCC. 
1053 Van der Grinten (1989), p. 443, no. 231. 
1054 Article 2:140/250(2) DCC. The words „staat met raad ter zijde‟ were introduced in 1971. 
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shareholders, for example advisors such as bankers, accountants and 
lawyers, and sometimes related customers and politicians.
1055
 
 
 Management could operate without paying much attention to 
shareholders. This was the atmosphere in most companies, whether or not 
they were “structure regime” companies.  
 
 In 1982 and 1983 three serious cases of mismanagement hit the headlines 
in the Netherlands.  
 
 Rijn-Schelde-Verolme was a conglomerate of shipbuilders centred around a company run 
by maverick entrepreneur Verolme. The bankruptcy of the group led to a parliamentary 
inquiry whose proceedings were broadcast on TV. The inquiry revealed that: 
 (a) the management board was not fit for its task: although the CEO did have 
industrial experience, it was not in shipbuilding; 
 (b) the supervisory board had taken no action even in the face of disaster; in 
addition, the chairman had arranged for the company to pay for many of his 
private expenses. A moratorium on payment of the group‟s debts was agreed on 
9 February 1983 and the government provided large amounts of state aid to the 
business before bankruptcy. 
 
 OGEM was a conglomerate of construction companies that went bankrupt in 1982. There 
was a lengthy investigation by the Enterprise Chamber. It was the first major 
mismanagement case and was decided by the Supreme Court in 1990.1056 The main cause 
of the problems at OGEM was that the executives had strong egos, tended to act 
independently of one another and were united only in their disrespect for the supervisory 
board. The chairman of the supervisory board saw it as his function to blindly support the 
CEO. Two memoranda from supervisory board members who objected to the course of 
events were swept under the carpet.  
 
 The Association of Shareholders (Vereniging Effectenbeheer) instituted proceedings 
before the Enterprise Chamber, which in due course held that there had been 
mismanagement. Subsequently, the liquidator held the members of the management and 
supervisory boards liable. As they were not insured, the matter was settled for low 
amounts. However, all were kept busy with investigations, court cases and newspaper 
reports, and it was bad for their personal reputation. 
 
                                                     
1055 Couwenbergh and Haenen, Tabaksblat (2008), p. 132. 
1056 OGEM, HR 10/1/1990, NJ 1990, 466. 
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 Tilburgsche Hypotheek Bank was declared bankrupt in August 1983. At that time interest 
rates had soared to 14% and property values had plummeted. As a result, properties often 
provided insufficient security for mortgages. In response, the mortgage bank‟s managers 
transferred real estate back and forth with new “fixed” valuations. Members of the 
supervisory board noticed the problem and had it investigated, but did nothing. The 
members of both the management board and the supervisory board were held by Breda 
District Court to be liable to the liquidator.1057 The supervisory board members were not 
covered by D&O insurance and paid liquidated damages.  
 
 The many bankruptcies of the 1980s and especially the abuse of empty BVs to leave 
national insurance contributions unpaid resulted in the inclusion of new provisions in the 
DCC and other legislation regulating the liability of directors in bankruptcy cases.1058 
Another result was that most directors took out D&O insurance. As long ago as 1986 Jaap 
Glasz, a well-known lawyer, dean of the Dutch Bar and an effective supervisory board 
member of many companies, wrote a book entitled “Recommended Rules of Conduct”, 
which had been praised earlier at a meeting of the Dutch Centre of Directors (NCD) in 
1985.1059 His suggested rules contained many ideas that would later be incorporated in 
codes of best practices. 
 
 1995 saw the publication of the first Dutch corporate governance report: 
the Peters Report. Jaap Peters, retired CEO of Aegon, was a director of 
considerable authority. His committee produced 40 recommendations.
1060
 
The aim was to stimulate discussion in boardrooms and shareholders‟ 
meetings. Although there was initially plenty of discussion, there was not 
much follow-up.
1061
  
 
 In 2001 the Ahold case caused huge turmoil. It suddenly came out that the 
board had overstated the group‟s turnover in the accounts by including 
the turnover of joint ventures they did not really control and using side 
letters, possibly to confuse their accountants. This was even referred to as 
                                                     
1057 Tilburgsche Hypotheek Bank, Breda District Court 1/5/1990, NJ 1990, 740. 
1058 The three Insolvency Abuse Acts (of which article 2.138/248 DCC was the third) introduced the concept of 
joint and several liability for directors, subject to certain defences. Under the third Act liability could arise as a 
result of sloppy accounting, failure to file accounts and other causes of bankruptcy. The second Act provided 
for liability for failure to inform the tax and social security contribution authorities in the case of near 
bankruptcy. Under the first Act contractors could be held liable for debts of their subcontractors.  
1059 Prof. Jaap Glasz, De Commissaris. Aanbevolen Gedragsregels, Serie Recht en Praktijk, no. 44, tweede druk 
(1992) (“Glasz (1992)”) (also published in 1986). See also Glasz (1995). 
1060 Calkoen (1996), pp. 333-337, see also Annex Peters. 
1061 Couwenbergh and Haenen, Tabaksblat (2008), p. 88. 
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the “Ahold scandal”. Although Royal Dutch Shell came in for criticism in 
2001 for the way in which it had accounted for “future oil reserves”, the 
directors were regarded as having acted in good faith. Nonetheless, this 
case too raised issues about better governance. The Enron and WorldCom 
cases in the US fuelled the debate still further. In my view, the 
spectacular growth in international ownership of Dutch listed shares and 
the rise in the number of foreign members of boards of Dutch companies 
have also been major factors prompting change.
1062
 
 
 Eventually, the debate culminated in the appointment of the Tabaksblat 
Committee. Morris Tabaksblat, retired CEO of Unilever and Chairman of 
Reed Elsevier, has vast international experience in Brazil, New York and 
London. Despite his cosmopolitan background, Tabaksblat is also very 
much a Dutch polderaar at heart, in other words, someone who believes 
that it is best to keep on talking, compromising and soliciting support. He 
has been quoted as saying, “I can bring things together reasonably well, I 
believe.”1063 
 
 The Tabaksblat Committee produced a draft code in 2003 and, after wide 
consultation, the final Tabaksblat Code in 2004. Like the Cadbury Code, 
Higgs Review and Combined Code in the UK, the Tabaksblat Code 
introduced principles and best practice provisions on a “comply or 
explain” basis. In the Netherlands it is also called a “apply or explain” 
basis. The Tabaksblat Code also proposed legal reform, which was 
introduced on 1 October 2004, for more shareholder rights and, 
interestingly, the possible alternative of a one-tier board.
1064
 
 
 The Tabaksblat Code was given a statutory basis in the DCC, which 
introduced the requirements that every listed company must mention in 
its annual report (jaarverslag) whether it complies with the Code and if 
not, explain why not.
1065
 The government also appointed a monitoring 
committee under Jean Frijns – the Frijns Committee – which reported 
each half year and updated the Tabaksblat Code on 10 December 2008.  
 
                                                     
1062 Den Boogert (2004), p. 113 and Winter (2007), p. 6. 
1063 Couwenbergh and Haenen, Tabaksblat (2008), p. 173. 
1064 Tabaksblat Code, p. 6. 
1065 Article 2:391, 5 DCC and a general decree. 
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 All of this had an important impact, and even marked “the beginning of a 
revolution for supervisory board members.”1066 Many extra duties and 
roles were assigned to supervisory board members. The time needed to 
carry out their duties increased by 100%. Until the Tabaksblat Code 
supervisory board members functioned for and with management. Now 
they were to be independent and nominated by a nominations committee 
in keeping with a profile for every position. Supervisory board members 
were to be involved more intensely in monitoring the strategy of the 
management board. Greater emphasis was put on the roles of the 
chairman, assisted by a company secretary, and the audit, nominations 
and remuneration committees. There was even talk of co-management 
(medebestuur) by supervisory boards.
1067
 
 
 In the area of strategy many supervisory board members take the view 
that they only monitor. Others – often retired CEOs of large, successful 
companies – wish to be more active like their US counterparts and even 
propose alternatives like their UK counterparts.
1068
 
 
 The Tabaksblat Code was introduced on 1 October 2004. On that same 
day an important reform of Dutch company law introduced extra rights 
for shareholders, such as the right to appoint and dismiss supervisory 
board members. It also gave 1% of shareholders the right to put items on 
the agenda of general meetings, veto very important transactions and 
have a say on pay, as described above. Here the Dutch legislator may 
have overdone things in its zeal to adapt to foreign investors.  
 
 The Tabaksblat Code of 2004, the Act of 1 October2004, various 
Enterprise Chamber cases such as OGEM and HBG,
1069
 the rather sudden 
internationalisation of the shareholders and of the boards of Dutch listed 
companies and the influence of foreign financial markets, including the 
indirect effect of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act
1070
 all combined to bring 
about substantial changes in the position of board members in Dutch 
companies. And there have, indeed, been substantial changes in 
                                                     
1066 Den Boogert (2004), p. 114. 
1067 Den Boogert (2004), p. 115. 
1068 Schuit (2010), p. 26 in interviews of well-known Dutch CEOs. 
1069 OGEM, HR 10/1/1990, NJ 1990, 466 and HBG, HR 21/2/2003, NJ 2003, 182. 
1070 Van Ginneken (2004), p. 152 et seq. 
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practice.
1071
 As a result of all these changes, many now speak of a one-
and-a-half tier system.
1072
 
 
 There is a noticeable convergence with UK practice: harder working 
supervisory board members, independent nominations, more involvement 
in strategy, etc. US and Dutch boards are also converging, with harder 
working supervisory board members in the Netherlands and more non-
CEO chairmen and the executive sessions in the US. And both US and 
Dutch boards now have more independent nominations and important 
committee work. To a large extent this is also influenced by large 
international investment institutions and their advisory voting institutions. 
 
 A monitoring committee – the Frijns Committee – was appointed to 
report on compliance at least once a year. The rate of compliance is 
generally good. After this committee had added a few new provisions to 
the existing Tabaksblat Code in 2008, the code was renamed the Frijns 
Code.  
 
4.5.3 The legal context of the division of powers between shareholders and 
board members 
 
 The general meeting of shareholders is not the highest organ of a 
company since it cannot instruct the management board.
1073
 Until 2004, 
shareholders in the Netherlands, notwithstanding their technical rights 
under the DCC,
1074
 were disinclined to get involved in discussions about 
strategy or about any other company matters for that matter. They were 
not required to make allowance for the interests of the company and 
generally voted in their own interests.
1075
 The Tabaksblat Code of 2004 
and the Frijns Code of 2008 made clear that the management board 
develops strategy, the supervisory board supervises and shareholders may 
exercise their right to vote, add items to the agenda and call a meeting.
1076
 
Furthermore, shareholders can engage in dialogue with the company.
1077
 
                                                     
1071 Couwenbergh and Haenen, Tabaksblat (2008), pp. 128 and 175. 
1072 Schuit (2010), p. 115; also Floris Croon, founder of the strategy advisors Boer & Croon, defended the one-
and-a-half-tier board at a conference at Nijenrode, chaired by Steven Schuit on 25 May 2010. 
1073 Forum-Bank case, HR 21/1/1955, NJ 1959, 91. Here there is convergence with the UK and the US. Their 
shareholders too cannot instruct the board. 
1074 See above at 4.5.2, notes 969-974. 
1075 Frijns Code: point 9 of the preamble. 
1076 Frijns Code: point 9 of the preamble and very clearly confirmed by the Supreme Court in the ABN AMRO 
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 The management board and the supervisory board are accountable to 
shareholders in the shareholders‟ meeting. There are many stipulations in 
the Frijns Code concerning transparency and the timely provision of 
information by the management board to the shareholders.
1078
 
 
 As regards dialogue between boards and shareholders, the Frijns Code 
does mention in paragraph IV.4, second principle, that shareholders 
should be open to dialogue, but the Code makes no reference to any 
obligation on the part of management to initiate dialogue with 
shareholders. The only obligation mentioned is that the chairman should 
act as the main contact for shareholders regarding the functioning of 
management and supervisory board members.
1079
 This is different from 
the UK Corporate Governance Code, which obliges the board in many 
different ways to engage in dialogue with shareholders about strategy.
1080
 
 
 The Stork, ABN AMRO and ASMI cases of 2006, 2007 and 2010 
respectively show that shareholders have become more active and have a 
wish for dialogue. This has created a discussion as to whether 
management and supervisory boards have obligations to enter into 
dialogue with shareholders. The general view is that the management and 
supervisory boards should ensure that communication between 
shareholders and the two boards is as good as possible,
1081
 although it is 
clear that boards have no real obligation to discuss strategy with 
shareholders or to mediate between management and shareholders.
1082
  
 
                                                                                                                                    
and ASMI cases. 
1077 Frijns Code IV.4, second principle. 
1078 Frijns Code IV.3. 
1079 Frijns Code III.4. 
1080 UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 D.1 Main Principle: „There should be a dialogue with shareholders 
based on mutual understanding of objectives,‟ and D.1.1 „The chairman should discuss governance and 
strategy with major shareholders.‟ 
1081 Frijns Code, point 10 of the preamble. 
1082 ABN AMRO in Sale LaSalle Bank, HR 13/7/2007, NJ 2007, 434 and ASMI, HR 2/6/2010, NJ 2010, 544 and 
see the opinion of Advocate General Timmerman in the ASMI case. 
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4.5.4 Roles of boards in a two-tier and one-tier system 
 
 Role of management board: develop and achieve 
 The function of the management board is to manage the company.
1083
 The 
Dutch term besturen (managing or directing) means more than just 
running the company; it also encompasses buying and selling important 
assets and determining policy and strategy. Managing the company does 
not include exercising rights that by law belong to the shareholders, such 
as the right to issue shares, unless this right has been delegated to the he 
management board in the articles of association.
1084
 Apart from running 
the company, the management board has the task of developing 
(formulating) and achieving objectives and strategy and defining and 
implementing risk profiles and CSR policy and is also responsible for 
financial reporting.
1085
 The management board and each of its members 
represents the company in all its contacts and contractual relations with 
third parties.
1086
 The management board must also provide the 
supervisory board with timely information on a regular basis and on the 
topic of strategy at least once a year.
1087
  
 
 The management board develops the company‟s objectives and 
strategy
1088
 and must also achieve and implement them.
1089
 In the ABN 
AMRO and ASMI cases the Enterprise Chamber and the Supreme Court 
confirmed that the management board is responsible for determining 
strategy and the supervisory board for supervising strategy.  
 
 Role of supervisory board: supervise and advise 
 Article 2:140/250 DCC states that it is the function of the supervisory 
board “to supervise the strategy of the management board and the overall 
management of the company and its enterprise”. It assists the 
management board “by providing advice”. The word “assists” (staat ter 
zijde) should be viewed against the Dutch background of harmonious 
consultation. The word “advice” reflects the advisory role of the 
                                                     
1083 Article 2:129/239 DCC and Van Schilfgaarde and Winter (2009), p. 150. 
1084 Van der Grinten (1989), p. 443, no. 231. 
1085 Frijns Code II.1. 
1086 Article 2:130/240 DCC. 
1087 Article 2:141/251 DCC and Frijns Code II.1.2. 
1088 Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), p. 474. 
1089 Frijns Code II.1. 
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supervisory board.
1090
 However, supervision is the main task. The 
supervisory role is described at length in the legal literature, which 
confirms that the provision of advice is part of this role and involves 
merely acting as a sounding board and not developing ideas 
independently.
1091
 
 
 The supervisory board supervises the management board in its work of 
developing and achieving objectives and strategy, defining and 
implementing risk profiles and CSR policy and its financial reporting
1092
 
and supervises the performance of the management board as well. The 
supervisory board is basically dependent on the management board for its 
information.
1093
 However, supervisory board members can now gather 
their own information.
1094
 This means that the supervisory board has a 
duty to gather information (haalplicht) and that the chairman has a duty 
to coordinate this.
1095
 Ten years ago supervisory board members did not 
have to check the text of an acquisition agreement or ask whether there 
are sufficient vendor guarantees and a financial analysis.
1096
 Would this 
low standard of conduct still be acceptable today, ten years later? I doubt 
it. I think it is now standard practice for the supervisory board to check 
whether due diligence has taken place before an acquisition and whether 
there are sufficient vendor guarantees and a financial analysis. The 
standards for directors have become higher.  
 
                                                     
1090 Frijns Code III. Role of the supervisory board. See also Van Schilfgaarde and Winter (2009), p. 235. 
1091 Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), pp. 603-605 devote more than two pages to supervision and only 
eight lines to advice, Assink in Assink and Strik (2009), pp. 93-94. Prof. M.J. Kroeze gives the same 
impression and says that the advisory role of the supervisory board may be growing, Kroeze Article (2005/A), 
p. 7. 
1092 Article 2:140/250 DCC and Frijns Code II.1.2, III.1 and point 9 of the preamble. 
1093 Article 2:141/251 DCC. 
1094 Frijns Code III.1.9. 
1095 Frijns Code III.4.1(b). 
1096 Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), p. 604 with reference to the case of Verto/Drenth, The Hague Court 
of Appeal 6/4/1999, JOR 1999/142. Verto acquired a company after doing only very limited due diligence and 
very limited financial analysis. The management board members negotiated the agreements. The supervisory 
board members failed to study the texts of the agreements or ask whether guarantees had been provided. The 
acquisition created huge losses for Verto. Verto (and the Association of Shareholders/VEB) claimed liability 
on the part of both the management board and the supervisory board, albeit for different standards of conduct. 
After the Enterprise Chamber had ruled that there had been „no mismanagement‟, the members of the 
management and supervisory boards were not held liable by the courts. 
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 One of the main supervisory duties of supervisory board members is to 
ensure that there is a good management board and that it functions 
well.
1097
 Supervisory board members must check whether there are 
tensions within the management board. The supervisory board must be 
diligent in monitoring the composition of the management board and its 
entrepreneurship and succession. In “structure regime” companies and 
under the articles of association of many companies, the supervisory 
board appoints the management board members. Even if the articles of 
association provide that the shareholders‟ meeting appoints the 
management board members, the supervisory board usually nominates 
them or at least has influence on these nominations. This influence on 
nominations by outside supervisory board members has always been part 
of Dutch board culture. The Frijns Code emphasizes the role of 
evaluating the management board.
1098
 
 
 Furthermore, the supervisory board is charged with setting the 
remuneration of the management board members under the policy 
adopted by the general meeting
1099
 and with representing the company if 
the management board members have a conflict of interest
1100
. 
 
 Roles of board members in a one-tier board under the Act 
 Under the Act the new article 2:129a/239a to be added to the DCC 
provides that all duties or roles in a one-tier board are to be divided 
among the executive and non-executive directors. However, a mandatory 
provision is that the supervising and nominating duty will be performed 
by the non-executives. Developing and achieving the aims and strategy of 
the company, in other words running (besturen) the company, is the duty 
of the executives. The non-executives are responsible for supervising the 
performance of the executives. Developing strategy and risk management 
is the duty of the whole board (executives and non-executives together). 
Strategy development decisions are made in the whole board. It is the 
whole board that will choose the direction to be taken, i.e. whether to 
adopt the US model in which non-executives actively challenge 
executives or the UK model in which executives and non-executives 
cooperate in developing company strategy. 
 
                                                     
1097 Glasz (1992), pp. 17-18; Van der Grinten (1989), p. 515 and Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), p. 603. 
1098 Frijns Code III.1.7. 
1099 Article 2:135 DCC. 
1100 Article 2:146/256 DCC. 
  
 384 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
4.5.5 Boards‟ roles on strategy 
 
 Management board determines strategy and supervisory board only 
supervises (different in the case of one-tier boards) 
 A diagram for strategy development, achievement and supervision is 
given below. Dutch literature makes a distinction between developing or 
planning strategy (ontwikkelen) on the one hand and implementing it 
(realiseren) on the other hand. There is more emphasis on 
implementation
1101
 than on development, whereas in the UK there is 
substantial emphasis on the development of strategy. 
 
 Develop Implement Supervise 
1-tier board Complete board Executives Non-executives 
2-tier board Management Management Supervisory 
 
 Under Dutch law supervisory board members do not actively participate 
in planning strategy. Jean Frijns, the chairman of the committee that 
produced the Frijns Code, states that in the vast majority of Dutch listed 
companies supervisory board members are indeed not involved in 
formulating business strategy. Most executive board members want their 
supervisory board members to limit themselves to monitoring in a 
reactive rather than a proactive manner. Most supervisory board members 
say that their main task is to supervise the strategy plans of the 
management board. Some say that if the management board does not 
develop strategy plans, they may ask questions and even make 
suggestions.
1102
 In most cases the management board develops – one 
might even say adopts – the strategy plan and gives a draft to the 
supervisory board. In fact, they discuss it only once a year
1103
 at a 
meeting that generally lasts half a day or, at most, one or two days. This 
tends to result in no more than a few minor changes to the company‟s 
strategy plans. 
 
 In a minority of companies, many of which are large companies such as 
Philips, Shell, Unilever, Heineken, DSM and Akzo, supervisory board 
members tend to be more active and wish to discuss strategy. Often this is 
because the supervisory boards of such companies include some very 
experienced CEOs (or retired CEOs) of other companies as well as 
                                                     
1101 Frijns Code II.1, realisatie principle, and Van Manen (1999), p. 92. 
1102 Van Manen (1999), pp. 150-155. 
1103 Article 2:141/251, 2 DCC. 
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foreign members. These supervisory boards are actively involved in 
developing the strategic plan. Such practice has developed in “turbo” 
supervisory boards (also called the one-and-a-half-tier system), but is not 
based on the law or the Frijns Code. A basis for these more active 
supervisory board members can be found in the words “assist the 
management board by providing advice” in article 2:140/250 DCC and 
“advice” in the Frijns Code III.1. In giving their advice, supervisory 
board members should limit themselves to broad strategy. The general 
view in the Netherlands is that they should not involve themselves in 
matters of detail.
1104
 
 
 There has sometimes been confusion in the Netherlands about the role of 
supervisory board members in strategy. When Centaurus and Paulson 
wrote to the chairman of the supervisory board of Stork
1105
 that they 
wished to discuss strategy with him, he wrote back: “I have forwarded 
your letter to the management board since it, as you know, deals with 
strategy.” This was explicitly mentioned in the judgment of the Enterprise 
Chamber, which was mainly critical of the manner of communication 
rather than the fact that the supervisory board did not concern itself with 
strategy.  
 
 The ABN AMRO and ASMI cases have made it absolutely clear that the 
management board determines strategy and the supervisory board 
supervises strategy, and also that the supervisory board should make 
every effort to promote optimal communication between shareholders 
and the management and supervisory boards. At the same time, it is clear 
that the boards have no obligation to follow any instructions of 
shareholders or even an obligation to discuss strategy with 
shareholders.
1106
 
 
 We must realize that there are many different types of companies. In 
small companies, the management board members develop the strategy 
themselves and present the strategy plan to the supervisory board for 
approval once a year. At the other end of the spectrum there are the large 
conglomerates where strategy is often developed from the bottom up in 
strategy groups or in “scenario development” groups. These groups 
                                                     
1104 Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), p. 605. 
1105 Stork, Enterprise Chamber, OK 17/1/2007, JOR 2007, 42. 
1106 ABN AMRO in Sale LaSalle Bank, HR 13/7/2007, NJ 2007, 434 and ASMI, HR 2/6/2010, NJ 2010, 544. See 
also the opinion of Advocate General Timmerman in that case, and the Frijns Code, point 9 of the preamble. 
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discuss strategy development with the management board members, who 
then decide on the strategy plan and present it to the supervisory board 
members for approval. In some small companies supervisory board 
members are more actively involved in the discussions about the 
development of strategy. And in some of the large conglomerates 
supervisory board members are involved in the discussions with the 
bottom-up strategy groups and scenario groups, and do not wish to be 
asked to approve a predetermined strategy plan. In many companies the 
management board spends a lot of time preparing presentations for 
supervisory board meetings and suggesting alternatives and pointing out 
problems. These are, in my view, encouraging developments. 
 
 Having stressed the value of development of strategy, I add that there 
should also be focus on the implementation of the strategy. It is my view 
that supervisory directors in a two-tier board or non-executive directors in 
a one-tier board will be better supervisors of the implementation of the 
strategy, if they have actively been involved in the development of the 
strategy and understand all the building blocks of the strategy. 
 
 Strategy in the broader sense 
 Jeroen van der Veer, retired CEO of Royal Dutch Shell and present 
Chairman of Philips and ING and Vice-Chairman of Unilever, said in an 
interview concerning his vice-chairmanship of a special strategy 
committee of NATO that “strategy is: what do you want and do you have 
the means”.1107 
 
 The supervisory board‟s role in respect of the “what do you want?” 
aspect is merely to supervise, but it has important influence as regards the 
“means” and, especially, board succession.  
 
 In summary, strategy in the broader sense includes: 
 (a) defining the company‟s purpose or objects; 
 (b) agreeing on strategy; 
 (c) establishing the company‟s policies; 
 (d) appointing the executives and regulating the succession of 
members of the management and supervisory boards. 
 
                                                     
1107 NRC Handelsblad, 18 December 2009, p. 12. 
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 For points (a) to (c), general Dutch law would use the word “policy” 
(beleid).
1108
 The management board takes the initiative in formulating 
policy and the supervisory board supervises these aspects. As regards 
succession under (d), the supervisory board clearly plays an active role in 
the process of nominating and appointing directors and that the 
shareholders‟ meeting is responsible for making the appointment.1109 By 
both tradition and law, nominations are always made by the supervisory 
board members. Recently, such nominations are always on a profile, as 
required by the Frijns Code and the DCC.
1110
 
 
 Strategy role of supervisory board in “structure regime” companies 
 When the Structure Regime System Act was introduced in 1971, the 
supervisory board of many Dutch companies attained greater powers. 
These supervisory boards now had the power to approve or veto many 
important decisions on matters such as takeovers and large-scale 
redundancies. Having more powers should imply more responsibility and 
active involvement. This has, however, not happened. The practice in 
most of these “structure regime” companies stayed as it was: the 
management board remained responsible for taking the initiative and the 
supervisory board limited itself to supervision and approval. This was 
also the case at Stork, which was a “structure regime” company; not only 
did the supervisory board consider that it was it was not responsible for 
strategy but it also communicated insufficiently with shareholders. This 
resulted in litigation: the Stork case of 2006. 
 
 Development of strategy not high on the list of priorities in the 
Netherlands 
 Unlike the UK Cadbury Code, the Higgs Review, the Combined Code, 
the UK Corporate Governance Code and the Walker Review, the Frijns 
Code makes little mention of strategy development. The UK Codes give 
examples. 
 
 – Combined Code 2006, Supporting Principle A.1 
  “The non-executive directors, as equal members of a unitary 
board, should be involved in strategy as the executive directors.” 
 
                                                     
1108 Article 2.140/250, 2 DCC. 
1109 Article 2:132/242 DCC. 
1110 Frijns Code III.3.1 and for „structure regime‟ companies article 2:158/268, 3 DCC. 
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 – Combined Code 2008, Supporting Principle A.1 and UK 
Corporate Governance Code A.4 
  “As part of their role as members of a unitary board, non-
executive directors should constructively challenge and help 
develop proposals on strategy.” 
 
 – Higgs Review puts the strategic role first. 
 
 – Walker emphasizes in recommendation 6 that NEDs should be 
encouraged to challenge and test executive proposals on strategy, 
and recommendation 9 makes clear that the chairman must, in 
setting the agenda of the board and in chairing the meetings, 
ensure that sufficient time is given to strategic issues. An 
informed and critical contribution of directors is encouraged and 
expected on matters of risk and strategy. 
 
 It is interesting to note that in the US the Delaware courts honour the 
concept of long-term strategy in that where the board can show that it has 
developed a long-term strategy this will be treated as a valid defence. In 
the Time Warner case it was acknowledged that the board of Time had a 
long-term strategy when it chose its preferred merger partner and wished 
to preserve Time‟s identity and the independence of its journalists. In the 
recent case of the Dollar Thrifty merger with Herz, the court respected 
the long-term strategy of Dollar Thrifty.
1111
 Similarly, in the case of Air 
Products v. Airgas it respected Airgas‟s 5-year plan.1112 
 
 The Frijns Code merely states as follows: 
 
 II.1 The management board is responsible for achieving the 
company‟s aims, strategy and risk profile and for corporate social 
responsibility (no mention of the development of strategy). 
 
 II.1.2 The management board shall submit the strategy and parameters 
for strategy to the supervisory board for approval. 
 
 III.1 The role of the supervisory board members is to supervise and 
give advice. 
 
                                                     
1111 Dollar Thrifty, C.A. No. 5458-VCS (Del. Ch. 8 September 2010, Leo Strine). 
1112 Air Products v. Airgas, 15 February 2011, Chancellor Chandler C.A. No. 5249/5256C. 
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 III.1.6 In more detail, this role is to supervise (a) the objectives, (b) the 
strategy, (c) risk management, (d) the financial reporting process, 
(e) compliance with the law, (f) the relationship with 
shareholders and (g) corporate social responsibility. 
 
 An argument for supervisory board members to become involved in 
developing strategy rather than merely supervising its achievement is that 
there are many more views on strategy than those expressed by 
management. Stewardship shareholders, activist shareholders, NGOs and 
the media all have views that also count. For this reason alone, it is vital 
for supervisory board members to play a more active role in the 
development of strategy. 
 
 Summary: the supervisory board only supervises strategy plans, but takes 
the lead in succession matters 
 It may therefore be concluded that apart from their active role in 
succession planning Dutch supervisory boards do not play a very active 
role in developing strategy, although the supervisory board members of 
some companies are becoming increasingly active in this field. Holding 
lengthy and repeated discussions of strategy is fairly alien to Dutch 
corporate culture. However, external factors may pressurise supervisory 
boards into becoming more proactive.  
  
 Proposal 
 I would like the next code of best practices (or the advice of one of the 
committees monitoring best practices) to include a step in the direction of 
supervisory board members being increasingly involved in the process of 
developing the company‟s strategy. This would mean that supervisory 
board members would have to inform themselves better about the 
business of their companies, listen to lower management and visit the 
shop floor. Moreover some supervisory board members are already 
playing a more proactive role in the development of strategy. In this 
connection, there is also a general wish for better information and access 
to lower management and on-site visits as is mentioned in sub-
section 4.5.6 below. I propose that the boards discuss the way and means 
for this process at least once every year. 
 
 For example, the Corporate Governance Code could be amended as 
follows: 
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 II.1 “The management board has the entrepreneurial leadership in 
developing and achieving the aims, the strategy, the risk profile 
and CSR”; 
 III.1.1 Add a second sentence: “The supervisory and management 
boards will deliberate with each other at least once a year to 
adopt a procedure:  
  - for the provision of timely and relevant information to be 
given to the supervisory board; and  
  - for the possibility for supervisory directors to talk with lower 
management and visit the premises of the enterprise; and  
  they will establish a timetable for regular meetings between the 
two boards in which entrepreneurial strategy, risk management 
and CSR are discussed; and  
  they will settle what the role of the supervisory directors will be 
in those discussions and the ways and means of their functioning 
with each other. If there is a one-tier board the board should hold 
these annual deliberations.”  
 Alternatively this text could be added to III.1.8 or III.1.9. 
 
 If supervisory board members wish to play a more active role in 
developing strategy, be involved at an earlier stage, receive more timely 
information and have more time to deliberate strategy in their meetings, 
they might consider becoming non-executive directors of a one-tier 
board. Even then it would be advisable for the boards to discuss the 
details of the process each year. 
 
 Whether a company chooses a two-tier or one-tier system, it is advisable 
for the boards to discuss the procedure for developing strategy, for more 
information and regular discussions about strategy and to confirm the 
outcome of the annual discussion. 
 
4.5.6 Early and on-site information, access to lower management: difference 
between two-tier and one-tier boards 
 
 One of the worries of Dutch supervisory board members at present is the 
quality and timeliness of the information they receive.
1113
 In a two-tier 
board supervisory board members only approve and do not take part in 
the decision making process. After all, in the case of a two-tier board 
                                                     
1113 De Bos and Lückerath (2009/O), p. 33, nearly half of supervisory board members think they receive 
inadequate information and receive it too late. 
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supervisory board members do not have access to lower level managers 
or visit their operations. 
 
 In the case of a one-tier board, by contrast, non-executive directors have 
earlier and easier access to lower management and on-site information. 
Here there are elements of US and UK corporate governance that could 
be followed by Dutch companies.
1114
 There is no legal obstacle, even 
under the present two-tier system, that would prevent supervisory board 
members from insisting on receiving relevant information in good time 
and being able to make on-site visits. There is a connection between 
receiving early and on-site information and participating in strategy 
development. 
 
4.5.7 Differences between supervisory board members and non-executive 
directors 
 
 If a company with a two-tier system were to change to a one-tier system, 
this would involve the supervisory board members becoming non-
executive directors. It is therefore useful to discuss the differences 
between the two. This will give an insight into the functioning of 
supervisory board members and non-executive directors under present 
law and under the regime introduced by the Act and in some cases make 
clear why it would be an improvement if the Act were to be enacted: 
 
 (a) Involvement in decisions 
  Supervisory board members are not involved in decision making: 
they merely approve or veto decisions. Non-executive directors 
are involved in all decisions of the board. They vote together with 
the executive directors. As they are involved in decision making, 
they need to know more, receive more in-depth information and 
have a greater understanding of the reasons for the decision. They 
are involved in the development of strategy. Accordingly, they 
are more involved and have greater responsibility than 
supervisory board members, which is an important difference 
(see 4.5.5 above). 
 
 (b) Veto on major decisions? 
  A supervisory board as a whole, and therefore its majority, has a 
right to veto major decisions. 
                                                     
1114 US section 3.5.6 and UK section 2.5.8. 
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  In a one-tier board the non-executives only have a veto if they 
outnumber the executive directors. It is a best practice rule of the 
Frijns Code that there should be more non-executive than 
executive directors.
1115
 To ensure that the non-executive directors 
can outvote the executive directors, the law allows a provision in 
the articles of association of the company giving non-executive 
directors a double or even treble vote.
1116
  
 
 (c) Instructions to the executive directors 
  The supervisory board may give instructions to the executive 
directors on general guidelines only if this is possible under the 
articles of association.
1117
 In a one-tier board non-executive 
directors can take initiatives, which are binding on the board. 
Their influence is, of course, larger if they are in the majority by 
number of weighted votes. 
 
 (d) Extra powers 
  Supervisory board members may have extra powers if provision 
for this is made in the articles of association (statuten).
1118
 
 
 (e) Co-management 
  Supervisory board members may not co-manage (kunnen niet 
meebesturen). This creates problems if supervisory board 
members wish to do so anyway, as sometimes happens in a crisis. 
Such situations bring forth the “one-and-a-half-tier boards” 
referred to above. These complicated questions involving 
supervisory board members acting in excess of their powers may 
arise in cases where a company elects to have a combined board 
(e.g. Reed Elsevier). The same problem arises in a different way 
                                                     
1115 Frijns Code III 8.4. 
1116 Article 2:129/239, 2 DCC makes it possible for companies to give double or treble votes, provided that this 
is not done in such a way that one person would have all the power. Instead, the power can be given to the 
supervisory board as a group. 
1117 Under article 2:129/239, 4 DCC, the articles of association may provide that the supervisory board members 
are empowered to give instructions about general policy. In the absence of such a provision in the articles, the 
supervisory board cannot instruct management. Euro Motorcycle v. Bosman, The Hague Court of Appeal 
25/8/1998, 98/127 Injunction. 
1118 Article 2:140/230, 3 and 4 DCC. 
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for non-executive directors. They can manage and give 
instructions, but may not represent the company. 
 
 (f) Chairman 
  The position of a chairman of a one-tier board differs from that of 
a chairman of a supervisory board. The chairman of a one-tier 
board runs the board as a whole, presides over the meetings and 
arranges for the provision of information. In such a case, the CEO 
can focus on the day-to-day management. 
 
 (g) More information and at an earlier stage 
  The supervisory board has the right to receive information only 
from the executive directors and only if it is necessary for the 
giving or withholding of approval.
1119
 If a supervisory board 
member wants extra information he must go through the 
chairman and afterwards the complete board. Only then is he free 
to approach management. Non-executive directors receive more 
information, in particular more in-depth information about the 
business and the market, and receive it at an earlier stage.
1120
 Also 
non-executives can collect information at their own initiative, in 
most cases informing the chairman and CEO that they are doing 
so. Therefore it is easier for non-executives than for supervisory 
board members to sense whether there is good teamwork in the 
executive team. These are important differences (see 4.5.6 
above). 
 
 (h) Represent the company 
  Supervisory board members cannot represent the company.
1121
 
Non-executives can, in theory, represent the company, unless this 
they are not given signing powers in the articles of association 
(this is likely to be the case in most companies once the Act is 
enacted). 
 
                                                     
1119 Article 2:141/251 DCC. 
1120 Jeroen van der Veer, retired CEO of Shell and present Chairman of Philips and ING and Vice-Chairman of 
Unilever, has confirmed this information difference to me. In his words, “In a one-tier board non-executives 
can get „operational‟ information”. 
1121 Article 2:130/240 DCC. 
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 (i) Knowledge attribution 
  The knowledge of a supervisory board member is not attributed 
to the company. However, the knowledge of a non-executive can 
be attributed to the company unless he is excluded from 
representing the company, which will usually not be the case. 
 
 (j) Representation in case of conflicting interest 
  Supervisory board members may represent the company in cases 
where the executive directors have a conflict of interest.
1122
 Non-
executive directors do not have this power. The Act solves this 
problem by inserting a provision in article 2:129/239, paragraph 6 
DCC that precludes any director with a conflict of interest from 
attending the board meeting and states that, if this does not solve 
the problem, the shareholders‟ meeting may decide.1123 
 
 (k) Legal person as director 
  Only natural persons may be supervisory board members.
1124
 By 
contrast, legal persons t may be managing or executive directors. 
The Act determines that only natural persons may be executives. 
This difference is of a technical nature. 
 
 (l) Calling meetings 
  The supervisory board as such may call a meeting. Non-executive 
directors do not have this power without the majority vote of the 
complete board. This could have been arranged in the Act, but 
has not been. Naturally, however, provision for this could be 
made in the articles of association. 
 
 (m) Appointment 
  Under the present DCC it is possible to stipulate in the articles of 
association that one-third of the supervisory board members are 
appointed by persons or bodies others than the shareholders‟ 
meeting.
1125
 This should also apply to non-executive directors, 
but is not stipulated in the Act. 
 
                                                     
1122 Article 2:146/256 DCC provides that the general meeting of shareholders may appoint persons to represent 
the company. 
1123 Article 2:129/239. 6 DCC. 
1124 Article 2:140/250, 1 DCC. 
1125 Article 2:143/253 DCC. 
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 (n) Who determines remuneration? 
  The remuneration of supervisory board members is determined 
by the shareholders‟ meeting. Under article 2:135, paragraph 3 
DCC the remuneration policy in respect of the management board 
(and hence of non-executive directors too under the old law) is 
determined by the shareholders‟ meeting. Remuneration policy 
includes share and option plans, but not the amount of 
remuneration as such. In order to make the same arrangement for 
non-executive directors, i.e. that their remuneration is determined 
by the shareholders‟ meeting, this would have to be arranged in 
the articles of association. 
 
 (o) Structure regime 
  Supervisory board members are important in “structure regime” 
companies. The DCC regulates their powers and their nomination 
and appointment. Under old law a “structure regime” company 
cannot have a one-tier board. However, the Act makes this 
possible. Article 2:164/274(a) of the Act provides that the articles 
of the DCC on supervisory board members in a “structure 
regime” company apply mutatis mutandis to non-executive 
directors in a one-tier board of such a company.  
 
 (p) Committee membership 
  Committees are deemed to be part of a supervisory board. 
Usually they consist solely of supervisory board members. 
However, there is no legal obstacle to having other persons, for 
example executive directors, as members of board committees. 
 
  In company with a one-tier board it would seem logical to have 
only non-executives as members of committees because of their 
monitoring role. Here too, however, there is no legal obstacle to 
having others as members. 
 
4.5.8 Role of management board members in representing the company  
 
 An important element of the role of directors is whether they can 
represent the company and, if so, to what extent. 
 
 The First Council Directive of 9 March 1968 (68/151/EEC; OJ EC L65/8) 
emphasizes the importance of the registration of directors in the trade 
register of the country where the company is registered. In the 
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Netherlands the Chamber of Commerce administers a trade register 
known as the Handelsregister. It is meant to facilitate the freedom of 
trade between member states by means of clear and transparent rules, 
thereby enabling third parties dealing with a company to easily ascertain 
who has the power to represent the company. If a director is entered in 
the Trade Register as managing director, he may represent the company 
in all contracts and legal actions, without limitation,
1126
 unless the register 
shows that more than one signature is required. A provision may be 
entered in the register that the company can be represented only by two 
management board members, or by two executive directors. 
 
 Third parties may rely on registration in the trade register as exclusive 
evidence of who may represent the company. Apart from managing 
directors, who have full power of representation, it is also possible to 
register a proxy holder with limited power of representation. The 
Netherlands does not have a system comparable to that of the US, where 
each officer may represent the company. Under the Dutch system those 
with the power of representation are either a managing director with full 
power of representation or a proxy holder with limited power. Others 
have no registered power of representation (see article 2:130/240 DCC). 
Under the Trade Register Act, especially section 18, managing directors 
are obliged to file and update the registrations. This obligation of 
directors is also mentioned in most articles of association and, although it 
is an administrative task, it is regarded as important. 
 
 Sometimes a company or board may wish to give a limited proxy to one 
management board member to act alone in certain limited matters, 
notwithstanding the fact that a two-signature system has been registered. 
In practice, if two signatures are required, two directors representing the 
company give a limited proxy in writing to the person who may act 
alone.
1127
 This could also be done under article 2:129(a)3/239(a)3 DCC 
as introduced by the Act (hereinafter “DCC (Act)”).  
 
                                                     
1126 Bibolini, HR 17/12/1982, NJ 1983, 480, where the Supreme Court held that a director registered as such in 
the trade register can represent the company even if the third party knew about the requirement of shareholder 
approval. If a director has signed without the approval of the supervisory board or shareholders, despite such a 
requirement in the articles of association, the signature is valid vis-à-vis third parties, but the director 
personally can be held liable. This was decided in Schwandt/Berghuizer Papierfabriek, HR 29/11/2002, NJ 
2003, 455. 
1127 Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), p. 484 and Sanders, Westbroek, Storm and Buyn (2005), p. 172. 
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 As we have seen, a power of representation in the Netherlands is based 
on registration and article 2:130/240 DCC, which confirms that the 
company can be represented by the management board and every 
management board member, provided that the articles of association may 
determine otherwise. In the UK section 40 of the Companies Act 2006 
also determines that the power of directors to bind the company is 
deemed to be without limit. There is a difference. In the Netherlands, if 
the articles impose a limit on the management board members, that will 
not be held against the third party. In the UK, however, if a director has a 
limit imposed by the articles of association of £1 million, that limitation 
is deemed to be public knowledge and can be held against the third party 
because the articles are public.
1128
 In the US, representation power is 
usually based on position (CEO or president are deemed to have the 
authority to bind the company), bye-laws, board resolutions or apparent 
or ostensible authority.
1129
 In the US the authority of an officer is not 
overtly clear, hence the practice of legal opinions. 
 
 In the Netherlands there can be internal limitations, such as the 
requirement of the prior approval of supervisory board members or the 
shareholders‟ meeting. If a management board member enters into a 
contract with a third party without such consent, the contract is still valid 
vis-à-vis that third party, but the management board member will then be 
held liable internally.
1130
 In other words, the power of representation of 
management board members is unlimited and unconditional.
1131
 This is 
different from the UK and the US as described above. 
 
 Generally, supervisory board members cannot represent the company. 
Only in exceptional cases, such as if all the management board members 
have a conflict of interest, may the company be bound by supervisory 
board members.  
 
 For a one-tier board it will be logical to register only the executive 
directors – and not the non-executives – as persons who can represent the 
company. This last point also applies to the chairman, who will not have 
                                                     
1128 Davies (2001), p. 161, nos. 7-9. 
1129 Pinto and Branson (2009), p. 134, revised Model Business Corporation Act § 8.41. 
1130 ABN AMRO case and article 2:107a DCC and Schwandt/Berghuizer Papierfabriek, HR 29/11/2002, 
NJ 2003, 455. 
1131 Article 2:130/240, 3 DCC, and Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), p. 485 and Prof. J.M.M. Maeijer, 
Vertegenwoordiging in Rechtspersoon: De Naamloze en de Besloten Vennootschap (1994), p. 370. 
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the power to represent the company. If the company so wishes, the 
chairman and or other non-executives could have the power of 
representation. 
 
4.5.9 Dual task of managing directors: action and monitoring 
 
Under existing Dutch law each member of the management board has a 
dual task: day-to-day management and monitoring. In the first place he 
has his specific daily duties. For example, the COO of an oil and 
chemical storage company is responsible for the storage tanks, their 
maintenance and the buying and selling of tanks. Let us suppose that he 
has been given the authority to bind the company in matters within his 
remit, without the consent of anyone else, up to a limit of €5 million per 
transaction. This same COO, as management board member, is required 
to monitor his fellow finance director in so far as general policy and the 
main aspects of the latter‟s tasks are concerned. For example, the COO 
will also study the financial accounts. The finance director in turn will 
monitor the work of the COO when he enters into contracts for the 
building of an LNG tank for €20 million. 
 
 The Dutch term for the specific (non-monitoring) duties of an individual 
director is taak, as set out in the present article 2:9 DCC and in 
articles 2:9 and 2:129/239a, paragraph 3 DCC as amended by the Act. 
There is also a reference in the old article 2:9 DCC to werkkring, which 
may be translated as “area of work” or “sphere of duties”. The subject of 
the monitoring task is the general course of affairs (algemene gang van 
zaken). Article 2:9 DCC of the Act mentions that the whole management 
board has responsibility (draagt de verantwoordelijkheid) for the general 
course of affairs, which implies that this board has to act as a team and is 
jointly and severally liable for the general course of affairs. The present 
article 2:9 DCC says that each of them is liable for the whole (ieder van 
hen voor het geheel aansprakelijk), whereas the proposed article 2:9 
DCC uses the expressions “bears the responsibility” (draagt de 
verantwoordelijkheid) and must “monitor the general course of affairs”.  
 
 This distinction between the specific duties of an individual director and 
the general task of overseeing is an important topic in Dutch legal 
literature in general and in particular in connection with thoughts about 
one-tier boards in particular.
1132
 
                                                     
1132 Dumoulin (2005), pp. 268-269; Dortmond (2003), pp. 118-119; Van den Ing (2000), pp. 140-141; Van den 
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 The general view is that the management board manages the company 
(the Dutch word is besturen).
1133
 This means that the powers are vested in 
the whole management board, which is responsible for all aspects of the 
governance of the company. This is comparable to the US concept in 
section 141(a) of the Delaware GCL: “the … shall be managed under the 
direction of the board” and to the UK concept of the unitary board. In the 
US and the UK the board as a whole takes all the decisions. 
 
 The general view in the Netherlands is that the board as a whole can 
delegate certain aspects of its work to a specific director. But such 
delegation does not relieve the board of the responsibility to give clear 
instructions, to delegate only to a person who is capable of performing 
the task, to consult and to monitor. This is important not only for the 
general functioning of a board but also when discussing the possibility of 
dividing up tasks within a one-tier board. The general view is that 
delegation is possible under old law and is expressly described in the Act. 
The Act requires a statutory basis for the division of tasks in 
article 2:129/239a, paragraph 3 DCC.
1134
 
 
 There is a specific difference between Dutch law and practice on the one 
hand and UK and US law and practice on the other. In the UK and the US 
it is possible to delegate general powers to a non-director. For example, 
in US and UK joint venture agreements there is often a clause permitting 
an “alternate director” (i.e. a replacement director) to attend a board 
meeting instead of a board member.
1135
 This idea of an alternate director 
is not possible under Dutch law, because the responsibility of a director 
for the general policy is purely personal.
1136
 
                                                                                                                                    
Ing (2005), p. 115 et seq.; P.J. Dortmond, „Delegatie binnen het toezichthoudend en het bestuurlijk orgaan‟, 
Ondernemingsrecht 2005/90, p. 263 (“Dortmond (2005)”); Mr J.M. Blanco Fernández, „Rechtspositie in 
aansprakelijkheid van bestuurders en commissarissen‟, Ondernemingsrecht 2000/17; Strik (2010), p. 105 et 
seq.; Wezeman (2009/G), p. 93; Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), p. 171. 
1133 Article 2:129, 1 DCC. 
1134 Article 2:129/239a(e) DCC: “The articles of association may directly or indirectly provide that one or more 
management board members can validly decide on matters that come within their remit. Any such provision 
pursuant to the articles of association must be in writing.” (Bij of krachtens de statuten kan worden bepaald 
dat één of meer bestuurders rechtsgeldig kunnen besluiten omtrent zaken die tot zijn respectievelijk hun taak 
behoren. Bepaling krachtens de statuten geschiedt schriftelijk.) 
1135 Davies (2008), p. 381. 
1136 Sanders, Westbroek, Storm and Buyn (2005), 6.2, p. 202. There is also no scope for “alternate supervisory 
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 Dutch authors make a distinction in 4 (some say 3) tasks of directors: 
first, the specific task allocated to him; second, all tasks not specifically 
allocated; third: the general course of business (the second and third can 
be one group); fourth: monitoring each other. The first is individual, the 
second, third and fourth are collective.
1137
 See also 4.6.2 below. 
 
 The general view is that managing the general course of affairs of a 
company is the task of the complete management board and, in the case 
of a one-tier board, of all the executives and possibly the non-executives 
as well, and that this entails joint and several responsibility and liability 
for all actions of each and every director, even if the actions were 
undertaken by a director to whom powers had been delegated. This is in 
line with the Dutch tradition of governance by consensus.  
 
4.5.10 Independence of supervisory board members 
 
Interestingly, the Frijns Code not only defines independence in technical 
terms but also sets a standard of behaviour (the duty to “act critically”). 
This is one of the few cases in which the Frijns Code broaches the subject 
of behaviour (gedrag).
1138
  
 
 The Frijns Code stipulates that all but one of the supervisory board 
members must be independent of the company and defines independence 
as not having been connected with the company as an employee or 
contracting party during the preceding year, not having cross-board 
memberships (see (d) in the note) and not holding or directing a company 
that owns more than 10% of the shares in the company.
1139
 
                                                                                                                                    
board members”. 
1137 Strik (2010), p. 137; other jurists say there are 3 tasks, because they put the seond and third together. 
1138 Frijns Code Principle III.2. 
1139 Frijns Code III.2.2. 
 In summary the supervisory board member or any member of his family: 
 (a) may not be an employee or management board member; 
 (b) may not receive fees from the company; 
 (c) has not had important business relationship with the company during the preceding year; 
 (d) is not a management board member of another company where a management board member of the 
company is supervisory board member; 
 (e/f) does not hold or manage a company that holds 10% of the shares in the company; 
 (g) has not managed the company in the preceding 12 months as a replacement management board member. 
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 The main difference of principle between the Dutch and US positions is 
that in the US independent directors can be and are encouraged to own 
shares in the company on the grounds that having a stake in the company 
is a motivational factor. In the Netherlands, however, they are 
discouraged from owning shares as it is thought that this would make 
them less receptive to other stakeholder interests and the long-term view. 
The Frijns Code puts the threshold at a 10% shareholding.
1140
 In the US 
cross-directorships are deemed to compromise independence only if the 
cross-director is a member of the compensation committee. In the 
Netherlands all cross-directorships should be avoided.
1141
 The Frijns 
Code says that all cross-directorships create a lack of independence. The 
difference with the UK is that in the Netherlands a maximum term of 
12 years applies to supervisory board membership,
1142
 whereas in the UK 
a director is deemed to have lost his independence after 9 years of 
service. The UK Corporate Governance Code even suggests that a 
company should actively consider whether a director should be 
reappointed after 6 years. 
 
 The question is whether the drive for independence is not overdone. Will 
the pendulum swing back? If one over-emphasizes independence, the 
pool of available business knowledge and expertise becomes very small. 
The Frijns Code only permits one non-independent supervisory board 
member/non-executive director. Professor Maarten Kroeze argues that 
this should be more flexible, and there is international support for his 
view.
1143
 The UK system of balanced membership is more flexible. 
 
 UK chairmen are not regarded as independent after their appointment. 
This point has not been raised in the US and the Netherlands, probably 
because they do not yet have a track record of “hands-on” chairmen. This 
point may crop up in the future.  
 
                                                     
1140 Frijns Code III.2.2(e). 
1141 Frijns Code III.2.2(d). 
1142 Frijns Code III.3.5. 
1143 Kroeze, Article (2005/A), with reference to US economics studies. Martin Lipton informs me he is of the 
same opinion. The UK Walker Review warns that too many independents might be detrimental to the 
knowledge represented in the board. Warren Buffet in Cunningham (2009), p. 55 makes the same point. 
  
 402 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
 The last independence criterion in the Frijns Code is not having acted as 
de facto manager of the company in the preceding year.
1144
 This is 
analogous with the UK reasoning that a chairman is ipso facto no longer 
independent. It is my impression that in the US independence is generally 
a matter of fact, not of formal rules, because the US courts hold that there 
is a duty of loyalty to the company. Under the Dutch Code, by contrast, 
independence is more of a box-ticking exercise. 
 
4.5.11 Chairmen in the present and future 
 
 Introduction 
 Under present Dutch law the chairman of the company is the chairman of 
the supervisory board. 
 
 The general view is that whereas the role of the CEO has become 
stronger the chairman‟s position has not grown at an equal pace. This 
means that a certain balance has been lost.
1145
 
 
 There are many instances where a strong CEO has managed to dominate 
the chairman. After all, the CEO has all the information, can choose what 
he wants to tell and has the opportunity to influence the chairman in one-
on-one meetings and calls. In this way the CEO can also create a distance 
between the chairman and the other members of the supervisory 
board.
1146
 This can only be prevented if the chairman has the initiative 
and can gather information about the company and its business from 
other internal sources. So far, however, the Dutch consensus culture has 
expected the chairman to behave not as an active leader, but as a primus 
inter pares.
1147
 The DCC makes no mention of the chairman of the 
supervisory board. 
 
 Tabaksblat 
 The Tabaksblat Code and the Frijns Code have given the chairman of the 
supervisory board a substantial role in ensuring the functioning of the 
supervisory board and its committees. Under the Codes the chairman has 
                                                     
1144 Frijns Code III.2.2(g). 
1145 Schuit (2010), p. 33. 
1146 Smit (2009), which describes the board dynamics at ABN AMRO, where supervisory board members for 
years seemed ignorant of a continuing disagreement between the CEO, Groenink, and the director for 
investment banking, Jiskoot. 
1147 Sanders, Westbroek, Storm and Buyn (2005), 6.6.3. 
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to act as the main contact between the supervisory board and the 
management board members and shareholders and to ensure the orderly 
and efficient conduct of proceedings at general meetings.
1148
 
 
 General meeting 
 Conducting the general meeting of shareholders is an external function. 
As mentioned above, the DCC does not state who should chair the 
meetings, but most articles of association provide that the chairman of the 
supervisory board should preside over the general meetings.
1149
 General 
meetings in the Netherlands are less well prepared than in the US and 
UK, where the lead time is much longer and all the procedures are 
observed for proxy voting and the provision of extensive information. 
General meetings in the Netherlands are often full of surprises. An 
example is the HBG case of 2003, where shareholders had asked the 
chairman to consult the shareholders‟ meeting about a substantial 
transaction (the conclusion of a joint venture), although there was no 
legal obligation to seek the approval of the general meeting. At a later 
meeting the boards gave some information about the transaction, but the 
shareholders questioned whether it was sufficient. The Enterprise 
Chamber held that there had been mismanagement, but the Supreme 
Court overturned the decision. This was an example of a supervisory 
board having to deal with a novel and unexpected situation.
1150
 Foreign 
chairmen are not used to surprises at formal meetings. Chairing may 
become increasingly difficult
1151
 if general meetings of shareholders are 
shown live on the company website and electronic voting becomes 
possible.
1152
 Given the large percentage of foreign shareholders and the 
difficulties for foreigners in speaking and voting at general meetings, the 
pressure to move the debate with shareholders to an earlier date before 
the meeting, as is the practice in the US with proxy soliciting, is likely to 
increase.
1153
 
 
                                                     
1148 Frijns Code Principle III.4. 
1149 Sanders, Westbroek, Storm and Buyn (2005), 6.6.3. 
1150 HBG, HR 21/2/2003, NJ 2003, 182. 
1151 Cees J.A. van Lede, Chairman of Heineken, retired CEO of AKZO, „De rol van de voorzitter‟ [„The Role of 
the Chairman‟], Ondernemingsrecht 2005/8, p. 258 (“Van Lede (2005)”). 
1152 Van Lede (2005), p. 257. 
1153 Riens Abma, director of Eumedion, „Changed Position of the Shareholder‟, Goed Bestuur 2 (2006), p. 16 
(“Abma (2006/A)”). 
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 External 
 The responsibility for chairing general meetings of shareholders results in 
other external duties, such as giving the company a human face (a duty 
shared with the CEO), promoting the company‟s image in the long term, 
and deputising for the CEO in cases of illness or sudden absence (as 
happened at ING, where chairman Homme replaced the CEO when he 
suddenly fell ill). The chairman may possibly also be called upon to 
explain matters in the case of a crisis and to explain the company‟s 
remuneration policy to the outside world. All these functions suggest that 
while the CEO is chosen for what he can do the chairman is often chosen 
for the impression he makes. Nonetheless, he should be modest!
1154
 
 
 Internal team leader 
 The most important internal function of the chairman is to advise, 
encourage and act as a sounding board for the management board, 
especially the CEO.
1155
 He should know the company well. He should 
also understand the dynamics of the management team and take action as 
soon as he suspects any disagreement between management board 
members. He should talk to them and inform his fellow supervisory board 
members. As soon as he senses disagreement between two executive 
directors during a meeting, he should adjourn informally and talk to each 
of them. In that sense he acts as the coach of the management board. 
 
 Some commentators say that Dutch companies have a triangular 
organisation: management board, supervisory board and shareholders. All 
three should communicate well internally and with each other.
1156
 If there 
is a problem of communication the chairman should try to mend the lines 
of communication.
1157
 
 
 He is clearly the team leader of the supervisory board and as such 
responsible for ensuring the best possible results in the following fields: 
induction, training, information, agenda setting, allowing for sufficient 
time for consultation and decision making, committee functioning, 
appraisals at least once a year, election of the vice-chairman, meetings of 
                                                     
1154 Van Lede (2005), p. 257. 
1155 Van Lede (2005), p. 258. 
1156 Frijns Code III.4.1. 
1157 This principle is to be found in article 2.8 DCC: “All concerned with the company should act reasonably 
towards each other”. This is a basic principle of Dutch company law. It starts with good communication and 
also involves taking due account of one another‟s interests. 
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the supervisory board without management board members present, 
proper contact with the management board and works council,
1158
 and the 
planning of an orderly succession for management and supervisory board 
members. The harder the chairman works, the more important it is that he 
ensures that no information gap exists between him and the other 
supervisory board members, because he will only get the best out of his 
fellow board members if they are fully involved and informed. 
 
 Clearly, the Tabaksblat Code was inspired in part by the UK Combined 
Code. The UK literature on chairmen is often used as example in the 
Netherlands.
1159
  
 
 The UK codes and literature have also inspired the most recent Dutch 
book by Professor Steven Schuit entitled “The chairman makes or breaks 
the board”. Professor Schuit interviewed captains of Dutch industry and, 
based on the information they provided, made recommendations. These 
recommendations deal with the points mentioned in the Frijns Code, 
which are in many cases influenced by the UK codes. The chairman 
should ensure (1) proper succession of board members, (2) proper 
consultation and debate in the supervisory board, (3) proper coaching and 
“employment” of the management board members,1160 (4) proper 
committee composition, (5) proper distribution of information, (6) proper 
follow-up to board decisions, (7) independent monitoring, (8) proper 
coordination of advice, (9) proper training and education, (10) proper 
evaluation, (11) meetings of the supervisory board without management 
board members present, (12) proper discussion of the development and 
achievement of strategy, (13) proper communication with important 
shareholders, (14) transparent reporting, (15) choosing a vice-chairman to 
evaluate the chairman, and (16) proper documenting of the division of 
                                                     
1158 Frijns Code III.4.1. 
1159 E.g. Cadbury (2002) and Rushton (2008). 
1160 Schuit (2010), pp. 57-58. Ensuring proper coaching and „employment‟ of the management board members is 
an important function of the chairman. Schuit explains on pp. 57-58 that the chairman should act as sounding 
board, coach and confidential counsellor for the management board members. He should also take a lead in 
promoting their well-being and functioning and hence in their remuneration. In addition, the chairman should 
be a member (not the chair) of the remuneration committee. He should take the lead in appointing and 
dismissing management board members and be chairman of the nomination committee. The word 
„employment‟ was introduced in this context by P. Elverding, CEO of DSM and retired chairman of ING and 
Océ. 
  
 406 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
duties between the CEO and the chairman.
1161
 The book includes an 
English summary and is well worth reading. Schuit is of the view that 
chairmen should be more active than they are at present in order to get 
the best out of their fellow supervisory board members. He pleads for 
“heavyweight” chairmen. The same points would also be applicable to 
the chairman of a one-tier board, who would then also act as team leader 
of the executives and non-executives. The sheer number of quotes from 
people who are or were in positions of authority in large companies, such 
as Morris Tabaksblat, Hans Weyers, Jeroen van der Veer, Rob 
Zwartendijk, Jan Michiel Hessels and Kees van Lede, lends extra weight 
to these recommendations. It is interesting that the emphasis placed by 
Professor Schuit on the chairman‟s role as an inspiring team leader fits in 
well with the Dutch tradition of teamwork and consensus.  
 
 Questions 
 Schuit raises the question of whether the Dutch should follow the UK 
example exactly. Whatever the answer to this question might be, it is 
thought-provoking to read about “chairmen/team leaders” in the UK 
literature. It raises the question of whether UK chairmen are not 
becoming too powerful. Is it right that they should have a room next to 
the CEO? Would it not be better if the CFO were to sit in the room next 
to the CEO and that the chairman were to have a room on another floor, 
for example a floor above or below the CEO? Or should he perhaps have 
no room in the company‟s offices at all, as suggested by Kees van 
Lede.
1162
 Should there be greater emphasis on the CFO? Is it right for the 
chairman to speak to shareholders about strategy without the CEO being 
present? Hans Weyers believes this should not happen.
1163
 As UK 
chairmen are experts in just listening and not saying anything, not even 
by body language, it may be acceptable for them to have meetings with 
shareholders, but this may not be advisable in Dutch corporate culture. 
The advice of the Frijns Monitoring Committee is that the chairman 
should be able to speak to shareholders to sound out their views in the 
presence of another supervisory board member and an executive.
1164
 It is 
also Martin Lipton‟s advice that a chairman or lead director should not 
                                                     
1161 Schuit (2010), pp. 49-96, where he provides quotes from captains of industry in support of all 16 of these 
items and sets out his own proposals for the text of a code on internal regulation. He calls his proposals 
„observations‟. 
1162 C. van Lede quoted in Schuit (2010), p. 94. 
1163 H. Wijers quoted in Schuit (2010), p. 78. 
1164 Monitoring Committee June 2008, p. 66. 
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speak to shareholders other than in the presence of the CEO. Again, what 
is possible in the UK where the chairman only listens may not be 
appropriate in the US or the Netherlands. For a low key approach and not 
too much hands-on leadership we might look to the US examples of non-
CEO chairmen and lead directors. 
 
 Finally, what should a chairman do if there is a dispute between 
management and shareholders? In the Stork and ASMI cases
1165
 the 
Enterprise Chamber gave the impression that the supervisory board 
should act as a go-between. The term used by the Enterprise Chamber – 
bemiddelen – is generally translated as mediate, but the meaning of the 
Dutch term is wider. The word mediate has a neutral connotation. In my 
view, a supervisory board can hardly be called neutral because it must 
have its own view. If it does not agree with the strategy of the 
management board it should say so immediately, but only to the 
management board. If it agrees with the management board it should 
support it. If the supervisory board then talks to shareholders it has to 
express support for the position of the management board, but remain 
open to the views of the shareholders. It may suggest a compromise in the 
presence of a management board member, after having consulted with 
management, but has no obligation to do so.  
 
 A completely different question is what the chairman of the supervisory 
board should do if he senses that communication between the 
management and the shareholders is not good. He should make every 
effort to ensure that communication improves and should in any case do 
nothing that could exacerbate the situation. In some cases the supervisory 
board might then be free but is not obliged to play a conciliatory or 
mediating role,
1166
 as proposed by the Frijns Monitoring Committee and 
Advocate General Timmerman in the ASMI case.
1167
 This requires 
politeness, respect and sensitivity to the feelings of the parties or, as 
Mrs M. Bax has said, emotional intelligence.
1168
 This does not mean the 
                                                     
1165 Stork, OK 17/1/2007, NJ 2007, 15; ASMI, OK 5/8/2009, JOR 2009/254. 
1166 In my view, the word “bemiddelen” has too much of a mediation connotation. 
1167 The view expressed by the Frijns Monitoring Committee, June 2008, p. 66, and in the opinion of Advocate 
General Timmerman in the ASMI case is that there is no obligation but only a freedom to mediate. In the ASMI 
case the Supreme Court held that the supervisory board did not have a duty to mediate. HR 2/6/2010, NJ 2010, 
544. 
1168 At a seminar held by DLA Piper on 24 March 2010 Mrs Marieke Bax, a trained lawyer and MBA and 
member of the supervisory board of several companies, mentioned the importance of chairmen being 
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supervisory board has to make concessions. It can listen and say it will 
give the matter thought. 
 
 In a one-tier board the role of the non-executive chairman is much 
clearer. He monitors, coaches and, if he agrees, supports management. I 
do not think that UK or US judges or lawyers would suggest that a 
chairman has a mediating role; naturally, he has a role in improving 
communication, but no more. 
 
 As regards committees, the chairman should not chair the audit 
committee or the remuneration committee, but should chair the 
nomination committee. There is convergence on this point in the UK, US 
and the Netherlands.
1169
 
 
4.5.12 Separate chairman and CEO: exceptions in family companies? 
 
Under Dutch law the chairman of the supervisory board and the CEO 
cannot be the same person. No one can be on the management board and 
supervisory board at the same time. The Act too states that all one-tier 
board companies must have a separate chairman who is a non-executive 
director and therefore cannot be the CEO at the same time.
1170
 
 
 In the UK and the US even the most convinced proponents of separate 
non-CEO chairmen make exceptions for family companies. For example, 
Cargill Corporation, a US company, is 100% owned by the family. 
Cargill is a huge conglomerate with operations in the food, energy, 
chartering and finance sectors. It has a board of five executive directors, 
five outside directors who are also family members and five independent 
directors. No family members are employed by the company. Cargill has 
a non-family professional CEO/chairman, who has the complete trust of 
the family; as CEO he has a high profile within the company and ensures 
that he meets a lot of staff in many different locations. He is also in close 
touch with the family and gives them direct information. Cargill is 
successful and has come through the crisis well. The close cooperation 
between the CEO/chairman and the family is regarded as a plus. Would a 
separate chairman in any way improve the communication with family 
shareholders? In the event of a dispute a lead independent director can 
                                                                                                                                    
emotionally intelligent. 
1169 Frijns Code III.5.6, III.5.11. 
1170 Article 2.129/239(a) DCC of the Act. 
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always step in. The family considers it an advantage that they need deal 
with only one person, namely the CEO/chairman who manages the 
company and represents it – in his capacity as chairman – in dealings 
with the outside world. Keep it simple! 
 
 The point I wish to make is that there are good examples of a combined 
role working. So the question could be asked why the Act mandatorily 
prescribes that these positions should in all cases be held by two separate 
persons. Even UK and US proponents of separate non-CEO chairs say 
that it would not be appropriate to have a “one size fits all” rule. 
 
 If Cargill were a Dutch company and still wanted to have a combined 
CEO/chairman after the Act becomes law, it would be advised that by 
law it is required to have a CEO/president and a separate chairman. It 
could also be advised to include a provision in the board bye-laws to the 
effect that only the CEO/president should communicate with 
shareholders. The bye-laws would state that the chairman presides over 
the board meetings, but could also stipulate that the chairman should 
always follow the advice and suggestions of the CEO/president. The 
chairman would also chair the shareholders‟ meetings, but let the 
CEO/president deal with all items on the agenda of the meeting. 
 
 As we are not dealing with a public company in this hypothetical case, a 
more straightforward alternative would be for the company to have only a 
classic management board without non-executive directors. The CEO 
could then be called chairman of the board and the five family members 
and independent directors would constitute an advisory board in the same 
way as Unilever used to work, see 4.4.2.3 above. 
 
 Possible ways of achieving greater flexibility would be to amend 
article 2:239(a) DCC as proposed in the Act or to insert a clause in the 
Act on liberalisation of the rules on share capital and governance in 
private limited liability companies (known as the Flex BV Bill) providing 
that the general meeting of shareholders could resolve by a large majority 
to opt out of the requirement that the position of chairman be held by a 
non-executive director. However, I shall refrain from making such a 
proposal, also because there are practical solutions to solve this problem 
as described above.  
 
 There are many views and possibilities of using the one-tier board system 
in family companies, where family members may want to be more 
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involved in the business as non-executive directors. The One-Tier Board 
Act gives substantial flexibility.
1171
 
 
4.5.13 Evaluation 
 
 One of the most important functions of the supervisory board is to carry 
out formal evaluations of both the management board members and its 
own members.
1172
 At least once a year the supervisory board meets, 
without any management board members present, to discuss the 
functioning of its own members and its own profile as well as the 
management board‟s strengths and weaknesses1173 In the US it is 
common practice to hold separate meetings for non-executives only 
(confusingly known as “executive sessions”) before or after each board 
meeting. At these meetings one of the topics is nearly always the 
evaluation of the executives. In the Netherlands some companies are 
starting to follow this example. 
 
 Another question is whether advisors should be involved in the 
evaluation. Professor Steven Schuit suggests an evaluation by external 
advisors every two years.
1174
 I support this as a best practice suggestion 
for large companies. The increased use of external advisors is discussed 
also in sub-section 4.4.3. 
 
 The nomination committee (also called the selection and appointment 
committee), consisting of supervisory board members only, is involved in 
the evaluation of the management and supervisory boards as a whole and 
of the individual members and reporting this to the supervisory board.
1175
 
In practice this is an open discussion where, normally, all members are 
present, including those who are being evaluated. If there is likely to be 
friction or a possible dispute, the members may consult together 
beforehand either by telephone or in a smaller group. If the aim is to 
dismiss a director or obtain his resignation, he will often be asked to 
briefly leave the room. Subsequently he will have the opportunity to 
defend himself. The vice-chairman presides over the evaluation of the 
                                                     
1171 Financieele Dagblad, 23 April 2011, p. 11, "Familiebedrijven kunnen baat hebben bij een „one-tier board‟". 
1172 Glasz (1992), pp. 17-18; Van der Grinten (1989), p. 515; and Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), 
p. 603. 
1173 Frijns Code III.1.7. 
1174 Schuit (2010), p. 73. 
1175 Frijns Code III.5.14(b) and (c). 
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chairman.
1176
 The task of the remuneration committee is, of course, to 
express an opinion on the value of each management board member when 
it advises on that person‟s remuneration. 
 
 In the case of a one-tier board the Act explicitly states that the 
remuneration of the executive directors is determined not by the whole 
board but only by the non-executive directors.
1177
 
 
 The Monitoring Committee, the committee that monitors and reports on 
compliance with the Corporate Governance Code, reported in December 
2010 that there is room for improvement in the transparency provided by 
supervisory boards to shareholders and other stakeholders about their 
evaluation procedures.
1178
 
 
4.5.14 Term of office, re-election, dismissal of supervisory board members and 
non-executive directors 
 
 The term of office for supervisory board members is four years and can 
be repeated three times.
1179
 It is considered unusual in the Netherlands if a 
supervisory board member does not complete the full twelve years. This 
tendency to remain firmly ensconced in one‟s seat is seen by many as a 
drawback of the Dutch tradition of consensus-seeking consultation 
among people who are for the most part members of the old boy‟s 
network and are, above all, keen not to upset the apple cart.
1180
  
 
 One way of avoiding painful dismissals of supervisory board members or 
routine renewal of their term of office after the standard four years would 
be to have them re-elected at shorter intervals. One-year intervals have 
been mentioned. The UK Corporate Governance Code of 1 July 2010 
gives annual re-election as a best practice rule. However, in an open letter 
                                                     
1176 Frijns Code III.4.4. 
1177 Article 2.129/239(a), 2 DCC, as proposed in the Act. 
1178 Monitoring Report (2010), p. 6. 
1179 Frijns Code III.3.5. Management board members too are appointed for four years at a time, without a 
maximum, Frijns Code II.1.1. Article 2:161/271(2) DCC also gives a statutory 4-year maximum for 
supervisory board members in „structure regime‟ companies. 
1180 Prof. Auke de Bos and Dr. Mijntje Lückerath-Rovers, Gedragscode voor Commissarissen en 
Toezichthouders: Discussiedocument (2009) (“De Bos and Lückerath (2009/D)”), mention that this tradition is 
not conducive to good standards of conduct; see also Schuit (2010), p. 73 and Van Manen (1999), p. 292. 
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in the Financial Times three important pension funds have objected to 
this annual re-election rule, arguing that it promotes short-termism.
1181
 
 
 Interestingly, the opinion of the UK pension funds has been used as an 
argument in the US too against appointing directors for short terms. In the 
US a majority of listed companies have annual elections, but a large 
minority
1182
 have boards with staggered three-year terms. I agree with the 
argument of the UK pension funds about the dangers of short-termism 
under a regime of annual re-elections and would favour three- or four-
year terms, but it seems that Dutch directors themselves have decided to 
move on more quickly. The Monitoring Report of December 2010 
informs us that 43% of the supervisory board members withdraw after 
their first term of four years.
1183
 What is said above about terms of office 
also applies to non-executive directors of a one-tier board. 
 
 As regards the maximum total term, the Frijns Code mentions twelve 
years whereas the UK codes suggest nine years for chairmen and six 
years for executive directors. Generally, it could be argued that a six- or 
nine-year maximum would be preferable in these busy and fast-moving 
times. 
 
4.5.15 Formal documentation of functions in two-tier and one-tier boards 
 
 Because the roles and functions of the management board and the 
supervisory board in a two-tier system are described in the DCC and also 
in various articles of association, there has been little demand in practice 
for documentation on the functioning, powers and standards of 
management and supervisory board members in the Netherlands.
1184
 
                                                     
1181 Open letter in the Financial Times of 16 July 2010 from Hermes Equity Ownership Services, Railpen 
Investments and Universities Superannuation Scheme, in which they argue that annual re-election promotes 
short-termism and refer to the Stewardship Code for Institutional Investors of 2 July 2010 and to the opinion of 
the chairman of the Association of FTSE Companies. 
1182 4% of the largest 100 companies, 25.2% of Fortune 500 companies and 41.9% of the NYSE companies have 
staggered boards. See the commercial database of Shark Repellant. This was also confirmed to me by Adam 
Emmrick, partner in Wachtell Lipton, by e-mail of 10 August 2010. Examples of corporations with staggered 
boards are Airgas, Air Products, Bank of America, Barnes & Noble, Baxter, Blackrock, Dole, Eastman, 
Fidelity National Financial, Hertz, Huntsman, Kellogg‟s, McDonalds, Metlife, Mousanto, NRG, Sysco, Estée 
Lauder, Western Union, US Airways, Visa and Western Refining. 
1183 Monitoring Report (2010), p. 49. 
1184 De Bos and Lückerath (2009/O), p. 35. Only 33% of supervisory board members have specific descriptions 
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 At present, articles of association often list the decisions of the 
management board that need the prior approval of the supervisory board. 
Sometimes the articles of association state that the supervisory board can 
give instructions to the management board about general policy matters. 
The articles of association can also describe which director is authorized 
to sign on behalf of the company and whether two signatures are 
necessary and, if so, whose signatures. All of this should be public and is 
indeed public because the articles of association are filed in the trade 
register at the Chamber of Commerce. Article 2.129/239(a) DCC (Act) 
provides that the duties of board members should be described in the 
articles of association. This is a good addition because it will increase 
transparency. 
 
 It is, of course, important to record all the further details in board bye-
laws and letters of appointment, as is the practice in the US and the 
UK.
1185
 The detailed letters of appointment for NEDs in the UK are 
particularly good examples to follow. This is also of importance in 
connection with possible exculpation as described below in sub-
section 4.7.1. 
 
4.5.16 How board committees can help to get the best out of directors  
 
In the Netherlands a nomination committee is concerned solely with 
nominating supervisory and management board members. Most Dutch 
remuneration committees have until now restricted themselves to the 
remuneration of directors. Since 2008 the remuneration committees of 
banks only have become involved in the remuneration of certain levels of 
middle management following the introduction of new rules on the 
financial rewards for large groups of bank employees.
1186
 
 
 The differences between a two-tier system and the proposed one-tier 
system will become noticeable in the scope of work of the various board 
committees once a one-tier board is introduced. An interesting point can 
be made about the difference between the committees of a two-tier board 
and a one-tier board. In a two-tier board it is logical for the nomination 
committee to discuss only the succession of the management and 
                                                                                                                                    
of their duties. 
1185 UK sub-section 2.5.8, US su-bsection 3.5.6. 
1186 Controlled Remuneration Policy Decree and DNB Regulation on Controlled Remuneration Policy. 
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supervisory board members. In a one-tier board it is to be expected that 
the nomination committee will also be involved in discussing the 
succession to all key positions in the company and its subsidiaries. The 
same is broadly true of the remuneration committee. In a two-tier board 
this committee discusses the remuneration of the management board 
members only, whereas in a one-tier board they have to discuss the 
income policy at middle management levels as well.
1187
  
 
 This aspect of a one-tier board, where its remit includes management 
development in a broader sense, should be studied in the light of US 
practice and experience. In the US, succession is given much 
consideration at board level.
1188
 US business leaders understand that 
choosing the right people throughout the company and ensuring they 
receive appropriate remuneration is part of risk management and should 
be regarded as setting the tone from the top. 
 
 Over the last ten years Dutch practice has to some extent converged with 
that of the UK and the US. Here too, board committees are increasingly 
preparing decisions in great detail before proposing them to the full board 
for final decision. This is in keeping with the example of the US,
1189
 
where committees sort out the details so that matters are ready for brief 
discussion and a quick vote by the board. 
 
4.5.17 Succession 
 
The system of succession in Dutch public companies has always tended 
to vary from company to company and has not followed uniform and 
transparent rules. A variety of pressure groups could make binding or 
semi-binding nominations or even appoint management and supervisory 
board members. These groups included priority shareholders and board-
friendly foundations, in cases where defence mechanisms had been 
installed. And in the case of “structure regime” companies supervisory 
board members and works councils had rights of nomination and 
appointment. Even in the absence of such privileged groups, it was 
customary for the CEO to propose his own successor and the successors 
                                                     
1187 Van Lede (2005), pp. 258-259. 
1188 US Chapter, sub-section 3.5.7 above. 
1189 Frijns Code Principle III.2: “… to prepare decision making”. In the UK, the FRC Guidance on Audit 
Committees: "Nothing in the guidance should be interpreted as a departure from the principle of the unitary 
board." The SEC and NYSE apply the same principle. Langman (2005), p. 261. 
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of other management board members. Often such a successor was 
accepted by the supervisory board. Similarly, the chairman of the 
supervisory board and other heavyweight fellow members appointed their 
successors. Now, with the recent evolution of nominations committees 
presided over by the chairman, there is a more formal process.  
 
 The Dutch can learn both from the UK example of rigorously following 
the procedures for nominations and of regularly discussing succession
1190
 
and from the example of US boards, which actively plan recruitment, 
development and succession for all key positions.
1191
 Although the 
introduction of nomination committees has seemingly improved the 
Dutch succession planning system, the CEO is still felt by some to 
exercise too much influence.
1192
 
 
 Nomination committees are now required to draw up a profile for the 
board as a whole whenever they make a nomination.
1193
 The idea of a 
profile was put forward by the Peters Committee in 1997 and even 
earlier, in 1984, by the Social and Economic Council (Sociaal 
Economische Raad/SER), in its advisory report on the members of 
supervisory boards of “structure regime” companies. This idea was 
developed further in the Tabaksblat and Frijns Codes.  
 
 In my view, a certain amount of formalisation of the nomination 
procedures is a good idea and a profile can be helpful in this respect. 
There are many companies where this works well, but there are others 
where profiles and formal procedures are just window-dressing, or box-
ticking exercises, designed to conceal the fact that a dominant director is 
still pushing his or her favourite. Another criticism, often heard about 
profiling, is that it focuses on formal aspects such as residence, 
nationality, knowledge and experience and less on the personal qualities 
                                                     
1190 Cadbury (2002), p. 96, Main Principle A.4 CC8 and B.2 GC10, and sub-section 2.5.9 above. 
1191 US Chapter, sub-section 3.5.7 above. 
1192 Financieele Dagblad, 12 October 2010, p. 11 in which Peter Elverding, Chairman of ING, Océ and Q-Park 
utters some critical remarks addressed to business leaders, who have too little knowledge of human relation 
issues. 
1193 Frijns Code III.3.1 applies as a profile for all listed companies; since 1 October 2004 article 2:158/268, 3 
DCC requires a profile for structure regime companies. A special committee, under chairman Cees Maas, 
which was asked to advise about the future of banks, published an advisory report on 7 April 2009 (Maas 
(2009)). That committee recommended that a profile be made for the supervisory board as a whole and for 
each supervisory board member individually, see p. 12. 
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needed for good human resource and teamwork aspects. The introduction 
of nomination committees does provide for a proper procedure. It is 
important to follow the UK example of discussing succession and 
nominations regularly in meetings to avoid decisions being prepared and 
taken informally. Dutch corporate practice would also do well to follow 
the US example of discussing mid-level succession and formulating 
emergency plans for sudden vacancies. 
 
 Proposal 
 I suggest that the following text be added as III.2.4 to Principle III.2 of 
the Frijns Code: “The supervisory and management boards will deliberate 
with each other at least once a year about the procedure and the ways and 
means of discussion, the frequency and timing of the evaluation and 
succession of supervisory and management board members and about the 
desirability and, if so, the frequency, to ask outside advisors to assist in 
this process, as well as the terms of office of all the directors, and which 
middle management persons should fall under the evaluation and 
succession process. If there is a one-tier board, the complete board should 
hold these annual deliberations.”  
 
4.5.18 Risk management 
 
 Risk management is treated as important in the Netherlands. Article 
2.141/251 DCC puts it on the same level as strategy. That article 
mentions that the management board must report at least once a year to 
the supervisory board on strategy and risk management. The Frijns Code 
includes provisions for risk analysis based on operational and financial 
objectives, guides for the layout of a financial report and a system of 
monitoring and reporting,
1194
 including the highlighting of the main risks 
and a description of major failings detected in risk management.  
 
 The Frijns Code puts the responsibility for strategy and risk on the 
management board.
1195
 Risk management was also discussed extensively 
by the Association for Commercial Law on 8 December 2009. The 
association was advised by Professor Bastiaan Assink and Dr Daniëlla 
Strik, who is litigation partner at Linklaters and defended a thesis on 
                                                     
1194 Frijns Code II.1.3 and 4. 
1195 Frijns Code (2008): Best Practice II.1.3. There is convergence with the UK and US on the point that risk 
management is part of strategy. The Maas Committee‟s Report for Banks, described below in subsection 
4.5.19, takes the same view on p. 12. 
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director liability in 2010.
1196
 Generally, the view is taken that in banks the 
CEO should be responsible: he sets “the tone from the top”.1197 There 
should also be a Chief Risk Officer (CRO), who should be a member of 
either the management board or the management team.
1198
 There should 
be a risk committee of supervisory board members.
1199
 The Maas 
Committee, mentioned below at 4.5.19, also recommends that banks 
should have a risk committee.
1200
 The supervisory board members are to 
supervise the management board in the performance of its risk 
management activities. Here there is a parallel with the supervisory 
board‟s monitoring of strategy.1201 All these measures are to be combined 
for better risk management. 
 
 Examples of important risk management or supervision cases: 
 
 – Laurus (2005)1202 was the product of a merger of food shop chains. It developed an 
aggressive plan – the “Konmar Plan” – to integrate the chains. The Enterprise Chamber 
did not condemn this ambitious strategy. The point at issue was whether there had been 
sufficient follow-up by the management and supervisory boards in their monitoring of the 
plan once it started to fail. The Enterprise Chamber ruled that there had been 
mismanagement by the management and supervisory boards on the follow-up aspect. It 
also confirmed that mismanagement does not automatically imply liability. The issue of 
liability is dealt with by the District Courts (arrondissementsrechtbanken). The Supreme 
Court upheld this decision, but declared that the plaintiff‟s allegation of mismanagement 
by the supervisory board members should be dismissed because the arguments put 
forward by the plaintiff were insufficient to enable the supervisory board to defend itself. 
This was a case of insufficient follow-up and is difficult to prove in court. 
 
 – Ceteco (2007)1203 was a trading company that had a very ambitious plan for expansion. 
The management and supervisory boards continued to approve further acquisitions, 
                                                     
1196 B.F. Assink and D. Strik, Ondernemingsbestuur en risicobeheersing op de drempel van een nieuw 
decennium: een ondernemingsrechtelijke analyse (2009) (“Assink and Strik (2009)”). 
1197 Principle 4.1, Code for Banks, no. 4.1 and Maas (2009), 1.18. 
1198 Code for Banks, nos. 3.1.7 and 4.1. 
1199 Assink and Strik (2009), pp. 237-238. 
1200 Code for Banks, no. 4.5. 
1201 Article 2.141/251 DCC and D. Strik, „Pre-advices to the Association of Commercial Law‟, in B.F. Assink 
and D. Strik, Ondernemingsbestuur en risicobeheersing op de drempel van een nieuw decennium: een 
ondernemingsrechtelijke analyse (2009), pp. 241-242. 
1202 Laurus, HR 8/4/2005, JOR 2005. 
1203 Ceteco, Utrecht District Court 12/12/2007, JOR 2008/10. 
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although they should have realized that the administrative systems would be unable to 
cope with the expansion. This was a typical example of “overstretching”. There were red 
flags. Both boards should have investigated whether the plans for expansion should be 
continued. In due course Ceteco went bankrupt and the liquidator started liability 
proceedings against the management board, the supervisory board and one large 
shareholder. They were all held to be liable by the District Court. The case was settled by 
payments by the defendants. This case has caused concern among supervisory board 
members of other companies. 
 
 – Henkel (1997) had JMG Promotion organise a promotional campaign with toy panda 
bears as presents for its customers. JMG went bankrupt with only 200,000 panda bears, 
available for 280,000 enthusiastic customers. Henkel asked the court to hold the sole 
director of JMG liable for miscalculating the volume and not taking out insurance for the 
risk. The Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court confirmed that the director of JMG had 
made an incorrect commercial decision, but deemed it a normal risk and did not hold the 
director liable. (HR 14/11/1997, NJ 1998, 270)  
 
 – Beklamel (1990) bought feed products from Stimulan and resold them to a buyer who 
did not pay, stating it had a counterclaim. Beklamel went bankrupt and could not pay 
Stimulan the purchase price. Stimulan claimed this amount from Beklamel‟s managing 
director because he should have realized, when entering into the purchase contract, that 
Beklamel could not pay if things went wrong and should therefore have taken out 
insurance for this matter. The courts held that the director was not liable. (The insurance 
issue would be decided differently if there is an explicit undertaking to insure.1204)  
 
 – Tax Collector v. Roelofsen (2006).1205 The tax collector claimed that Roelofsen, CEO 
and 100% shareholder of two companies, both of which had gone bankrupt and could not 
pay their tax debts, was liable because he had systematically filed incorrect tax returns 
and ran up a large debt. The Court of Appeal and later the Supreme Court did not hold 
him liable.  
 
 – OGEM (1990).1206 OGEM was a conglomerate of construction companies that went 
bankrupt. The Enterprise Chamber concluded there had been mismanagement on many 
counts, and the management and supervisory board members had to pay relatively small 
sums out of their own pocket, because they were not insured. The Enterprise Chamber 
discussed the risk management of this fast growing conglomerate. It was the duty of the 
management and supervisory boards to obtain sufficient information from the various 
                                                     
1204 Beklamel, HR 6/10/1989, NJ 1990, 286. 
1205 Tax Collector v. Roelofsen, HR 2/12/2006, NJ 2006, 659. 
1206 OGEM, HR 10/1/1990, NJ 1990, 446. 
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departments to fulfil their management and supervisory tasks. When this turned out to be 
impossible the management board should have taken action. The supervisory board too 
had failed to take action or show any initiative, despite all the red flags. Members of both 
boards did not even read essential documents. The Enterprise Chamber held that this 
constituted mismanagement, and its decision was upheld by the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court ruled that even one act or omission can be mismanagement if it causes 
substantial damage. The case revealed that many of the company‟s executive directors 
had strong egos and had acted on their own and in utter disregard of one another. They 
had been united only in their joint disrespect for the supervisory board. The chairman of 
the supervisory board saw it as his task to blindly support the CEO. Two memoranda 
from supervisory board members who objected to the course of events were “swept under 
the carpet”.  
 
 Comparison of these Dutch supervision cases with the Delaware 
supervision cases (Caremark, AIG and Citigroup) reveals similarities, but 
differences as well.  
 
 As to the standard of care in the Delaware cases, there is a distinction 
between care in transactional decisions such as Van Gorkom, Disney and 
Lyondell on the one hand,
1207
 where the test is whether the board tried to 
consider all aspects in making its decisions, and general supervision over 
a longer period on the other, in cases such as Caremark, AIG and 
Citigroup.
1208
 As to the question of the individual liability of each 
director, the Delaware Courts look at the different facts for each director 
and his specific involvement. This implies that outside directors are less 
likely to be held liable than inside directors.  
 
 Let use now consider how the Delaware Court might have dealt with each 
of the Dutch cases described above. 
 
 – In the Laurus case, the Delaware Court would also not have 
condemned an ambitious plan (see its ruling in the Citigroup case). As 
regards the “insufficient follow-up response to the failure of the 
                                                     
1207 Van Gorkom, 14 March 1985, 488 A.2d 2858 (Del. 1985) described above in subsection 3.7.3.1 under 
Takeover cases, Disney (Del. Sup. 2000), (Del. Ch. 2005) and (Del. Sup. 2006) described in subsection 3.1.2 
above and Lyondell 25/3/2009, C.A. No. 3172 described in subsection 3.5.3 at (iii). 
1208 Graham (Delaware Supreme Court 24/1/1963, 188 A.2d 125), Caremark (Delaware Chancery, 1996 A.2d 
959, 967), Stone v. Ritter (Delaware Supreme Court, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006)) and AIG (Vice-Chancellor 
Strine 10/2/2009 965 A.2d) and Citigroup (Del. Ch. 24/9/2009, 964 A.2d 106) are described above in 
subsection 3.5.4 in item 8 and again in subsection 3.7.2.3. 
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strategy plan”, it would have considered the specific facts relevant to 
each individual director, but would not have held the director liable 
provided he had “tried” to monitor, was not in bad faith and had no 
other conflicting loyalties (see the Caremark judgment), even without 
an exculpatory clause in the articles of association. 
 
 – In Ceteco, the Delaware Court would have looked at the part played 
by each individual director in the “overstretching”. Had they tried, 
were they in good faith, did they not have any other conflicting 
interest? If there had been no clear red flags, the director would 
probably not have been held liable (see the Caremark judgment), even 
without an exculpatory clause. 
 
 – In OGEM, the Delaware Court would probably have held the insider 
directors liable for not even trying to read essential documents, for 
disloyalty, for misinforming other directors and shareholders and for 
blatantly ignoring warnings (red flags). The supervisory board 
members, who had heeded the warnings, would not have been held 
liable. 
 
 Comparison with UK judgments shows that the courts there attach less 
importance to the duty of supervision and judge a director more on how 
he performs his duty of care, which is a more objective criterion (as in the 
Barings case).
1209
 They are called “care” cases and not “oversight” cases, 
and there has been a move away from a mere subjective test to an 
objective test as in Barings. In the UK there is a tendency, both in 
liability and disqualification cases, to allow for the fact that NEDs spend 
less time at the company and have less information than executive 
directors. UK law therefore distinguishes between NEDs and executive 
directors.
1210
 In the US there is a tendency to focus liability on the 
officers and possibly the chair of the audit committee. As the board is 
basically unitary, this is an individual test for each director. Where 
management board members are held liable in the Netherlands, the 
supervisory board members too are usually liable, but this is always 
measured against their own standard of conduct (entrenched attitude and 
no care in the OGEM case, not doing their own home work in the 
Tilburgsche Hypotheek Bank case and failure to take action in the Bodam 
                                                     
1209 Barings (no. 5), [2001] B.C.C. 273; [2000] B.C.L.C. 523, described above in sub-section 2.6.5. 
1210 CC8 Schedule B and Strik (2010), p. 118. 
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case
1211
). Whether this distinction would be possible in the Netherlands 
between the individual directors is discussed in 4.7 below.  
 
 Convergence 
 The Dutch apply a risk management system similar to the “Enterprise 
Risk Management Integrated Framework” of the US Committee of 
Sponsoring Organisations of the Tradeway Commission (COSO), and 
UK companies use the Turnbull Guidance.
1212
 
 
 One-tier board – non-executive directors in the Netherlands 
 The Advisory Committee for the Future of Banks in the Netherlands (the 
Maas Committee)
1213
 makes no mention of the role of non-executive 
directors on a one-tier board. As the non-executive directors of a one-tier 
board would be involved in decision making and therefore also 
responsible for decisions about risk management and as they would also 
be quite well informed in advance about risks and could ask questions in 
advance, it seems reasonable to assume that they would have an 
influential role and would therefore have much the same chance of being 
held liable as the executive directors.
1214
 What does this mean? Are 
executives and non-executives supposed to understand all control systems 
and new products that are developed in the bank? The Frijns Code has 
introduced, for public companies, the concept of the “in control 
statement” of the management board.1215 Article 4.5 of the Code for 
Banks of the Maas Committee (see below at 4.5.19) confirms that there 
must be a product consent procedure. The Chief Risk Officer (CRO) and 
the Risk Committee, a committee of board members introduced by the 
Maas Committee, should be involved in these matters. They should 
receive reports about the bank‟s products from an internal auditor. They 
should also understand the risks mentioned in the annual report. The 
same applies to large industrial companies. It follows that not each non-
executive director is supposed to understand all the bank‟s systems and 
products, but they must know of the existence of the systems and reports 
about products. 
                                                     
1211 Bodam Jachtservice, HR 28/6/1996, NJ 1997/58, in which the managing director kept no proper accounts 
and did not file any accounts. He was held liable for his failure to perform these duties. The supervisory board 
members were also liable for not making the managing director cure his default. 
1212 Strik (2010), p. 224.  
1213 Maas (2009). 
1214 Strik (2010), p. 127. 
1215 Frijns Code II.1.5. 
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 Many corporations in the US have come to realize that the largest risks 
are caused internally and that risks in all aspects of the business, such as 
nomination, compensation and finance, can be evaded to some extent by 
the tone from the top. This can be a good example for Dutch companies. 
The UK Walker Review correctly identified that the wrong type of 
behaviour was at the root of governance failure in many banks, which is 
much the same thing.
1216
 The Walker Review also emphasized that the 
Risk Committee should perform due diligence before acquisitions. Such a 
practice would also, of course, be beneficial for Dutch and US 
companies. 
 
4.5.19 Corporate Governance at Banks 
 
 On 7 April 2009, the Advisory Committee on the Future of Banks in the 
Netherlands (Advies Commissie Toekomst Banken), also referred to as the 
Maas Committee after its chairman Cees Maas, former CFO of ING, 
presented its report “Restoring Trust” (the Maas Report or Maas 
(2009)).
1217
 The Maas Committee was set up in November 2008 as an 
independent advisory committee on the initiative of the Netherlands 
Bankers‟ Association (Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken), with the 
mandate of making recommendations to improve the functioning of 
Dutch banks. The immediate reason for setting up the Maas Committee 
was the acute lack of trust in the financial sector that arose in the autumn 
of 2008 as a result of the financial crisis (the credit crunch). On 
9 September 2009 the Netherlands Bankers‟ Association issued the 
“Code for Banks”, which dealt with more or less the same points, but 
differed in some aspects. The Minister of Finance and the Netherlands 
Bankers‟ Association established a committee to monitor compliance 
with this Code. The Monitoring Committee published its first report in 
December 2010. 
 
 One of the key recommendations for banks is, once again, to make the 
customer their primary concern when weighing up the interests of the 
various relevant parties. The Maas Report also contains far-reaching 
recommendations on strengthening the governance structure and risk 
management of banks, with a key role being assigned to the chief risk 
officer (CRO) and a separate risk management committee, alongside the 
                                                     
1216 Walker Review and ACCA (2010), p. 12. 
1217 Maas (2009). 
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other three committees (i.e. the Audit, Nomination, and Remuneration 
Committees). In implementing the recommendations of the Maas Report 
and the Code for Banks, banks should apply the “comply or explain” 
principle. 
 
 The response to the Maas Report from both the financial sector and 
politicians has, in general, been positive. The Maas Committee‟s 
recommendations are particularly relevant to Dutch financial institutions, 
but it is possible that certain recommendations may also have an impact 
on businesses outside the financial sector. The committee‟s most 
important recommendations concern the areas of governance, risk 
management, the relationship with shareholders and remuneration. 
 
 Governance 
 Banks should once again focus primarily on the interests of customers 
and savers. In making this recommendation, the committee redefines the 
stakeholder model – under which directors should ensure that due 
consideration is given to the various interests of all of an enterprise‟s 
stakeholders – for financial institutions and possibly goes too far by 
singling out one category, i.e. the customer. The Code for Banks 
redresses the balance 
1218
 by saying that the supervisory board and the 
management board should consider all interests, i.e. those of customers, 
shareholders and employees, but does emphasize the duty of care 
(zorgplicht) towards customers. The renewed focus on the public role of 
banks is also emphasized by the recommendation in the Maas Report that 
a bank‟s management board members should sign an “ethics and morality 
statement”, through which they acknowledge and affirm their corporate 
social responsibility. The Code for Banks has adopted this 
recommendation.
1219
 By now board members of nearly all Dutch banks 
have signed such a statement.
1220
 
 
 A much more intrusive requirement proposed by the Maas Committee is 
that all of the bank‟s managing directors should pass a banking 
examination prior to taking up their appointment, and should also follow 
compulsory further training while in office. This proposal too has been 
adopted by the Code for Banks.
1221
 Banks have started to comply, but it 
                                                     
1218 Code for Banks, nos. 2.1.2, 2.1.8, 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. 
1219 Maas (2009), 1.16. 
1220 Code for Banks, no. 3.2.4. 
1221 Code for Banks, no. 3.1.4. 
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remains to be seen how this unusual requirement will be enforced. 
Nothing similar exists in the UK or US. 
 
 Finally, the Maas Report recommends that banks aim for greater diversity 
on their supervisory and management boards. This recommendation too 
is taken up by the Code for Banks.
1222
 The Maas Committee has gone a 
step further than the Frijns Code, which recommends that the 
composition of the supervisory board be more diverse. The Act advocates 
diversity in the composition of one-tier boards and also for management 
and supervisory boards: at least 30% women and 30% men. 
 
 The Maas Committee recommends that the duties of supervisory boards 
of financial institutions be expanded considerably in terms of content and 
responsibilities. This is echoed in the Code for Banks.
1223
 It argues, for 
example, in favour of a statutory requirement for expertise assessments of 
supervisory board members, in combination with compulsory further 
training. In his response of 10 April 2009 to the report, the Minister of 
Finance has indicated that the expertise assessment will be provided for 
in the Financial Supervision Act, which is currently in the process of 
being amended. Supervisory board members – particularly the chairman 
of the supervisory board and the chairmen of the audit committee and the 
risk management committee – must have sufficient experience of the 
financial sector, and their time availability must be sufficiently 
guaranteed in order to ensure the proper fulfilment of their 
responsibilities.
1224
 Here there is convergence with UK (Walker 
Committee) and US regulations. 
 
 Finally, both the Maas Committee and the Code for Banks emphasize the 
role of the external auditor. When auditing a bank‟s annual report, the 
auditor should make an in-depth assessment of the actual functioning of 
the bank‟s governance system. Besides carrying out an annual internal 
assessment, the supervisory board should have an external party assess its 
performance once every three years.
1225
 
 
                                                     
1222 Code for Banks, no. 3.1.1. 
1223 Code for Banks, no. 2.1. 
1224 Code for Banks, no. 2.1.6. 
1225 Code for Banks, no. 2.1.10. 
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 Risk management 
 The Code for Banks, following the example of the Maas Committee, has 
drawn up a number of specific recommendations for the purpose of 
improving internal checks and balances relating to risk management. The 
committee envisages a key role for the supervisory board in particular.
1226
 
 
 First, when drawing up the bank‟s risk strategy, the management board 
should pay explicit attention to the formulation of a “risk appetite 
statement”, i.e. a statement indicating the bank‟s readiness to accept risks, 
which must fit in with the bank‟s general strategy.1227 This is the 
responsibility of the CEO. The Chief Risk Officer (CRO) must also be 
involved in the process.
1228
 The Code for Banks puts more emphasis on 
the CEO and less on the CRO.
1229
 The Code has followed the Maas 
Committee by requiring that a risk appetite statement be submitted to the 
supervisory board for approval at least twice a year. The decision making 
process in this regard is to be initiated by the supervisory board‟s risk 
committee; an internal and an external auditor should also be involved in 
the process.
1230
  
 
 The management board is charged with implementing risk policy based 
on the risk appetite statement; an important role for implementation is 
assigned to the CRO. The supervisory board should supervise the 
implementation of the risk policy and regularly examine whether the 
products offered by the bank and the client base to which the products are 
offered fall within the bank‟s overall risk profile. As part of an ongoing 
management of risks, the management board should set up the risk 
management system in such a way that it is at all times aware of the 
current risks affecting the bank‟s capital. Any interim decisions 
influencing the bank‟s risk profile must be submitted to the supervisory 
board for approval. Risk management approval is required prior to the 
introduction of new financial products (“product approval process”). 
 
 Relationship with shareholders 
 In the view of the Maas Committee, a financial institution should strive 
for a shareholder structure that is in line with the institution‟s nature. The 
committee believes that the one-sided approach to shareholder value by 
                                                     
1226 Code for Banks, no. 4.2. 
1227 Code for Banks, no. 3.1.7. 
1228 Code for Banks, nos. 3.1.7 and 3.1.8. 
1229 Code for Banks, no. 4.1. 
1230 Code for Banks, nos. 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 5.2 and 5.4. 
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groups of shareholders whose main focus is on short-term profits has led 
to undesirable developments in the past few years. To counteract this, it 
recommends that the shareholder structure of financial institutions should 
ensure the presence of a proper balance between the interests of the 
shareholders, on the one hand, and those of the other stakeholders (the 
customers, employees and society as a whole), on the other.  
 
 The Maas Committee recommends that listed banks strive in particular 
for a stable group of shareholders who are willing to commit themselves 
to the company for a longer period. According to the Committee, these 
long-term stewardship shareholders could be rewarded by, for example, a 
loyalty dividend. However, in light of the 2007 Supreme Court decision 
in the DSM case,
1231
 the practical implementation of this recommendation 
is still to be worked out. The Maas Committee also points to the 
importance of registration and identification of shareholders in order to 
facilitate a dialogue with the management board. In his response to the 
report, the Minister of Finance has said that the soon-to-be-published 
corporate governance bill will contain proposed statutory rules for the 
identification of shareholders in listed companies.  
 
 Finally, the Maas Committee mentions depositary receipts – a defence 
mechanism that has made something of a comeback – as a useful way of 
preventing a situation in which a limited number of shareholders can 
exert a disproportionately large influence on the outcome of a vote at the 
general meeting of shareholders as a result of the absence of many of the 
other shareholders. The Maas Committee recommends that receipt 
holders who are present or represented at a general meeting should be 
able to exercise their voting rights at all times. This is a reference to the 
fact that, under the DCC,
1232
 receipt holders may be prevented from 
exercising their voting rights in certain circumstances, for instance in a 
hostile takeover situation. In the Committee‟s view, such prevention 
should not be possible. The reactions to this proposal have so far been 
mixed: the Minister of Finance has largely endorsed it, but the 
                                                     
1231 DSM, HR 14/12/2007, NJ 2008, 105. DSM had tried to alter its articles of association in such a way that 
shareholders who held their shares for more than 3 years would get a 30% higher dividend and an extra 10% 
for each further year. It also wanted to introduce the right for DSM to obtain information from shareholders to 
check the period they had owned their shares. Franklin Mutual objected, claiming equality of shareholders and 
privacy, and succeeded in having the Enterprise Chamber block the alterations to the articles of association 
proposed by DSM. However, the Supreme Court, as requested and argued by Advocate General Timmerman, 
reversed the judgment. 
1232 See article 118(a) DCC. 
  
 427 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
Association of Shareholders (Vereniging van Effectenbezitters/VEB) has 
been extremely critical. The Code for Banks has not adopted this 
recommendation. 
 
 Remuneration policy 
 The credit crisis has fuelled criticism of the remuneration paid to 
directors of financial institutions. The Maas Committee makes a number 
of specific recommendations regarding banks‟ management board 
members, which partly supplement and partly deviate from the Frijns 
Code. The Code for Banks has adopted most of these recommendations. 
 
 The total remuneration paid to a bank‟s management board members 
should, according to the Maas Committee, remain just under the average 
of the remuneration for comparable positions outside the financial sector, 
taking into account international comparisons.
1233
 In addition, the Code 
for Banks puts forward supplementary rules with respect to the variable 
income components of the remuneration and proposes that the total 
amount of variable remuneration for directors be limited to a maximum 
of 100% of the fixed remuneration,
1234
 although an exception is granted 
for certain medium-sized banks. In any event, the remuneration structure 
must be compatible with the remuneration granted within the company as 
a whole.
1235
 Moreover, the variable remuneration should consist only of 
cash and shares and not, for instance, of options. 
 
 The performance criteria by which the level of the variable remuneration 
component is judged must, according to the Maas Committee (and the 
Code for Banks) include non-financial indicators, such as client 
satisfaction and the quality of risk management.
1236
 In addition, the 
supervisory board should have the discretion, in certain situations, to 
reduce retroactively the variable income component awarded or paid 
earlier.
1237
 In any event, no variable remuneration should be granted to 
management board members if the bank is not generating a profit. The 
Code for Banks also confirms that the exit provisions of the Frijns Code – 
i.e. a maximum of one year‟s salary – should also be applied by banks. 
Finally, the Code for Banks recommends that the supervisory board be 
required to approve the total remuneration of the individuals in the first 
                                                     
1233 Code for Banks, no. 6.3.1. 
1234 Code for Banks, no. 6.4.2. 
1235 Code for Banks, no. 6.3.1. 
1236 Code for Banks, no. 6.4.3. 
1237 Code for Banks, nos. 6.4.5 and 6.4.6. 
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layer below the management board (senior management). A detailed 
regulation for income of bankers is applicable since 1 January 2011.
 1238
 
 
4.5.20 Summary of roles of supervisory board members/non-executive directors 
 
 1. In a two-tier system the management board formulates and 
implements strategy. The supervisory board supervises both 
aspects. Under the Act, the non-executive directors in a one-tier 
board join the executive directors in formulating and developing 
strategy. The Act leaves open exactly what role the non-
executives will have in developing strategy: actively challenging 
as in the US or jointly developing as in the UK. US and UK 
examples of boardroom practices with regard to strategy 
development and regular discussion about strategy are 
worthwhile, as is the early, on-site information UK and US board 
members receive. Also useful are the possibility of free access by 
board members to middle management and the US and UK 
practice of holding more executive sessions before or after each 
meeting, frequent discussions about evaluation and succession of 
board members and middle management. I have proposed in sub-
sections 4.5.5 and 4.5.17 that the committee monitoring the Frijns 
Code should put these points on the agenda in its next report and 
recommend that the one-tier board or, in the case of a two-tier 
system, the management and supervisory boards should discusses 
annually how they will deal in their meetings with strategy, early 
and on-site information, access to middle management, executive 
sessions, evaluation and succession. 
 
 2. There are three important differences between two-tier and one-
tier systems for supervisory board members and non-executive 
directors; first, whether or not they are involved in decision 
making; second, the time when they receive information; and 
third, whether or not they receive on-site business information 
and have access to middle management. The other side of the 
coin is that supervisory board members are said to be more 
independent than non-executive directors. 
 
                                                     
1238 Controlled Remuneration Policy Decree and DNB Regulation on Controlled Remuneration Policy. 
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 3. Representing the company is a power formally reserved to 
executive directors in the Netherlands. Registration of powers of 
representation in the trade register is essential.  
 
 4. The role of the chairman is rapidly increasing in both one-tier and 
two-tier boards. Generally, the UK practice whereby the 
chairman acts as team leader of the whole board deserves to be 
followed, although a Dutch chairman should be slightly less 
hands on and may not have to have an office in the company 
building or talk to shareholders about strategy on his own. He 
should stay closer to the typical US chairman. These are among 
questions that can be discussed as suggested in sub-section 
4.5.11. It is advisable to confirm the division of roles between the 
chairmen and the CEO in writing and to work out extensive 
contacts with all outside directors.  
 
 5. There is convergence with the UK and the US in that Dutch 
outside directors are now working harder and are more 
independent. In addition, in all three countries there are separate 
non-CEO chairmen of the boards, committee work plays an 
important role and the chairmen usually chair the nomination 
committee. In the area of risk management there is convergence 
with the US and UK in ideas of “tone from the top” and the 
responsibilities of CEOs, CROs and risk committees. 
 
4.6 Duties of Dutch board members  
 
4.6.1 Introduction to the duties of board members 
 
 The duties of management board members and supervisory board 
members in a two-tier system will be described in this section (4.6). In 
some instances, I will discuss the expected duties of non-executive 
directors under a one-tier board as opposed to supervisory board 
members in a two-tier system. 
 
 These matters will be dealt with in the following sections: the basis for duties according to 
the law, articles of association, agreements, the Frijns Code, other voluntary codes and 
court decisions (4.6.2); the Enterprise Chamber procedure (4.6.3); the Enterprise Chamber 
cases that raise standards (4.6.4); the regulation of conflicts of interest (4.6.5); and, 
finally, a summary of duties of directors (4.6.7). 
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4.6.2 Basis for the duties of board members 
 
 The hierarchy for the duties of board members is as follows: 
(1) legislation;
1239
 (2) articles of association; (3) general internal 
guidelines, (4) agreements to which the company has explicitly adhered 
or joint venture agreements;
1240
 (5) the Frijns Code
1241
 and (6) other 
voluntary codes or guidelines. Court decisions deal with all these aspects 
and interpret the law.
1242
 
 
 Laws 
 The general duty of the management board is to “manage” (besturen) the 
company. This involves the general authority and duty to manage the 
company internally and the enterprise externally.
1243
 Internal management 
duties include decision making by the management board, with or 
without the approval of other organs, and day-to-day management.
1244
 
The management board gives due information to the supervisory board 
and informs it at least once a year about the strategy and the risk 
management system it has developed and executed.
1245
 The management 
                                                     
1239 Relevant laws are Book 2 DCC, the Trade Register Act, the Works Council Act, the Bankruptcy Act, the 
Competition Act, the Act of Financial Supervision (which includes matters such as the supervision of 
institutions, securities and tender offers) and many other statutes such as environmental acts. 
1240 See for CSR generally, T.E. Lambooy, Corporate Social Responsibility: Legal and Semi-Legal Frameworks 
Supporting CSR. Developments 2000-2010 and Case Studies, thesis (2010) (“Lambooy (2010)”); Batco case, 
Amsterdam District Court, 9/3/1978, NJ 56890, where Batco had confirmed in its annual accounts that it 
undertook the obligations of the collective agreement and the UN Code of Multinationals, which said a board 
should consult with employees before deciding to close a factory. The board had not consulted employees 
when it decided to close a factory and was therefore blocked, because it had publically confirmed it would 
abide by the UN Code. Joint venture agreements to which the company is often party are also enforceable. 
1241 The Frijns Code ranks higher than other general voluntary codes or guidelines, because the Frijns Committee 
consisted of members broadly nominated and appointed and because the law confirms that it is a „comply or 
explain‟ code in article 2.391, 5 DCC and a decree designating the Frijns Code as the relevant code. 
1242 The judgments of all civil courts deal with liability cases and nullification or suspension of decisions and the 
Enterprise Chamber cases are about whether or not there has been mismanagement and measures to be taken in 
companies. 
1243 Prof. J.M.M. Maeijer, Vertegenwoordiging en Rechtspersoon (1994), p. 363 (“Maeijer (1994)”); Van 
Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), p. 473; Van Schilfgaarde and Winter (2009), pp. 150-151; Van der Grinten 
(1989), p. 446. 
1244 Article 2.129/239 DCC. 
1245 Article 2.141/251 DCC. 
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board will represent the company.
1246
 The management board may not act 
ultra vires.
1247
 Each management board member must act reasonably 
towards other board members and shareholders.
1248
 In addition, each 
management board member must discharge his duties properly,
1249
 and 
article 2.9 DCC, as amended by the Act, makes clear that these duties 
include not only those specifically allocated to him but also the general 
conduct of the company‟s affairs (algemene gang van zaken).1250 The 
management board must keep proper accounts.
1251
 It must prepare the 
annual accounts within five months of the end of the financial year and, 
in the case of a listed company, the annual accounts must be published 
within six months and also every six months.
1252
 The management board 
members must file the accounts with the trade register within 8 days of 
the annual general meeting that has approved them.
1253
 Most companies 
with a turnover or workforce above a certain limit must have an external 
auditor appointed by the general meeting. The board must hold this 
general meeting of shareholders before the end of the sixth month after 
the close of the relevant financial year.
1254
 At this meeting it must present 
its reports and accounts to the shareholders.
1255
 The management board 
must file the company‟s articles of association and forms for registering 
                                                     
1246 Article 2.130/240 DCC. 
1247 Article 2.7 DCC. 
1248 Article 2.8 DCC, expresses the positive requirement of the consensus culture; the liability aspect of the 
consensus culture is joint and several liability. 
1249 Article 2.9 DCC is the main article determining the duty and therefore liability of management board 
members and, indirectly, supervisory board members towards the company. It is basically a joint and several 
liability and will recur in item 4.7 on the liability of directors and in the Staleman v. Van de Ven case. Article 
2.9 DCC also provides for the possibility of a defence to liability if the default is caused by a matter that lies 
outside the specific remit of an executive director and he has not been negligent. However, as he is also 
responsible for the conduct of the general affairs of the company and has a double onus of proof, the defence 
will not often be allowed. 
1250 Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), p. 542. 
1251 See article 2.10 DCC giving the general obligation for proper bookkeeping and articles 2.363/393 DCC 
which give all the stipulations for the annual accounts as well as the the serious sanctions in article 2.138/248 
DCC (improper accounting is a presumption for serious management and liability in bankruptcy cases) and 
article 2:139/249 DCC (liability for misleading accounts). 
1252 Article 2:101/210 DCC and article 5:24 Act on Financial Supervision. 
1253 Article 2.394, 2 DCC. 
1254 Article 2.108/218, 2 DCC. 
1255 Article 2.101/210, 2 DCC. 
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directors as representatives with the Trade Register.
1256
 These are the 
most important duties of the management board and they are among those 
mentioned in the DCC. 
 
 Shareholders have the right to decide on the issue of shares and on 
buy-backs (redemption of shares by the company), to call meetings of 
shareholders and decide on the agenda and to declare dividends, to adopt 
the accounts, to issue discharges to management and supervisory board 
members and to determine the remuneration of supervisory board 
members and the remuneration policy for management board 
members.
1257
 On paper these rights certainly exceed those of shareholders 
in the US. 
 
 For vital decisions such as change of control of the company, 
acquisitions, disposals, mass redundancies, large loans and 
reorganisations, the management board must consult with the company‟s 
works council (ondernemingsraad).
1258
 The works council has from 3 to 
15 members who are elected by and from among the employees. The 
works council has no veto right but there must be consultation. If the 
works council is not consulted, this may seriously endanger or delay the 
execution of the decision because the works council may have the 
decision reviewed by the Enterprise Chamber. The works council made 
use of this right in the Organon case.
1259
 When considering terms and 
conditions of employment (arbeidsvoorwaarden) the board needs the 
works council's consent.
1260
 
 If the company is in serious financial problems and is close to bankruptcy 
management board members have the obligation to warn the bodies that 
collect social security contributions.
1261
 
 The management board must also comply with all securities regulations 
contained in the Act of Financial Supervision, which deals with many 
areas such as insider trading, the disclosure of controlling shareholdings 
(melding zeggenschap), the issue of prospectuses and offering 
documents. 
                                                     
1256 Articles 19-23 Trade Register Act (Handelsregisterwet) and article 2.69/180 DCC. 
1257 These rights of shareholders have been described above in sub-section 4.5.2. 
1258 Section 25 Works Council Act. 
1259 See above in sub-section 4.4.2.2. 
1260 Section 27 Works Council Act. 
1261 Sections in the social securities laws, the income tax law and the value-added tax law. 
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 The above is a fairly prescriptive list of duties. At present, the DCC does 
not make much difference in this respect between public and private 
companies (NVs and BVs), but a bill has been introduced allowing 
greater flexibility for BVs. 
 
 Supervisory board members have the duty to supervise the strategy 
developed and executed by the management board and to supervise the 
general affairs of the company.
1262
 They assist the management board by 
providing advice,
1263
 which is always given in the interests of the 
company and its enterprises.
1264
 If they notice, or should notice, that the 
management board is seriously in default of its duties as outlined at the 
start of this section, the supervisory board members should take action. 
Their duties are different from those of a non-executive director in the 
proposed one-tier board. The Bodam Jachtservice case
1265
 of 1996 clearly 
shows how the same set of facts results in liability for supervisory board 
members and management board members, albeit for different reasons. In 
this case a managing director had failed to keep proper accounts and to 
file them with the trade register. This constitutes serious negligence and 
can lead to liability to the liquidator under article 2.138/248 DCC. The 
Supreme Court ruled that the supervisory board members could not be 
expected to fulfil these duties of the managing director themselves, but 
should have either pressured him to perform them or arranged for him to 
be replaced. It was not sufficient to hold a shareholders‟ meeting to 
discuss the problem. However, if the same set of facts were to occur in 
the future in a company with a one-tier board, the non-executive directors 
would have to check in an early stage whether there was proper 
accounting and filing and take measures in advance to ensure that this 
happens, as they would be directors and not supervisory board 
members.
1266
 
 
 Articles of association 
 The articles of association of NVs and BVs are drawn up by a civil law 
notary in accordance with standard models. The rights and obligations of 
                                                     
1262 The monitoring duty of article 2:140/250 DCC. 
1263 The advice duty of article 2:140/250 DCC. 
1264 Their duties must be performed in the interests of the company. See detailed discussion in sub-section 4.2.5 
above. Article 2.140/250 DCC confirms this. 
1265 Bodam Jachtservice, HR 28/6/1996, NJ 1997/58. 
1266 Strik (2010), p. 135 and Parliamentary Papers, Second Chamber 2008/09, 31763 nr. 3, 17 and nr. 6, pp. 13 
and 25. 
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shareholders, management board members and supervisory board 
members are usually described in a fairly detailed way, including their 
powers to represent the company and the decisions for which the 
supervisory board and/or the general meeting has a veto right. The 
articles of association are important. If directors breach the provisions of 
the articles of association they are liable.  
 
 Two cases are mentioned here that show the importance of articles of 
association. 
 
 Wijsmuller (1968)1267 
 A director of Bureau Wijsmuller N.V. was dismissed by resolution of the company‟s 
general meeting of shareholders. Its shareholder, Wijsmuller Nederland N.V., voted for 
dismissal. However, under the articles of association of Wijsmuller Nederland N.V., the 
board of Wijsmuller Nederland N.V. could take such action only if authorised by a valid 
vote of the holders of a special class of priority shares. Although a meeting of priority 
shareholders had been called due notice of it had not been given. As a result, not all 
priority shareholders attended the meeting. It followed that this meeting of priority 
shareholders and the resolution it adopted authorising the board of Wijsmuller Nederland 
N.V. were invalid. The Supreme Court stressed the importance of the right of all 
shareholders to be consulted in a meeting. 
 
 In NOM v. Willemsen (2008) the Court of Appeal held that Willemsen, the managing 
director, was liable. He had asked for a payment moratorium for the company without the 
shareholders‟ consent, although the articles of association gave the shareholders a veto 
right. The Supreme Court held that although the veto right under the articles of 
association was important all circumstances should be considered, for example the fact 
that Willemsen had discussed the moratorium with shareholders, including NOM, who 
had raised no objections. The Supreme Court overturned the decision.1268 
 
 The articles of association are important to a one-tier board and should 
provide for a clear division of roles and duties between executive and 
non-executive directors. As a complete board all directors have the duty 
to manage the company.
1269
 Managing means they have a duty to 
develop, implement and monitor all aspects of the company, the “general 
affairs of the company” (algemene gang van zaken). These include 
strategy, annual accounts, risk management and Corporate Social 
                                                     
1267 Wijsmuller, HR 15/7/1968, NJ 1969, 101. 
1268 NOM v. Willemsen, HR 12/9/2008, JOR 2008, 297. 
1269 Article 2.129/239 DCC. 
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Responsibility (CSR). When they divide up their duties among 
themselves, they must take account of the executive and non-executive 
roles defined in the articles of association.
1270
 The executive roles may 
also be divided into specialisms (CEO, CFO, COO – Chief Operations 
Officer, CRO – Chief Risk Officer, and CHO – Chief Human Resources 
Officer). Non-executives can devide tasks too. Any such division must be 
recorded in writing and be based on a provision in the articles of 
association.
1271
 
 
 As the duties of the executive directors of a one-tier board – and even a 
two-tier board for that matter – are divided among them, they have an 
obligation to perform a specialised management task on a day-to-day 
basis. Under the present article 2:9 DCC this is still called the director‟s 
area of work (werkkring), but the word used in the new article 2:9 DCC 
(Act) is task (taak). Article 2:129a/2:239a, paragraph 3 DCC (Act) gives 
executive directors the right to assume a specific task. This is worded as 
follows: “validly decide on matters that come within their remit”. At the 
same time, however, they still have the general duty to manage, i.e. to 
develop, implement and monitor the general affairs of the company and 
hence also to monitor their colleagues. This second task of monitoring 
has also been discussed above in sub-section 4.5.9. The basic joint and 
several liability of executive and non-executive directors with the 
possibility of an exculpation defence for a director where the act or 
omission falls outside his area of responsibility (i.e. outside his “task”) 
and there are no other serious grounds for holding him liable, is discussed 
below in sub-section 4.7.2.7. 
 
 Although the non-executive directors in a one-tier board specifically have 
the task of monitoring,
1272
 this does not mean that this duty is confined to 
monitoring their colleagues. Besides monitoring generally, they also have 
a duty – as directors – to be active in relation to strategy development, the 
annual accounts (including the report of directors), risk management and 
corporate social responsibility as well as all aspects of general 
management. It is sometimes incorrectly thought that a non-executive 
director is a sort of “turbo” supervisory board member or an extra active 
monitor. While monitoring may be his specialised role, a non-executive 
director also has the general duty of a director. 
                                                     
1270 Article 2:129a/239a, 3 DCC (Act) 
1271 Article 2:129a/239a, 3 DCC (Act). 
1272 Article 2:129a/239a, 1 DCC (as introduced by the Act). 
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In the example of Bodam Jachtservice, mentioned earlier in this section, 
where management had not kept proper books and had failed to file any 
accounts, it seems reasonable to assume that if the supervisory board 
members had been non-executive directors on a one-tier board they 
themselves would have had a duty to arrange for the accounting and 
filing. As the term for drawing up and filing the annual accounts had 
expired, they would have had to inquire how these formalities were going 
to be fulfilled and would have needed to keep their finger on the pulse. 
The same analogy as in the Bodam case could be applied in cases where 
risk management systems are non-existent or inadequate. Supervisory 
board members in a two-tier system should supervise and check, ideally 
in advance, whether systems are in place and take corrective action in the 
event of deficiencies. Non-executive directors in a one-tier system should 
ask in advance whether systems are in place and help to develop or 
challenge them. Hence there is a formal difference between the task of 
supervisory board members in a two-tier system and non-executive 
directors in a one-tier system, but in practice it is mainly a difference in 
timing and level of involvement.
1273
 
 
 This is comparable to the position of a UK executive director who has to 
manage the affairs of the company, develop general strategy and monitor, 
and to the position of a UK non-executive director who has to monitor 
and develop strategy, risk management systems, CSR etc. 
 
 In my view one of the Act‟s strengths is that article 2:129a/239a DCC (as 
introduced by the Act) provides that the division of tasks is to be 
described in the articles of association. When the Act becomes law 
anyone will be able to find which director is responsible for what by 
consulting the company‟s articles of association and the names of the 
executive and non-executive directors in the public registers. At this point 
it will no longer be necessary to rely on detailed facts to establish the 
different duties and responsibilities. It is clearly an advantage for the 
directors to describe their functions transparently for the case that they 
might need to seek exculpation from liability.
1274
 
 
                                                     
1273 Strik (2010), p. 133 and Parliamentary Papers, Second Chamber 2009/09, 31763 nr. 3, p. 8. 
1274 Strik (2003), p. 374; Dortmond (2005), p. 265; Strik (2010), p. 132; Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), 
p. 170. 
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 General Internal Guidelines 
 Most companies have directors‟ regulations next to the articles of 
association. These can be general policies and/or guidelines. They can 
also be divisions of tasks as suggested by article 2:129/239a, paragraph 3 
DCC. The Staleman v. Van de Ven judgement explicitly mentions 
division of tasks and general guidelines for the board as an important 
factor to determine directors‟ duties. See 4.7.2.1. Internal guidelines are 
important in case of legal disputes, because they are meant to be 
internally generally applicable and can be produced in court. 
 
 Codes and agreements the company has adhered to 
 Codes such as UN codes for multinationals to which a company has 
adhered, as mentioned above in the first lines of this sub-section 4.6.2 in 
the Batco case, rank higher in the hierarchy than the Frijns Code because 
the company has explicitly bound itself to such code. Joint venture and 
shareholder agreements governed by Dutch law are also binding. Many 
foreign enterprises choose the Netherlands as the locus of their joint 
venture because Dutch joint venture agreements are binding and 
enforceable internally in the long term.
1275
 It is advisable to have the 
agreements countersigned by the company and even by the board 
members.
1276
 
 
 Frijns Code 
 The Frijns Code of 2008 describes in detail the duties of management 
board members and supervisory board members. It makes very clear that 
the management board has a duty to formulate and develop strategy, 
draw up annual accounts and develop and follow risk management 
systems and CSR plans,
1277
 and that supervisory board members only 
                                                     
1275 Inaugural lecture of P.J. Dortmond, Stemovereenkomsten rondom de eeuwwisseling, oratie (2000) 
(“Dortmond (2000/O)”) and Maeijer (1994), pp. 354-361; Van der Grinten (1989) no. 217.1 and Van Solinge 
and Nieuwe Weme (2009), nos. 381-388. 
1276 Doetinchemse IJzergieterij, HR 1/4/1949, NJ 1949, 405, in which the supervisory board members had issued 
shares to friends based on a right conferred on them by the articles of association to counter the threat of an 
unfriendly takeover. The supervisory directors did this to prevent a shareholder agreement to which they, as 
supervisory directors, were not a party. They did so in the interest of the company. The Supreme Court ruled in 
favour of the directors because they were not bound. See also HVA/Socfin, HR 19/3/1975, NJ 1976, 267 where 
an agreement was enforceable because it had been signed by the directors. The agreement gave 25% 
shareholder Socfin the power to make binding nominations of specific supervisory board members in a 
„structure regime‟ company, where the supervisory board members would normally have had this right. 
1277 Frijns Code Principle II.1. 
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have the duty to supervise these activities.
1278
 Both the Frijns Code and 
its predecessor – the Tabaksblat Code of 2004 – have been largely 
instrumental in raising the standard by which the duties of the managing 
directors and the supervisory board members are judged.
1279
 Both Codes 
mention the possibility of a one-tier board. 
 
 Other codes or guidelines 
 There are many other codes and guidelines such as the Global Compact 
Rules,
1280
 the draft Dutch Code of Conduct for Supervisory Board 
Members and the Observations for Chairmen,
1281
 which will hopefully 
lead to further discussion. 
 
 Court cases 
 Civil cases for liability under articles 2:9 (the company), 2:138/148 
(liquidator in the case of bankruptcy) and 6:162 (tort) DCC and criminal 
cases will be discussed in section 4.7. First, in sub-sections 4.6.3 and 
4.6.4, I will consider the Enterprise Chamber procedures and some 
Supreme Court cases. These cases, and the media attention they have 
attracted, have since 1990 had a growing impact on the standard of duties 
of managing directors. 
 
4.6.3 Enterprise Chamber procedure: right of inquiry 
 
 The right of investigation into the dealings of corporations was 
introduced into Dutch law in 1928, following the example of the UK 
Companies Act of 1862. In 1971 the specialised Enterprise Chamber was 
set up. This is a division of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal and consists 
of judges specialised in this field. There were a few lengthy proceedings 
between 1971 and 1994. Since 1994 shareholders, trade unions and the 
public prosecutor may request an order for an investigation and at the 
                                                     
1278 Frijns Code Principle III.1. 
1279 Den Boogert (2005); Langman (2005); Wezeman (2009/G); and Prof. H. Beckman, „Enkele losse gedachten 
bij en over commissaris, toezicht en controle‟, column, Ondernemingsrecht 2005/8, p. 291 (“Beckman 
(2005)”). 
1280 Global Compact Rules to which companies can adhere. See Preliminary advisory report to the Netherlands 
Lawyers‟ Association of June 2010, Maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen. Preadviezen van Prof. mr. 
A.J.A.J. Eijsbouts, Prof. mr. F.G.H. Kristen, mr. J.M. de Jongh, mr. A.J.P. Schild en Prof. mr. L. Timmerman 
(2010); and Lambooy (2010). 
1281 Draft code of conduct, of Prof. Auke de Bos and Dr. Mijntje Lückerath-Rovers and the observations of 
Schuit (2010). 
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same time seek an immediate temporary injunction, such as a blocking 
decision or agreement and the appointment or dismissal of directors. 
There is a right of appeal to the Supreme Court.
1282
 The procedure is 
described in articles 2:345 to 359 DCC. 
 
 One of the first major cases was the OGEM case,
1283
 which was decided 
in 1990. It described the aims of the right of investigation: 
 curing and reorganising the company; 
 finding evidence of possible mismanagement; 
 allocating responsibility for proven mismanagement; 
 prevention of further mismanagement. 
 
 The procedure in Enterprise Chamber proceedings takes place in two 
steps. First, someone – usually a shareholder – warns the company of 
mismanagement in a letter to the management board and, in the absence 
of a satisfactory response, applies to the Enterprise Chamber for a ruling 
on whether there are “good reasons to doubt that the company is being 
proper managed” (gegronde redenen om aan het juiste beleid te 
twijfelen).
1284
 Often, an order for a temporary injunction is requested at 
the same time. The second step, after an investigation has been made by 
experienced businessmen, accountants or lawyers appointed by the 
Enterprise Chamber, is for the original applicant to ask the court to 
determine whether there has been mismanagement (wanbeleid)
1285
 and to 
issue final injunctions. The threshold for mismanagement is a breach of 
“elementary principles of reasonable entrepreneurship” (elementaire 
beginselen van verantwoord ondernemerschap).
1286
 These terms are 
broad enough to give management and supervisory board members a 
certain amount of discretion. This comes close to the “business judgment 
rule”, except that in some cases (e.g. HBG,1287 ABN AMRO1288 and 
ASMI
1289
) the Enterprise Chamber has evidently broadened its remit to 
include correcting the business judgment of the board. However, in each 
                                                     
1282 Sanders, Westbroek, Storm and Buyn (2005), p. 310, et seq., no. 310. 
1283 OGEM, HR 10/1/90, NJ 1990, 466. 
1284 Article 2:350 DCC. 
1285 Article 2:355 DCC. 
1286 OGEM case, HR 10/1/1990, NJ 1990, 466, described below in sub-section 4.6.4. 
1287 HBG, HR 21/2/2003, NJ 2003, 182. 
1288 ABN AMRO in Sale LaSalle Bank, HR 13/7/2007, NJ 2007, 434, described below in sub-section 4.6.4. 
1289 ASMI, HR 2/6/2010, NJ 2010, 544, described below in sub-section 4.6.4. 
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of these cases the Supreme Court reversed the Enterprise Chamber 
decision. 
 
 It is important to note that the Enterprise Chamber does not deal with 
liability of directors for which the claimant has to approach the regular 
District Courts. The Enterprise Chamber sometimes seems to apply a 
higher standard for good management than the ordinary courts do in 
liability cases. Owing to the media coverage of the cases mentioned 
above, the standard of behaviour expected of directors has risen, 
notwithstanding the final judgments of the Supreme Court. When the 
Enterprise Chamber declares mismanagement by the company, its 
decisions usually apply to all board members and no distinction is made 
between the management board and the supervisory board. In most 
Enterprise Chamber cases, whether an outside director is supervisory 
board member in a two-tier system or a non-executive director in a one-
tier system is unlikely to make much of a difference. Although the 
standards of conduct for supervisory board members are different, they 
too are always subject to investigation.  
 
4.6.4 Enterprise Chamber cases and standards 
 
 In OGEM (1990), which had gone bankrupt, both the Enterprise Chamber and the 
Supreme Court found seven instances of mismanagement: (i) the public announcement of 
a recent acquisition had stated a price lower than the real one, (ii) shares had been bought 
back without supervisory board consent, (iii) a building had been acquired in exchange 
for shares in OGEM without informing the board, (iv) overly optimistic information had 
been given to shareholders about results, (v) property mortgages had been provided to 
banks contrary to internal regulations (this occurred because none of the board members 
bothered to read the documents relating to mortgages), (vi) the supervisory board had 
refused to pay the former CEO his due indemnity, (vii) a consultancy agreement had been 
made with a critical shareholder to keep him quiet. In general, the executive directors 
acted independently of one another and had strong egos and no respect for the supervisory 
board, whose chairman blindly supported the CEO. Two memoranda from supervisory 
board members who objected to the course of events were swept under the carpet. The 
Hague District Court found the management board members and supervisory board 
members liable and the case was settled for fairly moderate amounts. None of the 
directors was insured. 
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 In Bobel (1999)1290 the management board members and supervisory board members had 
acted solely in the interests of one majority shareholder and had grossly neglected their 
tasks of management and supervision. This had gone on for over 25 years, until the 
company went bankrupt. The Enterprise Chamber held that this constituted 
mismanagement and ordered the directors to pay for the costs of the investigation. The 
order for costs was reversed by the Supreme Court.  
 
 Gucci (2000)1291 was the first large case in a corporate power battle in which certain 
parties sought an interim injunction from the Enterprise Chamber rather than from the 
president of the District Court. Previously it had been customary to request injunctions 
from the president of a District Court, who usually issued prompt and clear temporary 
injunctions (kort geding).1292 The French company, Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy 
(LVMH), had built up a 34% shareholding in Gucci NV, which was the holding company 
of Gucci. It was a Dutch NV, listed on the Dutch stock exchange. Gucci reacted to the 
threat of LVMH by creating an employee stock owner plan (ESOP) under which 
employees would buy Gucci shares worth NLG 2.5 billion and would be lent the full 
amount by the company. Companies are forbidden to lend money to anyone wanting to 
buy their shares.1293 The Enterprise Chamber decided the case holding the middle ground 
and issued a temporary injunction depriving both LVMH and the ESOP of the right to 
vote their extra shares. This Gucci I decision laid down obligations for controlling 
shareholders, stating that a 24.5% shareholder is a controlling shareholder and has 
obligations to other shareholders. Gucci quickly found another French company, Pinault 
Printemps Redoute (PPR), as a white knight. A month later the Enterprise Chamber ruled 
against Gucci, because the financing of the shares was illegal. The Supreme Court held 
that while the investigation is still pending the Enterprise Chamber may issue only 
temporary and not final injunctions.  
 
 RNA (2003)1294 created 3 rather temporary defence mechanisms in reaction to the threat 
of Westfield‟s tender offer for RNA shares, because RNA was against integrating with 
Westfield‟s external management. The Enterprise Chamber blocked the defence 
mechanisms. However, the Supreme Court reversed this judgment and permitted the 
mechanisms, ruling that in this case temporary defence mechanisms were permitted.  
 
                                                     
1290 Bobel, HR 19/5/1999, NJ 1999, 659. 
1291 Gucci, 27/9/2000, NJ 2000, 653.  
1292 For a typical preliminary injunction case before the president of a district court, see Doetinchemse 
IJzerfabriek, HR 1/4/1949, NJ 1949, 405. As noted previously, this involved a defensive issue of shares to 
friends in reaction to a threat. 
1293 The provision prohibiting financial assistance can be found in article 2:98c/208c DCC. 
1294 RNA, HR 18/4/2003, JOR 2003, 110. 
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 In Stork (2007)1295 the management and supervisory boards used a defence mechanism to 
block shareholders from voting to dismiss the supervisory board. The reason why the 
shareholders Paulsen and Centaurus were so adamant was that they disagreed with the 
management and supervisory boards about strategy. They wanted a split up, and 
management did not. Communication was bad and the Enterprise Chamber found that all 
sides were at fault and therefore froze the whole matter and appointed three 
super-supervisory board members. In the end Stork was taken over by a private equity 
group, which confirmed that it would not split up the company in the first four years. The 
Enterprise Chamber held that a defence mechanism cannot be used for the purpose of 
blocking a shareholder‟s vote and that the supervisory board should play a mediating role 
between shareholders and management, but that shareholders have an obligation to 
explain their views in more detail when they communicate with boards. These have 
become important standards of conduct.  
 
 The recent case of ASMI (2010)1296 once again involved a dispute between management 
and shareholders – the UK activist pension fund, Hermes, was actively arguing with 
management – about splitting up the company. Here too the company used a defence 
mechanism to influence – not block – voting. The Supreme Court clearly held that the 
management board determines strategy and the supervisory board supervises strategy and 
is not obliged to discuss matters with individual shareholders outside the shareholders‟ 
meetings, nor is it under a legal obligation to mediate between management and 
shareholders (thereby differing from the Enterprise Chamber‟s opinion in the Stork case), 
but should try to help keep communication as good as possible. In this case the Supreme 
Court did not condemn the use of such a defence mechanism, and referred the case back 
to the Enterprise Chamber without ordering a further investigation and the Enterprise 
Chamber stopped the investigation. 
 
 ABN AMRO (2007)1297 was engaged in strategically planned merger talks with Barclays. 
Under the proposed merger ABN AMRO would keep its identity and influence. It sold 
LaSalle, which it had planned to sell for a long time. LaSalle accounted for less than one 
third of ABN AMRO‟s business at about the time when a new consortium consisting of 
RBS, Fortis and Santander made an overture for a tender offer. In this important case the 
Supreme Court gave a clear opinion on several issues. The board should consider the 
interests of all stakeholders. Directors determine strategy, the supervisory board monitors 
this and the general meeting of shareholders can state its views and has rights given by 
law and the articles of association. Article 2:107a DCC about shareholder consent should 
                                                     
1295 Stork, Enterprise Chamber, OK 17/1/2007, NJ 2007, 15. 
1296 ASMI, HR 2/6/2010, NJ 2010, 544. 
1297 ABN AMRO in Sale LaSalle Bank, HR 13/7/2007, NJ 2007, 434. 
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not be interpreted broadly and, even if such consent had been required, it would not affect 
the validity of resolutions in relation to third parties. 
 
 Landis (2005)1298 was distributor of ICT products and had grown very quickly as the 
result of a series of acquisitions, some at a high price. It was an example of 
“overstretching”. There was no accounting and the market had been given misleading 
information. Landis and many subsidiaries went bankrupt. It was held that there had been 
clear mismanagement. The important question was whether a shareholder can request an 
investigation of the management of unlisted subsidiaries. This was answered in the 
affirmative by the Supreme Court. 
 
 In HBG (2003)1299 the Enterprise Chamber tried (i) to raise the standards of 
communication concerning important joint ventures, even though there is no legal 
requirement for consent by shareholders, and (ii) to oblige boards to provide information 
to shareholders in great detail. The Supreme Court reversed these efforts of the Enterprise 
Chamber by confirming that boards do not have to consult shareholders about decisions 
that do not require shareholder consent. On the point of detailed information, the 
Monitoring Committee has in the meantime introduced an obligation to give detailed 
information on a website. This has been confirmed in the Frijns Code.1300 This means that 
now there is an obligation to provide detailed information and courts would rule against 
boards that fail to do so. See sub-section 4.6.2, third to last paragraphs. 
 
 Laurus (2007)1301 is the most important case concerning the relationship between an 
Enterprise Chamber investigation resulting in a declaration of mismanagement and later 
liability cases before a District Court. The Supreme Court held that a district court 
                                                     
1298 Landis, HR 4/2/2005, RvdW 2005, 25. 
1299 HBG, HR 21/2/2003, NJ 2003, 182, see also Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), p. 382, no. 326. HBG, 
HR 21/2/2003, NJ 2003, 182, a case known as „the dredging war‟. Boskalis made a tender offer for HBG. 
HBG refused the tender offer and the board discussed it in a general meeting of shareholders, but did not 
mention an alternative strategy. The meeting asked whether the board would have called the meeting for 
consultation purposes if it had an alternative. The chairman of the supervisory board answered: "Only if there 
were another offer or a change of the company profile". A week later HBG announced that it declined 
Boskalis‟ offer and entered into a dredging joint venture with Ballast Nedam. In a later general meeting HBG‟s 
CEO gave a presentation about the joint venture with slides, adding that HBG did not need consent for the 
joint venture. The Enterprise Chamber blocked the joint venture, holding that under the circumstances it was 
reasonable that HBG‟s board should consult the general meeting about the joint venture. The Supreme Court 
reversed the decision, confirming that there was no general rule obliging the board to consult with the 
shareholders‟ meeting or seek its consent for joint ventures. 
1300 Frijns Code IV.3.6. 
1301 Laurus, HR 8/4/2005, JOR 2005, 19. 
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liability case is a new case and that the declaration of mismanagement by the Enterprise 
Chamber should not influence the decision in the later case. Because the Enterprise 
Chamber investigation is informal and there is often no proper trial, the District Court is 
not bound by the investigation. Such an investigation might exercise some influence, but 
the Supreme Court was clear that the conclusion of the investigation does not form legal 
precedent. The facts were that Laurus had a very ambitious strategy. Neither the 
Enterprise Chamber nor the Supreme Court condemned the ambitious strategy as such. 
The courts also permitted a sale to Casino. The issue was whether there had been 
sufficient follow-up by the management and supervisory boards in their monitoring of the 
plan once it started to fail. Both courts held that there had been mismanagement by the 
management board, but clearly stated that this did not mean it had made any decision 
about liability. The supervisory board members won in the Supreme Court, because the 
arguments put forward by the plaintiff were insufficient to enable the supervisory board 
members to defend themselves. This was a case of insufficient follow-up to a failing 
strategy plan. These are very complicated cases and largely dependent on the facts.  
 
 Let us, for argument‟s sake, compare how these matters decided by the 
Dutch Enterprise Chamber and the Dutch Supreme Court would be 
approached by Delaware Chancellors and Justices.  
 
 First something about the procedures. Cases before the Dutch Enterprise 
Chamber start with a short hearing with possibly some preliminary 
injunctions and this is very often followed by an investigation and further 
hearings. The decision is a declaration of mismanagement or not. 
Liability is not declared by the Enterprise Chamber but by the District 
Courts. 
 
 Delaware case law can be distinguished between on the one hand director 
liability cases which are usually derivative cases which start with a 
motion to dismiss, which is a very quick procedure. If the case is not 
dismissed it is followed by a lengthy procedure where the courts carefully 
look at the facts and circumstances of each individual director and on the 
other hand there are injunctive relief cases such as takeover cases where 
the defendant is usually the board as a whole. Within the group of 
liability cases a division can be made between general supervision or 
“oversight” such as Caremark, Stone v. Ritter, AIG and Citigroup on the 
one hand and on the other hand care in individual transactions, such as 
Van Gorkom, Disney and Lyondell. The injunctive relief cases include the 
takeover poison pill cases, such as Unocal, Time (Warner) and Revlon 
and cases such as Blasius involving the manipulation of voting on the 
appointment of directors. 
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 Of the Enterprise Chamber cases mentioned above, OGEM, Bobel, 
Landis and Laurus would be comparable liability cases in Delaware, even 
though in these cases the court only answered the question of whether 
there had been mismanagement and no injunctions were involved. The 
other Enterprise Chamber cases are comparable with Delaware injunctive 
relief cases. 
 
 Given the facts of Dutch mismanagement cases, the Delaware approach might be the 
following: 
– in OGEM: the Delaware approach might be disloyalty and a lack of care shown 
by most inside directors and, possibly, also by some supervisory board 
members, because they did not try to monitor or read essential documents, 
misinformed the other board members and shareholders and refused to react to 
red flags; 
 
– in Bobel the Delaware approach might be to establish how dependent each 
individual director was on the majority shareholder. Inside directors would 
probably be held more liable than outside directors. Some directors would 
probably be held liable, especially those who had committed gross negligence 
and/or shown disloyalty to the company, because disloyalty is not exculpable; 
 
– in Landis, there was no accounting and the market had been given misleading 
information. By Delaware standards some of the directors would be liable for 
disloyalty and lack of care; 
 
– in Laurus, the Delaware approach would be not to condemn an ambitious 
strategy since the Delaware vice-chancellor did not condemn Citigroup and 
applied the business judgment rule. I think in Delaware one would check 
whether the board was not disloyal and seriously consider the aspect loyalty in 
relation to the sale to Casino. I think that in Delaware as in the Netherlands 
these cases would depend on the facts. Delaware might possibly be slightly 
more lenient in liability cases, provided that the independent directors had not 
been guilty of disloyalty and had discharged their duty of care sufficiently not to 
have been guilty of intentional misconduct, because they would otherwise be 
exculpated. 
 
 In the Dutch Enterprise Chamber injunction cases, the Delaware approach might be as 
follows: 
– in the Gucci poison pill case, the financing provided for the issue of shares 
under the ESOP was in breach of article 2:98c DCC forbidding financial 
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assistance; the Delaware approach would be to also issue an injunction to block 
the pill if Delaware law included a statutory prohibition to this effect;  
 
– in RNA the Delaware approach would be to accept the defence mechanisms as a 
proportionate reaction and would permit the defence in accordance their Unocal 
criteria; 
 
– in Stork, the Delaware approach might be to apply the Unocal and Blasius 
criteria and not accept the issuing of shares to block the right to vote for the 
appointment or dismissal of directors, because this would be regarded as 
manipulating such voting rights; 
 
– in ABN AMRO, I think that the Delaware approach would be to apply Time 
(Warner) and not Revlon, because the board had a developed strategy and the 
sale of LaSalle was part of that strategy. I therefore believe that the Delaware 
approach would be to rule in the same way as the Dutch Supreme Court and 
would not stay the sale of LaSalle. Another point is that in Delaware the 
threshold for the requirement of shareholder consent for disposals is much 
higher (50-100% of the value of the company, whereas in the Netherlands it is 
one third of the value of the company);1302 
 
– in HBG, where the shareholders wished to be consulted on major transactions, 
the Delaware approach would be, like the Dutch Supreme Court, not to give a 
right of consultation to the general meeting if there were no legal requirement to 
do so. 
 
4.6.5 Conflicts of interest 
 
 The main duty of management board members and supervisory board 
members under Dutch law is to act in the interests of the company.
1303
 
The present law is that where conflicts of interest involving management 
board members occur, the company should be represented by the 
supervisory board. Alternatively, the general meeting may always 
appoint another person as the representative.
1304
 Codified Dutch law deals 
only with the issue of representation of the company by a management 
board member in the event of a conflict of interest. This can cause 
                                                     
1302 See also the opinion of Advocate General Timmerman in the ABN AMRO case. 
1303 Article 2:140/250 DCC for supervisory board members and article 2:229, 5/238, 5 DCC (as introduced by 
the Act) for managing directors and executive directors, and see subsection 4.2.5 above. 
1304 Article 2:146/256 DCC. 
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surprises and legal insecurity. The rather complicated caselaw under 
present Dutch law, with its focus on representation, is discussed below. 
The legislator wishes to create more legal security in transactions by 
moving the question of conflict of interest to the decision fase, and 
basically making it possible for the conflicted person to opt out of the 
decision making. 
 
 The Act has added paragraphs concerning the loyalty of board members 
and provides that the management board members are to act in the 
interests of the company.
1305
 The Act adds that if any board member has a 
conflict of interest he may not participate in the discussion and if all 
board members have a conflict the decision will be made by the 
supervisory board or, in the absence of such a board, by the general 
meeting of shareholders, unless the articles of association provide 
otherwise.
1306
 In the same way a supervisory board member who has a 
conflict of interest may not participate in the discussions. If all 
supervisory board members have a conflict of interest or no decision can 
be made because a quorum is lacking, the decision will again be made by 
the general meeting of shareholders, unless the articles of association 
provide otherwise.
1307
 Where a conflict of interest arises, the Act provides 
that the director concerned may not have any influence over the decision. 
The new Dutch arrangement is less flexible than the practical solution 
adopted in the UK and the US, where a director simply mentions that he 
has a conflict of interest at the beginning of the meeting and can get 
board or shareholder ratification. I have come across a UK-trained 
chairman who was in the habit of asking at the start of each meeting 
whether any board member had a conflict of interest in respect of any 
points on the agenda. The agenda point would be: "declaration of 
interest". 
 
 The new system of dealing with conflicts of interest during the decision- 
making stage as provided for in the Act is an improvement on the present 
Dutch system of focusing on the representation stage. 
 
 The case law of the last 15 years shows how complicated this focus on 
representation is. 
                                                     
1305 Article 2:129/239, 5 DCC. This duty for supervisory board members was already laid down in article 
2:140/250, 2 DCC. 
1306 Article 2:129/239, 6 DCC. 
1307 Article 2:140/250, 5 DCC. 
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 The Mediasafe II case (1998)1308 put an end to the old practice of permitting one person 
to represent many parties in a deal. An agreement was signed by one director for the 
parent and the subsidiary to give set-off and/or joint and several claim rights to a bank. As 
the bank could have known of this conflict of interest, it could be held against the bank, 
thereby invalidating the signature. This was notwithstanding the general rule that the 
signature of a registered management board member binds a bank. 
 
 This Mediasafe II case drew attention to the issue of conflicts of interest and resulted in a 
flurry of cases. Brandao (2002)1309 dealt with a real material conflict of interest where Mr 
A.J. Maren, as director of Burgslot N.V., signed an agreement on behalf of Sundat N.V., a 
management BV company which he also represented. Sundat B.V. hired out Maren‟s two 
sons to Sundat N.V. on conditions that were very favourable for the sons. Brandao, as 
shareholder of Sundat N.V., asked the court to set aside the decision of Sundat N.V. to 
enter into this agreement. It argued that the director of Sundat N.V. had decided to give 
his sons (working via a management BV) favourable employment terms. The Supreme 
Court set aside the agreement. This case was comparable to the decision in the old case of 
Maas v. Amazone (1940)1310 where father Maas, acting as director on behalf of the 
employing company, signed a favourable employment contract in favour of his own son. 
Here the Supreme Court judged the father to have a conflict of interest. I assume that the 
Delaware and UK courts would do the same, unless the board or shareholders had ratified 
the agreement. Dutch law does not have this ratification process. 
 
 Duplicado (2004)1311 confirmed the Mediasafe II judgment. In this case, a director who 
owned 100% of the shares of two companies signed on behalf of both companies. His 
signature was held to be invalid. 
 
 Subsequently, the Bruil (2007)1312 judgment gave a more nuanced and substantive answer 
to the question of conflict of interest. Mr Bruil was 100% shareholder and managing 
director of both Bruil Arnhem B.V. (BA) and Bruil-Kombex B.V. (BK). These companies 
were both fully owned by Mr Bruil. On behalf of these two companies Mr Bruil had 
signed contracts under which BA sold some but not all of its real estate to BK (the sale 
was good for both parties, the price was fair and BA got a contract to build a factory for 
BK). Each company gave the other a right of first refusal on its real estate. All the shares 
in BA were subsequently transferred to Ballast Nedam while Mr Bruil kept all the shares 
                                                     
1308 Mediasafe II, HR 11/9/1998, NJ 1999, 171. 
1309 Brandao, HR 3/5/2002, NJ 2002, 393. 
1310 Maas v. Amazone, HR 14/11/1940, NJ 1941, 321. 
1311 Duplicado, HR 9/7/2004 NJ 2004, 519. 
1312 Bruil, HR 29/6/2007, NJ 2007, 420. 
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in BK. In due course BA sold its real estate to Fernhout B.V. without allowing BK to 
exercise its right of first refusal. BK claimed a penalty payment from BA for its breach of 
the right of first refusal. BA defended itself by arguing that the right of first refusal was 
invalid because Mr Bruil had signed on behalf of both companies and had a formal 
conflict of interest. The argument was rejected by the District Court, but accepted by the 
Court of Appeal. Before the Supreme Court gave judgment in favour of BK (thereby 
refusing to set aside the contract), Advocate General L. Timmerman gave a detailed 
opinion in which he discussed all the case law and literature as well as American law.
1313
 
He argued that all of the cited material favoured a nuanced case-by-case factual test of 
conflict of interest over a mere formal test. The bare possibility of a conflict of interest is 
not sufficient. He advised that a conflict should be deemed to exist where a personal 
interest prevails over a company interest, even when no one has suffered any damage. As 
his opinion was accepted by the Supreme Court, the existence of a conflict of interest now 
has to be judged on the facts of the case. 
 
 Since the Bruil decision of 2007 conflict of interest therefore has to be 
handled on a case-by-case basis and a nuanced decision taken on the 
issue of representation. As mentioned above, the Act shifts the focus to 
the decision making stage. 
 
4.6.6 Summary of duties of directors 
 
 1. The duties of management board members and supervisory board 
members and of executive and non-executive directors are based 
on the following elements of the law: (i) statute law, (ii) articles 
of association, (iii) internal guidelines, (iv) agreements, including 
shareholder agreements which are enforceable and should 
preferably be countersigned by the company and its boards, 
(v) the Frijns Code, (vi) other codes. Decisions of the courts 
interpret the law. 
 
 2. The Enterprise Chamber cases and all the media coverage they 
have attracted have raised expectations for the conduct and duties 
of directors to a more aspirational and higher level than for the 
standards of liability. Generally Dutch law is converging with US 
and UK case law, except in some Enterprise Chamber decisions. 
                                                     
1313 He cited, inter alia, Hamilton, The Law of Corporations, 5th ed., p. 468, Corporations, including 
partnerships and limited liability companies, cases and materials, 6th ed., p. 759 and Dennis Block and § 8.60 
Model Business Corporation Act. 
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Although there has been no deliberate attempt to follow Delaware 
case law trends, the results of the decisions are not very different. 
 
 3. Conflict of interest has been dealt with in a more nuanced way on 
a case-by-case basis since the Bruil decision. The Act includes a 
practical solution for decision making. 
 
4.7 Liability of directors 
 
4.7.1 General 
 
Directors are not generally held to be liable, except where “serious 
blame” (ernstig verwijt) attaches to them or they have been guilty of 
“manifestly improper management” (kennelijk onbehoorlijk bestuur). 
Case law gives some guidance on this point.  
 
The principle of joint and several liability (hoofdelijke aansprakelijkheid) 
is characteristic of Dutch law and can be seen as a logical consequence of 
the tradition of consensus and collegiate boards.
1314
 Joint and several 
liability was introduced in article 45 of the 1838 Commercial Code and 
repeated in article 47c of the 1928 Commercial Code, which was copied 
from section 31 of the 1876 Cooperative Associations Act. The text of 
article 2.9 DCC is still the same. The idea is that all management board 
members are equal and have open discussions with each other, and thus 
have a basic knowledge of what their colleagues are doing. The system of 
Dutch corporate liability law retains the joint and several liability model, 
but applies it on case-by-case basis and in a more nuanced way, with 
some exemptions and/or grounds for exculpation (disculpatie). 
 
 The concept of joint and several liability for all acts and omissions is 
based on articles 2.9 (liability to the company), 2:138/248 (liability in 
bankruptcy), 2:139/249 (liability for misleading accounts) and 6:162 
(liability for tort) DCC. Basically, supervisory board members are held to 
the same standard of liability by way of articles 2:149/259 and 2.150/260 
DCC, but only in their specific, different role of supervision. There is 
also a tradition of joint responsibility of both boards. 
 
                                                     
1314 Molengraaff (1940), p. 255; Van der Grinten (1955), p. 420, no. 242; Van der Grinten (1989), p. 385, no. 
385; Van Schilfgaarde and Winter (2009), no. 42; Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), no. 417; and 
Beckman (1994). 
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 All the articles mentioned provide for the possibility of exculpation as 
defined by case law. Case law on article 2:9 DCC is limited, because in 
the Netherlands the company rarely claims that its directors are liable. 
The main case is of 1997.
1315
 There is concern in the Netherlands that 
non-executive directors on a one-tier board might possibly be held to a 
higher standard of liability than supervisory board members on a two-tier 
board. The Staleman v. Van de Ven case gives some guidance by listing 
circumstances that can be relevant for exculpation, including the 
“division of tasks and guidelines for the board”. It is important to note 
that in his answer to questions of the Dutch Senate
1316
 (the upper house of 
parliament) concerning the Act on one-tier boards the Minister of Public 
Safety and Justice referred to the importance of the Staleman v. Van de 
Ven case. He adds that in principle a director is not liable for damange 
caused by another director, except if there is also serious blame against 
him, because he took no measures or should have informed himself 
better. He adds that although there is a principle of joint and several 
liability directors should not be held liable too easily. There should be 
room for creativeity and risk taking. These answers are consistent with 
earlier answers to the Second Chamber.
1317
 This helps to explain the text 
of the present and future articles 2.9 DCC, which exculpate a director 
who can prove that the default was committed in an area outside his remit 
and that serious blame does not attach to him. The discussion about this 
aspect and the relevance for a one-tier board as well as examples of 
divisions of tasks are described below. 
 
 It is therefore important to describe the tasks of inside and outside 
directors clearly in corporate documentation, as is customary in the UK 
and US, since this can be used as an argument for exculpation.
1318
 
 
                                                     
1315 Staleman v. Van de Ven, HR 10/1/1997, NJ 1997, 360. 
1316 Memorandum of Reply to the Senate, 31763, of 2 May 2011, p. 16. 
1317 Explanatory Memorandum, Parliamentary Papers 31763, 2008/09, nr. 3, pp. 3 and 9 and Memorandum of 
Reply, Parliamentary Papers 31763, 2008/09, nr. 6, p. 3. 
1318 Strik (2003), p. 374; Dortmond (2005), p. 265; Strik (2010) p. 132; Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), 
p. 170, for the UK see end of sub-section 2.5.8 and for the US see sub-section 3.4.11. 
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4.7.2 Who can sue? 
 
4.7.2.1 The company 
 
Under article 2:9 DCC, which provides that each director has an 
obligation to perform his duties properly, only the company itself can 
make a claim. No shareholder or creditor is entitled to claim under this 
article. The Netherlands does not allow derivative suits
1319
 as in the US 
and the UK, where shareholders can file a suit against the director in the 
name of the company with the leave of the court. The company may also 
sue a director on the basis of several specific prohibitions under the DCC, 
such as withdrawing shares, having the company buy back its own 
shares
1320
 and/or unauthorized acquisition of the company‟s shares.1321 As 
mentioned above the Staleman v. Van de Ven case (1997)
1322
 is 
important in relation to claims by the company under article 2.9 DCC. It 
defines the test of “serious blame” or “serious personal culpability” 
(ernstig verwijt). 
 
 Messrs Staleman and Richelle were consecutive CEOs of the Van de Ven group of car 
sales and car rental companies. They had mismanaged the companies by making 
disadvantageous loans to Easy Rent at a rate of interest that was lower than the interest 
their own companies paid their bank (NMB, which is now part of ING). They let Easy 
Rent‟s debt run up too high and made many other lasting arrangements that were both 
chaotic and disadvantageous for the Van de Ven companies. In 1988 the general meeting 
had issued all the directors with a discharge from their obligations based on the accounts. 
However, the accounts were not clear on the loans to Easy Rent and their conditions. The 
Van de Ven companies held Staleman and Richelle liable for the losses of the companies 
(the equity had gone from NLG 2.3 million positive in 1988 to €5 million negative in 
1990). The companies also sued the supervisory board members for damages. The District 
Court dismissed the claim against the members of both the supervisory board and the 
management board, because they had all received a discharge from liability. Discharge is 
                                                     
1319 Prof. M. Kroeze, Afgeleide Schade and Afgeleide Actie, thesis (2004) (“Kroeze (2004)”). 
1320 Article 2:95 DCC. 
1321 Articles 2:98a/207a and 2:98d/207d DCC. 
1322 In the Staleman v. Van de Ven case, HR 10/1/1997, NJ 1997, 360 the Supreme Court defined the standard of 
liability under article 2.9 DCC as serious blame. Another case in which the company filed a claim against 
management board members and supervisory board members was Verto, The Hague Court of Appeal 
6/4/1999, JOR 1999/142. In this case both boards had been sloppy in an acquisition and Verto had lost a lot of 
money, but the Enterprise Chamber did not call this mismanagement and the courts did not hold any of the 
directors liable. 
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a typically Dutch company law concept. At the annual general meeting, after having 
discussed the accounts, shareholders are asked to give the directors a discharge from 
liability for their activities in the relevant year as disclosed in the accounts. After 
considering all the details and facts mentioned above, the Court of Appeal discerned a 
pattern of clearly disadvantageous arrangements with Easy Rent and concluded that all 
this added up to “serious blame”. Management board members Staleman and Richelle 
were therefore held liable to the Van de Ven companies. The case against the supervisory 
board member was not really pursued seriously by the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeal 
held that the discharge for the directors could not exculpate them, as the accounts made no 
mention of the arrangements with Easy Rent. 
 
 The Supreme Court upheld this judgment and ruled that serious blame depends on the 
circumstances of the case, e.g. the nature of the company‟s activities, the general risks, the 
division of tasks, the general guidelines for the board, the information they should have 
had, the insight and diligence that can be expected of a director and how he has complied 
with this. The Supreme Court is not allowed to recheck the facts, but it did hold that 
serious blame attached to the directors for the disadvantageous arrangements. 
 
 The term serious blame certainly suggests that directors are granted a 
degree of discretion and comes close to the Delaware business judgment 
rule. 
 
4.7.2.2 The shareholder 
 
 A breach of contract or a tort committed by a director may result in the 
admission of a claim for damages against the director by the company, 
but a claim made by the shareholders of that company will not be 
upheld.
1323
 The damage suffered by the shareholders as a result of such 
breach of contract or tort is generally derived from and coincides with the 
damage suffered by the company.
1324
 
 
                                                     
1323 Poot ABP, HR 2/12/1994, NJ 1995, 288. Mr Poot was managing director and 100% shareholder of Poot 
B.V., which had a project development contract with ABP, pension fund/investor. ABP withdrew from the 
contract. Poot B.V. went bankrupt and Mr Poot sued ABP in tort for his personal damages, i.e. the lost value of 
his shares in Poot B.V. The Supreme Court confirmed that as Poot B.V. was a separate entity it could make a 
claim, but not its shareholder Mr Poot. 
1324 An example is the NOM v. Willemsen case, HR 12/9/2008, JOR 2008, 297, where a director had requested a 
payment moratorium without the shareholders‟ consent, which was explicitly required by the articles of 
association. However, as Willemsen had consulted with NOM, the Supreme Court accepted his defence. 
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 Shareholders may hold the members of the management and supervisory 
boards liable for damage suffered as a result of misleading annual 
accounts. If the annual accounts, the interim figures published by the 
company or the annual report misrepresent the condition of the company, 
the management board members will be jointly and severally liable to 
third parties for any loss suffered by them as a result.
1325
 This is the only 
cause of action available to shareholders, but has not been much used to 
date. Class actions, which have been possible in the Netherlands since 
2005 as discussed below in 4.7.3.2, might increase the number of claims 
brought.
1326
 A management board member will not be liable if he proves 
that he is without blame.
1327
 
 
 A supervisory board member who proves that a misrepresentation of the 
condition of the company in the accounts is not due to any failure on his 
part to perform his supervisory duties will not be liable.
1328
 It is important 
to note that this exculpation would not apply to non-executive directors 
on a one-tier board. Once the case law on this point develops, it is likely 
that they would be exempted only if they prove they are without blame in 
their duties. Case law might make a distinction between executive and 
non-executive directors. 
 
4.7.2.3 Liquidator 
 
Liquidators may claim compensation for the entire deficit upon 
liquidation from each management board member on the basis of 
articles 2:138/248 DCC, and from supervisory board members on the 
basis of articles 2:149/259 DCC, if the board in question has performed 
its duties in a “manifestly improper way” (kennelijk onbehoorlijk) and 
this is likely to have been an important cause of the company‟s 
bankruptcy. This also applies to a “shadow director” (feitelijk 
bestuurder), i.e. a person who has acted as if he were a director. If the 
                                                     
1325 Article 2.139/249 DCC. 
1326 Jaap Winter, „Corporate governance handhaving in de VS, EU en Nederland‟, in  M.J. Kroeze, C.M. 
Harmsen, M.W. Josefus Jitta, L. Timmerman, J.B. Wezeman and P.M. van der Zanden (eds.), Verantwoording 
aan Hans Beckman (2006), p. 642 (“Winter (2006)”), a festschrift for Prof. Beckman. In practice, class actions 
have been brought against CEOs who have been unduly optimistic in their future projections, but such actions 
are normally based on general tort, article 2:162 DCC. A class action against Philips failed because the 
plaintiff used the wrong argument (unfair advertising). 
1327 Article 2.139/249 DCC. 
1328 Article 2.150/260 DCC. 
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accounting is insufficient or if the company has not filed its accounts with 
the trade register, the management board will be assumed to be liable.
1329
 
 
 Articles 2.138/248 DCC were introduced in 1987 as the so-called Third 
Insolvency Abuse Act. It was said that 10% of all bankruptcies were 
caused by fraud and often by fraudulent accounting. Initially, a liquidator 
always filed his claim against all members of both the management and 
supervisory boards because otherwise his claim would be regarded as 
inadmissible,
1330
 as articles 2.138/248 DCC provide that the entire board 
is liable. Later it became possible to choose and only file claims against a 
few specific directors.
1331
 Nonetheless, liquidators usually still file their 
claims against both full boards. 
 
 If there has been sloppy accounting and/or the accounts have not been 
filed there is an assumption that this is the cause of the bankruptcy. Poor 
accounting or failure to file in time are therefore very dangerous. 
Supervisory board members do not have to keep or file accounts 
themselves, but they can be held liable for the omission anyway.
1332
 In 
Bodam (1996) it was held that supervisory board members must take 
some form of action. Holding a shareholders‟ meeting was not enough. If 
a board member or shadow director proves that sloppy accounting or 
failure to fail accounts was not the cause of the bankruptcy, he will not be 
liable.  
 
 In Mefigro (2001)1333 the defendant argued that that the bankruptcy had not been caused 
by sloppy accounting or failure to file the accounts. Vlimeta B.V. traded in scrap metal. It 
was declared bankrupt in 1994. The liquidator sued W, one of the directors of Vlimeta 
B.V., who was registered as director in the trade register. The defendant argued he was 
not in fact a director and that an incorrect entry in the trade register did not make him a 
director for internal purposes (the liquidator being treated as an internal party). Although 
the District Court and Court of Appeal did not accept his argument, the Supreme Court 
did. Mefigro B.V. and its 100% shareholder Mr Mefigro had a different defence. They 
argued that neither Mr Mefigro nor Mefigro B.V. was a director, and that they were 
                                                     
1329 Article 2.138/248 DCC. 
1330 Van Haaften qq v. Timmer, Zwolle District Court 14/4/1993, TVVS 93/7, pp. 181-182. 
1331 Van Galen qq v. Bolasco, Rotterdam District Court 26/6/1997, JOR 1997, 140, Arnhem Court of Appeal, 6 
May 1997, JOR 197, 110, see J.B. Wezeman, Aansprakelijkheid Bestuurders, thesis (1998), pp. 325-326 
(“Wezeman (1998)”). 
1332 Bodam Jachtservice, HR 28/6/1996, NJ 1997/58, discussed in subsections 4.6.2 and 4.5.4. 
1333 Mefigro, HR 23/11/2001, NJ 2002, 95. 
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instead a shadow or de facto director of Vlimeta B.V. This argument was rejected by the 
District Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, which held that shadow or de facto 
directors can be held liable. However, Mr Mefigro and Mefigro B.V. were permitted by 
the Supreme Court to prove that they had not been shadow directors in the last 3 years 
before the bankruptcy (which is the time bar) or to prove or make clear that the 
bankruptcy was caused by reasons other than sloppy accounting and failing to file the 
accounts. 
 
 In Van Schilt  (2006)1334 the court accepted the defendant‟s argument that the bankruptcy 
had been caused not by sloppy accounting or failure to file the accounts but by the death 
of a director, the sudden departure of another director, damage to products and the 
termination of the bank‟s credit. This case also confirmed that where accounts are filed 
without an auditor‟s report, the filing is incomplete. However, it was accepted that there 
was evidence of other causes. 
 
 Another important case concerning the liability of management and 
supervisory board members was the Ceteco bankruptcy mentioned above 
at 4.5.18.
1335
 That was a case in which the company had pursued a risky 
strategy. The court found that this had been within the management 
board‟s discretion, but held that there had been a failure to heed red flags 
and to properly supervise the follow-up at a time when the company was 
overstretching itself. All members of the management and supervisory 
boards plus a shadow director/shareholder were held liable. 
 
4.7.2.4 Creditors and third parties 
 
Articles 6:194-196 DCC give creditors or other third parties the right to 
sue an individual director in tort. There are many examples of claims by 
creditors on the grounds of tort. Three important Supreme Court 
decisions are: 
 
 In Beklamel (1989) the Supreme Court confirmed that the criterion for director‟s liability 
was whether the director should have understood at the time of entering into a contract 
that the company would not be able to pay in the case of bankruptcy, see note 1204. 
 
 In Tax Collector v. Roelofsen (2006) 1336 the director had filed incorrect tax returns which 
resulted in lower tax payments than were due. After the company went bankrupt, it was 
                                                     
1334 Van Schilt, HR 20/11/2006, JOR 2006, 288. 
1335 Ceteco, District Court of Utrecht, 12 December 2007, JOR 2008, 66, see subsections 4.5.6 and 4.5.18 above. 
1336 Tax Collector v. Roelofsen, HR 2/12/2006, NJ 2006, 659. 
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found that there had been underpayment of taxes. The tax collector sued the director who 
had been responsible for the filing. The Supreme Court did not hold the director liable. 
The test in tort was that the director (i) understood at the time that the company would not 
be able to pay, which was not the case and (ii) there was serious personal blame (ernstig 
verwijt), which was not the case either. 
 
 In the case of Eurocommerce (2009)1337 the director of Kloosterbrink B.V., a company 
that owned shares in Vista B.V. had convinced another shareholder of Vista B.V., 
Eurocommerce B.V., to guarantee bank debts of Vista B.V. although the director in 
question could have known that Kloosterbrink B.V. was unable to discharge its 
obligations. He was held liable. 
 
 In certain circumstances third parties may have specific claims under the 
DCC, for example claims that an NV or BV does not exist, should exist 
or has no legal personality
1338
 or is incorrectly entered in the trade 
register,
1339
 and claims against founders who became directors for 
damages caused before the NV or BV obtained legal personality. During 
such a period, the NV or BV is said to be “in the course of formation” (in 
oprichting).
1340
 Shareholders or others who have rights of first refusal on 
shares can claim for damages or specific performance.
1341
 Finally, as 
mentioned above, third parties can claim for misrepresentation of 
accounts.
1342
 
 
4.7.2.5 Government authorities 
 
In the case of a corporate bankruptcy in the Netherlands, directors of the 
company can be held personally liable for various unpaid taxes and social 
security contributions under the second Insolvency Abuse Act.
1343
 The 
following authorities may sue such director(s): 
 
– the Tax Collector for taxes and national insurance premiums; 
– the industrial insurance boards for employees‟ insurance 
premiums; and 
                                                     
1337 Eurocommerce, HR 26/6/2009, NJ 2009, 148. 
1338 Article 2.4, 4 DCC. 
1339 Article 2.69/180, 2 DCC. 
1340 Article 2.93/203 DCC. 
1341 Article 2.98a/207a DCC. 
1342 Articles 2.139/249 and 2.158/260 DCC, see sub-section 4.7.2.2. 
1343 Tweede Misbruikwet as described clearly in Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), p. 586. 
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– the industry pension funds for pension contributions. 
 
 The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (Autoriteit 
Financiële Markten/AFM) can investigate matters such as insider trading, 
notification of financial holdings, prospectuses, offer documents and, 
especially, the annual accounts of listed companies and then take 
appropriate measures. 
 
4.7.2.6 Who can be sued? 
 
 Each individual member of the management and supervisory boards can 
be held liable. There is no legal necessity to sue the members of the board 
of directors collectively, as directors may individually have recourse 
against their fellow directors. Usually plaintiffs start by claiming that all 
the members of the management and supervisory boards are jointly and 
severally liable. 
 
4.7.2.7 Joint liability 
 
The management board has a general reporting obligation. This is a 
collective responsibility and suits the Dutch concept of a consensus-
seeking or collegiate board. Under such an obligation, each director is 
responsible for that part of company policy which falls within his specific 
remit as director. Moreover, each director has an obligation to the 
company to perform his general duties properly. 
 
 Under the present text of article 2:9 DCC, each director is responsible to 
the company for the proper performance of the duties assigned to him. If 
a matter falls within the remit of two or more directors, each will be 
jointly and severally liable for any shortcoming, unless he proves that it is 
not attributable to him and that he was not negligent in acting to prevent 
the consequences. 
 
 Another example of joint liability of directors under Dutch law is 
article 2:138/248 DCC, which states that in case of bankruptcy of a 
company, each director will be jointly and severally liable to the estate of 
the company for the total amount of the obligations and to the extent that 
these cannot be satisfied out of the liquidation of the other assets, but 
only if the management board has manifestly failed to perform its duties 
properly and this can reasonably be assumed to be an important cause of 
the bankruptcy. Improper accounting and failure to file accounts are 
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regarded as important causes, but exculpation is possible even then if the 
director proves there was in fact a different cause (see the Supreme Court 
cases described above in sub-section 4.7.2.5).  
 
 It is clear that individual directors can exculpate themselves in certain 
circumstances. If an individual director can prove that a shortcoming in 
the performance of the board, which may have caused damage to the 
company or a third party, cannot be attributed to him and/or that he 
properly tried to prevent this damage, such exculpation may be 
successful. Under article 2.149/259 DCC this applies to supervisory 
board members too. Misrepresentation of accounts can also be held 
against both management board members
1344
 and supervisory board 
members,
1345
 each subject to the possibility of exculpation.
1346
 
 
 In keeping with Dutch corporate culture, management board members 
tend to make decisions jointly, as a collegiate board. This results in joint 
and several liability, with the possibility of exculpation. 
 
 Some authors argue that less stress should be put on the issue of joint and 
several liability. Others would prefer only an individual liability and for 
wider possibilities of exculpation. They reason that directors should feel 
free to work as entrepreneurs and should not be constrained by an 
increase in the specialisation of functions on supervisory boards and non-
executive committees. Finally, there will be specialisation in the future 
one-tier board based on article 2.129a/239a, paragraph 3 DCC (Act), 
which states that directors can have specialised functions.
1347
 
 
 Professor J.B. Wezeman
1348
 has made three proposals: first, to change 
article 2.9 DCC and take away the joint and several liability (this would 
                                                     
1344 Article 2.139/249 DCC. 
1345 Article 2.150/260 DCC. 
1346 Dortmond (2005), p. 265 argues that a non-audit committee member should, in certain circumstances, be 
less liable than the Audit Committee chair. 
1347 Maarten Kroeze, Bange Bestuurders, oratie (2005), also translated in English, Frightened Directors, 
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=960315 (“Kroeze, Speech (2005)”), Strik (2010), pp. 127-144., Wezeman 
(2009/G), pp. 93-107 and B.F. Assink and M.J. Kroeze, „Ja, wij willen‟, Ondernemingsrecht 2010/6, pp. 246-
277 (“Assink and Kroeze (2010)”) in which they argue for a Dutch business judgment rule. See also Winter 
(2006) in festschrift for Beckman, who mainly worries about the class actions in misrepresentation cases and 
warns against derivative cases, Dortmond (2005), p. 265 and Wezeman (1998). 
1348 Wezeman (2009/G), pp. 100-106. 
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make each director liable only for his specific task and not for improper 
management by a colleague, although they would still all be liable for 
general management); second, to define the concept of liability more 
clearly and follow the Delaware business judgment rule as defended by 
Assink in his thesis of 2007;
1349
 and, third, to introduce more possibilities 
of indemnification by the company, based on the argument that as 
article 2.9 DCC is not mandatory for BVs there could be indemnification 
even if there was serious fault. Indemnification by the company means it 
holds the director harmless for claims of the company itself and of any 
third party. Finally he also notes the emergence of a trend in certain 
cases. First, Tax Collector v. Roelofsen of 2006,
1350
 where the tax returns 
filed by the director were too low and caused damage to the tax collector 
when the company went bankrupt. Second, Nutsbedrijf Westland of 
2007,
1351
 where the director had been dismissed because of incorrect 
accounting and the Supreme Court held that the serious blame test should 
also apply in tort cases. And, third, NOM v. Willemsen of 2005,
1352
 where 
the director had asked for a payment moratorium without seeking the 
consent of the shareholders, although he had consulted with NOM, an 
investment company belonging to the northern provinces. In all these 
cases the director was not held liable by the courts. Wezeman interprets 
this as an indication that the Supreme Court is moving towards the 
Delaware business judgment rule, without actually copying it. In all those 
cases the director had not acted against the interests of the company and 
was not seriously culpable. Nor was there any bad faith. I agree with him 
as regards the last aspect of convergence with the Delaware business 
judgment rule test for liability as such, provided there is no disloyalty, no 
serious blame and no bad faith. I will discuss the other aspects of 
exculpation and indemnification below. 
 
 Mrs Strik proposes that article 2.9 DCC be changed in such a way as to 
clarify the issue of exculpation. For example, whether a director who 
finds out about mismanagement by a fellow director should be liable only 
for damage arising from the moment he discovers the problem.
1353
 The 
changes she has suggested to the text of the new article 2.9 DCC as 
contained in the Act have not been introduced in the amendments to that 
                                                     
1349 Assink (2007). 
1350 Tax Collector v. Roelofsen, HR 8/12/2006, NJ 2006, 659. 
1351 Nutsbedrijf Westland, HR 2/3/2007, NJ 2007, 240. 
1352 NOM v. Willemsen, HR 20/6/2008, JOR 2008/260. 
1353 Strik (2010), pp. 235-255. 
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article for one-tier boards, but the courts might follow her and apply 
broader grounds for exculpation of directors in line with the decision of 
the Supreme Court in of Staleman v. Van de Ven and the circumstances it 
mentions. 
 
 The only possible criticism of the Supreme Court‟s decisions is that they 
only give criteria for what a director should not do, i.e. not incur serious 
blame. Directors and corporate lawyers would be grateful to know how 
much freedom directors have. More clarity could help directors to adopt a 
more confident approach to their entrepreneurship.
1354
 Another aspect is 
that the media and insurers like to exaggerate the liability risks and many 
risk-conscious lawyers are not very comforting either. This may be due to 
the fact that the law is not overly clear yet.
1355
 To make it clearer is easier 
said than done. It requires a large volume of clear case law and good 
information about the law on directors at the courses that they follow. By 
comparison, the Delaware business judgment rule and the UK 
literature
1356
 in a different way clearly state that directors who have 
seriously considered all aspects are free to take decisions as they see fit. 
 
 As to joint and several liability I would repeat that this is part of the 
Dutch corporate consensus-seeking or collegiate culture. It has the 
advantage that specialists on the board take the time to explain to the 
other directors, all of whom are responsible, what they do to perform 
their specialised duties. This stimulates internal communication and 
avoids compartmentalism. As regards exculpation, the Staleman v. Van 
de Ven case, the new text of article 2.9 DCC and the explanations of the 
Minister of Justice are starting to provide more clarity. This also applies 
to the position of non-executive directors in the proposed one-tier board. 
 
 Since the 1990s there has been debate about the exact text of article 2.9 
DCC and especially about the possibility of exculpation mentioned there. 
The words task (taak) and area of work, also called “scope of 
responsibility” (werkkring) have been at the centre of the debate, but 
there is general agreement that if one board member fails in his specific 
task, his colleagues can exculpate themselves if they prove that it was 
outside their specialism, that they did not fail to take action as soon as 
they should have discovered it and that they were not seriously 
                                                     
1354 Kroeze (2005), third reason, pp. 16-21. 
1355 Kroeze (2005), sixth reason, pp. 22-23. 
1356 Davies (2008), pp. 493 and 510; Mayo in Rushton (2008), p. 127. 
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culpable.
1357
 Few examples have been given in the whole debate and 
examples are indeed difficult to give. However, as soon as a director 
becomes aware of a failure that falls outside his remit he should take 
action to avoid or mitigate its effects. This implies that any examples 
given are usually based on a failure to give information or fraud by one 
director that remain concealed.
1358
 The explanation given by the Minister 
of Justice for the proposed article 2.9 DCC (Act) does give some 
examples of a separation of tasks: finance, purchasing, sales, directing a 
separate division, human resources, filing data with the trade register, 
filing of accounts.
1359
 The Minister adds that directors with separate tasks 
must inform other directors at the next meeting what they have done. 
This, again, reconfirms the concept of the collegiate Dutch board. How 
this information is to be provided from time to time could be specified in 
internal bye-law or even in the articles of association.
1360
 
 
 Another example could be that a certain task is allocated to a director. 
Another director then discovers a mistake made by the first director. In 
such circumstances, he must immediately inform the complete board and 
discuss what solutions are possible and perhaps ask for the appointment 
of an expert. If he has done this, exculpation would apply.
1361
 
 
 So much for exculpation. The essential point is that a director is not liable 
if he cannot be seriously blamed for a fault that has committed. This is a 
high threshold for liability. 
 
 Increasingly, supervisory board members receive letters from lawyers of 
shareholders threatening that if they take a certain decision they will be 
held liable. This makes it all the more important for there to be a clear 
understanding of the test of serious personal blame (ernstig verwijt), as 
described in the above decisions of the Supreme Court. Directors should 
                                                     
1357 Strik (2010), pp. 87-92; P.J. Dortmond, „Misbruik van rechtspersonen‟; Piercing Van Schilfgaarde (1990), 
pp. 17-22; Dortmond (1990); Dortmond (2000/A), pp. 67-71; Dortmond (2003), p. 118; Dumoulin (2005), 
point 3; Beckman (1994), pp. 54 and 115; Van Solinge and Nieuwe Weme (2009), no. 445; and Van 
Schilfgaarde and Winter (2009), no. 47. 
1358 Strik (2010), p. 101. 
1359 Strik (2010), p. 129 and Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 31763, nos. 3, p. 4, and 6, p. 5 (these include all 
the expanatory memoranda of reply and reports).  
1360 Strik (2010), p. 132 and Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 31763, nos. 3, p. 17, and 6, pp. 13 and 25 
1361 Beckman (1994), p. 115. 
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realize that courts give them entrepreneurial leeway that is fairly close to 
that of the Delaware business judgment rule.  
 
 The Gispen v. Coebergh case of 1999
1362
 was an example of joint and 
several liability and exculpation. The District Court made clear that in 
article 2.9 DCC cases the plaintiff has the onus of proving serious blame 
and that an individual director has the onus of proving he was not 
culpable if he wishes to exculpate himself. Here the whole management 
board knew and accepted that a director had recklessly concluded a 
contract that was grossly unfavourable to the company. The District 
Court ruled that this was so obviously wrong that none of the directors 
succeeded in exculpating themselves. However, in the same case a 
double payment made by one director without telling the other director 
was so specific to the area of work of the paying director that the other 
director could exculpate himself. 
 
4.7.3 Procedural complications 
 
4.7.3.1 No derivative actions 
 
Derivative actions, which are actions where shareholders take the 
initiative in having the company sue the directors, are possible in the UK 
and the US, as described above.
1363
 Derivative actions are not known 
under Dutch law.
1364
 A shareholder only has a cause of action against a 
director if the breach of contract or tort of the director affects the 
shareholder personally, i.e. where the act has been committed by the 
director with the intention of causing damage to that shareholder. 
 
4.7.3.2 Class actions  
 
 Under current Dutch civil law, a foundation or association can institute an 
action intended to protect the collective interests of a variety of persons. 
This “class” or “collective” action covers both actions in which the 
individual interests cannot be identified (general interest actions), and 
actions in which individual interests can be identified (group actions). 
The law aims to offer efficient and effective legal protection in cases 
                                                     
1362 Gispen v. Coebergh, Rotterdam District Court 17/6/1999, JOR 1999/244. 
1363 For the UK see subsection 2.7.3 and for the US see subsection 3.7.2.1.  
1364 There is debate about this. Prof. M. Kroeze gives arguments in favour of this in his thesis in Utrecht, Kroeze 
(2004) and Kroeze (2005); Winter (2006), p. 641 is not in favour. 
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where individual interests are small, but general interests are large. 
However, unlike the US “class action” procedure, the object of such an 
action cannot be to seek specific determination of monetary 
compensation. A claim should be limited to a declaratory judgment, that 
establishes whether or not there is liability. Collective action against 
corporations or directors can be initiated by shareholders or third parties 
who have suffered damage, for example as a result of a tort committed by 
directors. 
 
 Legislation to have settlements of mass damages declared universally 
binding by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal entered into force in 2005.
1365
 
Under this legislation, a foundation or association representing the 
injured parties must first negotiate with the defendant in an attempt to 
reach a settlement. The second phase entails an order declaring the 
collective settlement to be binding. This procedure starts with a joint 
request of the foundation or association and the liable party to the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal, a special section of which has exclusive 
jurisdiction in these procedures. The Court of Appeal must also decide 
upon a certain period during which an individual injured party may elect 
to be excluded from the collective settlement. The minimum duration of 
this so-called “opt-out” period is three months. Each individual injured 
party who has not explicitly informed the liable party within this term 
that he elects to be excluded is bound by the settlement. 
 
 The last phase covers the payment of compensation to the individual 
injured parties. Each injured party who has not exercised his right to opt 
out automatically becomes a party to the settlement by way of a third-
party clause and loses his right to institute separate proceedings. 
 
 International shareholder class action cases have been settled against 
companies under Dutch law. An example is the action against Royal 
Dutch Shell that had started in the US.
1366
 
                                                     
1365 Act of 2005: Collective Action (Financial Settlement) Act (Wet Collective Afwikkeling Massaschade) dealt 
with in the Code of Civil Procedure, articles 1013-1018, and articles 7.907-910 and 3:305a-d DCC. Together 
with article 2.139/150 DCC concerning misleading accounts, this creates a combination that resembles the 
threat posed by the US securities class actions. See also Ianika Tzankova and Daan Lunsingh Scheurleer, 
Annals, Aapss 1622, March 2009. 
1366 Financieele Dagblad, 3 March 2011, p. 11. The main cases are DES, Amsterdam Court of Appeal 1/7/2006, 
NJ 2006, 461, Dexia, Amsterdam Court of Appeal 25/1/2007, NJ 2007, 427, Vie d‟Or, Amsterdam Court of 
Appeal 29/4/2009, NJ 2009, 440 and Skele, Amsterdam Court of Appeal 29/5/2009, NJ 2009, 506. See also 
  
 465 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
 
4.7.3.3 Costs and fees in liability proceedings 
 
According to the rules of professional ethics of the Dutch Bar, Dutch 
lawyers may not, in principle, agree to a “no cure, no pay” arrangement. 
Contingency fees are therefore not applied under Dutch law. The former 
Minister of Justice, Mr Donner, who is presently Minister of the Interior, 
is against contingency fees because fee structures of this kind would 
promote more litigation. I agree. In this respect the US could learn from 
the Netherlands and the UK, where contingency fees are equally 
unenforceable.  
 
 In the Netherlands, orders for costs payable by the loser to the winner are 
based on a statutory scale, with fixed amounts for each stage of the 
proceedings. This results in lower compensation for costs than the winner 
has to pay to his lawyer. If the winner were awarded a more realistic 
amount for costs, as in the UK, this would provide a greater deterrent 
against frivolous cases. 
 
4.7.4 Aspects of liability: difference between supervisory board member and 
non-executive director  
 
This study has examined many different aspects of the various ways in 
which the management of companies is organised in the UK, the US and 
the Netherlands. Given the now pending choice between a two-tier and a 
one-tier board system in the Netherlands, there is a general worry that if 
supervisory board members become non-executive directors, they will be 
exposed to higher liability.
1367
 Non-executive directors of a one-tier board 
will not merely be a more active version of supervisory board members; 
instead, they will have a different role as managing directors 
(bestuurders). 
 
 Non-executive directors in a one-tier board are described in the Frijns 
Code in III.8, which mentions the possibility of a one-tier board. “The 
composition and functioning of a management board comprising both 
members having responsibility for the day-to-day running of the 
company (dagelijkse gang van zaken), i.e. the executive directors, and 
members not having such responsibility, i.e. the non-executive directors 
                                                                                                                                    
Tekst en Commentaar Rechtsvordering (vierde druk), p. 1335. 
1367 Wezeman (2009/G), pp. 93-99; Strik (2010), pp. 125-131; and Timmerman, Two-Tier (2009), p. 26. 
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shall be such that proper and independent supervision by the latter 
category of members is assured.”1368 
 
 Non-executive directors will not only supervise. They will have wider 
responsibility than supervisory board members, because they will not 
only monitor but also be involved in decision making and developing 
strategy. They will receive more information and receive it at an earlier 
stage. They will actively challenge management while it is developing 
strategy, risk management and CSR (as in the US), or even be actively 
involved in the development of these strategic items (as in the UK). This 
means that non-executives will have more chance to prevent mistakes 
and damage for the company and therefore avoid liability. The biggest 
problem for supervisory board members – and for the future non-
executive directors as well – is to get good information. Non-executive 
directors will be better placed to obtain that information than supervisory 
board members in the traditional two-tier board system. 
 
 Below are some quotes of the Minister of Justice in explaining the new 
Act: 
 “Non-executive directors must supervise the executive directors 
and each other. Executive directors must supervise each other 
and the non-executive directors.”1369 
 “All directors are jointly and severally liable even for specific 
tasks, subject to the possibility of exculpation.”1370 “Non-
executive directors participate in the development of decisions 
concerning the day-to-day running of the company.”1371 
 “The tasks of non-executive directors are wider than supervising 
and advising. They have management board responsibility. They 
are involved in strategy to a greater extent than supervisory board 
members. They must not only take action when they see 
mistakes; the directors in a unitary, „monistic‟ board have joint 
responsibility for board policy. They receive more information 
and receive it an earlier stage. As they should know of problems 
at an earlier stage, they are more likely to be held liable. Liability 
depends on the circumstances of the case.”1372 
                                                     
1368 Frijns Code Principle III.8. 
1369 Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 31763, no. 6, p. 26.  
1370 Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 31763, no 3, p. 8. 
1371 Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 31763, no. 3, pp. 8 and 14. 
1372 Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 31763, no. 3, pp. 4 and 6. 
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 Clearly, there is a convergence with the roles of UK NEDs and US 
independent directors. Executive directors run the day-to-day business 
and develop and monitor the general strategy. Non-executive directors 
are not involved in the day-to-day affairs of the company, but develop 
and monitor the general strategy. Although there is joint and several 
liability, a non-executive director may be exculpated where he has 
received less information than an executive director and because he 
understandably spends less time on the specific point than an executive 
(see Schedule B to the UK Combined Code of 2008). 
 
 It is understandable that potential non-executive directors could be 
concerned about increased liability because of (1) the extra role of being 
a general director (bestuurder) and (2) the uncertainty caused by variable 
standards of liability.
1373
  
 
 But is this concern justified? In my view not. First, it is important to note 
that in his reply of 2 May 2011 to questions of members of the Senate 
(upper house of parliament) the present Minister of Safety and Justice 
states on three occasions that liability will depend on the specific facts of 
the case, with a reference to the Staleman v. Van de Ven decision (in 
which a much more nuanced view is expressed and a factor is the 
description of the function), which is consistent with earlier comments of 
his predecessor.
1374
 Second, the Act on the one-tier board makes a clear 
distinction between executive and non-executive directors. Third, under 
the existing case law on the liability of management and supervisory 
board members, the latter have often been held liable in the same way as 
management board members, subject always to the proviso that they have 
incurred serious blame. As supervisory board members are already in 
many cases held liable together with management board members under 
the two-tier system, the concern that non-executive directors will have 
greater liability than supervisory board members is in practice not 
impending. 
 
 When managing directors are judged under the present two-tier system to 
have managed the company improperly and to have been seriously 
culpable, it is usually the case that the supervisory board has failed in 
                                                     
1373 Strik (2010), pp. 55, 74-75, 78 and 134  
1374 Parliamentary Papers II 2008/09, 31763, Memorandum of Reply to the Senate of 2 May 2011, pp. 5-6 and 
16. 
  
 468 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
some way in the performance of its supervisory role.
1375
 The same level 
of diligent supervision will be expected by the courts from the new non-
executive directors of a one-tier board. The difference, however, is that 
they will be better informed and can and should take earlier action to 
avoid default and damage. 
 
 I believe that my view is supported by the following case law: 
 
 1. Mismanagement 
  Mismanagement judgments by the Enterprise Chamber are never 
against specific directors but against the company. However, the 
Enterprise Chamber can naturally rule against a specific director 
or group of directors in the case of a tied vote or other deadlock 
in the running of the company, but in most cases of 
mismanagement the ruling is for or against the whole 
management board and supervisory board, albeit sometimes for 
different standards of conduct. I would mention the cases of 
OGEM, Landis, Bobel and De Vries Robbé, all of which were 
held by the Enterprise Chamber to have gone bankrupt because of 
mismanagement on the part of the directors of both boards. In 
Textlite and Laurus the supervisory board was regarded in a 
different light from the management board, but mainly for 
technical procedural reasons. In HBG, RNA, DSM, ABN AMRO 
and ASMI the Enterprise Chamber held that there had been 
mismanagement by the company and therefore by all members of 
both boards. The main point is that these rulings were relevant to 
the company and both of its boards. 
 2. Liability 
  In liability cases (Ceteco, Bodam, OGEM and Tilburgsche 
Hypotheek Bank) the supervisory board members are nearly 
always held to be liable when the management board members 
are also liable. 
 3. Standard of conduct 
  It is interesting to note that the standard of conduct for liability of 
supervisory board members is often slightly different from that 
                                                     
1375 Wezeman (2009/G), p. 105, who quotes the Tax Collector v. Roelofsen, Nutsbedrijf Westland and NOM v. 
Willemsen and Prof. M.J. Kroeze, inaugural lecture about “Frightened directors”, in which he repeats the 
words of two ministers of justice: Donner (1928) and Korthals Altes (1987) “Bonafide Directors have nothing 
to fear”. 
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for liability of management board members; this is attributable to 
the different nature of their functions: 
  – Tilburgsche: management: fraud 
    supervisory: failure to check the report they 
had ordered from the auditor  
  – OGEM: management: fraud 
    supervisory: entrenched, i.e. always 
slavishly following whatever 
the CEO wished, not even 
reading documents 
  – Bodam: management: no accounting or filing 
    supervisory: no action taken 
  – Ceteco: management: no action taken despite red 
flags 
    supervisory: no action on red flags 
 4. Let me now return to the straightforward case of Bodam. 
Management had failed to provide proper accounting and to file 
accounts and was liable. The supervisory board members were 
also liable as they had taken no remedial action after discovering 
the failures of management, such as dismissing the responsible 
director and fixing the accounting and filing. In the case of a one-
tier board system a non-executive director would be liable if he 
fails to inquire at the beginning of the year about how the 
company arranges its accounting and also fails to follow up on 
the answer. It is a question of timing and involvement. The same 
would apply to risk management systems.  
 
  The supervisory board member must be active if he discovers 
something, the non-executive director must be proactive. At first 
sight this would imply that the non-executive director has a 
greater risk of being held liable than the present supervisory 
board member, but because he is a member of the one and only 
board he will also receive full and timely information, thereby 
enabling him to minimise the risk. 
 
 I would like to repeat that although the possibility of a difference of 
liability between a supervisory board member and a non-executive 
director exists in theory because of the formal difference in their 
functions, this is less so in practice because (a) directors are not easily 
held liable owing to the far off threshold of serious blame, and (b) if 
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management board members are liable because it is so serious, the 
supervisory board members will usually be liable as well. 
 
4.7.5 Indemnification and insurance 
 
 (a) Indemnification 
  The possibility of having the company indemnify its directors is 
not mentioned in Dutch legislation. In practice, certain companies 
have included such a possibility in their articles of association. 
This is a practice that has been borrowed from the US.  
 
  It is generally assumed that indemnification is not possible where 
a director has breached article 2:9 DCC. Likewise, under article 
2:9 DCC and relevant case law, a director is liable towards the 
company only where there has been improper management 
(onbehoorlijk bestuur) on his part for which serious blame 
(ernstig verwijt) attaches to him. In other words, a director is not 
liable to the company and third parties for ordinary negligence, 
which is something that can be contractually excluded. It is 
questionable whether liability for an act involving greater 
culpability than ordinary negligence can be excluded by contract. 
On the other hand, a director will be able to rely on an 
indemnification where it covers legal defence costs for false 
claims.
1376
 
 
  Shell, Unilever and Philips have indemnification clauses for their 
directors in their articles of association.
1377
 
 
  Professor J.B. Wezeman suggests that more extensive 
indemnification should be possible in BV companies with the 
approval of a quorum of shareholders. This would be a further 
point of convergence with the US. It is also a subject for Dutch 
law studies to focus on, especially those that favour greater 
                                                     
1376 G.H. Potjewijd, „Vrijwaring voor bestuurders en commissarissen‟, Ondernemingsrecht 2003/16, p. 607 et 
seq. (“Potjewijd (2003)”), takes the view that indemnification for the results of gross negligence is possible; 
for more problems, see B.F. Assink and P.D. Olden, „Over bestuurdersaansprakelijkheid: De Reikwijdte van 
de maatstaf ernstig verwijt, vrijtekening en vrijwaring nader bezien‟, Ondernemingsrecht 2005/1, p. 9 et seq. 
(“Assink and Olden (2005)”). 
1377 Royal Dutch Shell Plc, article 136, Unilever N.V., article 19.10 and Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V., 
articles 17.4 and 23.2. 
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protection for directors. The Delaware exculpation clauses have 
helped directors in the US. 
 
  In view of the legal constraints on indemnification, D&O 
insurance is preferable. In particular, it should be noted that a 
director will have no recourse under an indemnity in the case of 
the company‟s bankruptcy. However, it can be to the advantage 
of directors to have both, given the limits on the insurance 
coverage, the possibility that an insurer may unjustifiably refuse 
to pay out under the policy, termination of the policy, failure to 
pay premiums and the possible insolvency of the insurer. 
 
 (b) Directors‟ and officers‟ insurance 
  US, UK and other insurance companies issue D&O policies in the 
Netherlands. In addition, a so-called BCA policy (“Bestuurders-
Commissarissen Aansprakelijkheids-verzekering” or Directors-
Supervisory board members Liability Insurance) has been set up 
by 11 large insurance companies in the Netherlands. 
 
  The company concerned is the policyholder and pays the 
insurance premiums. The insured persons are the present, former 
and future management board members and supervisory board 
members of the company. In view of the collective responsibility 
of the boards, the members of such a board can usually only be 
insured collectively. The territorial applicability of the coverage, 
the size of the company, the number of directors, the financial 
situation of the company, the number of exclusions and the 
insured amount are factors that will determine the premium to be 
paid. It should be noted that the premium paid by the company is 
deductible for corporate income tax purposes. The insured 
amount is the maximum amount to be paid by the insurance 
company per claim and per insurance year for the insured parties 
individually and collectively. 
 
  If the insurance company is notified of circumstances that could 
lead to a claim but no claim is actually made until after the policy 
expires, this claim too will be covered. 
 
  It should be noted that coverage provided under a policy is 
composed of the description of the insured interest, the 
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description of the insured parties and any inclusions and 
exclusions, all of this being read in its mutual context.  
 
  The coverage provided under the policy may be limited due to a 
large number of exclusions. Liabilities arising out of the 
accounting obligation and the obligation to file the company‟s 
annual accounts may be excluded from coverage. Liabilities 
resulting from the failure to notify or properly notify the 
competent authorities of the company‟s inability to pay taxes, 
social security premiums etc. under the Second Insolvency Abuse 
Act are also not covered. In accordance with the general rule of 
Dutch law, liability caused by an individual director‟s intent falls 
outside the scope of the insurance. 
 
  In the event of the company‟s bankruptcy, both the liquidator and 
the directors are entitled to buy extended coverage. During a 
period of three years starting from the date of bankruptcy, claims 
made against an insured party and filed within this period are 
covered if they are based on acts committed during the term of 
the original policy. An additional premium must then be paid. 
 
4.7.6 Summary of liability 
 
 In the Netherlands there have been only a few cases where a company has 
filed a claim against its directors. An example is Staleman v. Van de Ven, 
which describes many circumstances that are important for serious blame 
to be applicable, such as internal guidelines and description of functions. 
The shareholder has direct claim for tort, including misrepresentation of 
accounts. The recent Dutch class actions legislation could widen the 
circle of plaintiffs and causes. 
 
 The liquidator has a good chance of collecting amounts from the directors 
if there has been sloppy accounting or a failure to file accounts. Creditors 
can claim if a director, when entering into a contract, knew the company 
would not be able to pay, as in the Beklamel case. The Netherlands has a 
tradition of consensus-seeking or collegial boards that keep each other 
informed. In consequence, joint and several liability applies to all 
directors. Usually the management and supervisory boards are held liable 
together. In cases, where management board members are seriously 
culpable the supervisory board members are often deemed to have known 
unless they can show that the relevant default was not part of their task 
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and that they did not have to take any action. In such cases exculpation 
might be possible. 
 
 There is still concern that in a one-tier board system a non-executive 
director will be more readily held liable than a supervisory board 
member. This concern is exaggerated (a) because directors are liable only 
in cases of serious blame or obvious improper management and (b) in 
such cases not only non-executive directors but supervisory board 
members too should have known and taken action. The most recent reply 
of the Minister of Safety and Justice of 2 May 2011 reconfirms the 
importance of the Staleman v. Van de Ven doctrine, i.e. that courts should 
look at all the facts concerning a director‟s actions, including his job 
description. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Differences, changes, convergence, remaining differences, what can 
we learn from each other 
 
Since the 1990s substantial changes have taken place in the composition 
and roles of boards of listed companies in all three countries – UK, US 
and the Netherlands. Because these changes took place at varying times 
the differences in the direction taken have seemed larger than they in fact 
ended up to be. Now that the changes have made their mark – and it is an 
ongoing process – we notice a substantial convergence in the three 
countries. Because of different backgrounds some notable differences 
remain. 
 
 We also find that there are areas in which the three countries can come 
closer to each other through continued discussion about better corporate 
governance. For the Dutch, now able to choose between a two-tier and a 
one-tier board, the most important question is the practical improvements 
they can make to their way of functioning by cherry picking from the UK 
and US, even if a company chooses to keep a two-tier board structure. 
 
5.2 Boards before the 1980s 
 
 In all three countries up to the 1980s boards were led by strong managers, 
who in practice chose their outside or supervisory directors and used 
them as their trusted advisors. In all three countries shareholdings were 
spread out and there were hardly any shareholders with a substantial 
holding of shares, a situation which favoured managerial capitalism. 
 
 The main differences concerning corporate governance in the three 
countries can be expressed under the following captions: 
 
 Who? 
 In the US especially, and in the UK as well, there was an emphasis on the 
strong CEO/chairman, while the Netherlands favoured management by 
consensus. The cultural background of a greater hierarchy in the US and 
the UK and a lesser hierarchy and consensus boards in the Netherlands 
plays an important role here. 
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 How? 
 The UK and the US had one-tier boards, which meant that from a formal 
point of view all directors were involved in decisions, while the 
Netherlands had and has two-tier boards, where the managing board 
decides and the supervisory board is limited to consent or veto. This is an 
important cultural and practical difference. 
 
 For whom? 
 While in all three countries the board had the duty to act in the interest of 
the company, this was generally interpreted to imply that in the UK and 
the US the board acted in the interest of shareholders, while in the 
Netherlands it acted in the interest of stakeholders. The Netherlands had 
workers‟ participation rules which the UK and the US did not have. In the 
UK boards were not able to use legal defence mechanisms against hostile 
takeovers, while this was the practice in the US and the Netherlands. UK 
shareholders had the legal power to dismiss directors, while US and 
Dutch shareholders in practice did not have such power. These 
differences have been part of the culture of each country. 
 
 Who is held liable? 
 While in the US there was substantial litigation and a large market, the 
UK and the Netherlands were less litigation prone and relied on social 
control in a small market where most influential players knew each other. 
These are important cultural differences, caused by the large size of the 
US and its appreciation for fair trial, free speech and debate. In liability 
cases the Netherlands works with the concept of joint and several liability 
of directors, because boards are deemed to be collegial. In the UK and the 
US a liability claim is usually instigated against individual directors and 
the courts weigh the facts concerning each individual director. 
 
5.3 Changes at different moments 
 
 Corporate governance had been topical in the US in the 1970s and there 
were broad discussions about the need for truly independent directors and 
committee members, especially on audit committees, but in practice in 
most cases the imperial CEO was dominant in the choice and 
appointment of outside directors he trusted. 
 
 In 1992 the UK took the lead – upon instigation of leaders in the City and 
institutional investors supported by the government – with the 
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trendsetting Cadbury Code of Best Practices, which set aspirational 
standards and introduced the concept of “comply or explain”.  
 
 Who? And how?  
 The UK emphasized balance, (a) by separating the function of CEO from 
the task of chairman and, (b) in the area of Board functioning by 
underlining the important roles of creative strategy and monitoring by 
Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) who are in a small majority so as to 
form a balanced board. The Cadbury Code and all its successor codes 
emphasized all elements of early and on-site information of NEDs, 
formal discussion on succession by the complete board, intense work, 
evaluation, committees, etc. The best practice codes system in the UK led 
to changes in all these areas. 
 
 For whom? 
 The UK Companies Act of 2006 introduced the concept of “enlightened 
shareholder value” in section 172, which emphasizes that the board must 
have regard to all aspects, including elements such as employees, 
customers and the environment and promote the success of the company 
for the benefit of its members as a whole. 
 
 In the US the first changes came in 1994 at large companies, such as 
General Motors, instigated by shareholder activists like CalPERS, but 
these initiatives dwindled as soon as share prices moved up and the 
conviction took root that better governance could be achieved by giving 
directors options and shares. 
 
 In the US the real changes came after the Enron scandal and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. At that point the imperial CEO/chairman 
was still common. Since thenactivists fought for changes, which are 
continuing. 
 
 In the Netherlands, where boards are to act in the interest of the company, 
shareholders are able to wield more power since 2004, thanks to the 
Tabaksblat and Frijns Codes, the relaxation of the Structure Regime Act, 
the Enterprise Chamber jurisprudence and the substantial increase in 
foreign shareholders. 
 
 How? 
 In the US a counterbalance to strong management is achieved by a large 
majority of the board consisting of independent directors, where the only 
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officer on the board is the CEO. The roles of the independent directors 
include the task of co-deciding on strategy by intense challenging and 
monitoring. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, stock exchange regulations, 
privately developed best practice codes and court decisions emphasize 
personal independence of directors, due process in board meetings, 
independent advisors, and early and on-sight information, succession 
procedures, intense involvement of all directors, etc. There are “executive 
sessions” where the independent directors meet separately. The 
committees are composed of only independent directors and have quite 
stringent procedures to assure that directors can form their opinions 
independently and can freely ask advice of outside specialists if they wish 
to do so. 
 
 Who? 
 In the US already 30% of listed corporations have separated the functions 
of CEO and chairman; shareholder activists are urging other corporations 
to follow this trend. In the other 70% lead directors are becoming 
stronger. Modesty is becoming a more important characteristic for CEOs. 
 
 These changes in the US were slower to come than in the UK, because 
they were a result of long discussions between shareholder activists and 
CEO supporters, such as the Business Roundtable, while the federal rule 
makers have not really taken the initiative. They have since taken drastic 
action with the enactment of some measures in corporate law through the 
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Dodd-Frank Acts. 
 
 In the Netherlands there has been debate about defence mechanisms from 
1990 onwards. Litigation about corporate governance matters in the 
Enterprise Chamber became more frequent after 1995 with the 
introduction of the possibility of preliminary injunctions. In 1997 there 
was first the Peters Code; then came the Tabaksblat Code in 2004, which 
on many subjects followed the Cadbury Code for example by: 
 
 – Stressing more activity by supervisory directors in the 
Netherlands, such as evaluation, formal succession and separate 
board committees for auditing, nominating and remuneration; the 
Tabaksblat Code also mentioned the possibility of a one-tier 
board as an alternative to a two-tier board. 
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 – Directing the focus more on shareholders, as in the Relaxation of 
the Structure Regime Act of 2004, which gave shareholders more 
powers in several ways. 
 
 In all three countries the influence of institutional investors and activists 
have increased considerably over the last twenty years – first in the UK, 
then in the US and in the last 9 years in the Netherlands also with 75% 
foreigh shareholders – and direct communication between board and 
strategic and vocal investors has become a common feature. 
 
5.4 Convergence 
 
 With internationalisation, larger institutions and growing critical pressure 
of shareholders and with legal changes in the UK since 1992, the US 
since 2002 and the Netherlands since 2004, the board systems and roles 
of management and directors in these three countries are converging in 
many ways. 
 
 Who? CEO and chairman 
 Although this is not part of the consensus board culture of the 
Netherlands, the Dutch CEO has become stronger due to the 
centralization of conglomerates and stock market and media 
requirements, and the wishes of foreign investors. The UK and US CEOs 
have become less prominent because of the rise of a separate independent 
chairman, now the rule in most UK companies and increasingly so in the 
US. 
 
 The chairman in all three countries is increasingly playing a more 
important role, especially in the UK. In the US, and now also in the 
Netherlands the concept of the heavier-chairman and in the US of the 
lead director as well, is being promoted as a counterweight for the strong 
CEO. While UK chairmen are prominent and have direct contact with 
shareholders even in discussing strategy, the way the role of the chairman 
is developing in the Netherlands might show more similarities with the 
trend in the US. 
 
 Some questions will continue to be asked in the three jurisdictions. 
 
 Can a chairman, who spends so much time at the company, make sure 
that his colleagues on the board keep up with him so that he gets the best 
out of them?  
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 Should he have an office next to the CEO? 
 
 Should he communicate directly with shareholders and how and on what 
topics? In any case he should not discuss strategy with shareholders 
without the CEO being present. 
 
 How? Boards work! 
 The job of outside or supervisory directors is becoming more demanding 
in all three countries. They all spend more time on strategy; in the UK by 
developing strategy together with management, in the US by challenging 
management at the earliest stages of setting the course. Netherlands law 
assigns to supervisory directors the duty of monitoring, but there is a 
growing tendency of supervisory directors wanting to become involved in 
developing strategy. 
 
 All three countries have introduced active, hard working, board 
committees, which implies that they are all getting used to the fact that 
the board does not always meet as a whole, but board members often 
have separate meetings of only a few. There are differences in who 
attends and who is a member. In the US only independent directors attend 
committee meetings, while in the Netherlands supervisory directors are 
the only formal members, but executives will often attend. In the UK, as 
well, non-executives are members and executives attend on invitation. 
 
 The Dutch two-tier board in its practical functioning is getting closer to 
UK and US one-tier boards. The practice of hands-on, working 
supervisory directors and separate committee meetings make the Dutch 
speak of “one-and-a-half-tier” boards, while the US boards with their 
executive sessions, where independent directors meet without the CEO or 
any other officer, could also be called one-and-a-half-tier boards.  
 
 All three countries have introduced formal nomination and succession 
procedures in nomination committees at full board level. For the 
Netherlands this substantial difference with the old practice of CEO 
prompted nominations of the past is changing the oligarchic old-boy 
atmosphere at the top of the Dutch corporate governance world. There are 
still some minor differences, e.g. in the UK and the Netherlands the 
chairman usually chairs the nomination committee, while in the US it is 
usually a senior independent director who chairs the nomination 
committee. 
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 All elements of best practices, such as evaluation, diversity and early and 
on sight information, as well as more time required of non-executives 
which means less time for other functions receive a lot of attention in all 
three countries. The US is ahead on diversity because of its multicultural 
background tradition. The Dutch are behind in early and on site 
information, because of the two-tier board culture. 
 
 The US practice of executive sessions, where independent directors meet 
without the CEO or any other officer, is sometimes being followed by the 
Netherlands and occasionally in the UK. 
 
 For whom? 
 In all three countries boards are taking all factors and interests into 
consideration though in the end loyalty to the corporation prevails and 
especially to the long term shareholder interest, with elements of 
difference of nuance in each country. 
 
 As mentioned above there are many more institutional investors, more 
shareholder associations and activists, more foreign investors and hedge 
funds, but also more long term strategic investors. An increase in direct 
communication with these strategic long term investors permitted to a 
certain extent by the authorities – the UK FSA, the US SEC and the 
Dutch AFM – which have issued guidelines and letters in the form of 
questions and answers to assist participants in one-on-ones. 
 
 Who is liable? 
 In the US litigation on director liability continues at huge cost and time, 
but the Delaware courts persevere in producing leading opinions that give 
direction to aspirational best practices of directors by preaching the 
standards of liability and by giving judgments along the lines of the 
business judgment rule. 
 In the UK there is infrequent liability litigation, but the number of 
disqualification cases and criminal cases against directors is increasing. 
 
 The interpretation in Dutch jurisprudence of liability for serious blame 
(“ernstig verwijt”) in the district courts on the one hand and 
mismanagement in the Enterprise Chamber on the other hand is 
developing to a clearer set of tests. Certain law studies recommend 
following the direction of the tendency in the US and the UK to give 
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directors leeway in their entrepreneurship by a methodical thought 
process comparable with the business judgment rule. 
 
 In the US companies usually indemnify directors against liability in their 
articles of association. In the UK this happens to a lesser extent and even 
less so in the Netherlands, but they may follow. 
 
 Convergence is to be found in the D&O insurance policies, although 
premiums do differ. 
 
5.5 Remaining differences 
 
 Although there have been substantial changes for better corporate 
governance in the three countries and more and more convergence, there 
are still differences. 
 
 Who? 
 In the UK nearly all listed companies have a non-CEO chairman. The UK 
chairman is at the company offices 2 or 3 days a week; he is very 
prominent and speaks directly with shareholders. 
 In the US the non-CEO chairman is not yet the norm. At present about 
30% of the listed companies have a separate chairman. Two reasons for 
the slowness of the US in introducing the non-CEO chairman are the 
strong CEO lobby that opposes the development as well as the culture of 
having respect for the exceptional individual and of giving him a chance. 
In US practice, lead directors in the 70% of the listed companies that still 
have a CEO/chairman as well as separate non-CEO chairmen in the other 
companies, will continue to be less visible than chairmen in the UK. 
 The Netherlands, with its two-tier boards, has always separated the 
function of CEO and chairman, but because a strong CEO is only a recent 
phenomenon and not natural to Dutch culture, the role of the chairmen 
has still to be strengthened to give counterweight. 
 
 Regarding the position of the chairman the three countries are in different 
phases of development. The UK is 15 years ahead, as a leading example. 
It may be that because of tradition and culture US and Dutch chairmen 
will remain less prominent. Americans like young leaders and have 
respect for the successful individual. Delaware jurisprudence puts 
emphasis on the complete board and not just on one chairman leader. 
Furthermore, US development over the last 20 years has favoured the rise 
of even more strictly independent directors in a large majority as 
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counterweight rather than the emphasis on the non-CEO chairman or lead 
director. The Dutch culture of supervisory boards, limited to monitoring 
does not promote chairmen who are the public face of the company. But 
the Dutch will realize that if they want a strong supervisory board it needs 
a strong team leader.  
 
 How? 
 Although there is convergence in many elements of better corporate 
governance, such as committees, formal nomination and evaluation 
procedures, there remain differences between the three countries mainly 
in the organisation and composition of board, the degree of involvement 
in decision making, the role of the outside directors in strategy and in the 
way that the outside or supervisory board members receive information. 
 
  Composition and organisation 
  Difference in composition between UK and US 
  The main difference in composition between UK and US boards 
is that in the UK the typical board has around 4 executive 
directors, a chairman and a small majority of around 5 or 6 
NEDs. The UK seeks balance. 
 
  In the US the board has only one executive – the CEO – and 
about 7 independent directors. The US seek counter balance. 
Other executive officers than the CEO do attend board meetings, 
but have no vote.  
 
  Why is the one executive, the CEO, in the US outnumbered to the 
tune of 1:7, where in the UK the four executives are only facing 
five or six outsiders at the boardroom table? The reason is often 
sought in the difference of how companies were run in the past. 
In the US there was the tradition of the powerful CEO/chairman. 
The forces that wished to check the dangers of a dominating 
corporate leader thought it wise to surround him at board level 
with an overbearing majority of independent directors. In Britain 
team spirit is admired. Companies would also be run best by a 
team, so all top executives are on the board only slightly 
outnumbered by non-executives; they all form part of a team and 
the captain, i.e. the chairman, is not the head of management. 
Besides in the UK the full board is involved in running the 
business, so it makes sense to have all top executives on the 
board; in the US the board is more at a distance from day-to-day 
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management and looks at the big picture, where the views and 
advice of outsiders is useful and the views of management are 
sufficiently represented by its leader, especially if other officers 
attend the meeting. 
 
  Under the two-tier board system of the Netherlands, and its 
tradition of teamwork, there was no need for outnumbering. The 
board of management performed its tasks, the supervisory board 
monitored, but did not take part in decision making. They can 
only approve or veto decisions brought to the table. The fact that 
supervisory boards usually have more members than management 
boards is not a result of a need to create counterweights, but 
because the tasks of both boards are different. 
 
  In practice a Dutch combined meeting, of both supervisory and 
management boards, would resemble the meeting of a UK board, 
or to a lesser extent, the meeting of a US board to which all top 
officers have been invited, except for the different tasks and 
obligations of the various directors and executives present. 
 
  Hereunder follow the main differences between the Dutch two-
tier system on the one hand and the UK, US and Netherlands one-
tier system on the other. 
 
  Involved in decision making 
  In UK, US and the Netherlands one-tier boards all directors – 
executive and non-executive – are – that is the first main 
difference between a two- and a one-tier board –involved in 
decision making, including strategy and succession planning like 
US and UK boards and they – the executives and non-executives 
– will all have to monitor each other as a team. In a two-tier 
system supervisory directors are not involved in decision making. 
They only monitor. 
 
  Strategy 
  According to the law (DCC and jurisprudence) Dutch supervisory 
directors only monitor the strategy achievement. The DCC and 
the Frijns Code only mention achievement and do not mention 
strategy development. Supervisory board members are not 
involved in the development of strategy. This is the second main 
difference between a one-tier and a two-tier board.  
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  There is also a difference of nuance between US and UK boards 
in strategy development. In the US the officers develop strategy 
and independent directors actively challenge and discuss 
alternatives. In the UK the whole board, including the NEDs, 
develops strategy. The background of this difference of approach 
is that the US board is slightly less hands on. If a Dutch company 
chooses to have a one-tier board it can choose whether it wishes 
to follow the US or UK example. 
 
  Early and on site information 
  Under the two-tier board system Dutch supervisory directors are 
not involved in decision making. For this reason they receive 
information at a later stage than outside directors in UK and US 
companies do. UK and US outside directors have more on-sight 
information and direct information from lower staff and division 
heads. This is, again, a consequence of the difference between a 
one- and a two-tier board. If a Dutch company would opt for a 
one-tier board, the non-executives would also get early 
information. 
 
  Whether a company chooses for a one-tier board or keeps a two-
tier board I propose, as is mentioned in sub-section 4.5.5, that the 
board or boards have a special meeting once a year to discuss 
how supervisory or non-executive directors will have a role in 
strategy, development, which topics are included in strategy in 
any case, whether points of strategy will be discussed at most 
meetings, what the timing of providing information to outside 
directors will be, whether outside directors will receive on-site 
information and may communicate with middle management. My 
proposal will be worked out in detail in paragraph 5.6(b) 
hereafter. 
 
  Differences in the areas of evaluation and succession 
  When it comes to evaluation and succession planning the UK has 
developed rigorous and formal evaluation practices; discussion 
about succession is regular and formal. One tries to avoid 
“discussions in the corridor”. 
  The US have developed the practice for boards (in committees 
and the full board) to hold discussions about lower management 
succession and income. 
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  In the Netherlands the nomination committee limits its work to 
directors‟ nominations. The remuneration committee limits its 
work to director‟s remuneration. Most Dutch remuneration 
committees stick to this limitation. Since 2008 only at banks 
these committees are obliged by law to check the remuneration 
policies of lower management. Still all nomination committees 
limit their succession interest to directors only. 
 
  I propose that the boards meet at least once a year on the rigorous 
and wider discussion about succession internally, as mentioned 
above and in sub-section 4.5.17 on succession and in 5.6(b), four 
pages hereafter on page 414. 
 
  Differences in written confirmation of roles 
  It is UK practice to describe the roles of non-executives and some 
chairmen in great detail. This is a consequence of the common 
law system and the freedom of shareholders in the UK and the 
board in the US to organize the company as they wish. In the 
Netherlands this has not been the custom, because of the greater 
amount of mandatory law on companies in the detailed Dutch 
Civil Code. However, there are many good reasons, e.g. for clear 
criteria when it would come to exculpation grounds for directors, 
to describe such roles in internal regulations and appointment 
letters in the Netherlands as well. See UK chapter, p. 87. 
 
  Executive sessions 
  Executive sessions, where independent directors meet without 
any officers, before or after each board meeting are a US 
invention first put in practice in 1993 at General Motors. 
  This idea finds its roots in the US emphasis on independence and 
the frustration of US outside directors serving with overly 
influential CEO/chairmen. 
  The example of holding executive sessions before and after each 
board meeting could be followed in the UK and in the 
Netherlands (both in one- or two-tier boards). 
 
 For whom? 
 In the three jurisdictions the concepts of whom the directors are working 
for are converging as well. In all of the three countries there is now a 
greater outside pressure exercised by large shareholders, foreign 
shareholders, shareholder activists, voting advisers, environmentalists, 
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employees, government supervisors and the media. Boards should 
consider, and in the Netherlands in many cases consult with, all interested 
parties and then decide on the direction that should be taken for ensuring 
the interest of the company and its enterprise, with a light tendency to 
long-term shareholder interest, see Dutch chapter, sub-section 4.2.5. 
 
 There are slight differences in the possibilities to have one-on-one 
meetings between directors and selected shareholders. Board members 
have to communicate directly with strategic long-term “stewardship” 
investors. The differences stem on the one hand from the opposition 
between the easy going UK city “clubbyness” and on the other hand US 
stricter laws on shareholder equality and insider trading and lastly for the 
Netherlands the lack of experience in communicating with shareholders. 
UK, US and Dutch law makers have developed question and answer 
letters or guidelines to facilitate these direct selective communications or 
one-on-ones. 
 
 Who is liable? 
 The US has more litigation, more indemnification as well as higher D&O 
insurance premiums, all of which are a consequence of a sue at the drop 
of a hat mentality and a different legal system in every state. The more 
limited possibility of indemnification for directors in the UK and the 
Netherlands lies in the law.  
 
 The UK has very few liability cases, because of the rule that the losing 
party pays all the costs of the winner and because of the absence of no 
cure no pay or large percentage of gain fee arrangements and a limited 
possibility of derivative actions; furthermore it is simply not part of 
British culture. 
 
 The Netherlands‟ concept of joint and several liability is opposed to UK 
and US practice, where liability cases are directed at individual directors. 
 
 A vital question is whether the decision of a Dutch company to opt for a 
one-tier board would increase the liability of outside non-executive 
directors, above that of the present supervisory board member directors. 
In theory the answer is yes: more liability, because the Dutch have the 
concept of joint and several liability of directors and, from a formal point 
of view, managing directors, including every director on a one-tier board 
are more likely to be held liable than supervisory directors, as they have 
different functions. In practice the answer is no, because the Supreme 
  
 487 
 
90002176 P 1281320 / 2   
Court has decided in Staleman v. Van de Ven that liability is not a dogma, 
but is based on specific circumstances, including assigned functions and 
internal regulations and depends on the role of each director in a specific 
case. And also the answer is no, because supervisory directors do at 
present seldom avoid liability in the rare cases that managing directors 
are found liable. See cases like Tilburgsche Hypotheek Bank, OGEM, 
Bodam and Ceteco, where managing and supervisory directos were liable, 
because of serious blame. Managing directors are only liable in cases of 
serious default. In those cases even supervisory directors should have 
been aware of the problems and have taken action. It is to be hoped and 
expected that Dutch jurisprudence will accept scope for entrepreneurial 
judgment of directors in good faith and accept exculpation in such cases 
for non-executive directors, keeping in view the difference between 
inside and outside directors as the US and UK courts do; compare section 
1157 of the Companies Act mentioned in sub-section 2.6.6, which gives 
the judge a mitigation right in connection with the function. The Dutch 
Parliamentary Papers to the Act refer to the Staleman v. Van de Ven case 
and seems to support the hope for different treatment of non-executive 
directors depending on the circumstances of the case and the assigned 
functions. 
 
5.6 What should the Dutch take over from the UK and the US; cherry 
picking 
 
 When studying UK and US corporate governance the Dutch should keep 
an open eye for examples and instances for possibly following whether or 
not they opt for a one-tier board or stay with a two-tier board. 
 
 Who? CEO/chairman 
 I believe that the Dutch should foster a climate which favours a stronger 
and active team leader as chairman, both for the present supervisory 
board and the future optional one-tier board. One possible model is that 
of the strong, hands-on UK chairman. Another, the US example of a 
chairman with a lower profile. The choice will determine the answers to 
questions; should the chairman have direct contact with selected 
shareholders? And if so, should he only meet them together with the 
CEO? How can an active chairman keep his co-directors motivated and 
have them keep up with him? Taking the Dutch corporate tradition into 
consideration, a chairman with an inclination to the US lead director or a 
non-CEO chairman seems more likely to succeed. For instance, meetings 
with shareholders in the UK are regularly attended by the chairman (see 
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2.5.7) without the presence of any executive, while in the US non-CEO 
chairmen or lead directors rarely meet with shareholders and if they do, 
they are accompanied by an executive or at least the general counsel (see 
3.5.5). 
 
 In any case it is a good idea to confirm clearly in writing what the role of 
the chairman should be and how he relates to the CEO and other 
directors. This is important in a two-tier board but even more so in a one-
tier board, because the Civil Code leaves many points open. A clear 
description and distribution of the functions of board members is 
important from a liability point of view as well, as became clear in the 
Supreme Court decision in Staleman v. Van de Ven which indicated that a 
description of functions in internal regulations were going to be a factor 
for the courts in their judgments. 
 
 In the area of proper communication and behaviour it is important to keep 
in mind that the CEO and the chairman should share their thoughts and be 
open on the dilemmas between each other and the other directors. 
 
 Another point is that, if there is any lingering disagreement between two 
or more directors on either of the boards, this should be known to all 
directors and sorted out. In my view, there is more chance of outside 
directors finding out about such internal disagreement in a one-tier than 
in a two-tier board. 
 
 How? 
 Involvement in decisions, strategy, information 
 When looking at the UK and US practice, two points spring to attention: 
outside director involvement in strategy development, see sub-sections 
2.5.3, 2.5.4, 2.5.5, 2.5.11, 3.5.3, 3.5.6 and 3.5.9 and early and on-site 
information, see sub-sections 2.5.8, 3.5.6 and 3.5.9. 
 
 The practice of early and on-site information includes direct access to 
lower staff. This can be laid down in an agreement among the directors, 
dealing with all the points to be discussed regularly also. 
 
 There is sometimes a misunderstanding about the independence of 
supervisory directors and their receiving limited and late information. 
Many Dutch CEOs and supervisory directors say that the value of the 
Dutch supervisory board lies in the fact that it is clearly and formally 
independent and should therefore not become involved in too many 
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details of the business. I do not agree with this argument. Every director 
should be independent and courageous of mind, have a straight back, in 
Dutch “rechte rug”, but should at the same time be fully informed and 
involved. Substance should be over form, see sub-sections 2.4.7 and 
3.4.9. 
 
 The Dutch can benefit from the US argument and practice to have 
directors who really understand the business of the company and have 
early on-site information and training. 
 
 There are better arguments in favour of a supervisory board and two-tier 
boards, which are to be found in Dutch corporate culture, described in 
sub-section 4.1.5 and sub-section 4.1.6(c) above. The Dutch had 
independent, supervisory, persons to support the managers with an eye 
for other interests in a more distant role all through the corporate history 
of the Netherlands. 
 
 But, even if one would stick to two-tier boards, improvements can be 
made. Full outside director involvement in strategy should serve as an 
example for the Dutch to follow, either as is practiced in the US (intense 
challenging, see sub-section 3.5.3) or in the UK (involvement in strategy 
development, see sub-section 2.5.5) as well as early information. There is 
no legal obstacle for supervisory directors in a two-tier board to become 
more involved with the strategy of the business as long as they do not 
take over the tasks allotted to management. Dutch law gives management 
the task to decide on "beleid", strategy, but I do not see why the two 
boards – the management board and the supervisory board – could not 
agree that the supervisory directors be informed at an early stage about 
strategy developments and are allowed to think along and co-pilot with 
management. This, of course, would require that both boards deal with 
each other tactfully and with respect for each other's duties. Such an 
arrangement would result in what is often called a one-and-a-half tier 
board. Further involvement on strategy should be a regular agenda item 
for board meetings. 
 
 The UK and US system, where the whole board decides, i.e. outside 
directors are involved in decision making, as opposed to the Dutch 
system where the management board decides and supervisory directors 
are not involved in decision making but only monitor, is the main 
difference between the nature of board activities in those two countries 
and the Netherlands. Whether outside directors are involved in decision 
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making is also the main difference between the one- and two-tier board. 
However, it is imaginable to have a two-tier board, where it is agreed by 
the boards that the supervisory directors should have a substantial 
involvement.  
 
 I propose that the Monitoring Committee would make the following 
amendment to the Frijns Code as mentioned in sub-section 4.5.5: 
 II.1 “The management board has the entrepreneurial leadership 
indeveloping and achieving the aims, the strategy, the risk profile 
and CSR”; 
 III.1.1 Add a second sentence: “The supervisory and management 
boards will deliberate with each other at least once a year to 
adopt a procedure: 
  – for the provision of timely and relevant information to be 
given to the supervisory board; and  
  – for the possibility for supervisory directors to talk with lower 
management and visit premises of the enterprise; and  
  they will establish a timetable for regular meetings between the 
two boards in which entrepreneurial strategy, risk management 
and CSR are discussed; and  
  they will settle what the role of the supervisory directors will be 
in those discussions, and the ways and means of their functioning 
with each other.  
  If there is a one-tier board the whole board should hold these 
annual deliberations.”  
 Alternatively this text could be added to III.1.8 or III.1.9. 
 
 While in meetings of the supervisory board with the management board 
in many Dutch companies 90% of the time is spent on presentations with 
slides by management, more time should in my view be reserved for open 
discussion with and by all directors. 
 
 In my view an annual discussion about the involvement of supervisory 
directors as proposed above will be a step in the direction and will bring 
more involvement of supervisory directors in the development of strategy 
of the company in a one-and-a-half-tier board. I believe that such a step 
will ease the way for an eventual, later, change to a one-tier board. I 
favour step by step change of culture over abrupt change. 
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 Executive sessions 
 The US example of executive sessions of independent directors only, 
before or after each board meeting, is a good example to follow, both in a 
one- and a two-tier board. It can be an institutionalized pre-meeting of all 
non-executive directors or supervisory directors, thus getting away from 
informal pre-meetings of 2 or 3 directors. The advantages of having 
regular executive sessions before or after each board meeting is that all 
outside directors speak up and that the fact that an executive session is 
scheduled regularly does not alarm the executive officers, see sub-section 
3.4.7.  
 
 Evaluation and succession 
 The UK practice of formal and regular meetings on evaluation and 
succession is a good example, see sub-section 2.5.9, as is the US practice 
to include succession and compensation of lower management in the 
board and committee discussion, see sub-section 3.5.7. 
 
 I propose that the Monitoring Committee would add the following text to 
III.2 of the Frijns Code, as mentioned in sub-section 4.5.17: “The 
supervisory and management boards will deliberate with each other at 
least once a year about the ways and means of discussion, the frequency 
and timing of the evaluation and succession of the supervisory and 
management board members and about the desirability and, if so, the 
frequency, to ask outside advisers to assist in this process, as well as 
about the terms of office of all the directors, and which middle 
management persons should fall under the evaluation and succession 
process. If there is a one-tier board, the complete board should hold these 
annual deliberations.” 
 
 Company Secretary 
 The UK example of a senior and independent person as company 
secretary who is the conscience of the company and mainly supports the 
Chairman and the outside directors is worthwhile to keep in mind for 
Dutch companies. See sub-section 4.4.3. 
 
 Dutch example: co-pilot model 
 The co-pilot model, where the chief financial officer – “from number 
cruncher to co-pilot” – and other managing directors give counterbalance 
to the CEO on an equal level fits well in the Dutch culture of a consensus 
board and could be considered in other countries, where hierarchy is 
decreasing. See sub-section 4.5.2. 
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 For whom? 
 The Dutch concept of “the interest in the company” as taking into 
account the interest of all stakeholders, but with a more important place 
for the long-term interest of shareholder value described above in sub-
section 4.2.5, also underlies the UK section 172 of the Companies Act of 
2006 mentioned in sub-section 5.3 and sub-section 2.6.3 and US literature 
and jurisprudence. At this stage the Dutch are slightly more a 
“stakeholder model” and the US and UK slightly more shareholder 
oriented. Dutch boards will continue to weigh all interests, but can 
improve on communication with long term shareholders. 
 
 The UK and US examples of shareholder one-to-one or one-on-one 
communication with stewardship shareholders are in my view useful, 
with due consideration of equality of shareholder rules and insider trading 
regulations, especially paying attention to the manner of conducting such 
meetings and the art of sounding out shareholders. The Dutch should 
emulate the British habit of listening quietly, without reacting, see sub-
sections 2.5.7(viii) and 4.2.5. 
 
 Litigation and liability 
 Every country has its litigation culture which is difficult to change. 
 Dutch lawyers study the Delaware cases and some argue that the business 
judgment rule is a good example. The Social Economic Council (SER) 
has noted that a strong point of the business judgment rule is that it brings 
judges to motivate their decisions according to several criteria. The 
Enterprise Chamber is giving more leeway to entrepreneurial decisions. 
There is hope that jurisprudence on non-executive directors‟ liability will 
develop in the direction of leeway for entrepreneurial decisions, taking 
into account that there is an argument for less liability of outside directors 
than inside directors in some fact specific cases. The Dutch Staleman v. 
Van de Ven case has pointed in the same direction and mentions that 
factors for liability are the division of tasks and internal directors‟ 
guidelines and the Parliamentary Papers of the Minister of Justice have 
repeatedly referred to this case. It is for this reason that it is advisable to 
have clear internal directors‟ guidelines and descriptions of divisions of 
tasks. See the last sentences of sub-section 4.6.1 and sub-section 4.6.2. 
 Indemnification of directors by the company should be expanded in the 
Netherlands. 
 Insurance policies are already similar to the UK and the US. Apparently 
there is no difference in premium in the Netherlands between a one- and a 
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two-tier board. Premiums in the UK are higher, and in the US much 
higher, than in the Netherlands. 
 
5.7 One-tier boards should also be possible for financial institutions 
 
 I propose to change article 3.19 of the Act on Financial Supervision (Wft) 
in the sense that there is a requirement for financial institutions to have at 
least 3 supervisory directors or 3 non-executive directors, see 4.4.2.4 
above. 
 
5.8 Pros and ons of a one-tier board 
 
 The main advantage of a two-tier board with supervisory directors for the 
Dutch is that they are used to it. This is part of their culture. One should 
be cautious not to change traditions abruptly. 
 
 A possible argument to stay with two-tier boards is that supervisory 
directors are held to a lighter degree of liability than if they were to 
become non-executive directors in a one-tier board. This argument is not 
supported by trends in case law. 
 
 Advantages of a one-tier board are more involvement of non-executive 
directors in strategy development and in decision making, giving them 
greater influence and more added value, also because they get earlier and 
on-sight information and therefore more knowledge about the business. 
They have a better feel for dilemmas and internal disagreement of 
management. They can furthermore be involved in the evaluation and 
succession of a wider group of management. All these advantages can by 
internal agreement be introduced in a two-tier board, which then tends to 
act as a so-called one-an-a-half-tier board. In a later stage the next step 
can be a one-tier board. 
 
5.9 One-tier board alternative inspiration for further discussion 
 
I hope that the Act introducing the alternative of a one-tier board will be 
an occasion for boards of Dutch companies to internally review their 
practice of corporate governance regularly and to find criteria how to test 
the way they operate and how to introduce improvements for what they 
find lacking and to strenghten what they find is working well. Often, an 
alternative helps to rethink current practice. Looking at foreign practices 
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can equally inspire appreciation of the strenghts of the current system and 
thoughts as to improvements. 
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6. ANNEXES 
6.1 Annex Summary in English 
 
 
Subject of the study and why 
This study investigates the one-tier board system. The reason for this 
inquiry is the introduction of the One-Tier Board Act, which was finally 
enacted on 6 June 2011 and which will probably become effective on 
1 January 2012. This Act gives the option for NVs and BVs to organize 
themselves with a one-tier board as alternative to the traditional Dutch 
two-tier board system with a management board and a supervisory board. 
This alternative governance system is being adopted to facilitate foreign 
investors. 
 
Looking over the borders is an effective way to accumulate ideas about 
better board practice. I have chosen for the comparison of the UK, the US 
and the Netherlands, because UK and US investors directly or indirectly 
own more than 50% of the Netherlands listed shares and because a lot of 
thought has been given to corporate governance in these two countries. 
 
How 
This study has five chapters: 
1. Introduction 
2. United Kingdom 
3. United States 
4. The Netherlands and 
5. Conclusion 
 
Each of the country chapters are composed of sections 1 – history and 
culture, 2 – who owns the shares, 3 – acts and informal codes, 4 – 
composition of boards, 5 – role of directors, 6 – duties and 7 – liability of 
directors. Each time the sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 are concluded by a 
summary. 
 
Within the Netherlands' chapter there is also a comparison between the 
one- and two-tier board systems. 
 
Findings 
The history and culture of board systems is different in each country. 
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The UK has since the East India Company of 1600 had companies where 
the shareholders were powerful. British directors like to be pragmatic and 
creative and to be active in developing strategy of the company. 
 
The US directors are used to free entrepreneurial activity. They are 
individualistic and assertive and give power to a strong CEO, who is in 
the majority of companies at the same time chairman.  
 
The Netherlands has through its history developed a collegial non-
hierarchical board system without strong CEOs or chairmen. This also 
entails a principle of joint responsibility for all directors. Through four 
centuries of corporate activities a system developed of managers and a 
separate body of supervisory directors who are at a distance and only 
monitor directors. 
 
In the last 20 years there has been a strong development in corporate 
governance practice. From 1977 the word corporate governance was used 
in the US where audit committees were developed. In 1992 the British 
developed the Cadbury Code of Best Practices with the "comply or 
explain" rule. This Code was followed and partly copied by many of 
these Codes in other countries. In 1992 shareholder activists initiated 
changes in the US, but after Enron the real development started in 2002. 
In the Netherlands, after the Peters Code of 1997, big changes came 
about in 2004 with the Tabaksblat Code. These changes provide for a 
convergence to a certain extent. 
 
While it is by now a joint characteristic of the three countries that the 
shareholdings of listed companies are spread out, there has been 
substantial change in the shareholdings in the last 30 years. In the 1970s 
UK investment institutions obtained important positions as large 
shareholders. The same happened in the 1980s in the US and from the 
1990s in the Netherlands. The Dutch went through another drastic change 
after 2000 with a growth to 75% foreign shareholders. 
 
The composition of the boards differ, while the number of people in the 
boardroom is about the same. 
UK: 4 executive directors, 1 chairman, 5 NEDs (non-executive 
directors) 
US: 1 CEO/chairman, 1 lead director, 5 independent directors, 
3 officers (not board members but in the room) 
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NL: two-tier: 4 managing directors, 6 supervisory directors 
 one-tier: 4 executive directors, 6 non-executive directors. 
They all have company secretaries, of which the UK ones have the 
strongest stature. 
 
The role of the outside directors differs. UK NEDs are active in the 
development of strategy, see sub-section 2.5.5. US independent directors 
actively challenge and debate the strategy, see sub-section 3.5.3. UK 
chairmen are strong, see sub-section 2.5.7. US lead directors or non-CEO 
chairmen are less powerful. 
 
Dutch supervisory directors are, save with some exceptions, not intensely 
involved in developing strategy or in decision making. The management 
board does that and supervisory board members are limited to monitor 
and have a veto on certain decisions. This means that Dutch supervisory 
board members do not get early information or on-site information and do 
not speak with lower management, as UK, US directors and Dutch one-
tier board non-executive directors do. 
 
Duties are converging. The UK enlightened shareholder value embodied 
in section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 is of interest, because of due 
consideration of all stakeholders as is the Dutch literature and 
jurisprudence on interest of the company and the attention for the 
shareholders' interest, see sub-section 4.2.5. 
 
The litigation scenes in the three countries differ, with a lot of activity in 
the US, where the loser does not have to reimburse the winner and where 
directors can rely on the business judgment rule which is clearly 
developed in the Delaware chancery courts, on indemnification and D&O 
insurance. The UK, where the loser must pay the winner for all costs, has 
rare liability cases, but more disqualifications. The Netherlands has 
enterprise inquiry cases for mismanagement and measures in companies 
and a separate route to the district courts for liability cases. In each 
country there is different recognition in various degrees for the 
differences in functions. See section 1157 Companies Act 2006 and the 
Dutch Staleman v. Van de Ven case. 
 
Conclusion and proposals 
Examples that can be followed and proposals for the practice of two-tier 
and one-tier boards are: 
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– more active supervisory directors led by a stronger chairman and 
supported by an independent company secretary; 
– more involvement in decision making and strategy and providing 
ofinformation for supervisory directors; 
 – more executive sessions; 
 – one-on-one meetings of the CEO and other executives, 
sometimes accompanied by the chairman, with selected long-
term shareholders; 
 – confirmation of the role of each director in writing. 
 
 Furthermore I have the following proposals: 
– I propose that the Monitoring Committee would make the 
following amendment in the Frijns Code as mentioned in sub-
section 4.5.5: 
  II.1 “The management board has the entrepreneurial 
leadership in developing and achieving the aims, the 
strategy, the risk profile and CSR”; 
  III.1.1 Add a second sentence: “The supervisory and 
management boards will deliberate with each other at 
least once a year to adopt a procedure: 
   – for the provision of timely and relevant information 
to be given to the supervisory board; and  
   – for the possibility for supervisory directors to talk 
with lower management and to visit premises of the 
enterprise; and  
   they will establish a timetable for regular meetings 
between the two boards in which entrepreneurial strategy, 
risk management and CSR are discussed; and  
   they will settle what the role of the supervisory directors 
will be in those discussions as well as the ways and 
means of their functioning with each other.  
   If there is a one-tier board the whole board should hold 
these annual deliberations.”  
  Alternatively this text could be added to III.1.8 or III.1.9; 
 
  Because supervisory directors according to Dutch law only 
monitor and do not decide, this practical way of working together 
can require tact from both managing and supervisory directors; 
 – I propose that the Monitoring Committee would add the 
following text to III.2 of the Frijns Code, as mentioned in sub-
section 4.5.17:  
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  “The supervisory and management boards will deliberate with 
each other at least once a year about the ways and means of 
discussion, the frequency and timing of the evaluation and 
succession of the supervisory and management board members 
and about the desirability and, if so, the frequency, to ask outside 
advisers to assist in this process, as well as about the terms of 
office of all the directors, and which middle management persons 
should fall under the evaluation and succession process. If there 
is a one-tier board, the complete board should hold these annual 
deliberations.” 
 – For one-tier boards I have the same proposals for these annual 
deliberations on process; 
 – I also propose that article 3.19 Wft should be changed so that 
banks and insurance companies can have a one-tier board. 
 
 In considering the pros and cons of a one-tier board, one sees that the 
good one-tier boards have a system where outside board members get 
earlier and better information and are involved in decision making and 
strategy development and know more about the business and its 
managers, but it still is useful to have the annual deliberation about 
process. 
 
 The pro of a two-tier board is that the independent supervisory board is 
part of the Dutch board culture, which implies that all directors know 
their role.  
 
 I propose as possibility to first change the activity and process of the 
boards and then, when the roles have changed, to consider to change to a 
one-tier board. 
 
 The One-Tier Board Act is important to spark the discussion about 
improvement of process and activity of outside directors and can with a 
good preparation be a good alternative board model. 
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6.2 Annex Samenvatting in het Nederlands 
 
 
De one-tier board in de veranderende en convergerende wereld van 
corporate governance. 
Een vergelijkende studie van besturen in het VK, de VS en Nederland 
 
 
Onderzoeksvraag en waarom 
 
Dit is een onderzoek naar de one-tier board (monistisch bestuur). De aanleiding 
voor dit onderzoek is de invoering van de wet betreffende wijziging van bestuur 
en toezicht, kort gezegd de One-Tier Board Wet, die uiteindelijk is aangenomen 
op 6 juni 2011 en waarschijnlijk van kracht zal worden op 1 januari 2012. Deze 
wet geeft de keuze aan NVs en BVs om haar bestuur te organiseren in een 
one-tier board (met uitvoerende en niet-uitvoerende bestuurders), als alternatief 
voor de traditionele Nederlandse two-tier board (met een directie en een raad van 
commissarissen). Dit alternatieve bestuursmodel wordt ingevoerd om 
buitenlandse investeerders te faciliteren. 
 
Over de grenzen kijken is een effectieve manier om nieuwe ideeën te verzamelen 
voor beter bestuur. Ik heb gekozen voor de vergelijking tussen het VK, de VS en 
Nederland, omdat Britse en Amerikaanse investeerders direct of indirect 
ongeveer 50% van de Nederlandse genoteerde aandelen houden en omdat er in 
deze twee landen veel is nagedacht over corporate governance. 
 
Hoe 
Dit onderzoek heeft vijf hoofdstukken: 
 
1. Inleiding 
2. Verenigd Koninkrijk 
3. Verenigde Staten 
4. Nederland en 
5. Conclusie. 
 
Elk van de landenhoofdstukken bevatten onderdelen 1 – geschiedenis en cultuur, 
2 – wie zijn aandeelhouder, 3 – wetten en informele codes, 4 – samenstelling van 
besturen, 5 – rol van bestuurders, 6 – verplichtingen, 7 – aansprakelijkheid van 
directeuren. In elk hoofdstuk wordt ieder van de onderdelen 4, 5, 6 en 7 
afgesloten met een samenvatting. Binnen het Nederlandse hoofdstuk is er ook een 
vergelijking tussen de monistische en dualistische bestuursvormen gemaakt. 
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Bevindingen 
De geschiedenis en de cultuur van de bestuursmodellen zijn in elk land 
verschillend. 
 
Het VK heeft sinds de East India Company van 1600 vennootschappen gehad 
waar de aandeelhouders machtig waren. Britse bestuurders zijn graag 
pragmatisch en creatief en zijn veelal actief betrokken bij de strategievorming van 
de vennootschap. 
 
De Amerikaanse bestuurders zijn gewend aan vrij ondernemerschap. Zij zijn 
individualistisch en assertief en geven graag een sterke CEO, die in de 
meerderheid van de vennootschappen tevens chairman is, de macht om de 
onderneming te besturen. 
 
Nederland ontwikkelde door de geschiedenis heen steeds een collegiaal niet-
hiërarchisch bestuurssysteem zonder sterke CEOs of voorzitters. Dit ging gepaard 
met hoofdelijke verantwoordelijkheid. Door al deze tijden ontwikkelde zich een 
systeem van actieve directeuren en daarnaast steeds een apart orgaan van 
commissarissen die op een afstand toezicht houden en adviseren. 
 
In de laatste 20 jaar is er een sterke ontwikkeling geweest in de praktijk van 
corporate governance. Het woord corporate governance werd in de VS vanaf 
1977 gebruikt, waar audit commissies werden ingevoerd. De Britten 
ontwikkelden in 1992 de Cadbury Code of Best Practices met de "pas toe of leg 
uit" regel. Deze Code werd opgevolgd en gedeeltelijk gekopieerd in veel andere 
landen. In 1993 initieerden aandeelhoudersactivisten veranderingen in de VS, 
maar na Enron begonnen de meeste veranderingen vanaf 2002. In Nederland 
kwamen, na de Peters Code van 1997, de grote veranderingen in 2004 met de 
Tabaksblat Code. 
 
Terwijl het een inmiddels gemeenschappelijke eigenschap is dat er op de beurzen 
van de drie landen een gespreid aandeelhouderschap is, is er een grote 
verandering in het aandeelhouderschap geweest in de laatste 30 jaar. In de 70er 
jaren verkregen in het VK institutionele investeerders belangrijke posities als 
groot aandeelhouders. Dit gebeurde ook in de VS in de 80er jaren en in 
Nederland vanaf de 90er jaren. De Nederlanders maakten nog een drastische 
verandering mee na 2000 met een groei van buitenlands aandeelhouderschap tot 
75%. 
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De samenstelling van de besturen verschilt, terwijl het aantal mensen dat in de 
bestuurskamer zit grofweg hetzelfde is: 
VK: 4 uitvoerende bestuurders, 1 chairman en 5 NEDs (niet-uitvoerende 
bestuurders) 
VS: 1 CEO/chairman, 1 lead bestuurder, 5 onafhankelijke bestuurders, 3 
officers (die geen bestuursleden zijn maar wel mee vergaderen) 
NL: two-tier: 4 directeuren, 6 commissarissen 
 one-tier: 4 uitvoerende bestuurders, 6 niet-uitvoerende bestuurders. 
Zij hebben allen een vennootschapssecretaris, waarvan de Britse de sterkste 
statuur heeft. 
 
De rol van de niet-uitvoerende bestuurders verschilt. In het VK zijn de NEDs 
actief in de ontwikkeling van strategie, zie 2.5.5. Britse chairmen zijn sterk en 
verdienen soms drie maal zoveel als de NEDs, zie 3.5.3. In de VS zijn lead 
directors of non-CEO chairmen minder machtig. 
 
Nederlandse commissarissen zijn, op enige uitzonderingen na, niet sterk 
betrokken bij de ontwikkeling van strategie of het nemen van besluiten. Dat is 
voorbehouden aan het bestuur. De commissarissen zijn beperkt tot toezicht en 
hebben een veto op bepaalde besluiten. Dit betekent dat de Nederlandse 
commissarissen een gebrek hebben aan vroege informatie en informatie op de 
werkvloer van de onderneming en aan gesprekken met lager management, zoals 
Engelse, Amerikaanse en Nederlandse niet-uitvoerende directeuren dat wel 
hebben. 
 
De verplichtingen convergeren. De Britse "enlightened shareholder value" van 
section 172 van de Companies Act 2006 is belangwekkend vanwege het rekening 
houden met "stakeholders" evenals de Nederlanse literatuur en jurisprudentie 
over het belang van de vennootschap en het mee laten wegen van het 
aandeelhoudersbelang, zie 4.2.5. 
 
Op het procesrechtgebied zijn er in de drie landen grote verschillen, met heel veel 
activiteit in de VS, waar de verliezer de kosten van de winnaar niet hoeft te 
vergoeden en waar directeuren kunnen vertrouwen op de business judgment rule, 
die in de Delaware Chancery Courts helder is ontwikkeld, op vrijwaring en op 
D&O verzekering. Het VK heeft zelden directeursaansprakelijkheid zaken, maar 
meer diskwalificatie (d.w.z. uitsluiting van bestuursposities) zaken. Nederland 
heeft Ondernemingskamer zaken voor wanbeleid en maatregelen bij 
vennootschappen en separate rechtbankzaken voor aansprakelijkheid. 
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In alle landen is een zeker besef met nuanceverschillen voor het verschil in 
bestuurstaken en disculpatie mogelijkheden, zie in het VK section 1157 
Companies Act 2006 en in Nederland het Staleman v. Van de Ven arrest. 
 
Conclusie en voorstellen 
Voorbeelden die opgevolgd kunnen worden en voorstellen voor de praktijk van 
two-tier en one-tier boards zijn: 
– actievere commissarissen, geleid door een sterkere voorzitter en 
ondersteund door een onafhankelijke vennootschapssecretaris; 
– meer betrokkenheid bij besluitvorming, strategie en meer en betere 
informatie van en voor commissarissen, geleid door een voorzitter; 
– meer aparte vergaderingen voor de RvC en niet-uitvoerend bestuurders; 
– meer one-on-one vergaderingen van bestuurders, soms begeleid door de 
chairman, met geselecteerde lange termijn beleggers; 
- de taak van iedere bestuurder en RvC-lid goed vastleggen. 
 
Voorts heb ik de navolgende voorstellen: 
– Ik stel voor dat de Monitoring Committee het volgende amendement maakt 
op de Frijns Code als gemeld in sub-onderdeel 4.5.5. 
 II.1 "Het bestuur heeft het ondernemende leiderschap in het 
ontwikkelen en uitvoeren van de doelstellingen, de strategie, het 
risicoprofiel en CSR van de vennootschap." 
 III.1.1 Toevoegen de zin: "De raad van commissarissen (RvC) en het 
bestuur zullen tenminste eenmaal per jaar overleggen om een 
procedure vast te stellen: 
  – voor tijdige en relevante informatieverstrekking aan de 
RvC; en 
  – voor de mogelijkheid voor commissarissen om met lager 
leidinggevenden te spreken en om de werkvloer van de 
onderneming te bezoeken; en 
  zij zullen daarbij een tijdschema vaststellen voor regelmatige 
vergaderingen van de directie en de RvC, waarin de 
ondernemingsstrategie, het risk-management en CSR worden 
besproken; en  
  zij zullen de rol van de RvC bij deze besprekingen vaststellen, 
evenals de manier waarop het bestuur en de RvC met elkaar 
zullen omgaan. 
  Indien er een one-tier board zou zijn zal het gehele bestuur dit 
jaarlijks overleg voeren." 
 Het is ook mogelijk deze tekst toe te voegen aan III.1.8 of III.9. 
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 Omdat commissarissen volgens de wet en de jurisprudentie alleen toezicht 
houden en niet besturen, kan deze praktische manier van samenwerking 
eisen stellen aan de tact van de bestuurders en commissarissen. 
– Ik stel ook voor dat de Monitoring Committee de volgende tekst toevoegt 
aan III.2 van de Frijns Code zoals vermeld in sub-onderdeel 4.5.17: 
 "Het bestuur en de RvC zullen tenminste eenmaal per jaar overleg plegen 
over de manier waarop zij met elkaar zullen vergaderen, over de frequentie 
en timing van de evaluatie en opvolging van bestuurders en 
commissarissen en over de wenselijkheid en, zo ja, de frequentie, om 
adviseurs van buiten te vragen hierbij te assisteren en over de 
zittingstermijnen van alle bestuurders en welke lagere leidinggevenden ook 
zullen vallen onder het evaluatie en opvolgingsproces. 
 Indien er een one-tier board is, zal het gehele bestuur dit jaarlijkse overleg 
voeren." 
– Voor one-tier boards heb ik dezelfde voorstellen voor dat jaarlijks overleg; 
– Ik stel ook voor artikel 3.19 Wft zo te veranderen dat banken en 
verzekeraars ook een one-tier board kunnen hebben. 
 
Bij de afweging van voor- en nadelen van een one-tier systeem, ziet men dat in de 
gunstige gevallen de niet-uitvoerende bestuurders in een one-tier bestuur eerdere 
en betere informatie krijgen en betrokken zijn bij de besluit- en strategievorming 
en meer weten van de onderneming en de managers, maar dat het ook nuttig is 
om daarbij jaarlijks overleg over de manier van omgang met elkaar te hebben. 
 
Het voordeel van het two-tier systeem is dat de RvC met haar onafhankelijkheid 
een onderdeel is van de Nederlandse managementcultuur, waarmee men 
voorzichtig dient om te gaan. 
 
Ik stel als mogelijkheid voor om eerst de activiteit en het proces te veranderen en 
dan te overwegen of men een one-tier board wil invoeren. 
 
De One-Tier Board Wet is belangrijk om de discussie over verbetering van 
activiteit van commissarissen en/of niet-uitvoerende bestuurders aan te wakkeren 
en kan met een goede voorbereiding een goed alternatief bestuursmodel zijn. 
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6.3 Annex One-Tier – Two-Tier 
ONE-TIER  –  TWO-TIER 
DIFFERENCES FOR LISTED COMPANIES 
 
 
Exec D = executive director in UK, US or NL   Man D = managing director in the Netherlands 
Sup D = supervisory director in the Netherlands  NED = non-executive director in UK or the Netherlands 
Ind D = independent director in US    SID = senior independend director in UK 
Code = in the Netherlands: Tabaksblat/Frijns   GM = General Meeting 
   in UK: Combined     Cie = committee 
 
 
 Dutch 2 Tier Dutch 1 Tier UK 1 Tier US 1 Tier 
Basis 2 separate boards 1 board 1 board 1 board 
Divided members 5-10 supervisory directors 
1-5 managing directors 
2-4 Exec D, 1 chair, 3-9 NED, or 1 
CEO, 1 chairman, 6-10 NED 
3-4 Exec D, 1 chair, 6-9 NED CEO/chair, lead director, 7-9 Ind D, 
or 1 CEO, 1 chair, 7-9 Ind D 
Role NEDs 
Sup D 
Ind D 
Sup D only supervise, not involved 
in decisions, sometimes veto 
NEDs involved in decisions except 
if delegated to 1 executive 
NEDs involved in decisions Ind Ds involved in decisions 
Decisions Management board decides, on 
some items supervisory board 
agrees or vetoes 
Board decides, except if delegated 
to 1 
Board decides, due process, Board decides, sometimes CEO 
strong, due process important 
Info and access to staff Late info, limited access Early info, full access + visits Early info, full access + visits Early info, full access + visits 
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 Dutch 2 Tier Dutch 1 Tier UK 1 Tier US 1 Tier 
Days work; meetings for 
Sup Ds or NEDs or 
Ind Ds 
15, no operational visits 
6 meetings 
Chair 35 days, 6 meetings 
30 → 50 days 
8 → 10 meetings 
Chair → 70 days? 
30 → 50 days, operational visits 
8 → 10 meetings 
Chair 2-3 days a week, 100 days p.a. 
30 → 50 days operational visits 
8 → 10 meetings 
Chair 2 days a week, 80 days p.a. 
Strategy Sup Ds only supervise on strategy, 
in (10-20%?) they pro-actively 
participate 
NEDs pro-active in strategy?? 
or 
NEDs only monitor?? 
NEDs pro-active in strategy Ind Ds pro-active in strategy 
Role chairman Chairs supervisory board and 
combined board and GM but not of 
management board 
Chairs one-tier board, stronger role 
Chair income 1.5 x NED 
Chairs of the board 
Chair income 4 x NED 
Chairs of the board, sometimes lead 
director 
Chair income 4 x Ind D 
Separate chairman Yes, but chair of supervisory board 
Management has own chair 
Yes, by law Yes, 99% since Cadbury Code In 30% of listed companies, 70% 
have lead director 
Role lead director 
vice-chair or SID 
Lead director in US is comparable 
with chair of supervisory board in 
the Netherlands 
Vice-chair can assist or replace 
chair and evaluates chair 
SID can assist or replace chair, sound 
out shareholders about chair and 
evaluate chair 
If no separate chair, lead director 
chairs executive session; if separate 
chair vice-chair can replace chair 
Communication with 
shareholders 
CEO, CFO, sometimes with Chair 
Some one on ones 
CEO, CFO, more with Chair, some 
one-on-ones 
CEO, CFO, Chair, SID!, many one-
on-ones 
CEO, CFO, Chair more one on ones, 
Reg. FD (Financial Disclosure) 
Appoint executives GM or supervisory directors GM or NEDs GM or board GM (power board) 
Nominate executives Supervisory directors (after 
nomination Cie) 
NEDs (after nomination Cie) NEDs (after nomination Cie) Ind Ds (after nomination cie), 
shareholders on proxy? 
Appointment/ 
nomination Sup Ds, 
NEDs, Ind Ds 
GM appoints sometimes upon 
nomination of supervisory 
directors suggested by Cie 
GM appoints sometimes upon 
nomination of NEDs suggested by 
Cie 
GM or board appoints upon 
nomination by Cie 
GM appoints upon nomination of 
board, suggested by Cie 
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 Dutch 2 Tier Dutch 1 Tier UK 1 Tier US 1 Tier 
Term executives  4 years by Code 4 years by Code 3 years, changing to 1 3 years, changing to 1 
Term NEDs 4 years by Code 4 years by Code 3 years, changing to 1 3 years, changing to 1 
Say on pay GM votes on policy GM votes on policy GM votes on policy GM no vote, may change  
Separate sessions for 
Sup Ds, NEDs, Ind Ds 
Supervisory only meets separately 
once p.a., some co‟s always 
Possibility, but not yet 
contemplated 
Once or twice p.a., Cies prepare, 
board a whole team 
Yes, before or after each board 
meeting; “Executive Sessions” 
Committees decide or 
only prepare? 
Cie only prepare Cie only prepare Only prepare, unitary board decides. 
A board can delegate decision to Cies. 
Decides to large extent, board often 
rubber stamps 
Duty Aspirational level of Code norms; 
mismanagement case-by-case by 
Enterprise Chamber 
Aspirational level of Code norms 
mismanagement case-by-case by 
Enterprise Chamber 
Aspirational level of Code; duties of 
individual directors, articles 170-181 
Companies Code 2006 
Many aspirational shareholders 
activist directives, politics and 
voluntary moves e.g. Pfizer and 
Microsoft 
Duty to whom Interest of the company; 
all stakeholders + long-term 
shareholders 
Interest of the company; 
all stakeholders + long-term 
shareholders 
Success of company, members as a 
whole, “enlightened shareholder 
value”, 172 Companies Code 2006 
To company, therefore indirectly 
Shareholders but business judgment, 
some states: stakeholders 
Liability Case by case, serious reproach, no 
general rules, supervisory in 
different role; collective liability 
with exceptions 
Case by case, serious reproach, 
NEDs in their function; collective 
liability with exceptions 
Disqualification cases, liability only if 
subjective test + objective test; 
“collective” or individual 
Business judgment rule provided 
loyalty and care (including good 
faith); individual; many cases 
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    6.4 Annex English translation of the Act 
 
Summarized translation of the One-Tier Board Act 
 
 
Act of 6 June 2011 to change Book 2 of the DCC in connection with the rules for 
management and supervision of NVs and BVs expected to become law on 
1 January 2012. 
 
2.9 Duty of board members to the company (completely new) 
 1. Each board member is responsible to the company for duly 
performing his duties. These include all board duties not allocated 
to other board members by law or the articles of association. 
 2. Each board member is responsible for the overall management of 
the company. He is jointly and severally liable for improper 
management unless no serious blame attaches to him, taking into 
account the duties allocated to others and provided he has not 
failed to take measures to avoid the consequences of improper 
management. 
 
2.129 Loyalty of board members (paragraphs 5 and 6 new) 
 1. Except for limitations in the articles of association, the board has 
the duty to manage the company. 
 2. The articles of association may confer more than one vote on a 
board member designated by name or function. Such a board 
member may not have more votes than all the other board members 
together. 
 3. Under the articles of association, board resolutions may only be 
subject to the consent of an organ of the company. 
 4. The articles of association may provide that the board should 
follow the directions of an organ of the company regarding policy 
in the areas designated in the articles. 
 5. In performing their duties the board members should be guided by 
the interests of the company and its business. 
 6. A board member may not participate in the discussion and decision 
making if he has a direct or indirect personal interest that conflicts 
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with the interest referred to in paragraph 5. If this means that no 
board decision can be made, the decision will be made by the 
supervisory board or, in the absence of a supervisory board, by the 
general meeting of shareholders, unless the articles of association 
provide otherwise. 
 
2.129a One-tier board (completely new) 
 1. The articles of association may provide that the duties of the board 
are to be divided between one or more non-executive directors and 
one or more executive directors. The task of supervising the 
performance of the duties of the directors cannot be withdrawn 
from the non-executive directors. Nor may responsibility for 
chairing of the board, nominating persons for appointment to the 
board and determining the remuneration of executive directors be 
allocated to executive directors. Non-executive directors must 
always be natural persons. 
 2. The executive directors may not take part in decisions on their 
remuneration.  
 3. The articles of association may directly or indirectly provide that 
one or more directors can validly decide on matters that come 
within their remit. Any such provision indirectly by way of the 
articles must be in writing. 
 
2.132 Appointment of directors (paragraph 3 new) 
 1. The first directors are appointed in the deed of incorporation. 
These appointments may be altered by the general meeting. If 
article 129a of Book 2 DCC (one-tier board) is applicable, the 
general meeting of shareholders determines whether a director is 
appointed as an executive or non-executive director. The two 
preceding sentences are not applicable if the appointment is made 
by the supervisory board pursuant to article 162 of Book 2 DCC 
(large company, structure regime). 
 2. The articles of association may limit the circle of persons from 
which appointments can be made. However, any such provision 
can be set aside by a resolution of the general meeting of 
shareholders passed by a two thirds majority representing over half 
of the paid-up capital. 
 3. No employment relationship in listed companies. 
 In listed companies the relationship between a director and the 
company will no longer be regulated by means of an employment 
contract. 
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2.132a Limitation on holding other positions (non-cumulation) (new) 
 1. Executive directors in large companies may not be 
  a) a supervisory director or non-executive director in more than 
two companies, or 
  b) chairman of another company. 
 2. This includes positions in large foundations and associations, but 
not other positions within the group itself.  
 
2.133 Nominations (paragraphs 1 and 3 new) 
 1. The articles of association may stipulate that appointments by the 
general meeting of shareholders should be made on the basis of 
nominations. 
 2. The general meeting of shareholders may revoke the binding effect 
of a nomination by a two thirds majority of the votes cast that 
represent more than half of the paid-up capital. 
 3. Where there is only one nomination for a position, the nominated 
person will be appointed unless the binding character of the 
nomination has been revoked. 
 4. These paragraphs are not applicable in the case of appointments by 
the supervisory board. 
 
2.134 Suspension and replacement (paragraph 1 second sentence and 
paragraph 4 new) 
 1. Every director may be suspended at any time by the organ that can 
appoint him. If article 129a of Book 2 DCC (one-tier board) is 
applicable, the board may at all times suspend an executive 
director. 
 2. If the articles of association stipulate a quorum for suspension by 
the general meeting, this quorum may not be more than a two 
thirds majority of the votes that represent over half of the paid-up 
capital. 
 3. A judge may not order the reinstatement of an employment 
contract between a director and a company. 
 4. The articles of association contain provisions regulating how the 
board should arrange for temporary replacements for directors if 
there are one or more vacancies on the board or one or more 
directors are incapable of performing their duties. 
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2.140 Duties of the supervisory board (paragraph 1 first sentence and 
paragraph 5 new) 
 1. If article 129a of Book 2 DCC (one-tier board) is not applicable, 
the articles of association may provide that there should be a 
supervisory board. Only natural persons may be members of such a 
board. 
 2. The function of the supervisory board is to supervise the strategy 
of the management board and the overall management of the 
company and its business. It assists the management board. In 
performing their duties the members of the supervisory board are 
guided by the interests of the company and its business. 
 3. The articles of association may add provisions concerning the 
duties and powers of the supervisory board and its members. 
 4. The articles of association may give more than one vote to a 
supervisory director specified by name or office. No supervisory 
director may have more votes than all the other supervisory 
directors together. 
 5. A supervisory director may not participate in the discussion and 
decision making if he has a direct or indirect personal interest that 
conflicts with the interest referred to in paragraph 2. If this means 
that no decision can be made, the decision will be made by the 
general meeting of shareholders, unless the articles provide 
otherwise. 
 
2.142 Appointment of supervisory directors (paragraph 2 new) 
 1. Supervisory directors not appointed in the deed of incorporation 
are appointed by the general meeting of shareholders. The articles 
of association may limit the circle of persons from which 
appointments can be made. However, any such provision can be set 
aside by a resolution of the general meeting of shareholders passed 
by a two thirds majority representing over half of the paid-up 
capital. 
 2. The first two paragraphs of article 133 of Book 2 DCC 
(nominations) are applicable unless the „large company (structure 
regime) rules‟ are applicable. 
 3. When a nomination is made or advice on a nomination is given, all 
the data on the supervisory director must be provided: i.e. his age, 
profession, shares in the company and other positions (positions 
with the group count as one) as well as reasons and, if the person is 
nominated for reappointment, his functioning. 
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2.142a Limitation on holding other positions (non-cumulation) (new) 
 1. Supervisory directors of large companies may not be supervisory 
director or non-executive director of more than 5 companies (a 
chairmanship counts as two). 
 2. Positions in large foundations and associations are included, but 
not other positions within the group itself.  
 
2.164a Large (structure regime) company rules/Appointments (new) 
 1. If article 129a of Book 2 DCC is applicable, the non-executive 
directors are appointed under articles 158 through 161a (rules for 
appointing supervisory directors: by the general meeting of 
shareholders upon nomination by the supervisory board, taking 
into account a pre-nomination by the works council for one third of 
the nominations). 
 2. In case a one-tier board, article 2.129a DCC, is applicable the 
non-executive directors appoint the executive directors. This power 
cannot be limited by any binding nomination. This also applies in 
large companies. 
 3. Important resolutions that require the consent of the supervisory 
board under large company rules cannot be delegated to one 
director as meant in article 2.129a(3) DCC. 
 4. In the case of a one-tier board, important resolutions that require 
the consent of the supervisory board under the large company 
rules must be decided upon also with the consent of the majority of 
the non-executive directors. If this consent is not given, however, 
this does not invalidate the power of executive directors to 
represent the company.  
 
2.166 Diversity in the composition of boards (new) 
 1. To achieve a balanced composition of management and 
supervisory boards at least 30% must be women and at least 30% 
men, insofar as the board consists of natural persons. 
 2. Large companies will take the balanced division of positions 
between men and women into account when making appointments 
and nominations and drawing up profiles. 
 3. This paragraph 2 is also applicable where companies are 
appointed to board positions. 
 (Article 391.7 on accounts gives „apply or explain‟ rules for this 
balanced composition rule.) 
 (This article will be revoked with effect from 1 January 2016.) 
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All the above articles of Book 2 DCC are applicable to public companies (NVs). 
Similar provisions (from article 2.239 onwards) apply to private companies 
(BVs). The corresponding articles are as follows: 
2.239   = 2.129 
2.239a = 2.129a 
2.242   = 2.132 
2.242a = 2.132a 
2.244   = 2.134 
2.250   = 2.140 
2.252a = 2.142a 
2.274a = 2.164a 
2.276   = 2.166 
 
Articles 297a and 297b are new and introduce the non-cumulation clauses for 
foundations. First 6 paragraphs of article 391 have not changed, only paragraph 7 
have been added (apply or explain diversity). This is an important provision. It 
describes all the aspects to be dealt with in the accounts, namely 
 
- true and fair view on balance sheet date; 
- changes and results in financial year; 
- analyses of result indicators, including HR and the environment; 
- main risks; 
- in Dutch, unless the general meeting of shareholders decides otherwise, and 
in the annual report; 
- expectations; 
- R&D; 
- important events that need not be in the accounts; 
- listed companies: report on the policy  for compensation of managing and 
supervisory directors and how the policy has been applied in the year under 
review; 
- financial risk management; 
- price, credit, liquidity and cash flow risks. 
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6.5 Annex Act in Dutch 
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6.6 Annex Definitions with reference to pages 
 
 
Definitions 
 
Managing director : Dutch director who runs the business in a Dutch 
NV or BV, usually on a two-tier board. He 
represents the company. In Dutch: “directeur” or 
“statutair directeur”. P 308, 314, 322, 335, 336 
 
Supervisory director : Dutch member of the supervisory board on a 
two-tier board. He only supervises and does not 
represent the company. In Dutch: “commissaris”. 
P 280, 298, 308, 311, 314, 329-333 
 
Executive director : UK, US or Dutch director in a one-tier board 
who runs the business. He represents the 
company. In Dutch: “uitvoerend bestuurder”. 
P 49, 51, 159, 305, 320 
 
Non-executive director : UK or Dutch director who is member of the 
board in a one-tier board. He has no management 
role, but is involved in monitoring and 
developing the plans and activities of the board 
and in decision making. In Dutch “niet 
uitvoerend bestuurder”. In the UK they are 
usually called “NED”. In the US most of the 
non-executive directors are called “independent 
directors”, because the US emphasizes 
independence. P 48, 49, 59, 62, 63-71, 305, 320 
 
Independent director : US non-executive directors who also are 
independent of management, the company and 
affiliated companies, according to the 
requirements of NYSE and NASDAQ. In the US 
there is a strong emphasis on the requirement of 
independence of directors. P 53, 123, 159, 161, 
163, 165, 167, 169, 177 
 
Board : In the UK, US and the Netherlands a group of 
directors who either run the business and/or 
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monitor the activities. It can be a board in a one-
tier board company or a management board and a 
supervisory board in a two-tier board company. 
P 49-50, 59-62, 155-160, 298 
 
Outside director : In the UK, US and the Netherlands any director 
who does not run the business. This can be a 
non-executive director or an independent director 
on a one-tier board or a supervisory director on a 
two-tier board system. P 48, 49, 161, 303 
 
Chairman of the  A Dutch chairman of a supervisory board in a 
supervisory board : two-tier system; in Dutch “president 
commissaris”. P 338-343 
 
Chairman : In the UK, US and the Netherlands the chairman 
of a one-tier board and in the Netherlands the 
chairman of the supervisory board in a two-tier 
system. P 167, 185-191, 199, 338-343 
 
Non-CEO chairman : A chairman in a one-tier board system who is not 
also CEO. This term is used in the US to 
emphasize that the chairman is not also the CEO. 
P 178. 185-191, 338-343 
 
CEO : Chief executive officer, who is leader of the 
executive team that runs the business. He is 
always a board member, either of the board in a 
one-tier system or of the management board in a 
two-tier system. P 49, 143, 159, 166, 167, 308 
 
CFO : Chief financial officer, who manages the finance 
of the business. He is member of the board in the 
UK, usually not a member of the board in the US 
and a member of the management board in the 
Netherlands in a two-tier system and usually 
member of a Dutch one-tier board. P 56, 159, 
167, 303, 314 
 
Officer : In the US each member of the executive or 
management team. Each officer in the US can 
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represent the company. Of the executive team in 
the US usually only the CEO is member of the 
board. In the UK and the Netherlands the term 
officer is not used in law codes, but appears as 
part of the terms CEO, CFO, CRO, etc. P 159, 
160, 161, 167 
 
Executive session : In the US a meeting of all independent or non-
executive directors, without any executives 
present. This name is remarkable, because it 
seems to say the opposite of what it is. P 160, 
162 
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6.7 Annex Abbreviations 
 
A. Atlantic Reporter, First Series 
A.2d Atlantic Reporter, Second Series 
A.C. Law Reports, Appeal Cases (Third Series) 
Act Act on the One-Tier Boards 
AEX De Amsterdam Exchange Index 
AGM Annual General Meeting of Shareholders 
All E.R. All England Law Reports 
B.C.C. British Company Law Cases 
B.C.L.C. Butterworths Company Law Cases 
BOFI Bank or financial institutions in the UK 
BV Besloten Vennootschap 
C.A. Court of Appeal 
CC6 Combined Code of 2006 in the UK 
CC8 Combined Code of 2008 in the UK 
CEO Chief executive officer 
CFO Chief financial officer 
CG10 UK Corporate Governance Code 2010 
Ch. Law Reports, Chancery Division (3 rd Series) 
Ch.D. Law Reports, Chancery Division (2 nd Series) 
CIO Chief investment or relations officer or chief IT 
 officer 
COO Chief operations officer 
CRO Chief risk management officer 
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 
D&O Director and Officer 
DCC Dutch Civil Code 
Del. Delaware 
Del. Ch. Delaware Chancery Court 
Del. Sup. Delaware Supreme Court 
Delaware GCL Delaware General Corporation Law 
DR Dutch Depository Receipts, in Dutch “certificaten” 
EIC English East India Company 
E.W.C.A. Civ. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) 
E.W.H.C. (Ch.) England & Wales High Court (Chancery Division) 
E.W.H.C. (Comm. England & Wales High Court (Commercial Court) 
FRC Financial Reporting Council in the UK 
Frijns Code Dutch Code of 2008, drafted by the Frijns Committee 
FSA Financial Services Authority in the UK 
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FSMA Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK) 
FTSE Financial Times Stock Exchange Index 
Hare Hare‟s Chancery Reports 
HR Hoge Raad (der Nederlanden) (Supreme Court (of the 
 Netherlands)) 
Ill.App.2d Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Second Series 
JOR Jurisprudentie Onderneming & Recht 
MBCA Model Business Corporation Act 
Mich. Michigan Supreme Court Reports 
NACD National Association of Corporate Directors 
NASDAQ National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations 
NED(s) A UK non-executive director(s) 
NJ  Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 
NV De Naamloze Vennootschap (journal) 
NYSE New York Stock Exchange 
OK Ondernemingskamer (Enterprise Chamber) 
Q.B.D. Law Reports, Queen‟s Bench Division 
R&D Research and development 
Regulation FD  Regulation Fair Disclosure 
RM Themis Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis 
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission in the US 
SER Sociaal Economische Raad (Social Economic Council) 
SID  Senior Independent Director 
Tabaksblat Code Dutch Code of 2004, drafted by the Tabaksblat 
Committee 
TVVS Tijdschrift voor vennootschappen, verenigingen en 
stichtingen (1962-1975)/Maandblad voor 
ondernemingsrecht en rechtspersonen (1980-1998) 
U.S. United States Reports  
U.S.C. United States Code 
VOC Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (Dutch East India 
Company) 
WL Westlaw, West‟s Law Research Database 
W.T.L.R. Wills & Trusts Law Reports 
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6.8 Annex Cadbury Code 1992 
 
 
1. Board of Directors 
   – should meet regularly; 
   – should not have one person with too much 
power; if the chairman and chief executive are 
the same person, there should be a strong 
contingent of non-executive directors; 
   – should have a formal list of matters to be decided 
by the whole board; 
   – should have an arrangement whereby directors 
can obtain external advice independently, but at 
the expense of the company. 
 
  2. Non-Executive Directors 
  – should express an independent view about 
strategy, results, appointments and company 
conduct rules; 
  - should be independent from the executive 
directors and must not have a business 
relationship with the company, other than their 
remuneration as outside director; 
  – should be appointed by a formal procedure for a 
fixed term and should not be automatically 
reappointed. 
 
  3. Executive Directors should have  
  – no contract for a fixed term of longer than 3 years 
without the permission of the meeting of 
shareholders; 
  – transparency about the total emoluments for all 
directors and individually for the chairman; the 
highest paid person should be mentioned 
explicitly and there should be information about 
salary, bonus and bonus systems; 
  – a remunerations committee that determines the 
remuneration of the directors. 
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  4. Financial Reporting and Control 
   The board should present a comprehensible valuation of 
the company: 
   – there should be an arm‟s length relationship with 
the auditor; 
   – the audit committee should consist of at least 3 
non-executive directors and should have written 
regulations; 
   – a confirmation that directors are responsible for 
the accounts and separately a confirmation about 
the responsibility of the auditor; 
   – reporting about the results of the internal audit; 
   – reporting about the enterprise as a going concern. 
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6.9 Annex UK Acts 
 
 
The Companies Act of 2006 is quite extensive and contains the following 
provisions on the subject of corporate governance, which mention between 
brackets the aspects which are dealt with: 
– directors binding the company, sections 40 and 44 
– appointment and removal of directors, sections 154-169 
– duties of directors, sections 170-174 (dealt with in detail in 2.6.6 above), 
including the important section 172 which gives directors the duty to act 
in the way he considers, in good faith, to promote the success of the 
company fot its members as a whole and have regard (amongst other 
matters) to: long-term consequences, employees, customers, 
environment, high standards, fairness between members 
– duty to avoid conflicts of interest, sections 175-181 (dealt with in 2.6.6 
above) 
– conflicting transactions, sections 182-226 
– directors‟ service contracts, sections 227-231 
– limiting directors‟ liabilities, sections 232-239 (dealt with in 2.7.6 above) 
– some definitions, including minutes and connected persons, sections 240-
258 
– derivative claims, sections 260-269 (dealt with in detail in 2.7.3 above) 
– company secretaries, sections 270-279 
– shareholders‟ meetings, section 281-361 
– accounts, sections 380-531 
– share capital, sections 540-859 
– company charges, sections 860-901 
– mergers and divisions, sections 902-941 
– the takeover panel, sections 942-973 
– squeeze-out and sell-out, sections 974-991 
– action for injunctions unfairly prejudiced, section 994, see 2.7.5 
– mitigation liability directors, circumstances, section 1157, see 2.6.3. 
 
The position of directors is also regulated in many other laws, such as 
– the Corporate Manslaughter Act 2007; 
– the Insolvency Act 1986 – fraudulent and wrongful trading; 
– the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 – prospectus, disclosure 
market abuse; 
– the Pensions Act 2004; 
– the Criminal Justice Act 1993 – insider dealing; 
– the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974; 
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– the Environmental Protection Act 1990; 
– the Environment Act 1995; 
– the Listing Rules and Disclosure and Transparency Rules; 
– the Takeover Code 2006; 
– the Enterprise Act 2002; 
– the Human Rights Act 1998; 
– the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, under which the court 
can bar a person from being a director for 2 to 15 years; there is extensive 
case law on this subject, including an order against all directors of 
Barings for failure to control Mr Leeson; 
– the Model Code on Directors‟ Dealings in the UK Listing Rules. 
 
All these statutes and rules contain detailed provisions that set minimum 
standards for companies and therefore their boards. Contraventions under these 
Acts can lead to prison sentences, fines or liability for directors. 
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6.10 Annex Peters Code 1997 
 
 
 (a) Supervisory board 
  1 profile; 
  2 independent; 
  3 accounts: information about supervisory board; 
  4 in supervisory board: at maximum 1 retired executive; 
  5 independent, no mandate; 
  6 not automatic re-nomination; 
  7 withdraw in case of insufficient functioning or conflicts; 
  8 inform chairman about conflicts of interest; 
  9 amount of board positions limited, but stimulate 
employees to accept outside functions; 
  10 member supervisory board not also on supervisory board 
of subsidiary; 
  11 shares of supervisory board should be long term and must 
be mentioned in accounts; 
  12 remuneration supervisory board not dependent on result; 
  13 no conflicts of interest; 
  14 special tasks for chair; 
  15 nominations committee, audit committee; 
  16 meeting schedule; 
  17 supervisory board discusses its composition, strategy and 
risks with management; 
  18 supervisory board discusses separately about its own 
functioning and evaluation of management board; 
  19a annual accounts to be accepted or rejected by general 
meeting of shareholders (GM); 
  19b GM to accept policy and give discharge of the board as a 
separate point; 
  20 not allowed to have a permanent supervisory director 
with extra powers; 
  21 protocol for supervisory board for its relation to 
management board, works council and shareholders; 
 
 (b) Management board 
  22 report to supervisory board, aims, strategy, risks, risk 
management, this report in accounts; 
  23 salary of management board in accounts; 
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  24 shares and options for long term, shares and options in 
accounts; 
  25 not even an apparent image of conflict of interest 
allowed; 
 
 (c) Shareholders 
  26 revaluation factor capital: also influence; 
  27 accountability to the general meeting of management and 
supervisory board; 
  28 supervisory and management board must enjoy trust of 
the general meeting; 
  29 discuss influence capital in general meeting; 
  30 request for agenda points; 
  31 investment analysis per sector; 
  32 efficient proxy system should be promoted; 
  33 if a party has acquired 50% there should be a mandatory 
bid for the remaining shares; 
 
 (d) Compliance of code 
  34 report in accounts; 
  35 see if accountant must investigate; 
  36 accountants advice on risk management; 
  37 supervisory board or audit committee discusses with 
accountant; 
  38 report rating agencies discussed in supervisory board; 
  39 committee suggests compliance to be monitored; 
  40 result of monitoring important for further discussion. 
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6.11 Annex Frijns Code 2008 
 
 
 Hereunder a short summary of the points of the Frijns code: 
 
 Preamble: 
 2 applies to Dutch listed companies, with influence on others; 
 4 comply or explain; 
 7 stakeholders important, while endeavours to create long term 
shareholders value (text cited above in 4.2.5); 
 8 taking account of stakeholders, including CSR, all stakeholders 
must be confident their interests are represented; good 
entrepreneurship, including integrity and transparency and 
effective supervision and accountability; 
 9 management weighs interests for strategy, while supervisory 
board oversees process; both are accountable for these roles; 
management and supervisory board guided by interests of the 
company and its affiliated enterprise, e.g. shareholders may have 
their own interest; 
 10 this can create tension and the code is designed to carefully 
handle the process and to help weigh the interests carefully; good 
relations and dialog with stakeholders are important; 
 11 in takeover situations this tension can be most pronounced, 
therefore special role of supervisory board. 
 
 Principles and best practice provisions: 
 P = Principle 
 
 I Compliance with Code 
 1.1 report in annual report; 
 1.2 changes discussed in AGM; 
 
 II Management board 
 1 P Role: achieving companies aims, strategy and risk profile and 
CSR; guided by the interests of the company and affiliated 
enterprise; provide supervisory board with information; 
responsible for compliance with law and risk management; 
 1.1 4 years; 
 1.2 submit to supervisory board for approval 
  (a) objectives 
  (b) strategy 
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  (c) parameters for strategy 
  (d) CSR 
 1.3 risk management 
  (a) risk analysis 
  (b) code of conduct 
  (c) guides for financial reports 
  (d) system for monitoring 
 1.4 annual report 
  (a) risks to strategy 
  (b) effectiveness of risk management 
  (c) major failings in risk management 
 1.5 assurance that financial reporting not contain material errors; 
 1.6 annual report describes sensitivity to external factors; 
 1.7 internal whistleblower complaints possible to chairman; 
 1.8 not too many functions; 
 1.9 shareholders give 180 days waiting time to board to discuss any 
agenda point; management shall use the time for constructive 
consultation; the supervisory board shall monitor this; 
 1.10 if a takeover bid on the company‟s shares is being prepared, 
supervisory board must be involved; 
 
 II.2 Remuneration 
 2 P level and composition; fixed and variable; variable part must be 
transparent; long term shares held, long term; 
 2.1 long term; 
 2.8 dismissal 1 year salary max; 
 2.9 no loans; 
 P: supervisory board determines remuneration based on policy 
adopted by general meeting, remuneration full in report; 
 2.10 if conditional and new circumstance: supervisory board may 
determine downward or upward; 
 2.11 claw back; 
 2.12 report on policy on website; 
 2.14 contract public; 
 2.15 severance pay in report; 
 
 II.3 Conflicts of interest 
 3 P conflicting deals require approval supervisory board; 
 3.1 management may not 
  (a) compete 
  (b) accept gifts 
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  (c) provide unjust advantages 
  (d) take business advantages for themselves 
 3.2 report any conflict to chairman and other management board 
members; 
 3.3 not take part in any discussion about conflicting deals; 
 3.4 conflicting deals entered into require consent of supervisory 
board and in annual report; 
 
 III Supervisory board 
 III.1 Role and procedure 
 P: supervise policy of management board and give advice; 
 1.1 division of duties within supervisory board described in terms of 
reference, in relation to management board, general meeting and 
works council on website; 
 1.2 annual accounts report on supervisory board; 
 1.3 data on each member including gender and other positions; 
 1.4 retire in event of inadequate performance or conflict; 
 1.6 supervision on 
  (a) objectives 
  (b) strategy 
  (c) risk management 
  (d) financial reporting process 
  (e) compliance law 
  (f) shareholder relationship 
  (g) CSR 
 1.7 at least once a year meet alone to evaluate itself, committees and 
management board; 
 1.8 at least once a year discuss with management corporate strategy 
and main risks, these discussions in report of supervisory board in 
annual report; 
 1.9 supervisory board members have own responsibility to obtain 
info from management board, auditor and officers and external 
advisors; 
 
 III.2 Independence 
 P: act critically and independently of one another, management 
board and any particular interest; 
 2.1 all independent but one; 
 2.2 not independent if 
  (a) employee within 5 years before 
  (b) receives other remuneration from company 
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  (c) he or partnership he belongs to has had business 
relationship 
  (d) cross board membership 
  (e) holds 10% or more in company 
  (f) board member of company that holds 10% or more 
  (g) temporarily managed the company 
 
 III.3 Expertise and composition 
 P: each can assess overall + specific expertise role designated to him 
in company profile 
 3.1 profile; 
 3.2 at least one financial expert; 
 3.3 induction + further training if necessary; 
 3.4 max five, chairmanship counts double; 
 3.5 max 4 years term; 
 3.6 retirement ladder; 
 
 III.4 Chairman and company secretary 
 P: chair ensures proper functioning of supervisory board and 
committees and act on behalf of supervisory board with 
management and shareholders regarding the functioning of 
management and supervisory board members and ensure efficient 
general meeting; helped by company secretary; 
 4.1 chairman ensures that 
  (a) supervisory board members follow induction and 
education or training 
  (b) supervisory board members receive timely information 
  (c) sufficient time for decision making 
  (d) committees function properly 
  (e) evaluation management board once p.a. 
  (f) supervisory board elects vice-chairman 
  (g) supervisory board has proper contact with management 
and works council 
 4.2 chairman may not be former member of management board; 
 4.3 helped by company secretary; 
 4.4 vice-chairman replaces chairman and is contact for supervisory 
board and management board for functioning of chairmen (see 
UK SID); 
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 III.5 Composition of 3 key committees 
  audit committee: 
  – not chaired by chairman or former manager 
  – at least one financial expert 
  remuneration committee: 
  – not chaired by chairman or former manager 
  – no more than one manager of other listed company 
  – consultant not also consultant to management nomination 
committee 
  – focus on selection of supervisory and management boards 
and senior management 
 
 III.6 Conflicts 
 6.1 immediately report to chairman; 
 6.2 not take part in discussion; 
 6.3 public transactions in accounts; 
 6.4-5 terms of reference; 
 6.6 limited delegated director; 
 6.7 if supervisory director takes on temporary management he has to 
resign as supervisory director; 
 
 III.7 Remuneration 
  by general meeting: 
  – no shares for supervisory directors by way of 
remuneration (different from US) 
  – any shares held must be long term 
  – no loans from company 
 
 III.8 One tier 
 P: in case of one-tier composition shall be of such that independence 
of non-executives is assured; 
 8.1 chairman not executive; 
 8.2 chairman check proper functioning of entire board; 
 8.3 committee requirements the same, committees only of non-
executives; 
 8.4 majority of non-executives; 
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 IV Shareholders 
 1 Powers 
 P: shareholders participate in decision making of general meeting; 
vote by proxy; general meeting should be able to influence 
management board decisions, major change needs consent; 
 1.1 general meeting may cancel binding nominations for 
management board; 
 1.2 votes on financing preference share votes limited; 
 1.3 threshold 2:107a Civil Code; 
 1.4 policy of reserves and dividends an agenda point; 
 1.5 decision dividends separate agenda point; 
 1.6 discharge voted separately; 
 1.7 determination of registration date; 
 1.8 chairman responsible for worthwhile discussion in general 
meeting; 
 
 2 DRs 
  trust office conditions; not to be used as anti-takeover device; 
issue proxies to vote as shareholders; 
 
 3 Information and logistics 
  management board provide press and analysts with carefully 
handled and structured info; management board and supervisory 
board provide general meeting in good time info for general 
meeting; 
 3.1 analysts meetings, presentations to investors and press 
conferences announced on website and by press releases; 
provisions for attendance by all shareholders. 
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6.12 Annex DCC 
 
 
The summary of Book 2 DCC, including articles proposed in Act, is: 
 
Title 1 General stipulations (applicable to all legal persons) 
1 government legal persons; 
2 church legal persons; 
3 list of civil legal persons; associations, co-operative associations (like 
Rabobank), mutual guarantee associations, NV‟s, BV‟s and 
foundations; 
4 required to be founded by a notary public; 
5 equal to natural person; 
6 publication; 
7 not act against their aim as mentioned in articles of association; 
8 all organs must act reasonably (important for duties and litigation); 
9 (Act) directors must act properly towards the company, would be liable in 
case of serious blame (important for duties and litigation); 
10 board has obligations of bookkeeping (important for liability of 
directors in case of bankruptcy); 
10a calendar year; 
12/16 voting rights, nullity and nullifiability of members decisions; 
17 legal person for indefinite period; 
18-23 change of legal person, unwinding, liquidation; 
24 bookkeeping must be stored; 
24a-d subsidiary, including definition of control, group company, 
participation, determination of quorum; 
25 company law is mandatory law unless stipulated otherwise; 
 
Title 2 associations 
Title 3 Cooperative associations and neutral guarantee associations 
 
Title 4 NV (art. 64-176) BV articles are 175-284 and are merely the same as 
the NV) 
Part 1 General 
64 NV is company with transferable shares, shareholders are not liable 
for more than their contribution; 
78a organs are general meeting of shareholders, meetings of special 
shares, management board, supervisory board and the combined 
meeting of the management board and the supervisory board; 
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Part 2 Shares 
79-91 definitions, issue, transfer, pledge, usufruct; 
92 equality of shareholders (DSM case); 
92a squeeze out; 
 
Part 3 Capital 
93-100 foundation, issue of shares, redemption, repurchase; 
98c company may not guarantee or support the purchase of its shares; 
101 accounts determined within 6 mo; 
102 publication accounts (important for liability of directors in case of 
bankruptcy); 
105 Dividends determined by shareholders; 
 
Part 4 Shareholders meeting 
107 has all power not given to board or others; 
107a consent needed of shareholders meeting for decisions of the board 
about an important change of the company or enterprise, which in 
any case are: i.e. examples: 
 (a) sale of all assets; 
 (b) important joint venture; 
 (c) buying or selling subsidiary with value of more than 1/3 balance 
sheet total; 
  if consent is missing this does not invalidate transactions towards 
third parties (ABN AMRO case) (part of act of 2004); 
108 annual meeting of shareholders within 6 months; 
108a meeting in case of low capital; 
109 management board and supervisory board can call meeting; 
110 10% shareholder can call meeting; 
111-114 calling of meeting; 
114a right to put points on agenda for 1% shareholders with 60 days 
notice; 
115-116 term of notice and place of meeting; 
117 participating in meetings: right of discussion; 
117a-b electronic meetings; 
118 one share one vote; 
118a DR holders have automatic proxy to vote except if there is a hostile 
takeover pending (part of act of 2004; Tabaksblat unhappy that there 
is a exception for hostile takeovers; see Couwenbergh and Haenen, 
Tabaksblat (2008), p. 104); 
119 registration date for shareholders short; 
120-128 voting, changes in articles of association; 
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Part 5 Management board and supervisory board 
129 board of management manages the company (see translation of one-
tier board act task to act “in the interest of the company and its 
enterprise” added in Act); 
129a (Act) one-tier board to be added (Act); 
130 board of management and each executive represents the company; 
131 competent court; 
132 (Act) appointment; 
132a (Act) non-cumulation to be added; 
133 (Act) nominations; 
134 (Act) suspension; 
135 remuneration: policy determined by shareholders meeting; 
136 filing for bankruptcy; 
137 special transactions; 
138 liability of managing directors in case of bankruptcy (see Van Schilt, 
Mefigro cases) (caveat bookkeeping and publication); 
139 liability for incorrect accounts; 
140 duties supervisory board (see translation one-tier board); 
141 information by management board to supervisory board in time; at 
least once a year about strategy; 
142 (Act) appointment; 
142a (Act) non-cumulation; 
143 up to one third of management board appointed by others than 
general meeting (e.g. government); 
144-151 suspension, remuneration, conflict of interest, liability as managing 
director; 
 
Part 6 Supervisory directors in structure regime 
152-157 technicalities of applicability and mitigated regimes; 
158-160 nomination by supervisory board for one third based on nomination 
by works council; appointed by shareholders meeting (new in 2004); 
161 dismissal by Enterprise Chamber; 
161a dismissal by shareholders meeting (new in 2004); 
162 supervisory board appoints management board members (some will 
apply in one-tier board for appointment of executives); 
164 list of important decisions for which management board needs 
supervisory board consent; 
164a (Act) same rule applies in one-tier board mutatis mutandis; 
166 (Act) new diversity article; 
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Title 5 BVs (articles 175-284 of BV same as 64-175 for NV) 
 
Title 6 Foundations (283-304) 
Title 7 Mergers and splitting (308-334ii) 
Title 8 Disputes in district courts and inquiry procedures in Enterprise 
Chamber and mandatory public bids (in connection with takeover 
directive) (335-359d) 
Title 9 Accounts (360-453) 
 (This title is all worked out in further detail in the decree on model 
accounts of 1983, changed in 2005.) 
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